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
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THE SELF AND ITS WORLD




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THE SELF AND ITS WORLD



By

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PREFACE

This is an age when everything that has heretofore been thought settled is under fire. We must reëxamine our profoundest convictions. When difficulties multiply and mysteries deepen and the spirit of man is oppressed by the weight of all this unintelligible world, philosophy is called upon to furnish a doctrine that will answer questions and satisfy with meanings.

The aim of *The Self and Its World* is to face frankly the central problems involved in all our fundamental interests—cognitive, æsthetic, moral, religious—and to seek a principle of explanation that gives a workable theory of life. Philosophy is first distinguished from science; for while it builds on science and uses scientific methods, it has a different task. Science describes, philosophy interprets.

Assuming with science that the external world is a mechanism, we ask, What is this world that we perceive through the senses, and how do we come to know it? A simple analysis of sense knowledge yields the insight that the world of sense perception is throughout and only a product of the mind's creative activity under compulsion of an independent source of stimulation. The mechanistic ideal of science is interpreted as meaning an orderly universe, a system in which all entities are reduced to process.

The philosopher asks, What is it that proceeds? If the world is pure process, nothing remains long enough to proceed, and there is no process. The theory cancels itself, unless we can find something that maintains itself through time. The realist calls this something an inde-

pendent world out in space, but cannot tell what it is. The absolute idealist says it is experience, but does not tell us whose. A better answer is that the reality in the outside world is exactly what it appears to be at any moment of our apprehension of it. Two factors give it permanence for us: one is the continuity of control from the source of stimulation, and the other is the persistence of our constructive activity. In other words, the outside world exists for us only so long as we are interested in it. Its reality is value.

What is this creator of its world, this originator of values—the self? It is not an object of observation, hence it cannot be identified with anything in time or space. Objects are its construction. It is not consciousness, though being conscious is one of its chief characteristics. It is not thought, nor feeling, nor conation. These are aspects of its activity; they can be analyzed into elements and can vanish into process. The self is not the observed but the observer. It is the agent whose activity includes our blundering and recovering, our groping and finding, our illusions and aspirations—all that constitutes experience. Its nature is expressed in its world; its measure is all that ever has been, is, or ever will be knowable. We are in the making, progressively realizing selfhood. Every capacity of the self is potentially infinite.

The outside world is defined exhaustively, though not in detail, as the self's response to stimulations from an independent source. That the world is common to all is conclusive evidence that the source is the same for all. The assumption that the world is knowable by all is the supreme reason for believing that the source is intelligent. These are the hard-won fruits of philosophy through the centuries. The conclusions can be ignored, but they cannot be logically overthrown.

From this vantage ground we are able to answer many questions of interest.

What of freedom? In every field of activity the self

is free, except in so far as its limitations have been proved, and even these limitations can be transcended in thought. They are movable barriers, as is evidenced by the achievements of science.

What is the ruling principle for the organization of values? It is the self. Whatever contributes to its unfolding is good, whatever interferes is bad. The self to be realized is essentially social, and in willing itself wills the good of society as a whole.

What is the ultimate meaning and justification of the objective world of change? The objective world is the nexus of conditions for the development of selfhood in spiritual beings. Its justification is found in its adaptability to the training of selves. Its physical expression must be renewed, its moral meaning abides.

What is the relation between human selves and the ultimate Power? They are copartners in creating the world of experience. The human self wills, and the ultimate Power executes. This vital, detailed, and continuous coöperation with the Power on which we depend suggests our inherent capacity to become worthy companions of the infinite Self.

Such in barest outline is the argument of the book. If the conclusions hold, deductions of transcendent value may be drawn as philosophy continues to write the story of the inner life, the fascinating drama of the spirit.

To my colleague, Professor Raymond F. Piper, who read the manuscript, my thanks are due for helpful suggestions. Students through several college generations have contributed substantially, by resistance that led to clearer exposition and by yielding that encouraged fresh effort. My closest associate, cancelling an untold obligation, leaves me still more deeply in her debt.

Syracuse, New York

G. A. W.

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THE SELF AND ITS WORLD

THE SELF AND ITS WORLD

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy has often been referred to as the great intellectual game. It is a game in the same sense that business is a game, or mathematics is a game. But the kings and queens and pawns are the manifold interests of life, and the stake is our all.

The figure at least serves to call attention to a paramount need. To play the game one must obey the rules. From ignorance or ignoring of the rules, philosophy has suffered much. A little misunderstanding of the meaning or structure of experience, a presumption that seems to be a truism and in no need of critical examination will precipitate the thinker into a maze of difficulties that multiply as he proceeds. He may become an eclectic, culling out the best things from competing philosophies, but find himself unable to build them into a consistent whole. Or he may conclude that what his principles do not explain is beyond human insight; but he thereby, on his own authority, puts an end to further discussion. Underlying most of these difficulties is a misunderstanding of the general character and method of philosophy. It is well, therefore, to bring into relief at the outset the distinctively philosophical problem and indicate the limits within which a solution may be looked for. To this end we shall consider the relation of philosophy to common sense, to the natural sciences, and to the other types of intellectual interest.

Philosophy is not common sense, though one of its

best brands is called common-sense philosophy. Every thinker likes to keep close to common sense when he reflects on the deeper questions of life, for then he feels the comforting support of untold multitudes of people. Common sense is the distilled wisdom and insight of all the past. But just because it consists of inherited beliefs, vaguely held and loosely applied, it needs critical study. It is never more accurate or consistent than practical life requires. It may harbor manifold contradictions and confusions not suspected till some crisis develops. Such a crisis is inevitable as soon as reflective thinking begins. Whoever feels the need of a working conception of life as a whole proceeds to philosophize. He undertakes to clarify popular beliefs and to render them consistent. For example, in the light of certain more or less scientific conceptions common sense is inclined to think that a thing's form and size and hardness belong to it by virtue of its being an external object, but that its color and temperature and smell originate in the mind. A very little scrutiny, however, makes it evident that if color is subjective, so are form and hardness; or if form and hardness are objective, so is color, so in fact are temperature and taste and smell, and even, in a sense, beauty and ugliness. Correction of the common-sense view is the work of philosophy. In trying to get rid of lurking inconsistencies, the thinker must recast his conceptions. If we cancel the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, popular beliefs concerning the outside world must be modified accordingly. The thinker who is in earnest with his task of reconstruction is in spirit, if not in attainment, a philosopher.

From this point of view philosophy may be defined as the working over of concepts.¹ We see, then, why so much that is common sense is taken up into philosophy, and why so much good philosophy passes for mere common sense. Even the hardest thinker who dares to seek the truth in hair-splitting distinctions and ultra-technical

¹ Cf. Herbart, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, § 6.

abstractions will eagerly turn to common sense to substantiate his conclusions. No one can hope to get a hearing who persistently offends convictions deeply rooted in the popular mind, unless he can invoke still deeper convictions. Inasmuch as the deepest conviction we have as human beings is that by observation and thinking we can know the world in which we live, any "working over" necessitated by the laws of consistent thinking can in the end be justified at the bar of common sense.

The relation of philosophy to science is even closer than to common sense as ordinarily understood. Nevertheless the contrasts between the two are vital. Confusion at this point has been the source of endless embarrassment. Had their tasks been carefully distinguished and held apart, science would have been spared many a barren controversy and philosophy many a humiliating defeat. Originally the term philosophy covered the whole field of knowledge; but during the early modern period, the sciences, one after another, began to break away and set up for themselves. These sciences found that their ever-growing body of observed data could best be studied if treated as constituting a relatively independent problem. Divide and conquer was the dictum of the sciences—a dictum amply justified by their success, the glory of modern life. This process of isolating portions of the general field for concentrated study has continued to the present time with no signs of abatement. If the sciences parcel out the territory in this way, what is left as a permanent possession for philosophy? May not the time come when philosophy will be left an intellectual pauper, free to roam at will in "the wild and tangled forest" of life's inscrutable mysteries and indulge in the "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories," yet really without a habitat and without a task of serious import? Can we find a task that will enable philosophy to be scientific without losing its character as philosophy? Unless this can be done, philosophy had better recognize itself as merely premature science.

Now as the several sciences went their own way, an interesting group of left-over questions appeared. These had the marks of being extra-scientific, yet were evidently legitimate. Some of them seemed to be postulates underlying the sciences, while others had to do with the field of knowledge as a whole. Evidently in the midst of this group, if anywhere, philosophy must find its permanent home and its garden to cultivate. Not one of the individual sciences is in a position to organize the results of all the sciences into a consistent world-view. This must be left to philosophy. In trying to meet the obligation, philosophy needs to examine the various assumptions and postulates of the several sciences, such as the atomic theory of matter, the ultimate adequacy of the mechanistic conception, and the nature of life. It must also adjust the conclusions of one science to those of another, so as to exhibit them as parts of a harmonious thought structure. The scientist may object that the time has not come for such an ambitious undertaking, and that when it does come, science itself should do the work in its own way. But the objection loses much of its force when we consider certain elementary facts. First, we all want some working conception of our experience world taken in its entirety. This conception may be tentatively held and may lack in definiteness; but limited and imperfect though it be, it is a necessity of our intellectual life. Here and there outlines of a satisfactory conception can even now be traced, and much that science takes to be established can find its appropriate place therein. Again, the postulates of the sciences, whatever their utility, are still postulates, and need to be considered in the light of all that experience reveals as to the nature of the world. With every advance that the sciences make in precision, the need of a critical handling of their fundamental postulates becomes more pressing. For instance, the atomic theory has been justified to the chemist by its great usefulness. Shall it stand as the final conception of reality? Or is it to be looked upon as a mere organizing principle with but

limited validity? Now philosophy is not interested to prove or disprove the utility of the conception in a particular field, for that is a scientific matter; but it examines the conception to determine the exact range of its application. Philosophy would ask concerning the atomic theory, can it serve as an ultimate principle of explanation for the physical universe? Is the cosmic world made up of infinitesimally small particles, each independent of all the rest? Or if the particles are connected, how much do the connections affect their inner nature? We may not think of the connections as merely external to the particles, for then they would themselves have the status of things, and so fail to connect. On the other hand, if the connections are really vital to the particles, the particles cannot retain a vestige of independence; they become lost as entities in the system considered as dynamic throughout. Thus philosophy might reason that the universe is not atomic in structure, except for those who refuse to think the issue through to the end.

The sciences may ignore this conclusion; they are not concerned with the issue raised. They are satisfied when they discover a principle that will enable them to arrange and exhibit their findings in the most effective manner. Yet the conclusion itself is of profound significance in the formulation of a world-view. In so far as philosophy endeavors to construct out of the postulates of the sciences and the resources of common sense a critical view of the world as a whole, it becomes what the ancients called it, a science of the sciences—a science of first principles.

This characterization may stand as a further definition of philosophy. But it is not wholly satisfactory, since it does not manifestly include what has come to be the most significant and pressing extra-scientific problem. The sciences, in separating from the original matrix, naturally took with them the prevailing beliefs about reality; but as distinctive problems were more sharply defined, these uncritical beliefs became a source of embarrassment. They seemed necessary, yet in the way. The more elementary

sciences, like physics and chemistry, soon undertook to re-define the scientific problem without reference to these inherited beliefs. This effort marked a distinct advance in insight; it set the sciences free. Their real objective was seen to be an understanding of the order of changes that take place in nature. All the observations and experiments, all the analyses, all the instruments of precision, all the generalizations have as their sole end the formulation of the laws of coexistence and change. This sweeping conclusion is not even now fully understood and accepted by all scientific men, but it is fast becoming a commonplace among them. It was forced upon them by the actual difficulties encountered in research. Physics and chemistry might assume the reality of matter, but had to confess that its nature was an inscrutable mystery. The biological sciences might assume the reality of a principle of life, yet could give no account of it as an actual existence distinct from vital phenomena. All that these sciences could do was to tell how matter and life acted. The assumption that there are realities in nature is, then, extra-scientific, yet it is made by everybody, whether scientist or not. Philosophy must face the issue. Is the world a mere nexus of activities, or is it a world of substantial things? If a world of things, what are they in their origin and nature? What sustains them, and what are we as distinguished from them? These questions are strictly philosophical, and science has no way of dealing with them. All other issues may be studied as problems in science; these lie outside its domain. They constitute the supreme object of interest for philosophy. Our completed definition, then will be that philosophy is a study of reality as such.

But the man of science will doubtless ask, Is the problem of reality a legitimate one? If it lies beyond the reach of the sciences, is it not beyond human ken? The variety of solutions possible to the problem and the lack of agreement among philosophers as to which is the right solution suggest the hopelessness of the undertaking. Should we not, then, recognize our limitations as human beings, ac-

cept as valid the universal belief that the outside world is real, cease trying to tell in what sense it seems to be real, and busy ourselves rather with the problems that we have some prospect of solving? The mystery of existence is inscrutable. Thus reasons the objector, who, whether scientist or not, insists on limiting intellectual interests to what can be seen and described. When such a man enters the field of philosophy, carrying his sceptical prejudices with him, he is known as a positivist or agnostic. An obstinate attitude deserves a name even though it is only a persistence in keeping a door to insight closed. The sceptical tendency can best be overcome by proving the success of philosophy in meeting the issues involved. The lack of agreement among philosophers will be dealt with in due time.

The important point at present is that the nature of reality is a distinctively philosophical problem. When we ask how a thing acts, we turn to science; but when we ask what a thing is, philosophy alone can answer. So many and serious are the aberrations resulting from a failure to recognize the distinctions here indicated between science and philosophy that a further word on the subject seems desirable, even at the risk of some repetition. The distinction may be considered as involving a twofold contrast—a contrast in aim and in method.

First, science aims at prevision and control. It seeks such an insight into nature's processes as will enable men to forecast, and, where desirable, to modify the course of events. In preparing man to meet the future intelligently and make nature minister to his needs, science is thoroughly practical. It has to do primarily with adjustments to environment. The better to accomplish this work, each science devotes itself to a limited field, either some clearly defined aspect of the world, or else a problem involving a definite group of objects. In contrast with the practical interests of science, philosophy aims at theoretical insight. It is not concerned to increase our control over nature's laws, but would satisfy the intellectual de-

mand for completeness, concreteness, system, and harmony. The completeness aimed at in the study of experience is not a mere matter of comprehensiveness or extension, such as might be reached if all the sciences were fitted into a general scheme. While it involves this, to be sure, it involves much more. In seeking the real, philosophy must find a place in its world-conception for every distinguishable aspect of experience. All that the separate sciences ignore as irrelevant to their purposes must be included in the purview of philosophy. The reason for this is evident. The existent real cannot be other or less than the entire fact in all its complexity. No simplified substitute, however useful in a practical way, will answer. Anything less than the exhaustively complete would be an abstraction, not reality. But what we have just said does not mean that philosophy attempts the impossible task of cataloguing the infinite items of changing experience. It undertakes the more modest task of formulating a conception of the world that will provide for every infinitesimal detail. It must do this because it seeks the ultimately concrete.

Science, being practical, can afford to ignore. It would be overwhelmed if it undertook to carry all the trivial items of experience into its problems. Not even a beginning could be made in the way of research. A scientific problem arises in the study of nature only as a result of analysis and selection in accordance with some particular purpose in the mind of the investigator. While the selection is evident in the most elementary phases of sense experience recognized by science, it is still more evident in the weaving of the intellectual fabric we call the scientific view of the world. This fabric is throughout a tissue of concepts, laws, theories. We call it "nature," "the universe," "the cosmos"; but, strictly speaking, it is an abstraction. The chief concern of science in building up this world is to discover uniformities in nature. These are found in the relationships between events and their conditions. When, for instance, it is noted that celestial mo-

tions may be viewed as a resultant of two opposing tendencies, we need only to determine the mass of two or more bodies and their distance one from another to see that their relative motions conform to a law, the law of gravitation. This law does not describe a body, but shows its relation to other bodies in such a formal and universal way that from appropriate data the position of bodies may be calculated for periods extending into the distant future. The law of gravitation thus takes its place as fundamental in a scientific world-view. All the other features of such a view are equally relational in character.

Philosophy, on the other hand, aiming to ascertain the nature of reality as it is, must transcend the mere formulation of guiding universals and reach if possible the individual in its uniqueness. The concrete is always individual, and hence necessarily unique. This statement is to be so construed as not to prejudge the question whether the concrete is not also a universal of a certain kind. An influential school of present-day thinkers contends that the real is the concrete universal. But at this stage of our discussion the argument will be less ambiguous and more easily understood if we stress the individuality of the real. To find and characterize the individual may require a long and arduous study of such abstractions as unity, variety, relation, change, quality. In fact, philosophy is so largely engaged with such considerations that it is likely to seem to the lay mind forbiddingly abstract, and quite divorced from the common interests of life. But that is only because it undertakes to be uncompromisingly thorough in the search for the reality that constitutes our everyday experience. As with the realities in experience, so with their relations to one another. No two relations can be exactly alike, nor can any relation continue without change. Hence the uniformities that constitute the structure of the scientific view must be reinterpreted by philosophy so as to do justice to the unique features of the individual's world.

This thought may be restated in a somewhat different

way, and its decisive importance thereby emphasized. We sustain two distinguishable attitudes toward our sense world. When interested in manipulating it, we treat it as detached from us; we look upon it as an observer would. We stand off, as it were, and view it from the outside. This is evidently an acquired attitude or point of view, originating in our practical needs. One result of this objective attitude is that all of life is reduced to the same level. The only existences are mere objects; nowhere can a subject or self be found. What may inadvertently be taken for selves must be treated as objects, susceptible of analysis and reconstruction like all other objects. In short, when we view our own experience world as it might appear to another person looking on, we eliminate ourselves entirely. But from this sophisticated attitude we may shift and view the external world as our own experience. To do this we must for the time being set aside practical interests. As soon as we realize that the sense world is primarily our own experience, a fairly definite line of cleavage appears between the world we experience and ourselves as having the experience.

Now science, as concerned with the practical mastery of nature, holds steadfastly the objective or impersonal point of view. It analyzes and describes as if analysis alone yielded trustworthy knowledge. The self, therefore, does not come within its scope except as an object, grist for its intellectual mill. In contrast, philosophy, having only theoretical interests and seeking to satisfy the desire to know the real as such, must recognize the primacy of the subjective or epistemic point of view. When the philosophical issue is raised, the self and its world become the two poles of interest. Philosophy thus views the world from within and therefore sees it in its concrete reality. While science as objective is necessarily abstract, philosophy is concrete to the limit of its power. It refuses to recognize the objects of the outside world as concrete, though they may seem so to the observer, but insists on taking account of the relations that determine the nature

of the object. Thus the reference of the object to the self as knower becomes supremely significant. The distinction between the knower and the objective world is, however, a distinction within experience and does not involve a dualism of realities. The philosophical contention that the objective world is experience and is therefore phenomenal throughout evidently holds the answer to vitally important questions. Whenever it is ignored, as it sometimes is even by philosophers themselves, philosophy loses its bearings and becomes quasi scientific. Many realistic thinkers take exception to the phenomenality of the objective world. They maintain that this doctrine prejudices all the main points of controversy in philosophy. They are right; but there is no help for it, unless they can furnish a better explanation.

Secondly, philosophical method differs from the method of the sciences principally in the greater use it makes of what is called the critical regress. The sciences are largely occupied with experimentation and such use of statistical material as furnishes a close approximation to experiment. In this they are free to make any assumption that may promote the attainment and organization of results. Thus chemistry assumes the molecular structure of matter; physics, the presence of ether; biology, the vital energy or principle of life. So long as such assumptions serve their purpose within the several sciences, they are accepted without further criticism. Only when they become inadequate or require too great a complexity of supporting assumptions are they called in question and more desirable principles sought in their place. This happens occasionally, but not often. For instance, the discovery of radio-activity a few decades ago led to various readjustments of theory in certain of the elementary sciences. It forced a new reckoning, and thus marked an epoch. So it was with the work of Copernicus and of Darwin. In each case the new doctrine had to prove its greater explaining power, its greater simplicity and adequacy, before it could supplant the old. When once accepted, the new theory

transformed the entire scientific structure. What each of the sciences is called upon to do whenever a discovery is made that affects its own basic principles and assumptions, philosophy undertakes to do for the whole field of knowledge. In the quest for an all-explaining principle, it tries out the principles that have proved serviceable in scientific research. Whatever has succeeded in a limited field has *prima facie* claim to an extended application. But these scientific principles reveal their inadequacy when applied to the whole range of experience. To take an illustration already used, the corpuscular theory of matter is summarily set aside by the exigencies of system. If all objects that compose our universe are in thoroughgoing interaction, then all is process and no atoms or corpuscles, however small, can escape the all-engulfing flux. To harmonize our working principles of explanation or organization is the very life of philosophy. Because the philosopher is always seeking the deeper harmonies, he must ask questions and make distinctions that may have little meaning for the scientist. His critical task is never done. Every new insight means reconstruction. Results are held tentatively in view of possible new findings. This persistence in returning to first principles and beginning anew the critical construction gives the appearance of treadmill movement. The old problems apparently recur with wearying regularity. This impression is wrong, since no problem ever recurs with exactly the same old meaning; yet harking back to beginnings is characteristic of philosophical method. The task, then, that we set for ourselves is to carry forward the critical revision of current views to the limit of our ability. The result must stand as final—until a keener analysis or a deeper insight discloses a flaw in our reasoning.

While at present we are interested in contrasting the two points of view or ways of treating experience, we should not lose sight of the fact already mentioned, that though contrasted, these two modes are strictly complementary and essential to each other. The science that

persistently maintained the objective point of view would finally issue in mathematical formulae, which, while valid for the world of objects, could certainly not be identified with that world. The elementary physical sciences are content to rest in such formulae, because they have ready at hand the metaphysical conceptions of popular philosophy. Thus when they speak of substance, matter, force, ether, atom, electricity, they are using intellectual interpretations, all of which are metaphysical. That the sciences should accept popular metaphysics with very slight critical examination is not strange nor reprehensible. So long as such conceptions serve the purpose of the sciences they justify themselves. This is because the aim of science, however theoretical the immediate attitude, is ultimately practical. On the other hand, a philosophy that tried to ignore the scientific view of the world would hardly merit serious consideration. The subjective method is simply a way of studying the objective world and accounting for it as knowledge. Philosophy assumes the results of scientific research, while science uses what it can of current philosophical conceptions. What is here said of philosophy in an abstract way, all that follows will illustrate.

In summing up we may recognize the broad similarities as well as the differences. Science and philosophy alike use all the resources of intellect and skill to attain the truth. Their methods are logical, and their results are taken to be established only when they stand against the strongest possible assaults. They study the same world, and all that either learns has a significance for the other. But science and philosophy ask different questions of nature and get appropriate answers. Science is concerned with questions of structure and function. Such investigation makes a strict limitation of each problem necessary and requires that the objective point of view be maintained. Philosophy, aiming at insight into the nature of the real, must be all-comprehensive in range and must consequently view the world from within as the experi-

ence of a self. Science proceeds largely by experimentation, philosophy by critical adjustment.

Having differentiated philosophy from the natural sciences, we have now to consider its relations to the other types of intellectual effort, such as theology, history, literature, and art.

Philosophy culminates in a theory of the ultimate power to which all things in the universe must be referred. A given philosophy may issue in the view that this power is unknowable, or that it is a material substance, or that it is simply the universe considered as a unity, or finally that it is an Intelligence working its will in nature's on-goings. When this last conception is reached philosophy approximates theology. Yet there is a generally recognized difference between the two. Theology starts with a doctrine of God, a doctrine more or less definitely presented in some traditional form (as in the Bible), and tries to harmonize it with the science and philosophy of the day. Philosophy, on the other hand, starts with the world of experience, past and present, and tries to weld the entire body of knowledge and theory into a consistent whole by clearing up the confusions and straightening out the contradictions. Philosophy has no preconceived theory and recognizes no authority except accredited experience and the laws of correct thinking. Theology commends itself to thoughtful people in so far as it approximates the methods and presuppositions of philosophy. On the other hand, philosophy seems able to complete itself only as it attains to a conception of an intelligent Power as the Source of all that exists. If this seeming proves to be actuality, then the saying of Hegel must be recognized as final insight, that all philosophy issues in a theology.

The relations of philosophy to history are equally intimate and if possible more complicated. Philosophy, as the interpretation of experience, must take account of the past. We can understand the facts of life only in their history. Reflecting on this truth, some thinkers have plausibly maintained that the really significant part of

philosophy is its account of human ideals in their gradual unfolding. But this view is one-sided; philosophy becomes philosophy only as it transcends the historical and becomes throughout critically systematic. Nevertheless philosophy profits greatly by a study of what man has thought and done in the past. Old systems though outgrown, old guesses at the riddle of existence, old controversies over real difficulties in the thought world, all help to deepen insight and make interpretations more adequate.

But the contrast between the historical and the critical study of life should not cause us to minify the similarities of aim and content. Both history and philosophy deal with the world as a human world to be interpreted in terms of human interest; both emphasize the inner meanings as contrasted with external description. Though history aims to be strictly objective in its treatment of events and institutions, it succeeds as history only in so far as it allows itself to be dominated by subjective considerations. The historian may go to great pains to ascertain the exact facts and to set them forth without prejudice, yet he inevitably selects his facts and arranges them with reference to his idea of their significance. If his conception of what is humanly significant in history should be much at variance with accepted standards of value, he would have to face the charge of inaccuracy, prejudice, superficiality, and could escape only by vindicating his position. Thus the present rules the past in so far as the past is recorded in history. Since historical perspectives vary with interest, there can be as many different interpretations of a given past as there are historians. Facts are artifacts and express subjective attitudes. This is no discredit to history. It means that we live in a human world where interests dominate. We can dehumanize it only by ceasing to understand it. As history is nothing if not interpretation, it is in its measure an illustrative philosophy of life, teaching by example. We may go even further than this. Since both history and philosophy deal ordinarily with individuals (persons as such) as distinguished from gen-

eral concepts and laws, and both alike endeavor to understand the present and the future by a study of the past, and also since both, transcending the natural science conception of causal connection, must recognize desires, ideals, purposes, as grounds of action, we may find much support for the statement that history is really philosophy in the making.²

Literature is related to philosophy much as experimentation is related to general theories in science. At least this is true as regards the literary classics. They are penetrative analyses of human nature and the motives that drive men to action. Like experimentation they imply theoretical construction. Inherent in every classic is a view of life and hence a philosophy. The larger conception may not be consciously before the writer at the time, but it controls his selection of theme, development of plot, and shaping of the *dénouement*. To bring out the underlying philosophy of a literary masterpiece is to reveal, so far as its thought content is concerned, its permanent significance and value.

But literature differs from philosophy not only as being the portrayal of a particular situation, rather than a logically coherent view of life as a whole, but also as being picturesque and emotionally appealing. Philosophy has no right to be picturesque, except for the sake of illustration. A picture is ambiguous. Philosophy, having to satisfy logical requirements, must avoid ambiguity as a surgeon avoids infection. The helpfulness of literature lies very largely in its analogical or metaphorical interpretations of experience; the helpfulness of philosophy, in its ability to solve life's major problems.

The wisdom literature of the world is compressed philosophy, embodying in vivid and arresting form the profoundest reflections of mankind. It testifies to the universality of the philosophical impulse and stands out as a

² For an illuminating discussion of the theme, see "What is History?" by J. W. Swain, *Journal of Philosophy*, 1923, pp. 281-289, 309-327, 337-349.

perpetual appeal to the thinker to weld its varying expressions together and bring them into harmony with the findings of science. In so far as this is done, we have a philosophy. Good literature then is, generally speaking, good philosophy as far as it goes, though good philosophy may not be good literature.

Philosophy is related to art quite as closely as to literature. The connection though profound is indirect. Art as the expression of beauty appeals to a fundamental need of human nature. No philosophy can afford to ignore it. Beauty exemplified is both a datum and an ideal for philosophy. It is something to be taken into account as giving content to life; it also suggests the goal to be reached in the elaboration of a philosophical system. As an ideal, beauty in philosophy concerns the logical form and structure (the "architectonic," as Kant called it). Philosophy must observe the law of intellectual perspective and proportion. It must have such clearness and definiteness, as well as depth and comprehensiveness, as will satisfy the mind in all its demands; to this extent it must have beauty, must be a work of art. But its art is of the intellectual type. If it reaches the emotions, it must be largely through its convincing power, its illumination of life's problems.

The relation of philosophy to the types of intellectual life other than the natural sciences may be summarized thus. Philosophy is not theology, yet it must give a satisfactory account of the racial God-consciousness and the phenomena of the religious life. It is not history in the generally accepted meaning of the term, yet it comprehends all the past, even that which does not get expressed in any histories. An interpretative account of the struggle for intellectual emancipation and enlightenment is primarily a history of philosophy, and as such furnishes an exhaustless reserve of suggestive material for systematic treatment. Literature and philosophy are also closely affiliated. Literary masterpieces are charged with philosophical significance. Especially is this true of the wis-

dom literature of the race. Art expresses beauty in sensuous form; like literature it appeals to the emotions. Philosophy aims to satisfy intellectual demands. At its best it has the element of beauty, but it is a beauty of harmony and organization of our beliefs. Thus philosophy claims kinship with all the intellectual interests. It undertakes to utilize them in constructing such a view of our experience world as will bear the sharpest scrutiny. It must, therefore, stand as our deepest insight into the meaning of life.

CHAPTER II

THE VALIDITY AND VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY

The validity of philosophy has been called in question because of its apparent unprogressiveness. The charge seems to be supported by two considerations. Superficially the issues that occupy the attention of present-day thinkers resemble those that were discussed by the ancient Greeks. One cycle of abortive solutions of the same problems appears to follow another with monotonous regularity. Seeing so many failures, the onlooker may conclude that these problems are beyond the powers of human intelligence. This conclusion is drawn the more readily by those who, trained in the strict, scientific way of thinking, find it difficult to shift to the philosophical. Again the charge of futility is apparently supported by the oft-observed fact that each philosophical system is the work of an individual mind and bears the marks of its origin. The personal element is inherent and cannot be eliminated. Unlike science, which is impersonal and objective, arriving at conclusions that all can test and must accept, philosophy apparently wastes itself in vainly attacking and defending contradictory conclusions with no decisive means of settling the issue between them.

Let us consider first the charge of monotony and lack of progress. It is natural that in philosophy each thinker should want to begin at the very beginning, so as to burden himself with as few presuppositions as possible. His aim is to make a fresh analysis of experience and try to carry the analysis a step further than any of his predecessors. If he can discover a new principle of explanation or

clarify one already employed, he may lay the foundation of a more satisfactory world-view. This continuously renewed effort to find, if possible, firmer ground on which to build is the essence of philosophy. It does not mean monotony where there is real thinking. From age to age the issues change, though the same terms may be used to designate them. Every time a basic conception, such as subject, object, consciousness, cause, is a little more sharply defined, our whole world-view feels the effect. Nothing can remain the same, though the poverty of language makes it necessary to retain the old terminology. The sameness is like the sameness of a landscape viewed casually and then again and again with greater attention, or like space relations that are the subject of more and more thoroughgoing mathematical treatment.

The second criticism, pointing to the bewildering variety and lack of consensus, is rather more difficult to meet, though to the careful thinker it does not weigh heavily. The personal element is present in philosophy as in all thinking. Science, with its problems of measurement, tries to be strictly impersonal, and succeeds to a remarkable degree by employing devices to nullify the inaccuracies of individual workers. Philosophy can also neutralize the eccentricities of individuals by methods of its own; but it can never get rid of the personal element. Evidently the term personal does not mean the same for philosophy as it does for science. For the latter it is synonymous with troublesome inaccuracy, for the former it is an inherent quality, all-pervasive and decisive of ultimate issues. The task of philosophy is not measurement, except to a limited extent, but rather interpretation; and all interpretation is personal, that is, it is the individual's own estimate of significance in any given experience. As soon as we ask for meanings, we enter the personal sphere, we move in a world that is human throughout. The problem for philosophy is to transcend the caprice and narrowness of the individual thinker, and reach that which is essential and universal.

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No doubt each thinker brings to the consideration of his problems a bias of interests and a personal attitude and capacity that are sure to affect somewhat his conclusions. A man's philosophy reveals what sort of man he is, what his dominant interests are, and what is the limit of his capacity to interpret his own experiences. Thus a scientist becoming interested in philosophical issues would naturally assume an objective attitude toward nature and life. What he could see with either his physical or his mind's eye would especially appeal to him. He would want to visualize his explanations. He would be eager to find evidence of orderliness, interdependence, and development in nature. If mathematically inclined, he would look upon nature as a sort of concrete logic, a geometry, an infinite problem in the mathematics of number and relations. If he cared more for the inductive and experimental sciences, he would dwell on the variety and beauty of nature, yet still would hold that a philosophical view of the world must be rigidly systematic. He would be primarily concerned with adjusting the assumptions of the various sciences, and at the same time he would naturally be shy of affirmations that seemed to go beyond inferences yielded by the analysis of scientific data. The logical drift would be toward a view of the world as an absolute system. Yet the philosopher in him would prompt him to retain at least the notion of substance as the real. He would retain it, however, with increasing difficulty. As he turned upon it his intellectual searchlight, it would shrivel up and become scarcely more than a conviction that something is real in the system, he knows not what. Scientists then who turn philosophers show a predisposition to an agnostic attitude toward the central problem of philosophy.

In partial contrast, the religionist who takes to philosophy finds it easy to believe what helps to establish his faith, and difficult to do justice to any conclusions that seem to threaten it. He is almost sure to oppose certain types of thought as being unworthy or unfruitful or in-

adequate or meaningless or simply atheistic; while at the same time he will be lured on to accept, often without sufficiently critical sifting, conclusions that superficially seem to help establish cherished beliefs. He may thus gather into his world-view much that shows bias and cannot withstand critical attack. To avoid the bias, he may elect to follow the lead of the scientist who would make philosophy "scientific." He would be likely to reach a conception of reality as substance concerning which we can know nothing, and would then become a theological agnostic or, what is practically the same, a pantheist.

Again when an artist or man of letters tries his hand at philosophical problems, he brings to his study a distinctive equipment and bent of nature. The universe presents itself to him as the arena where values are realized or destroyed. If strongly emotional, he may take a pessimistic view of life, see nature red in tooth and claw, man a sport of his environment, the future dark with forebodings of the tragic end; or he may turn meliorist, see in the discovery and appreciation of natural beauty the secret of a satisfying existence, and catch the inspiration of fellowship in service. Whatever his general scheme of things, his personal and æsthetic interests are sure to color his entire intellectual universe.

What is true of these types of intellectual interest and consequent bias is true of every individual who finds his way into philosophical territory. The business man, the philanthropist, the lawyer, the physician, each has his own personal equation which consciously or unconsciously affects his choice of experience material out of which to build his world-view. But such warpings, though common in the history of thought, are not really necessary. Each partial view contains a measure of truth, and if understood in its limitations, may contribute its share to a more adequate synthesis. Yet the personal equation will, perhaps, never be entirely got rid of. Philosophical insight is bound to vary through the whole gamut of human capacity to think and appreciate. There is no denying that

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this means bewildering diversity. But it has its advantages. From such richness and variety of philosophical construction and insight, the alert student can increase his resources. The main task is to find a principle that will organize all the affirmative elements into a coherent whole. A philosophy is to be measured by its ability to take up into itself the truth in other types of thought, and to give at the same time convincing reasons why the others fail. The problem is primarily one of inclusiveness. Only that philosophy will stand the test which can logically assimilate the truth in other systems and explain their error. Though the task has already commanded the best thought of a thousand generations and is certain to be a center of interest for a long time to come, we, the heirs of the ages, may enter into our inheritance, gather up into an outline view all that constitutes our experience world, and feel assured that some of life's most vital issues can even now be settled for us. This assurance seems warranted as we discover that since philosophy must comprehend a progressive richness and variety of experience, its principles of explanation must be susceptible of unlimited growth in ideational content. If we can find such principles we may accept them as final.

If this goal were attained, what would be its value? If it were not attained in full measure but continuously striven for, would the striving and the partial success have a value commensurate with the centuries of labor involved? In attempting to answer these questions, we may treat them as one rather than two, because if the principle of growth as just explained is valid, all philosophies are final for those who hold them, but remain so only till further reflection reveals a need of revision. An ultimately final philosophy is in the nature of the case impossible to any except an infinite intelligence, while a humanly final philosophy is attained by every thinker in so far and for so long as he is satisfied.

The values of philosophy are many. Perhaps the greatest is the recognition it brings of the place of values

in our lives and our experience world. From this point of view science is the creator of the problem that philosophy seeks to solve. That is, the scientific attempt to be accurate and fruitful in the study of nature leads to the adoption of a method that not merely ignores values but undertakes to exclude them entirely as factors. Science would be objective and impersonal. But this attitude is manifestly a means to an end, and the end is always a value. We obtain values by ignoring them. This is another way of saying that science succeeds by letting nature speak for itself without the intrusion of subjective considerations. True, we evaluate the results, yet the values seem to be read into what, as results, did not contain them. This impression gives rise to the notion that nature in itself is without value. If the scientific attitude were consistently maintained, the world would appear as a meaningless drift of dead matter, an infinite permutation of physical elements. We as selves would be resolved into aspects of the flux, or by-products of the process. This view is intolerable, of course. That it seems so foreign to us is evidence, however, not of its inconsistency, but rather of our incapacity to hold ourselves for long to a strictly scientific view of the world. The recovery from the abstract view of science and the bringing back of value into our experience constitute the movement toward philosophy. This restoration is vital to our well-being. Science and philosophy are so closely related that as the one increases in significance the other is similarly affected. Hence no one should be more insistent upon the importance of philosophy than the thoroughgoing scientist. On the other hand, the philosopher who does not know and appreciate science does little more than beat the air.

Philosophy gives values their rightful place in the concrete reality of experience. Life not only becomes an ordered whole of interrelated values, but the self as the evaluator is seen to hold the central place in its world. Thus all for which science exists is conserved, all is related to the self from which the organic unity is derived,

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This task of integrating experience according to the ideal of value makes philosophy the most practical of all pursuits. To the layman it may seem abstract and far removed from the details of life, but it is pursuing the supreme value of complete orientation in the world of values. The nature of such a quest explains why philosophy has so much to say about the basic concepts of the moral and religious life. The organization of experience in its concrete manifoldness and variety is not possible without thorough consideration of both the relation of values to one another and their relation to the ultimate Source of existence. This means that philosophy normally issues in a doctrine of God and man and destiny.

But a false philosophy may be harmful. We need only neglect some of the less obvious but vitally significant factors of experience and correspondingly emphasize others to get a distorted view of life. The mischief to the individual holding such views may not be great. His early training, social environment, and native moral bent may prevent his defective philosophy from coming to full expression in life and conduct. But if his philosophy is adopted by any considerable number of people, so that the hidden logic works itself out, the evil effects may be serious and far-reaching. Thus let a people adopt a materialistic view of life—a view apparently close to common sense—and sooner or later all that gives life its unity, meaning, and drive eventually suffers eclipse. A defective philosophy works in the social body like a subtle contagion. It may appear to the casual observer as insignificant as would the germs of a dread disease, and may be quite as fatal in its way.

Yet any conception of our experience world that we may adopt becomes so inwrought into our intellectual life that we are apt to cling to it tenaciously even after its inadequacy is glaringly evident. Force of habit, mental indolence, and a host of minor prejudices come to its support. Hence we often find the anomaly of highly trained minds refusing to consider in a critical way the

foundation questions of life, lest their working theory of the world be overthrown. After a man becomes preoccupied with specific tasks and interests, he has little time for the arduous intellectual toil of examining the fundamental assumptions of life. The moral of that is, we should work through the problems of a world-view before practical exigencies cut us off from constructive philosophical thinking.

Just because so many defective thought-systems find lodgment in society and maintain themselves in practical competition with one another, the conclusion has been hastily drawn that the value of philosophy is almost wholly negative. Philosophy may forsooth clear away the crude theories, superstitions, and confusions of ordinary thinking, but it may not aspire to any measure of finality as a positive world-view. Such an attitude indicates only mental weariness. Logic and reason are on the side of positive construction. All criticism of a faulty conception is based on the authority of something we hold to be true.

With this minimum accepted, we can proceed by careful reconstruction to an outline which, so far as we are able to see, comprehends all experiences and provides for all values of life. If at any time an enlarging experience or a more penetrative insight should demand a revision in order to admit the new truth, this could be accomplished without serious intellectual disturbance if our ground principles provide for such growth.

The magnitude of the task should not deter us. Nor should we be affrighted by the assaults from every quarter, nor depressed by the apparent lack of unanimity among thinkers even of the same general outlook. If our philosophy is adequate, it can stand against every criticism. And only persistent and trenchant criticism can reveal its adequacy. If adequate, it can take over all that is true in opposing systems and fit this logically into a comprehensive view.

PART I

THE WORLD OF SENSE PERCEPTION

CHAPTER I

THE DUAL CHARACTER OF OUR SENSE WORLD

In considering the world of sense perception we shall need to assume on the part of the reader an elementary knowledge of logic and psychology. These subjects are basic for philosophy, as for the sciences. But philosophy will have occasion to deal critically with some of their conclusions. The one great assumption which philosophy itself must make and which cannot be called in question is that in the end reason can justify itself; in other words, the world, being knowable, must have a rational structure. The following discussion will show what this means.

At the beginning of our study we may note a distinction universally made between the physical world, vast in extent and complexity, and our knowledge of it. This distinction will eventually constitute one of our most perplexing problems. Whatever the physical world may be apart from our knowledge, one thing must be granted, our knowledge of it is the world itself in so far as we know it. We are apt to lose sight of this obvious fact when we consider how little of the real world we encompass in any one act of perception and how often our apprehension of it is inaccurate. At present we are interested only in the world as known and we ask, By what means do we get this knowledge?

The easy answer to this question is that knowledge comes through the senses. One who gave this answer would of course grant that not all sense notions are true. He would recognize that sense material should be tested in appropriate ways, that observations should be made

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with care, that prejudice should not be allowed to color or modify what the senses give. Yet he would contend that the senses alone do the revealing, and that all knowledge is thus sensuous in character. This answer, though having a measure of truth, is far from being so simple as it seems. If it were adequate as it stands, or were all we could know, a philosophical view of the world might be a very easy matter—or else an impossibility. Difficulties emerge as soon as we try to clear the conception of ambiguities and to understand just what it means. They swarm from the side of the object as well as from that of the observing self.

What do we mean by the senses? As physical they are a part of the external world and involve the very issues raised. If we mean only that the senses are media or channels by which objects come into relation to the mind, we have said very little. At best we have indicated that there are steps intervening between the object and the brain cortex. This description has the advantage of being picturable, and adjustable to the rest of what we may know in the same way about the objective world. For the sense of sight we can set forth in imagination an ether that carries to the eye the light waves (if indeed light on its physical side is an ethereal phenomenon), and then we can follow the progress through the fluids of the eye to the rods and cones and thence along the optic nerve to the brain cortex. We may be fairly sure that the impulse from the object, on passing from the ether to the other media, changes its character considerably. What it becomes by the time it reaches the occipital lobes, we cannot know from direct observation. But even for the imagination it must be some form of motion and not the object. The physical series stops with the cortex and nowhere along the line of media have we anything but motion, while the object persistently remains out in space. Nevertheless, in the act of perception the object stands before us as apprehended.

How does the visual object come to be there for the observer? It is not on the retina; it may be some distance away. It seems large when near by and becomes actually smaller to vision as it recedes. We have ways of convincing ourselves that as a matter of fact it remains the same size whether far or near. One might ask with the psychologist, What is the actual size of the object? and get the psychologist's answer that its actual size is its apparent size when at a distance most convenient for observation. This answer only accentuates the importance of subjective factors in sense perception, but does not specify what they are. Vision alone is not enough to account for what we see.

That which is true of the sense of sight is true in principle for the other senses. They furnish their characteristic data out of which the mind builds its sense objects. For instance, by the sense of touch we seem to come into direct contact with the object and thereby determine immediately its size and contour. But is this contact immediate? The peripheral nerve endings are affected by the resistance of the object and somehow—no one knows how, though we can name the process—the impulse passes along the nerve to the brain. Only then do we have the experience of an object in contact with our body. Anywhere along the line of this moving impulse an effectual barrier can be set up and no touch sensation will ensue. The problem, then, is still on our hands. Seeing, hearing, tasting the object, are only the first steps, and not yet perceptive knowledge. Evidently we must go beyond the physical sense organs if we are to get much light on the *modus operandi* of sense perception.

The question we are discussing is as old as reflective thought. The early Greeks answered it by saying that the objects throw off little images of themselves that enter through the senses and are apprehended by the spirit within. This was a real attempt at explanation, but so crude and naive as hardly to merit a passing word

of criticism. Not only have we no evidence that images are thus thrown off, but if they were, they would in no way account for the perception of the object; for it is the object, not the image, that we see. The Greek explanation with certain modifications survives in principle among the so-called empiricists of the past two centuries.¹ These empiricists held that knowledge of external objects resulted from impressions made on the mind. They thought of the mind as like a blank sheet of paper or a wax tablet prepared to receive in a passive way the impressions as somehow representing the object. But the impressions do not see themselves. If they did, that would not be the same as seeing the object.

Another view, much more satisfactory, yet still beset with difficulties, is that raw material is given from without in the form of an unorganized manifold which is fashioned into things by the mind. This theory is ambiguous. It may mean that the given is an infinitely fine dust of passive elements, or it may mean that the manifold consists of a dynamic urge administered in successive pulses. The alternative of strictly passive or strictly active elements might be questioned as not exhaustive, and the contention made that they are neither wholly the one nor wholly the other. Why may they not be of the nature of things in the outside world, though not yet put together and related as we find them in experience? The different qualities, for instance, might come as distinct data ("sensa," as some call them)—like furniture shipped in a "knocked down" state—which combine according to inherent laws after they reach the mind. This suggestion is superficially plausible. But if we would be consistent in our thinking, we cannot stop short of the alternatives as stated. When we try to think of sense objects as partly active and partly passive, the passive parts fall away and disappear, leaving only the active to function in knowledge. The given manifold then cannot

¹ Cf. Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, bk. ii. chap. viii. § 12; bk. iv. chap. iii. § 23.

be a static or passive manifold. As such it could give not the slightest hint of its own nature, and could not be used in an explanation without losing its passivity. The strictly passive is the non-existent.

When, however, we think of the given as a succession of stimulations from a source that is adequate to the needs of the situation, we begin to see light; the difficulties one by one clear away. The transition from the static to the dynamic view of the given in sense perception is not altogether easy. The old view tends to persist and infect our dynamism. The thinker who can hold himself steadfastly and consistently to the dynamic conception of the given has the key to most of the persistent problems in philosophy. This will become more evident as we proceed.

The theory that we have been considering shows advance by representing the mind as active in the construction of the object. Two questions naturally follow: What is the nature and form of the mind's activity in sense perception? and what, precisely, is the contribution from the outside? These questions recognize that perception is a joint product. To neglect either factor is to fail of real insight. If, on the one hand, the mind does nothing, then the object may conceivably be crowded into it without the slightest response in the way of knowledge. If, on the other hand, the object is passive, it may be anywhere or anything without making itself known. There must be interaction; the mind must be affected through stimulation and must respond with constructive work. Having gained this initial insight we can face other difficulties as they arise.

Along with the two main questions certain others suggest themselves and press for answer. One of these is particularly urgent and merits at least a passing consideration, even though it plunges us into the midst of controversial matters that we are not yet prepared to discuss in a thoroughgoing way. The question is, If the object as known is really a joint product of stimulation and re-

sponse, what is the difference between this object and the real object that seems to exist in outer space, whether we perceive it or not? The question is urgent only because it expresses a misunderstanding which should be cleared away as soon as possible. When we speak of the known object as a joint product we are speaking of the real object lying out there in real space. If the questioner contends that there is another object as the original of the one we apprehend, yet entirely distinct from it, he is met by the difficulty that this original cannot be in the same space as the known object, for that space with all its content is our mode of apprehension, our constructive response to the independent stimulations. Nor can this assumed archetype object have the same nature as its ectype, the known object, unless it contains the same constructive elements and these elements are all mental in origin. There is a sense, as we shall see later, in which the two objects can be distinguished, but the distinction falls within the field of the knowable. It is the distinction between the object as it appears to the observer at a given moment and the same object as it may appear at other times and to other people.

But if the object may appear at various times, is it not independent of any single appearance? So plausible is this conclusion and so useful in meeting certain needs of reflective thought that it holds out against all criticism. It has repeatedly been expounded as all but self-evident, then abandoned because of its inherent difficulties, and afterwards taken up again when the alternative possibilities have been canvassed. It must be so and it cannot be so, seems to be the best we can say. The final answer, whatever that may be, will involve the main issues of philosophy. For the present we must suspend judgment till the evidence is all in. Meanwhile the outside world, rockribbed and ancient as the sun, persists, apparently indifferent to our individual notions about it. To raise the issue at all thus early is to give notice that the common-sense view will be called upon to defend itself. Nothing

is settled in philosophy till it satisfies the requirements of comprehensive consistent thinking. Certainly we must assume, as a minimum, that something independent of us, call it what we will, furnishes the continuous stimulation or control, while the response of the mind is of such a character that the resultant object seems itself to be independent of us. The riddle remains. If it can be solved to the satisfaction of the student, the outlining of a world-view will become comparatively easy. The main difficulties that block the way at present to a solution arise in large part from a very natural confusion. When one draws the line between the independent object and the object as it happens to be known, one assumes that the supposed independent object is the source of the stimulations that control the mind's activity in sense perception. This assumption really gives us two known objects, the one the cause of the other, while both as known are products of thinking. But the two persist in coalescing. The real object, then, as the known object, plays a double role; it is presumably the source of stimulation acting antecedent to experience and also the resultant construct that can exist only in experience. It is thus the cause of itself. How can a tree, for instance, be the cause of our having the perception of a tree and at the same time be the tree that we perceive—both the cause and the effect? Much ingenuity has been expended in trying to resolve this puzzle, yet with little success. Better hold strenuously to the conclusion that the source object and the sense object are not the same. But where, then, is the source object? Does it resemble the known object in form or color or texture or any quality whatever? To ask such questions is to call attention to the glaring difficulties in the notion of two objects. Space, though infinite, cannot harbor both; they refuse to remain in the same world. The difficulty, as we shall see, is resolved when we abandon the attempt to identify the source of stimulation with any sort of space-filling object.

But now another question obtrudes. If the cosmic

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object, in so far as known, cannot be the cause of our knowing it, since as known it is the mental response to antecedent stimulations, what is the status of the cosmic object? It is certainly not a mere chimera, that is, it is not in the mind in the sense that the *pons Varolii* is in the brain. It maintains a definite position out in space and acts as if it had nothing to do with the observer. It conforms to mechanical laws, and unless alive, changes its states only as it is acted upon from without by some other object. The mind, on its part, if it thinks at all, must conform to the laws of its nature. It may construct images, analyze, compare, and arrange its thoughts without in the least affecting the nature or activities of the things in the outside world. Thus our world seems again to split apart. Neither part can exist without the other and neither can be reduced to the other. The thought order is not the thing order; the two seem to be related only externally. This issue is formidable only in appearance. While it may not be entirely disposed of till we approach the end of our studies, a provisional solution that may meet our present needs can be found in two considerations.

Thoughts have contents; they refer to something other than themselves. We may think of another thought, or a phenomenal object, or a fantasy, but never of the thinking itself while it is being thought. For this reason, certain philosophers call in question the distinction between thought as process and thought as object. But evidently to deny that thought is a process—thinking—is to deny thought altogether, and to deny that it is, at the same time, content is to take all significance from it.

The second consideration is that every thought object has a nature which is expressed by the way it acts in its own environment. For instance, a novelist creating his characters and placing them in definite situations, lets them act in accordance with the nature he has given them. Otherwise he would lose caste as a literary craftsman. So the mathematician starting with certain postulates and undertaking to work out their implications must recognize

that they have a rational structure that must be respected. He is bound to obey the laws of the world he creates. We must conclude then that the distinction between the activity of thought in sense perception and the activity of things as apprehended raises no issue in the least peculiar. As process, thought is controlled by a complex of rational and other influences; as content, that is, as meaning an object, it belongs to an apparently independent world.

But when we speak of thought as a process, we must not make the blunder of identifying it with any movement in space. As process it is not in any sense picturable. This statement is perplexing to beginners, and frequently remains a stumbling block even to advanced students. Too many people hold that the non-spatial is the non-existent, and by that they mean unreal. Not much can be done for those who take this stand. They live in their imagination. The saying of certain physiologists of the last century, notably, Karl Vogt, that the brain secretes thought, sounds plausible to such people because the process can be imagined. But that which is thus imagined turns out to be some kind of physical movement. By their imagination, alone, they cannot grasp the nature of reality as such, not even physical reality. They merely confuse certain ideational constructions, certain schematic representations of motions (such as movements of brain particles), with thought as process.

But one who is thus confused may ask, If thought is not movement in space, why call it a process? The answer is simple. We call thought a process because it involves logically separable stages. As process, thought is strictly *sui generis*, without analogue in the physical world; as product, it is the world of objects apprehended by means of the senses. Even the fact that there is a process we discover only from a study of the product, especially the experience of error. In thinking the wrong result, the mind exhibits its activity. If all our thought content could be referred directly and with no possibility of mis-

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take to an outside world, we might never suspect that any thinking is involved.

The tendency to discredit thought as process finds support in that the process as such is never experienced. Its work is done in a twinkling. Even the reaction time of the psychologist does not indicate the speed of the mind's activities, for the reaction time is mainly distributed between the afferent and the efferent nerve currents. If only the mind would slow down sufficiently and the thinking be accompanied by friction or effort, we might feel something doing and study the activities by direct inspection. What these would actually be, we cannot even guess. Nor would such knowledge be of much service; for not the fact of activity, but its significance in acquired meanings, is what we want. Apparently, then, the only way to get this information is to study the world as perceived by the senses. In such study we can reason back from the accomplished fact to what is implied in its accomplishment.

CHAPTER II

THE THOUGHT STRUCTURE IN OBJECTS AS PERCEIVED

We are now ready to study the characteristics of our sense world as having a thought structure. These structural characteristics taken in their particularity are beyond computation in number. Each object seems to be an infinite complex of them. Moreover, each is changing continually. The sun never comes back to the same place in the heavens, the mountain that seems so firmly rooted and steadfast is different in every ultimate detail from what it ever was before, and it will never again be what it is now. So of all things. To enumerate the specific features of even a single object would be strictly impossible, for the object would be something else before we had well begun our inventory. Yet for our present purpose the distinctive features of the objective world may be gathered up into large irreducible classes, each of which may be treated for the time being as homogeneous. Sense perception reveals a temporal-spatial world of material things differing in the greatest variety of ways, qualitatively and quantitatively, and changing in such wise as to suggest, if not necessitate, the affirmation that they are causally connected. Their activities are measurable, and display an orderliness expressible in definite laws. These features must be accounted for, since they are a part of our experience. It is a question whether, strictly speaking, they are all found in sense experience; yet they do actually constitute the framework of the world as apprehended even by the unreflective. As a matter of fact, what we find in the sense world depends upon the thoroughness of our analyses. For

instance, we shall find it convenient for our purpose to treat space and time as if they were what common sense with its crude methods and practical interests considers them to be. Yet the mathematical physicist, concerned with problems of refined measurement, raises many questions of great philosophical import with reference to the subtle connections between the concept of space and that of time. Ignoring these questions for the present, we may treat space and time as separable aspects of our objective world. There is no danger of our confusing them. We need only to bear in mind that these distinguishable aspects and the others we are to consider are nothing more than aspects and are not to be taken as having any separate existence *in rerum natura*.

1. SPACE. As we try to orientate ourselves in our multifarious and changing world, one of our first needs is to find elements that are fixed and changeless to which thought can anchor. In the realm of ideas we approximate such elements by the discovery of laws, principles, mathematical truths. To satisfy this need in sense experience we may follow the scientist in his analysis of substances into their ultimate elements, but even these are discovered to have only relative and hypothetical fixity of nature. In fact, there is only one way to reach the absolutely static in experience, and that is to eliminate by an act of abstraction every feature of the world that could possibly change. Pure space, the absolute void, is the result. As such it is never experienced or even imagined in its utter nothingness. Yet, as an idea, it is made to yield all those insights that constitute our geometries and trigonometries.

When we think of space as in any conceivable sense a thing, we allow it to take over elements of experience from the realm of change. This process is begun in treating it as a nexus of relations. It is then no longer pure space. As has been intimated, pure space is a limiting conception to which the mind can only approximate. We know that our sense world is in space, and we think of this space as

spreading out into infinity. No part of it, however remote, can be entirely detached from what we see, for space forms a continuum.

In studying our world of sense perception, we naturally want to know what is meant by saying that an object is in space. Does the space do anything to the object? Or is it a mere container, enveloping the object and giving it a locus with reference to other objects? What is meant by space relations? If the object is not indifferent to them, space must be more than a void or nonentity; it must be an energy of some sort. To meet the difficulties here suggested the modern conception of space has been worked out. Is space a thing? we may ask. No, comes the answer, because if it were it would act like other objects of experience and require another space to contain it. To think of space as active is to deny its nature as the place of things. Yet if we think of space as utterly and altogether passive, it would be meaningless to say that a thing occupies space and sustains space relations to other things. The relations are the relations of the thing in the sense that the thing would not be the same if the relations were changed or obliterated. The relations, then, are strictly objective, and the thing is a thing in relations. It is inconceivable that a thing should have no relations and yet be in the world. Evidently we need to ask a back-lying question if we would meet the contradictory requirements of a rational conception of space. How do we come by the experience of things as in space, and of space as the place of things? The answer to this question will set us on our way toward a solution of all the puzzling problems that center in the nature of objective space.

The space that we want to know about is the external space of real physical objects, not any mere imaginary construction. Now the general conviction is that this space is external to the mind. Nevertheless we must grant that however external to ourselves the objects of the outside world may be, they are in space for us because we are

compelled to think them there. First the stimulations directly affect the mind, then immediately the objects are spread out in space before us. Apparently the essential thing is that the stimulations reach the mind, for if in any way they are interfered with so that they fail of their destination, no experience of an outside world follows. That is, the stimulations cannot be spatially separated from the mind if they are to be efficacious. This line of reflection leads to the curious and, in the end, vitally important conclusion that the stimulation itself is non-spatial. We find, then, that on occasion of a non-spatial form of activity affecting the mind, a spatial world exists for us, a world that we take to be real and entirely external to us. This looks like an extreme paradox. Nevertheless it is a plain statement of the facts with a minimum of inference, and it involves no actual contradiction. Some inference there is, it is true, namely, that space is a form of the mind's constructive activity and therefore exists only for the mind while it is active in this particular way. As a minimum this is a considerable inference. It means that not only the space of fantasy but phenomenal space, extending as far as light can travel, is directly the work of the mind. Nothing could induce a person to accept this conclusion except the most incontrovertible evidence that it is the only conclusion possible in the premises and that it is adequate to resolve our difficulties. Let us, therefore, consider first some of the common misunderstandings that becloud the issue, then the difficulties inherent in the theory and how to meet them, and finally the explaining value of the conception in overcoming the contradictions encountered in all other conceptions.

One common misunderstanding takes this form: If you consider space as mental, you require that the mind be as vast as space. Another form of the same objection is: The space you are discussing is necessarily subjective—it is merely mental—whereas the space of the outside world is objective. What has the individual observer to do with the space on the other side of the world? Another

misunderstanding growing out of the foregoing is that if space is subjective, so are all objects in space. Hence the world, the physical universe, turns out to be a subjective mirage created by individual fantasy. Such a view would be the last expression of absurdity.

These misunderstandings are difficult to meet because they are the outgrowth of thought habits. Underlying them is the assumption that the mind is a mere container of its ideas and hence is itself in space. To see that this view of the mind is incorrect we have only to reflect that what we call mind must be something that thinks. Its thinking is the only evidence that it exists. It produces ideas, content and all, and its ideas are all its own. We possess ideas only when we have ideational content, that is, objects of thought. To say that the objects thought of are in the mind is to deny that they are the product of the mind's activity. In this connection, "are in the mind" is a meaningless expression. If then the space of experience is mental in origin, it is not mind nor any part of mind, but a form of the mind's constructive activity. How can this be? To answer this question is to obviate the one serious difficulty inherent in the conception itself.

But before we pass to its consideration, we must touch upon a second assumption that leads to misunderstanding about the mental origin of space. It is assumed that what is mental is therefore fanciful. Our most ordinary experiences so constantly negate this assumption that it falls away on a moment's reflection. In our thought-world we distinguish what is true and therefore independent of our mere thinking from what is the play of our fantasy. The one differs from the other, not in being non-mental, but in having a nature that the mind must respect. My typewriter, for instance, remains just what it is and where it is in space, though I exert my utmost will power to think it otherwise. But the flowers that my daydream pictures as imaginary objects show no such obstinacy. I can do with them what I will, just because their existence depends wholly upon myself. If I would replace them by

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something else or have them change into something else, I should need only to change my way of thinking about them; there would be nothing in their objective character to prevent my making this change. Such creations of idle fantasy are naturally regarded as merely subjective, whereas the objects that must be thought in a determinate way, if we would know the truth, are put into the apparently independent world where all their characteristics and interrelations are objectively determined for them. Now to provide the utmost objectivity for thought-content that we take to be matter of fact or truth, we need only hold that the mind in thinking this content is controlled by an independent power. Because the mind influenced by this power must think as it does, it objectifies the content of its thought. This is only another way of saying that we experience an objective world because something acts upon us in the way of successive stimulations. Science traces various media involved, but the results are actually experienced only when the immediate contacts are made. When these two assumptions are rooted out, the misunderstandings that grow about them wither away.

Once the misunderstandings are disposed of, the inherent difficulties abate surprisingly. We may still wonder how it is possible for the mind to be active spatially, but such wonder accompanies the recognition of any existence whatever. We can only wonder how anything exists or acts as it does or affects other things about it. Things have a nature expressive of their mode of activity—that is the fact of observation. That minds exist with a characteristic nature is evidenced by our thinking. We can certainly get no light on the nature of thought, either as a process or as a product, by identifying it with the brain. Thinking must be taken for what it is, and if it is not like physical movements, then we have two disparate kinds of activity to reckon with. But we find relief from the apparently bizarre character of the conception that space exists only for the mind that thinks it, if we reflect on the following considerations. (1) We are con-

cerned with the space of our sense world, not with a hypothetical space that can exist in its own right as the space of a world by itself. Such a space severed entirely from our knowable world is in the strictest sense unknowable. If it could be said to be a facsimile of the space of our world, it would have the same origin. But by hypothesis it is independent, hence we can safely ignore it in our present inquiry. (2) There is nothing in the physical world as known that cannot be essentially duplicated in a vivid dream. The dream-world can be as vast and quite as real for the dreamer while he dreams. Its unreality as judged by our waking experiences lies not in its being of mental origin, but in our not being able to provide a place for it outside the dream. (3) The immediate antecedents of sense perception, as we have said, are not the apprehended space objects, for they are many media removed. Effective stimulation requires immediate contact. Knowledge of a world in space follows upon the influence of a non-spatial something affecting the mind and controlling its activity. What this something is we shall have occasion to consider in due time.

When we speak of space, we usually think of the limitless void that envelops the world. But this is a derived idea. We certainly do not experience it in its entirety any more than in its empty purity. Every perception has its own space, which is limited and full of objects and continues only as long as the perception lasts. A slight change in position makes the perceptive space different both in extent and in content. Only as the mind, by means of experiences that we need not here specify, is able to single out the common characteristics of these perceptual spaces and blend them into a continuum, do we have the conception of an all-containing space, of which the spaces of sense perception are but parts. Since this continuum is, as we have said, a limiting abstraction, we naturally think of it as in itself empty, homogeneous, and infinite. Manifestly it is quite as much a thought construction as are the perceptual spaces.

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Does this conception of space as a form of the mind's constructive activity prove adequate? Can it meet the difficulties and resolve the contradictions? Most of the difficulties encountered by the contrasting view of space can be summed up in the dilemma: Either space has the nature of a thing, influencing other things, and then it is not space at all; or it exerts no influence whatever on things, and then to be in space or to be spatially related is without meaning. Either space is an energy or it is nothing, and as an experience it is neither. Now the view that space is the form of the mind's response to stimulation resolves the dilemma with ease. Space is not a thing, not an energy or influence, nor yet is it a meaningless vagary or mere emptiness. It is the thought structure of the mind's experiences. As such it presupposes a dynamic transaction which is non-spatial in character, but which determines the relations of objects in space to one another. Objects influence one another in accordance with space variants. This fact produces the impression that space itself is the source of the connection, or at least a sort of go-between. That such an impression is illusory need not now be argued. The space of the mind's experience world has all the objectivity and reality that experience can give it, and space relations are as real as the objects related in space.

Furthermore the apparent discrepancy between perceptual and geometrical space is adjusted by thinking of space as a form of experience. Perceptual space is limited in range to the objects of an actual perception, whereas geometrical space is the all-encompassing space of the whole objective world. The two, however, can be readily harmonized. The many perceptual spaces all express the same laws of perspective and relation, hence they inevitably blend into a unitary continuum. Its unity is involved in the unity of experience. From the subjective point of view the unity of space may mean also the unity in the form of the mind's activity. Such a statement of the case seems satisfactory till we try to include literally all the

spaces that make up our experience. The space of the objective world is one without doubt, but what of dream-spaces and the spaces of imaginary scenes such as we find in novels? The impulsive answer is that they are not real spaces. Nevertheless they originate in the same way. The scene of a novel may be so vividly conceived that it seems almost as real as life itself. Dream-spaces are unquestionably real to the dreamer. When we say that space is one, we must mean, then, that it is one in so far as experience is a continuum. We may have as many spaces as we have distinctive, totally disparate experiences, though only one of them can be real to us at any given time. What right have we to say that only one can be real? The right lies in the conviction that space, being a continuum, cannot find room for a second space. The reality of one particular space rather than another depends on the nature of its contained objects.

The unlimited character of space can be explained in a similar way. Whether phenomenal space is unlimited or not, we cannot tell from actual experience, but we can be quite sure that the mental activity in which space originates does not contain in itself the hint of a limit. We can think space as far reaching as we wish, and know that if we would, we could think space beyond. All limits are therefore arbitrary.

As our concept of space is an abstraction from the experience of space-filling objects, the question is of interest and has been much discussed whether there could be a "real" space of less or more than three dimensions. A flat space of two dimensions is conceivable as a derived idea, but could not contain objects. We can think of such a space as a possibility only because we as the observers supply the indispensable third dimension. But if we treat space as a system of relations, we can investigate the properties of a one-dimensional or a two-dimensional space without reference to their existing in the objective world. The properties could be expressed in mathematical formulae that would be perfectly valid within the

initial assumptions. Mathematicians have found such investigations worth their while. Yet it is not self-evident that their results apply to the objective world. The space that can contain the objects of sense perception requires three dimensions. But what of four-dimensional or n -dimensional space? These are names given to mathematical formulae elaborated on the analogy of our three-dimensional space. It is pure assumption that they can be objective in the sense that the external world is objective.

But may not time be the fourth dimension? This suggestion which has received much attention has led to results that have proved very significant, especially for celestial physics. It led Einstein, Eddington, Whitehead, and their followers to posit a primordial four-dimensional continuum as the original from which space and time, as we know them, are developed. Into the intricacies of these speculations we shall not venture to go. Suffice it to say that they yield the principle of relativity which seems destined to be of revolutionary importance. From the philosophical point of view we can appreciate the emphasis of the relativists upon the close inner connection between space and time. The ability to treat them as aspects of a four-dimensional continuum apparently disposes of the theory held by Newton and most physicists since his day that absolute space and absolute time are entities independent of the observing intelligence. They cannot be such entities if they are so fundamentally related as seems evident. But if we consider space and time as forms of the mind's constructive activity in sense perception, their relatedness follows as a matter of course; they are distinguishable aspects of the one experience. The mind can do what it will with its ideas so long as it respects their nature as revealed in experience. Einstein's mathematical operations upon space-time relations have apparently turned out to be valid for the objective world; he has given us new insight into the inner nature of these relations. As nothing can be in space and not also in time, and nothing in time can be objectified except under

the spatial form, continued study of the two together promises to throw still further light on the problem of reality.¹ Such study will force to the front the question, What sort of reality can endure through time and operate in space? The question will occupy us later.

2. TIME. Not only the outside world but also the inner life has a temporal form. There is no such thing as a non-temporal experience. This very universality of time is an embarrassment when we try to tell what it is. We cannot imagine or even think a condition unconnected with time. We cannot so adjust ourselves as to look at it from the outside. When, for instance, we say that mathematical truth is non-temporal, we do not mean that its sphere of application is in a non-temporal world—an impossible notion, as we shall see—but rather that it is true for any adequately informed intelligence, anywhere, at any time. Another difficulty of a psychological nature is at first even more troublesome. We do not seem to be able, without special training, to think time except by picturing it as having dimensions, as standing or flowing or compassing events. But these are all space images. Space is the very essence and image of the eternally static, whereas time derives all its meaning from the fact of change. Things coexist in space, they succeed one another in time. Strictly speaking, only the present exists objectively, if indeed it does exist; the past is a memory, and the future an anticipation. The mind persistently tricks itself, and lands in confusion by transferring to an objective world its own apprehension of an ideal past and a future no less ideal. This confusion is responsible for some of the most vexatious blunders that we make in thinking about the nature of reality.

What do we mean, then, when we say that the world is in time? The answer must be in accord with certain facts. (1) Each event happens in its own time, yet is

¹ See S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*. For the mathematical treatment of the subject see A. S. Eddington, *Space, Time, and Gravitation*.

connected in experience with the event that follows. Thus there seems to be no break in the objective continuum. Only when we try to understand time, that is, grasp it as an idea, does it fashion itself into a succession of disparate instants. These instants are mutually exclusive; they never telescope, nor can one be prolonged into another, yet they blend in experience. From one point of view, then, there are as many times as there are events, and there are as many events as indivisible instants of time. This certainly is bewildering. From another point of view, time is one, a continuum, without apparent beginning or end; the instants are mere cross-sections or arbitrary divisions within the continuum. This view raises as many difficulties as does the other. Time as a continuum must somehow exist, but by definition as well as by the evidence of experience, the past no longer exists and the future is not yet, so that time again reduces itself to the indivisible instants which for thought are in no way connected. The two views must be harmonized. Time is a succession of discrete instants without duration, and time is an unbroken continuum whose very nature is to endure. Both these statements are evidently true. Yet how can they be harmonized? Only by viewing them as two complementary ways of looking at experience. If we think of time as an aspect of the mind's response in sense perception, the continuum becomes an obvious feature of each individual's enduring flow of experiences. The connections of part to part arise out of the unity of the mental life. On the other hand, the discrete disappearing instants that seem to the analyzing intellect to constitute time are the results of the search in the non-enduring for the underlying nature of duration. Both duration and the non-enduring elements are the work of the mind. Experience appears as a continuous succession of vanishing moments, or rather of events that follow hard upon one another.

(2) The experience of an event as present always involves a measurable duration in which can be distinguished

a past and a future. It is this past and this future that constitute the experienced present. Were it not for these elements the present would vanish entirely; the wall of partition between the two would be appropriated by the past and the future which do not exist.

It would not be enough to say that the past is a memory, for the word memory contains the problem. Remembering, as an act, is in the present though it refers to the past. The past, then, to which it refers must come into existence in the act of remembering. The past is ideal. It is constructed by the mind and as an act is in the present. In every respect it is what the exigencies of our experience and our interests require. If the constructed past contains many events that need to be arranged in a temporal order, it will seem to be extended and the first number of the series will seem far away. If we hold in consciousness but few events to be arranged, and especially if these are vividly before us, the series will seem short. The same event of a temporal series may seem near or far away in point of time according as we concentrate or withdraw our attention. Thus our past is continually changing. Every new experience modifies it by introducing a new interest, a new attitude. Some events become more interesting, some less, and some drop out altogether as the new experience captures attention. Not only are we thus continually reconstructing the past, but the work of reconstruction is all done in the present, making the past an integral part of our present experience. In other words, every experience is a complex in which some features are referred to a past as representing an experience that no longer exists in its original form, and some are held to constitute the immediate present. To be in time, then, is to have a place in experience; to be a part of the experience continuum is to have the temporal form.

When these obvious facts are admitted, the mental origin and nature of the past—form and content alike—seem to follow as a matter of course. Yet the conclusion is being questioned by some as unintelligible. They rea-

son that memories are in some sense replicas of the old experiences and are stored up somewhere, presumably in the cortex of the brain. Those who reason thus overlook two important facts. (a) An experience and a memory of it are different. While the memory may be almost as vivid, it lacks the qualitative detail of the original. If this were not the case, the later occurrence would have the status of a new experience and not of a mere memory. As a matter of fact, confusion may easily arise as to the status of a given experience whether, as content, it is something new or has been experienced before. The characteristic feature of a remembered experience is the reference of it to an ideal past. It is dated. So long as we can make this reference we have no difficulty in distinguishing the old from the new, the experience from the recollection.

(b) A past event can never again exist as that particular event. Even a repetition is another event with different connections. The event that ceases to be with its present leaves nothing behind it, except as the mind for which the event existed carries over the idea. As an event, it cannot push itself into a later present. This applies especially to the current notion that each event passes over into its successor, as if its life were thus prolonged. But such prolongation is unthinkable. There is no accumulation, no rolling together of reality, as Bergson might be interpreted as saying. The only possible way in which an event can continue is representatively in the life of the mind. The past then is made in the present. It lasts while the mind works in that particular way, and ceases as that identical past when the mind changes the form of its activity.

We rightly think of the past as changeless, because we can no longer manipulate the conditions that determine the character of the remembered experience. But changelessness pertains to it only because it no longer exists as event; there is nothing objective that can be changed. As constituted by the mind in the act of remembering, the past is manifestly as changeable as our interest in it. Just

as no two people can have in mind the same picture of an historic event, so no individual can continue to hold his own idea unchanged for long. From this point of view the changeless past is a pure fiction.

What we have said of the past applies *mutatis mutandis* to the future. Not only does the mind reconstitute its past experiences and thus create history; it sets before itself a something that represents what in the course of nature is expected to happen. When this is done with vividness, any future, however distant, is brought close to the present. In neither the past nor the future is the order of events under our control. The order may become confused, the series unduly shortened by dropping out important links, and the crudest inaccuracies committed, if we are sufficiently careless. Nevertheless we have the conviction that every event has its determinate place in the temporal series, and that its place can be known by us.

But how can we explain such knowledge? What in the stream of stimulations enables us to arrange our responses in the right order? Are there, in fact, any stimulations as the direct antecedents of the remembered experience? The easy way of meeting the issues is to say that the remembered experience is stored in the cortex and when the brain cells concerned are restimulated, the old experience recurs. But with that conception decisively rejected, not much of real explanatory value can be said. The problem is this: As both the past and the future are present constructs in so far as they exist for the knower, what in the present complex determines the order and distribution of the experiences, some of which are referred to the past and some thrown into a hypothetical future? The question can be answered only in a formal way and inferentially, since the temporal order is achieved in the very act of experiencing. We cannot experience the cause of an experience.

As regards reference to the past, we approach an explanation in distinguishing the actual factors at play. Within the ensemble of the mind's constructive responses

to present stimulations, there are separable portions each with characteristic marks. Some portions are less vivid, less insistent. As these are of such a nature that they cannot coexist with the others in the phenomenal world, they are relegated to a present that no longer exists. These portions are arranged in a temporal order, as near or remote, according to their characteristic marks, and also in conformity with what we know of the course of nature. The entire structure of the past is built up, consolidated, and made more definite with the growth of knowledge under the urge of practical needs. For instance, the interesting event of yesterday is thought as having occurred so many hours before our immediate present, because it is known to have happened under certain cosmic conditions. The known laws of change in the outside world then determine the definite place of the event in the series of experiences. The lapse of time, however, may seem long or short according to factors already mentioned. In spite of all indications, psychological and objective, we are likely to be inaccurate in our references to the past, unless we have recourse to memoranda or the testimony of other people.

The order in the anticipated events that constitute our ideal future is subject to the same uncertainties as the order of remembered events. But as regards the future we may seem slightly better off. At least the reference to the cosmic movements is likely to be more decisive, since the order of nature is the ground of expectation. We can know, generally speaking, that a certain number of changes must take place in nature before a given expectation can be realized.

That we have a temporal order at all comes about, as we have said, because certain objective situations are known to be mutually exclusive, cannot coexist. An object, for instance, cannot be hot and cold at the same time, though it can in successive moments of time. To make room for such incompatibilities we arrange our experiences in an order of sequence. Does this mean that in extra-mental reality the events occur simultaneously, or that they are

not successive until we arrange them? No, but it does mean that we apprehend them as a succession only as the mind weaves them together in a temporal order, and to do this the mind must command the entire series as a present possession. This necessity of a mental synthesis involved in the very existence of the time series explains the relativity of the time span. The length of time is a function of the number and character of the mutually exclusive events that we are able to hold in thought.

All that we have thus far been considering may seem to be purely a movement in the individual mind; but what of the cosmic time of external nature? In so far as it is known it differs from the time we have been discussing only in being a blend or abstract of the manifold temporal series that constitute our complex experience world. It is conceptual time, analogous to conceptual space. By methods of analysis and generalization we are able to grasp the events of the outside world as constituting a whole in which the succession is continuous and unending. The time series of experiences may be broken by periods of unconsciousness or by shifting attention, but the world order is inevitable, constant, and of comparatively uniform rate. By a simple act of abstraction we separate the order from the events themselves and view it as a pure one-dimensional continuum. We are strongly given to thinking this continuum as strictly non-mental. Must it not be if it is cosmic?

One of the deepest lines of cleavage in current philosophy is here suggested. Is there an independent time distinct from all mental construction? If we deny that there is, we face the problem of a changeless objective world, a now that has no relation to a past or a future. Thought can make nothing of such a monstrosity. If we affirm the existence of an independent time, we must conclude that everything is in flux except time, or rather that the world continuously vanishes in the act of coming into being. This would mean that when we think of the world as substantial reality we misrepresent it; the only reality

would be time itself. We are not now ready to face this issue. Leaving it until our general argument brings us to a higher level from which to consider it, we may revert to the question, In what sense is the world as known in time?

The world is known to be in time as the knower rethinks the events and arranges them in a temporal order. Time is simply the order of arrangement for these events. Had we not this power of ideal recovery, there would be no time for us and hence no world. The distinction of past, future, and present depends on various psychic factors. Though the remembered or anticipated event is as a rule relatively simpler, less vivid, less obtrusive, the decisive factor in the distinction is volitional. The present is the time in which we are acting; the past, the time in which we no longer act; and the future, the time in which we expect to act.

The volitional basis of temporal distinctions is ignored when we think of time as a conceptual content. The result is disastrous. As conceptual content, all three tenses must be thought as coexisting in a sort of timeless duration. Time thus becomes indistinguishable from space, change is unprovided for, and the world is reduced to illusion. The concept of duration is of great service and need not mislead us if we realize that it is a mere abstraction, a skeleton view of persisting experiences. The apprehension of a temporal series is time-encompassing, and time-encompassing is what we mean by duration. It is an image of a transaction. Just as we speak of duration as if it were something objective, so we may think of memory as a storehouse, anticipation as a quasi possession. Both experiences intermingle with the present; yet they are held apart, and each is given its distinctive character by its relation to the conative side of our nature. The suggestion that time is the fourth dimension comes apparently from the tendency to intellectualize time and thus assimilate it to space.

We may summarize, then, by saying that time, subjec-

tively considered, is the principle of arrangement of mutually exclusive experiences; objectively, it is the warp of our weaving. As a mental synthesis time involves a fairly complex activity of a creative sort. That time seems to be extra-mental is explained by its connection with objects of a temporal series. The objects are quite naturally thought to be independent of the mind, because they maintain themselves against any non-physical effort to change them. But the apparent independence of objects can, as we shall see presently, be easily explained in harmony with the conclusion just stated. This being assumed, we can see why the many perceptual time series so easily blend into one, and why the one time is thought to be limitless. It is one because it is the continuous activity of the same mind; it is limitless because nothing in the working of the principle compels the mind to stop in its synthesis.

In working out a conception of time we find complications like those encountered in the discussion of space. There are times and times, and some of them refuse to weld. Dream time like dream space, belongs to a different world from real time. And so of the various temporal systems developed in imaginary plots. Such time systems are as real as the make-believe objects that they connect.

3. SUBSTANCE. Space and time are the conditions of our having a world of objects, but it is the objects themselves that first arrest our attention. We live in a world of physical things; with them we must continuously reckon; the laws of their nature we must respect. Life consists largely in finding our way among them, adjusting ourselves to them, and discovering methods of making them do work for us. We may doubt much of what has been held to be true of the outside world, but we cannot seriously doubt the existence of these physical things. They are the substantial realities of experience, complex in structure, having manifold properties, occupying space, and enduring through time. Assuming, then, that they are real and exist somehow in their own right, we have now to ask, What is involved in our knowing them as

individual substances with diverse and changing properties?

When we try to answer this question, others crowd upon us for preliminary consideration. What precisely do we mean by thinghood or substance? Is it an existence distinct from its changing properties? If we could think away the properties and have a residuum of substance, what would it be? But if we should have no residuum, must we not wholly identify the unitary substance with its manifold properties and its changing states? To the unsophisticated a state of a thing is the thing at the moment manifesting its various properties. But just as we are perplexed to distinguish the substance from its manifested properties yet cannot identify it with them, so we seem debarred from giving substance more actual existence than is contained in its present, though we call it a substance because it is supposed to have existed through a past. Our conception of substance thus reveals some awkward inconsistencies. In it we seem to be trying to hold together two incompatible notions—the manifold properties (appearances) that constitute the substance and the unity of the substance as presumably something other than the properties. But our difficulties will largely clear away as we study the part substance plays in our mental economy.

To apprehend physical things as real existences, we must receive continuous stimulations from an independent source. When we say "continuous," we mean that no recognizable intervals exist between the successive beats of stimulation. Nevertheless the nature of time compels us to think of the stimulation as a continuously renewed impulsion. Each renewal follows so closely on its predecessor and is followed so immediately by another, that the whole constitutes for us a continuum. It is this continuum that we presuppose in the experience of objects. The successive stimulations may all be so similar in character that the mental response will mean a thing existing without perceptible change; or the stimulations may be so different one from another that the response will mean a changing

thing. In either case the thing or substance is that which the mind posits as carrying and uniting the qualities experienced under the control of the stimulations. As existing, the thing is located in the present, yet the present is only the temporary terminus; the thing extends back into a past that exists only ideally.

At this point it is difficult for us to avoid a certain lapse in our thinking. So prone are we to assume that external objects are independent things, that we find it far from easy, without losing all touch with reality, to hold strictly to our problem of ascertaining what the mind does in thinking substance. If we confuse the world of known and knowable objects with a supposed independent world, our perplexities become contradictions. A thing independently real would have to be and not to be its states. As identical with its states, it would lose itself in the succession; but as different from its states, it would cease to be the ground of the succession, and substance and states would be hopelessly divorced. Furthermore to exist in an independently real world, substances would need a timeless time in which to exist, that is, they could not change without losing their substantial character. The same difficulty of a timeless existence pertains to each state of the substance. There could be no succession in such a world.

When we avoid this confusion and hold to our problem, we find that two aspects of our experience in sense perception call for explanation; one is the emergence of objects as substantial things in the external world, the other is the order of their sequence. The easiest and most natural way to satisfy this vaguely felt need for explanation is to posit something of the nature of force or energy as the cause both of the manifestation and the order. This is likely to satisfy us so long as we are not too critical and move well within the sphere of practical interests. Things or substances thus become for the knower the dynamic center of activity. Each thing is marked off from all others by the character and rate of its qualitative changes. It is what it is by the law of its nature, which

means that its manifestations are the expression of law and, therefore, all emanate from the same source. This source thus becomes for us not only the cause of the observed activities but the cause of our having the experience of thinghood. It is in this way that we are able, with some show of reason, to refer all cause to the physical world. The uncritical view by which we live is, then, that the objects of the external world are themselves the source of stimulation by which we come to know them, and that they mutually determine their properties or states in accordance with inherent laws.

This analysis of our common-sense view is supported by the reflection that the essential characteristic of substance is resistance. A substance or thing is that in nature which up to a certain limit withstands our efforts to change its states, but which yields when the pressure is applied beyond the limit. Both the resistance and the yielding are significant. If the world of things resisted without yielding at any point, there could be no motion, no life, no experience. If, contrariwise, the yielding were entirely without resistance, like Lord Kelvin's frictionless fluid, there would be no evidence that anything existed. Thus we reason plausibly about our world. We find support not only in the idea of resistance, but in that of change according to law. While each thing is looked upon as a more or less self-contained center of activity, it is also observed to affect other things in characteristic ways. The nature of a thing or substance can thus be expressed by the series of changes possible to it under enviroing conditions. As soon as we begin to reflect on this situation, substance threatens to vanish into phases of activity. But in practical life we do not need to reflect very much on such matters. Our whole conception of external reality thus turns on a combination of conceptions that will not bear close inspection, yet perform an important function in connecting the elements of our experience that seem to belong together, and holding separate those that apparently should be kept apart.

The immense practical value of this device for organizing the elementary features of our experience amply justifies it, even though to critical thought it seems faulty. The mind can make nothing of the continuous flow of events. It must have something in the temporal series that remains constant in order to provide a resting place for thought. Otherwise nothing could be laid hold of and made a theme for study. When, therefore, the members of a succession seem to follow a law, we affirm substance as the sufficient explanation. When, on the other hand, the succession does not reveal any dominant law, we distribute the events into various distinct groups, that is, we affirm that more than one substance is involved. To think of change as without foundation in reality is absurd. To think of this causal reality as elsewhere than at the point of its manifestation seems equally absurd. Hence the mind never rests till it can think of substance dynamically and as located in the midst of the activities to be accounted for. It is the dynamic element in the substance which makes it seem concrete and independent of us. If under critical pressure we should try to mend our ways and abolish the idea of substance as substratum explaining the successive evanescent events, we should have our labor for our pains.

The external world becomes real and significant for us in the act of substantializing our experiences. The ease with which we do this conceals the activity involved. It seems to do itself, or rather it seems to be a mere presentation to consciousness of the thing-world in its elementary completeness. Only as we analyze the result into its distinguishable steps do we begin to appreciate the nature and complexity of the work done by the mind. It must build its world of things out of a flow of incipient experiences ("sensa"). These elements are never thought in isolation, but are combined into groups and endowed with energies in accordance with the apprehended order. We overcome the logical difficulty of the one (as thing) and the many (as the states of a thing) by saying that

the multiplicity is in the states and the unity is in the law of their sequence. The thing is more than the law by as much as it is thought to be of the nature of a force or energy. This vague conception of thinghood, when generalized, gives us the current notion of matter as furnishing the body to law, and effectiveness to energy.

Not only do we think of separate things as centers of controlled activity, but these things act as if they affected one another. This fact complicates our world in some respects and simplifies it in others. Ignoring the complications for the present, since they appear only to critical thought, we can see the simplifying influence of the new idea. Instead of having a world composed of infinitely numerous unrelated things we now advance to the conception of groups of things that belong together. Comparing these groups we find that they too seem connected and can be formed into larger groups. Thus in the quest for a super-substance or a generally dominating force, we create the problem of causal connection. But before we take up this—the central problem in philosophy—we need to devote a few paragraphs to the subject of change.

4. CHANGE. Our world of substantial things in space and time is also a changing world. Change characterizes it throughout; nowhere can we find anything that does not change, unless we except the content of our concepts, and they are said to be changeless only because the experience of change involves a passing from one conceptual content to another. Objects that to the casual observer seem to be absolutely immutable are known to the scientific student, equipped with instruments of precision, to be undergoing continuous change. Even the ancients knew this; at least Heraclitus declared that all things flow; nothing is changeless except the law of change. It is, as we have said, partly by the rate and manner of change that we distinguish one object from another. But the fact that we can distinguish a rate and manner of change implies that the succession has a certain order and arrangement. To account for this order we affirm causal connec-

tion. Thus in our most elementary experiences we find at work three closely related concepts expressive of three distinguishable aspects—substance, change, and causal connection. Each implies the others.

We have now to consider what are the mental elements in change. These elements have already been differentiated in our discussion of substance. There we saw that a substance was a unity of successive experience data expressing a definable nature. That the data may mean substance, they must follow a certain order, excluding absolute breaks. So it is with change. Unless the different experiences in a temporal series are so related that they appear as the successive states of the same thing, they are reckoned as expressing not change but mere succession. Thus if we saw a chair to the right of our desk and a moment later saw another chair like the first one but on our left, we might conclude that the second chair was merely the first one in a changed position. But to draw this conclusion we should want to know not only that the first chair was no longer on our right, but that sufficient time had elapsed for it to be removed to the place on our left. If there had been no appreciable interval between the sight of the chair in the first position and the sight of the chair in the second position, we should think of the different appearances not as a case of change but as indicating the existence of two independent chairs. In short, the laws of translation through space must be satisfied if we would identify the chairs as the same object in different positions. In all change, whether translation or internal modification, something posited as substance must be thought as continuing to exist through the series of appearances and exemplifying a law of connection among successive manifestations. Kant puts this idea aphoristically when he says that only the permanent changes. The essence of change, then, is not in the successive states, but in the law of the sequence. It expresses a relationship between the successive states of a thing. This law is interpreted as the substance or thing when the element of

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permanence is uppermost in our thought, and as change when the differences among the states are stressed.

That change involves a constructive mental activity is evident. It presupposes the original fixating act, an interweaving of experiences in a temporal series, the discovery of a definite order binding the members of the series together, and the recognition that these members are the successive states of the same thing. If any of these steps should fail, the result would be something less than the consciousness of change.

The issue is often complicated at this point by the intrusion of the irrelevant question, Do not changes take place whether we apprehend them or not? Even if we should answer this question in the affirmative, we should leave our own problem untouched. We are concerned solely with the question, How do we come to know change? It is the mode of procedure that interests us just now. When we get the facts of analysis before us, we shall then be ready to draw momentous conclusions from them.

The changing thing is apparently both itself and not itself, both permanent and successive. One source of perplexity in this conception is the nature of all ideational content. The content of an idea does not change. We may change, but the idea does not. We may pass from one idea content to another and realize a difference, but the change is not in either idea. The litmus paper may cease to be blue and become red, but the idea of blue remains the same, even when it no longer applies to the object. The question then arises, How can we think change by means of concepts that are themselves changeless in content? If all our mental furniture consists of concepts and all concepts are by nature static, change is apparently inconstruable. This purely intellectual difficulty looks formidable, in spite of the fact that we apprehend change with perfect ease. The full explanation involves much that we are not yet ready to discuss. To meet our present difficulty we need only point out that change as an

experience is not a concept at all. It is the shock of difference felt in passing from one state of the object to another. Change is interconceptual. Later on, in the study of the self, we can carry forward this suggestion.

5. CAUSAL CONNECTION. In sense perception each object seems at first to be individual and self-contained, because of its distinctive manner of change. Yet there is abundant evidence even to the casual observer that different contiguous objects change with reference to one another. They cannot, therefore, be wholly isolated. How completely they are connected is a question for science to answer. That they are all connected and form a system has for science become practically axiomatic. The connections are not only contemporaneous but successive in time. That is, the sense world, at any one instant, is thought as not only forming a system of interconnected elements, but also as somehow a resultant of antecedent conditions. This conception of causal connection is one of the central problems of philosophy.

Our interest at present is in the question, how the mind acquires the conception of interrelatedness in nature. Yet it is needful to consider first what we mean by cause. The passage from substance to cause is inevitable. Just as in the case of a thing with changing states we think that something of the nature of energy permeates and holds together the states and explains their order, so we affirm a cause to account for the apparent connections of substance with substance. We felt as we considered substance that the conception of a dynamic substratum could not easily be justified in the eye of the critic, and yet was persistently affirmed because of its practical value. The feeling of uncertainty increases as we try to utilize the same device to explain the interconnection of things.

The idea of causal connection is itself far from clear. As the basic principle of explanation in the field of objective nature, it has been subject to various modifications of meaning. These meanings so blend in ordinary thinking that any discussion of the subject is apt to seem hazy

and confusing. Two meanings in particular should be sharply distinguished and from them a third may be derived which is intermediate. These three meanings may be distinguished verbally as (1) Productive Causation or effective volition, (2) Scientific Causation or uniformity of coexistence and sequence, and (3) Causation as popularly understood, which includes the idea of a force or energy resident in the object as the real ground of any emergent effects. A word concerning each of these will further reveal the work done in getting our sense world.

One of the inscrutable mysteries of experience, not less a mystery because incessantly repeated throughout our waking life, is effective volition. Prompted by desire, we will to produce a change in the outside world so as to make it yield some further good; and immediately the muscles of the body respond in concerted activity for the realization of the purpose. We call this volitional or productive causation; but we mean only that following an act of volition, physical changes take place. The connection, so far as we can see, between the act and the result is merely a matter of fact and not at all necessary. Its frequency in experience dulls the sense of strangeness, but only multiplies the mystery for thought. Nevertheless, whatever may be the explanation, if there is one, volitional causation is the model of all causal connection, since it is the only one we know directly through experience. It is at times set aside or modified under stress of the difficulties encountered in construing it, only to be reinstated, as after all the one type that does not beg the question.

Primitive man was naive enough to accept it as everywhere in control. He peopled the world with spirits, each having limited powers, and each administering the affairs of its little domain in accordance with its own private will. In this rough, uncritical way were the activities of the outside world explained to the satisfaction of the primitive man. Spirits made the wind blow, other spirits caused the growth of plants, others brought the rain or the lightning and thunder. It is hard for one trained in

the modern way of looking at nature to imagine fully such a view of the world.

With the rise of scientific interest and the growing emphasis on the objective point of view, the volitional element has become less and less evident, until in the conception now prevalent only the bare form of connection is retained. When the scientist says that every event has its cause in the immediately preceding situation, he means that every event has a determinate place in an orderly world. In thinking thus he has in mind order more than determinateness. If any one should ask him what actually determines the place of a given event in the cosmic series, he would—true to form—simply refer to the antecedents. By so doing he saves himself from interminable controversy and satisfies all scientific needs. But the reference to the antecedents is really no more than a reassertion of orderliness. If one should take it as an explanation, that is, as accounting for what happens in experience, it would signally fail.

The most serious difficulty would lie in thinking a connection between two events that occupy different moments of time. By definition the antecedent precedes the event, and hence ceases to be by the time the event occurs. The temporal separation breaks the causal connection; the hiatus is complete. A productive cause must, therefore, coexist with its effect. Some have thought to avoid this conclusion by referring to the antecedent as transforming itself in producing what follows. "Is not matter indestructible? Does it ever really cease to be when it takes on new forms?" The fallacy in this bit of picture-thinking has already been exposed. As matter is merely an abstraction from material things, it has only an instrumental function. So long as we continue to have experiences of natural processes, matter in this sense will continue to be indestructible. Other attempts at explanation hover about the idea of a force or influence that is supposed to survive the antecedent and pass over into the next moment of time and work for the production of the effect. This sugges-

tion brings us to the third or popular conception of cause in nature.

We have seen that the scientist, in working out his problem of tracing uniformities in nature, has no need of cause in the productive sense. Yet only slowly did he discover that he could do without it. His present conception is the last stage in a rather painful process of stripping and attenuating the old persistent spiritistic conception. Only because the spiritistic conception survives in modified forms do we have to reckon with the third meaning of causal connection. This uncritical meaning is, as might be anticipated, full of vagueness and confusion. While discarding the intellectual or purposive element in volitional causation, it retains the assumed power to produce results. The vague idea is held that resident capacities in things enable them to affect one another and bring about a new situation. Though things as mere things have no will and cannot plan or realize a purpose, they can maintain themselves, can up to a certain limit resist efforts to change them, and can influence one another. Evidently in this idea we have something more than description and less than explanation. While appearing within the precincts of science, it is exorcised by scientific criticism. Though philosophical in intent, it is discredited among critical philosophers. But it maintains itself everywhere by virtue of our easy-going ways of thinking. So long as we are uncritical, it has the strongest possible support in the ineradicable conviction that whatever happens in nature must have a sufficient cause. Where are you to look for this cause if not among the objects of the sense world? Is not the cause where it acts? and it acts among things. It must be force.

This conception of force is basal in popular philosophy. Its affinity with the notion of substance has been pointed out. It is scarcely more than this notion extended to explain the interconnection of things. In the case of substance we are not greatly troubled by apparent contradictions; the idea has practical value, it helps to organize

our incipient experiences. So long as it works it justifies itself. But when we would explain interconnection by reference to the idea of force, logic insists on being heard. Force, as blind and unintelligent, has no way of resisting dissolution into mere process. If for the time being we assume that it does persist, it immediately breaks up into as many forces as there are things, then it passes over into the states of things and thereby multiplies itself indefinitely. At this point its logical instability becomes manifest. It is not any particular event in a causal series, but each in turn, persisting yet changing; the same considered abstractly as cause, yet different considered as event; one yet many—an impossible conception except for an uncritical attitude of mind.

Nevertheless the notion of a pervasive persistent force as the ground of change in the world about us haunts all our thinking. This is perhaps because it superficially satisfies the mental demand for a real explanation of why things act as they do, and because at the same time it has the semblance of being scientific, since it discards spiritistic or volitional implications. Under criticism it passes inevitably into one of the two types previously distinguished. How to choose between these two contrasting types we shall have to consider later on. We may then find that each is valid in its place. Causal connection is so intrinsically a philosophical problem that its solution with the implications constitutes philosophy.

As a mental functioning, the recognition of causal connection involves a fairly complex mental activity, and is throughout a construction, as has already become evident. The insight that every event and every relation between events is unique suggests the character of the work done in attaining the idea of causal connection. This work includes complicated processes of classification and the discovery of invariable ratios between given events and the rest of the world of events.

6. QUALITY, QUANTITY, AND NUMBER. We have now seen in part how the mind, under stimulation from an

extra-mental source, weaves its sense material into the experience of a temporal-spatial world of substantial things that are ever changing, and that sustain such relations to one another as lead us to affirm causal connection. All through our discussion thus far we have assumed qualitative and quantitative distinctions among things. These deserve a word, because they further reveal the mental activity in sense perception.

The qualities of things seem to be original sense data which the mind simply receives as given. But they are no more sense data than are substances. When the mind responds "figuratively," as James would say, to the stimulations, the thing with its qualities stands before us. Just as things or substances come into being for us only by a complex, though subconscious, activity of the mind, so the qualities or attributes of the thing exist only by virtue of mental work. The apprehension of quality requires a sense of contrast. Thus red is known in contrast with some other color. Heat declares itself only in the presence of different temperatures. The sense of contrast involves comparison, which is itself a rather complex process. For comparison of one object with another, both must be held before consciousness at the same time and our attention must pass from one to the other. A feeling of sameness or difference results.

We need to recall the frequently mentioned fact that things with their qualities are strictly responses to stimulations. To account for qualitative differences among things by reference to corresponding differences among the stimulations is merely to assert that the qualities, whatever their nature, have a sufficient ground. The apprehension, then, of quality, presupposes stimulations and a complex process, including the fixation of sense data, a comparison of these with one another, a feeling of sameness or difference, and the appropriate identifications. These steps are not taken consciously, and their order here given is logical rather than temporal, but they indicate what the

mind must do to get its world of qualitatively different objects.

In the apprehension of quantity we go a step further and generalize upon qualitative distinctions. Only as the qualities are reduced to a common denominator can they be compared quantitatively. In such comparison we must have a standard or unit of measure. We then answer the question, How much? in terms of this standard. As soon as we get beyond the most elementary quantitative comparisons, we encounter difficulties in determining what the standard shall be. Where extreme accuracy is required, as in scientific work, the selection of a standard becomes a task of considerable complexity, as is evidenced by the work of the Bureau of Standards established by government.

Counting and measuring complete the quantitative comparisons. We are now interested only in pointing out that all the processes involved in counting, adding, subtracting, multiplying, dividing, are mental. Hence we must class number as one of the elementary forms of mental activity.

7. PURPOSE. The foregoing characteristics of nature as it appears to us in sense perception are so structural, so necessary to the very existence of nature, that we may, with Kant, call them constitutive principles. There is another characteristic, not so evidently necessary and not exactly structural, yet manifest in our ordinary view of nature, namely, purpose. To unscientific, practical people every object in nature expresses a variety of purposes. As soon as a person is asked to name the dominant purpose, he begins to grope. The object seems to conserve many purposes but is defined by none. Moreover purpose cannot be anything objective, it is not concrete or tangible. Nature might conceivably be exhaustively described without once referring to purpose. Why then mention purpose as a fundamental aspect of the sense world? Because we are studying how the mind actually proceeds in getting its concrete actual world of sense perception, and can-

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not ignore purpose without overlooking a primary characteristic.

What do we mean when we say that there is purpose in nature? As applied to human conduct, purpose clearly refers to the controlling ideal in the working out of a plan. This ideal and the material to be fashioned are quite distinct; either might exist without the other. But when we speak of purpose in nature we must think of the material as existing in and for the purpose. The purpose would have to work throughout the concrete material, whatever its form, and the material in every stage of its transformation would be exactly what the purpose required. No conception of purpose in nature that falls short of this could bear a moment's criticism. On what grounds do we incline to attribute purpose to nature? The psychologist would point out that we are simply transferring to the objective world a characteristic of our subjective life of volition. While this is true as a description of what happens, it does not give the reason for the transfer. The suggestion of purposiveness in nature comes from many sources, two especially. (1) Living organisms show continuous adjustment to their environment whereby they maintain themselves, grow, and produce after their kind. (2) The environment itself is adapted to the performance of these functions. The very usability of things points to a more or less definite relation to some end. Further, every object whether in the organic or the inorganic world, awakens our interest and to that extent stimulates us to seek the purpose in things. Yet experience does not encourage such a quest. Purposiveness is vaguely felt as a sort of aura enveloping all experience but becoming increasingly elusive as we endeavor to fixate it in a definite concept. We live in a world that superficially seems to be full of purposiveness; yet nowhere except in human devising can we find a purpose that helps to explain the nature of a thing. Because of this fact the scientific biologist, who might be most interested in objective purpose, dismisses the matter and refers all vital

adjustments to adaptation. But adaptation is a kind of purpose with intelligent forecast left out. Organisms and environment are adapted to each other. So too the different parts or functions within the organism are mutually adjusted. This is as far as science can go. Because science can make so little of purpose, people of scientific tendency would read purpose out of their sense world. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, its unobtrusive presence colors every concrete experience connected with that world. We may then consider purposiveness as playing its part in the make-up of our sense experience. Later we shall see a more fundamental reason for holding to purpose as a principle of explanation. Purpose, while not a constitutive principle in the Kantian sense, may well be what Kant called a regulative principle in accordance with which we must think nature. Just as the notion of substance includes a reference to the past, so purpose reaches into the future and takes account of what is to be.

Other principles have been distinguished; but we need not consider them here, since our present aim is simply to show that the most necessary features of concrete experience are mental in origin.

These general aspects of nature as experienced in sense perception reveal a very complex constructive activity on the part of the mind. They are not separable elements, but rather the distinguishable principles of construction. Because of their generality they have commonly been called categories, to distinguish them from other less general concepts. We build our world in accordance with these principles. They are as real as the laws of growth in a tree, and are as non-existent. We have no choice in conforming to them. Given the stimulations, the form of response is as inevitable as any phenomenon of life.

CHAPTER III

THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY

1. THE WORLD AS A CONSTRUCTION BY THE INDIVIDUAL. We must further postpone the question whether an external world actually exists apart from all mental activity. We still need to fix our attention exclusively on the world as we experience it. But another question, which to many seems not another, arises concerning the validity of our sense world. Is the world we have been sketching real? Is it actually the world of everyday contacts? Or have we, after all, been moving about in an ideal realm where thought laws and structural principles may hold sway, but with which the real physical forces in nature—the substantial earth, the flood of waters, the sun and the distant stars—have nothing to do? This question, as an inner protest, has repeatedly forced itself on our attention as we carried forward the discussion of the thought forms. The answer is, we repeat, that we have been discussing this physical universe as it is, in so far as it comes within our ken. But we have considered only its intellectual structure. For this reason it seems to be merely a simplified imitation of nature, a film of unrealities.

That this seeming should be taken for fact without much thought is easily explained. We are primarily practical beings, busy with making adjustments and overcoming obstacles. Preoccupied in this way, we seldom have occasion to think of the world of the not-me as itself an integral part of our experience. This attitude of indifference or innocent ignorance is abetted by the difficulties we are continually encountering in our efforts to har-

monize our thought with experienced realities. We blunder as if by nature, we make false identifications, misjudge perspectives, and draw erroneous inferences. We are likely to be careless or inattentive; the sense stimulations may be insufficient to call forth the correct responses; there may even be structural conditions that make our conclusions inevitably false. Practically all experience accentuates the distinction between the actual world in which we live and our thought about that world. Hence the problem of validity is fundamental.

In approaching the problem of how the mind blunders and recovers, we need again to consider from a slightly different viewpoint the ground already traversed. We noted that the stimulations which are the immediate antecedents of sense experience come in blended rapidity, each ceasing instantly as the next comes into being. This follows from the nature of temporal existence. If, then, the mind's response were without constructive activity, the result would be a continuous flow, or hardly a flow in any definable sense. We could not call it experience, for that implies a permanent element. The first act of the mind then is to give fixity to some feature of its response. The stimulations presumably are all different, but the mind must make some part of its response representative of the rest. Thus the apprehension of an approaching or receding object involves many actual perceptions of the object at different distances from us and consequently of different sizes, not to consider the other differences. But the real object of sense experience is not supposed actually to vary in these manners. The reality is a fixed quantity with relatively fixed characteristics which need not be identified with any one of the several perceptions. This fixation of parts of the experience continuum, making them representative of the rest, is what we call generalization, and the result is a universal, though it is also an individual object.

All our sense knowledge is therefore representative; it has the character of universality and bears the marks of

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being a manufactured article. The ultimate individual in which there is no universal element can never be reached. We start with universals as things, and our world-building consists in making them over and organizing them into groups. While this is interesting in itself, it is of paramount significance in the study of validity, for it is the source of our most troublesome errors. We may be very much concerned as to which of the successive appearances shall be taken to be the real object, yet whatever our choice, it will represent the others only inaccurately and in a general way. Hence we might infer that, if we could see things as they are, we should behold reality continuously slipping past our fixities. Fortunately for practical life, we do not need such vision; it would be a source of embarrassment to us.

As psychology teaches us, our actual choice depends on certain considerations of convenience. So long as we can account for the main differences between the accepted real and the other members of the perceptive series, by reference to relative distance, difference in atmospheric conditions, and the like, we satisfy practical needs, and are inclined to ignore the inevitable inaccuracies. If we must take these into account, as in making the specifications for a building, we allow ample margins. The business of science is to reduce the element of inaccuracy to a minimum.

But through carelessness or lack of data we often fail to reach the needful degree of accuracy, and when trouble arises we conclude that we have made a mistake. It is entirely a question of more or less. When the mistake is glaring we are apt to class it with illusions, though that term is generally reserved for false identifications among objects. The point to be noted is that the only difference between illusion or mistake and accepted fact is one of degree. The element of inaccuracy is inescapable.

The test of truth in sense perception is then entirely a practical one. This means that a given deliverance of the senses may for a certain purpose be accepted as true or accurate, while for some other purpose, perhaps more ex-

acting or even simply different, it would be manifestly false. We have no matters of fact that are not constructed to order or that exist without reference to human interests. They all express a human bias. Their stability merely reflects the continuity of practical attitudes. This is true even of the simplest facts of experience, like the apprehension of the so-called primary qualities of objects. These qualities, such as extension, figure, number, motion, are wholly objective, yet their relativity to experience cannot be denied.

This relativity of truth becomes more striking as we continue to trace the law-giving presence of the universal in all sense thinking. From the primary acts of fixation, by which we secure perceptive universals, through to the utmost reach of scientific generalization, every step is controlled by practical exigencies and involves the construction of new universals. These successive universals of increasing generality and simplicity are of course indispensable to comprehensive thinking. They constitute the major part of our mental furniture and tend to usurp the place of concrete individual objects. When this usurpation takes place their congenital inaccuracy exposes us to serious danger. To make the usurpation plausible, these abstract universals must needs acquire what, for want of a better term, might be called psychic filling, something essentially indeterminate, nebulous, amorphic, the hazy suggestion of the reality that is being ignored.

All may go well with such devices in our mental economy so long as we remain within the logical range of application; but once the universal of high generality has established itself as a quasi individual (has been hypostatized), the temptation is to use it as if it had all the rich content and usability of the individuals subsumed under it. Then trouble begins. We proceed unwittingly to draw conclusions as to the nature of individuals in all their complexity, on the strength of what we know about the class universal. This fallacy of abstraction (*secundum quid*), like the weeds in an ill-kept garden, will vitiate all!

our thinking unless we are continually on our guard against it.

No wonder that universals, looked upon as expressing the inner nature of things, should, down through the ages, have been treated as possessing a reality of their own, a reality more fundamental even than that of things. They are relatively more permanent, are more usable in all theoretical constructions, and are capable of being more adequately expressed in language. As expressed they become the verbal coin of all communications, the containers of transmitted lore, the instruments of scientific manipulation, the basic elements in all our thinking. In what sense, if at all, universals are real, we shall need to determine later. But evidently they lack the tangible, sense-impressing qualities that we find in physical things. Because of this patent fact, the position of the realists—that universals or essences are real in the objective sense—has been challenged by the so-called nominalists, who hold that universals are only names for classes and at best exist only in the mind. From our studies thus far we can take issue with the nominalists to a certain extent. We can point out that even the individual thing is a true universal, a synthesis of successive appearances; hence to call a universal, as such, a mere name is to commit oneself to the absurd conclusion that all objects of sense are fictions.

Within the world of experience the practical requirements of life must determine what is to be considered real and what not. Beginning with the most definite object of sense perception, we can legitimately call real all that stands the practical test. But can anything short of the strict individual in all its definiteness stand such a test, if the test is applied with all thoroughness? The answer is near at hand. It is furnished by what has just been said about the practical character of all synthesis in sense perception. In identifying an individual object, we demand only such definiteness as the interests at the time require. These may vary within wide limits. Hence what may appear as a complete individual at one time may seem

quite different at another. Thus the desk may, to our preoccupied interests, seem only a vague object as regards color, size, position, etc., since all we may want as we write is a support; but at any moment our attention may be called to various details. The desk then becomes more definite. It is the same desk, of course, in both instances, but only because the different experiences are made to refer to the one object. Thus we see that validity in experience is synonymous with usability.

At this point a vital and interesting question arises. What is the ultimate individual to which we refer our experiences? We may have various notions of an external object, each valid for a specific purpose, but the object itself remains the same; only our ideas about it change. This object is our standard of reference by which we test the validity of our varying conceptions. What is this object that we take to be real? If we can answer this question, the issue as to the reality of sense objects as universals can be easily decided. Of one thing we may rest assured, the ultimately real object is itself an experience or it is nothing for us. In referring to it, we have not transcended experience. Hence the answer to our question must already have been given in our study of the concept of substance.

In sense perception we may have a great variety of interests, mental preoccupations, degrees of alertness. The results will differ accordingly, even though the stimulations are practically the same. Or to use the language of ordinary life, we may view an object in a great variety of ways. Each shift of standpoint or of interest and attention gives us a different experience. But we account for the differences by reference to subjective conditions such as those mentioned. We are sure that in any given perception, if the mind were more attentive to the stimulations, or its interests were different, the object seen would take on more complexity and definiteness. Evidently, then, the real object must be that object which the mind holds before itself more or less vaguely, as being able to satisfy

all possible interests. This object is never existent in all its definiteness. It is simply an ideal of completeness, suggested by our ability to vary our apprehension in the ways mentioned. This real object, then, is in a sense doubly mental, while at the same time it becomes the test or standard of reality for all experiences that can be referred to it. It is emphatically a universal, and as such it has all the marks of relativity inherent in other universals. Both its fixity and its trustworthiness arise from the continuity and character of the stimulations conjointly with the constancy of our mental reactions thereon.

Thus far we have been discussing the mental activity in perceiving physical objects. This activity is almost wholly subconscious. It provides only for our apprehension of sense objects, not for our communicating with one another concerning them. As social beings we have a strong impulsion to tell others about our experiences. But to do this we must carry forward our mental activity beyond mere apprehension. In throwing our experiences into the form suitable for expression we construct what are known as judgments. Thought as ordinarily understood is of this form. To judge is to have before the mind an object about which we assert something.

It is well to note just what the mind does in thus preparing its sense objects for social treatment. Before we desire to communicate, our sense world is for us a continuum of objects that stand out before us as concreated unities with various characteristics. We do not think of separating the structure or the qualities or the states from the object; they are for us the object as a complex whole. When the states of the object change, the object itself is supposed to change; the old object ceases to be and the new object takes its place. We may find ourselves mistaken about some feature of the object, but in that case the false conception falls away and ceases to be a part of the objective texture, while the correct one takes its place. We are thus in immediate and continuous touch with reality. But as soon as we yield to the im-

pulse to tell others about this real world, we reconstruct the objects, separating them as thought-themes from the qualities or activities by which we would characterize them. The object as theme becomes the subject of a judgment; what we would say about it is set over against it, and constitutes the predicate. If the theme changes, what we have said about it may not be true. If it does not change, our words may nevertheless not be adequate to express the full reality of the subject.

We may ask what the subject is in itself, and what the predicate can mean apart from the subject, and what the relation is that connects them. These may seem foolish questions; yet no less a thinker than F. H. Bradley,¹ on the strength of such difficulties, does not hesitate to condemn the judgment or "relational way of thought," as either meaningless or untrue. The predicate, he contends, asserts what is or is not contained in the subject. In the first case the judgment is tautological; in the second, false. This dictum apparently overlooks the intent of the judgment and its consequent artificial character. It is solely a means of expression. Hence for the reader or hearer it can be both true and informing, while for the writer or speaker, it is merely explicative and therefore tautological. When an assertion is made, we prove or disprove it by practical tests, and have resulting truth or error. In prejudgmental thinking we test for accuracy of observation, and have resulting apprehended object or illusion. In our further studies, we shall concern ourselves with the concrete world of experience rather than with the difficulties of adequate expression.

2. THE WORLD AS COMMON TO ALL. Having sketched the *modus operandi* of sense perception as if it were a matter of the individual's own construction and valid only for him, we now face a difficult problem pertaining to the nature of the common world—the world which we all know together, and which therefore cannot be the private possession of anyone. A student might

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 20, 33.

accept our analysis thus far, yet balk at the conclusion which seems to be involved, namely, that the common world is also a construction of individual minds in communication with one another. This conclusion seems absurd for several reasons. (1) Each individual mind has its own unique way of responding to stimulations; each has a different body of interests and habits—not to mention differing original capacities. Thus every mind works in its own exclusive laboratory, and its products are known directly only to itself. (2) The common world is vast beyond all comprehension in space and time. What is the individual mind with its few years of experience over against the limitless ages of the past? What is its power of vision as compared with the infinite reaches of space? In every direction the infinities stretch out beyond our sense knowledge. These vastnesses lose none of their reality by being out of our reach, they gain nothing by being known. (3) Whereas we are of little concern to this world (our appearing and disappearing seem to make no lasting difference with it), we must adjust ourselves to the world moment by moment in order to live. If all other grounds for rejecting the theory that the common world is the individual's own construct should fail, there would be no denying the force of this one. What is so real in its own right as the stone over which we stumble? What is so absurd as the notion that the food we eat is idea?

Let us now examine the validity of these objections. If our experiences are strictly exclusive must we not be solipsists in theory? Must we not consistently deny the very existence of the common world? From the viewpoint of theory such a world would seem to be a mysterious aberration of the subjective life. This difficulty has troubled reflective thinkers since reflection became a serious enterprise. Solipsism is of course intolerable; we simply cannot believe it. A solipsistic philosophy is foredoomed to the rubbish heap. But what are we to do with the difficulties? If the problem were something new,

we might find temporary relief in one or another of the verbal solutions that have had their day. We might say with certain realists that there are two orders of reality, the one subjective and the other objective, and that these, while independent of each other, are kept in strict harmony by a dominating power (preëstablished harmony). This theory looks good, but it does not work. There is no way of bringing the hypothetical independent world into the range of the known. Or we might hold with certain monadists that the selves or monads mirror the universe from their several points of view without transcending their private exclusive inner life. The universe, the common world, would then be each monad's perspective. Much the same difficulty besets this theory as the other. What is this universe that is mirrored? If it is the inner life of the monad, then there is no other. The two theories might be combined, as in H. Wildon Carr's recent book, *A Theory of Monads*. In this theory the exclusive world of the self and the objective universe are viewed as manifestations of a primordial reality which Carr calls Life. But life is an abstraction, unless it is identical with what we have been calling a self. There is evidence in Carr's book that he uses the two terms synonymously. In that case we have our starting point.

The question we are facing is, How does the individual obtain a knowledge of the world that is common to all minds? With this question we are liable to confuse a different one, namely, How can we know a world that not only is infinitely beyond us in time and space, but is presumably independent of anybody's knowing it? The assumed independence is what gives us trouble and confuses the issue. At the proper time we shall take up this second question, but not now, since it raises issues that we are not yet ready to consider fully. We revert, then, to our previous question, How can we know a world that is evidently apprehended by other intelligences in the same way as we apprehend it? How can we know our world to be a common-to-all world? Our world as our

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own experience should apparently be strictly private and in no sense transferable. It is limited, relatively simple, and exists for us only in the act of experiencing it. On the other hand, the phenomenal world of social intercourse is shared by all, has no assignable limits in time or space, moves on in its course without regard to us, and compels us to adjust ourselves to it continuously as a condition of our very existence. How can we come to know this enveloping universe, and even make it the touchstone by which we test our individual experiences?

In trying to answer this question we should not dodge any difficulty, nor yet permit ourselves unwittingly to make unwarranted assumptions. For instance, having set aside for the time the question of the objective world's independence, we should not allow it to come back by way of the inference that because the world is common to all it is possessed by none. Whatever the common-to-all world is, we could not know it if it were essentially different from the individual's world. As a world of experience it must be the experience of a knower. Here is the crux of the problem. The real difficulty does not lie in the vastness of the universe as compared with the orbit of our experience, nor in the minuteness of structure, nor in the apparent independence of our knowing it. We can reach its vastness by simply extending our experience world by means of legitimate inference. The puzzle as to what happened before the advent of man, or as to what goes on while we sleep, or as to the unreachable minuteness of the ultimate constitution, can be resolved in much the same way, provided we can explain the possibility of a common experience world that is at the same time individual and unique—common yet incommunicable, shared yet strictly private.

The apparent contradiction here indicated can be resolved by remembering two points. (a) In all communications of mind with mind, the media used, such as words and gestures, are general in meaning and require interpretation. As interpreted, they become a part of our

personal world. Thus in speaking of a rose, we may mention its color or the number of its petals or some other feature, yet in no case do our words convey exactly the definite content of our own experience. Likewise in history, the descriptions may be painfully minute, yet every item must receive an individual interpretation before it is known, and the interpretation necessarily depends on the mental prepossessions of the reader. (b) We test our interpretations by acting as if they were true and noting results. If these results are what we expected, the interpretations are taken to be correct. Very often we rely on testimony. A large percentage of our cherished beliefs have no other foundation; they would cease to be accepted if put to a real test. They originated in our trying to reproduce the thought world of another from the generalized data that he was able to express in words. We may read accounts of places not yet visited by us, but when perchance we later see those places, we find that our second-hand notions of them need much revision. The information derived from the description was accurate only as to general features, those which language symbols are adequate to impart. Even the most crucial and exhaustive tests do not cover the minutiae of another's experiences. Our common world then is simply such general features of our experience world as can be represented by symbols. Or rather the common world is literally our interpretation of symbols in terms of our individual experiences. It never ceases to be our own and its commonness lies in the power of interpretation.

The possibility of communication rests in the fact that we are profoundly conditioned in sense experience by a complex of activities which are strictly independent of us. These conditions, as expressed in physical terms, must be so far mastered that they can be represented by conventional signs. People of widely different experiences may have considerable difficulty in telling each other about their several worlds. As social beings, we have all our lives been attentive to just those features of nature which

can be carried across to others by means of symbols. What is so unique as to be difficult or impossible to convey to others is persistently slighted, as relatively less significant. Society thus conventionalizes our world. Nothing is quite real to us that is not communicable. Yet it may well be that what we think we are expressing is very different from what our words actually mean to another. Truth-telling is a fine art, never quite mastered by any of us. One thing is certain, our experience world is vastly richer than those generalized aspects of it which lend themselves to verbal or other expression. As life deepens, the unique and inexpressible becomes more significant.

The confusion alluded to as complicating the question is practically inevitable in advance of critical reflection. At first, as a matter of course, we identify the common world with a supposed independent world, and all our experiences of adjustment to environment seem to confirm this identification. But this is because we think of the common or phenomenal world as the actual source of the sense stimulations. Since we do not experience these stimulations as such, they come into consciousness only as expressed in the mind's "figurative" response. We infer their presence to explain the controlled character of our experience. In looking for the source of this control, we spontaneously turn to the world about us. It does not at first occur to us that the world as we apprehend it is the result of stimulation, and therefore cannot, strictly speaking, be also the cause. Having fallen into the pit of this logical inconsequence, we proceed to establish ourselves there by concluding that our own experience world is really subjective and essentially different from the cosmic activities. When once we see that our mentally constructed experience is the actual world as it appears to us, and that through memory, imaginative forecast, and the critical use of inference we can, out of the available sources of information, build a universe without limit, our difficulties begin to melt away.

But a serious embarrassment at this point is not primarily intellectual. It arises from the apparently monstrous egoism expressed in our explanation. The conception that the cosmic universe, even as a common-to-all world, is the individual's construct and has no other existence, so far as knowledge can reach, impresses one as bizarre, anthropomorphic, and absurd. This impression is very strong with those who have given much attention to the natural sciences. In order not to lose our bearings entirely and fail of all coherent explanation, we need to review the argument again and again to see if we have not made some mistake. There may perhaps be an alternative explanation which will not so grievously offend both science and common sense.

The current of sentiment against the foregoing explanation of the relation of the knower to the phenomenal world is so strong at present that certain writers reject the view even though they acknowledge that it is plausible, logical, and satisfying to the abstract intellect. They contend that when we come down to actual contact with physical nature and feel its mighty tides of energy, its resistless ongoings, and its indifference to our puny schemes, we see how absurd it is to think of ourselves as the makers of such a world. We should, forsooth, preserve our sanity, rest our case on the unequivocal evidence of our senses, and take the world presented in perception as just that which we do not construct but find. This common-sense view is apparently supported by the findings of scientific psychology. The psychologist, by connecting mental processes with physical processes and working out a schematic parallelism between them, seems to do away with all initiative on the part of the mind. The mind, he says, or what we call the mind, is a product. Its capacities are strictly limited to the range of control exercised by the physical processes, especially the central nervous system. Other sciences also seem to support common sense. Do we not need to wait on nature, patiently observe her ways, and persistently eliminate all

personal bias if we would find out her secrets? The world is surely independent of our perceiving it, and that is the end of discussion.

This argument derives its main strength from a complex of sentiments and established practical attitudes, and hence is difficult to meet. Sentiments are seldom amenable to argumentative treatment, and practical attitudes are set in our active nature. Both must be satisfied. Let us distinguish again between the world of possible experience and an assumed ontological world. The world of possible experience is the cosmic universe filling space and time. The ontological world is not a matter of experience but is the source of stimulation that determines the character of our experience. Confuse these two and we have the theory that the objective world is independent of us. Keep them apart, as we should if we would think clearly, and the source of stimulation becomes a distinct problem, while the world of possible experience emerges as wholly response of the mind to the stimulation. Its reality is not to be questioned, but it is the reality of controlled response and not of a producing cause. As controlled response it takes on the character of independence for reasons that we shall be able to appreciate when we pass to our next topic, the nature of the source of stimulation.

But we are not quite done with objections to our view. A much discussed conception of the intellectual life seems to throw us back upon common sense again. The question is raised whether the activity of the intellect does not carry us away from the real, the concrete world of sense perception and inevitably land us in mere abstractions. This idea is an old one, and has much to support it. On the strength of it, Bergson maintains that reality is found only in the sense data, the flow of impressions, and that the essence of the real is pure duration (continuity of change). One of his English followers, Mrs. Karin Stephen, puts the case rather graphically as follows: "Suppose in a dark room which you expect to find empty you stumble against something. . . . You find it has a

certain texture which you class as rather rough, a temperature which you class as warm, a size which you class as about two feet high, a peculiar smell which you recognize, and you finally jump to the answer to your question; it is a dog."¹ Since each quality is classified and named, the sense data are generalized before they can be used in identifying the object, which thus comes to be at least two removes from reality. The dog is a double abstraction. By parity of reasoning all identified objects are likewise declared to be devoid of objective reality.

This theory would apparently make the phenomenal world illusory, a fabrication based on the elemental experiences of the independent flow. While not the common-sense view, it leaves the impression that the common-sense view is nearer the truth than is any intellectual construction. By considering sense objects as the temporary or moving equilibria in the activity of the cosmic energy, Bergson and his school seem to do justice to both the common-sense and the scientific view. But the phenomenal world of sense perception is not the invisible energy, not the ceaseless flow of events, but the objects that we see and apprehend. The energy, the duration, the disappearing events exist for us only inferentially as aids in explaining the origin of our objective experiences. Bergson and his followers help to a satisfactory theory by drawing a sharp distinction between the constructed world and the varying impressions. But they are not unambiguous in treating the reality of the world as experienced. Reality need not mean total independence of the mind. The constituted world seems to be independent because its every feature is fashioned under compulsion. The independent reality is the source of the compulsion. This seems to be the conclusion to which we are logically driven.

The strangeness of this conclusion is considerably relieved by the well-known phenomena of dreams, trance,

¹ *The Misuse of Mind*, p. 15 f.

and hypnosis. In such states the mind creates a world of objects that for the time being have the same kind of reality as our external world. We have no theory of dreams to exploit, but wish simply to point out again how marvelously dreams mimic the real world. However fantastic and incoherent they may seem to our waking mind, they undoubtedly seem real while we dream. So much of a piece with the world of our waking moments are many of our dreams that we should be likely to take them as real in the sense in which we look upon the outside world as real, but for our inability to find a place for them in the temporal-spatial context. It is well known that children and some grown-ups are unable to carry through the distinction between the dream and the phenomenally real, so that their world is a confused jumble of both. In dreams we may not only construct a physical environment vast in proportions and indefinitely minute in structure, but we can create a society in which each individual person acts in accordance with his own nature. We can ourselves engage one of these dream people in a discussion and have all the sensations of triumph or defeat. We can blunder and be corrected by a dream friend, we can forget and have him call the forgotten item to mind. There is nothing that we cannot experience as objectively real in the fabrications of a dream. The fabrications are illusory only from the viewpoint of our workaday world.

That we can have a privately built world which is for us common to all, is not to be doubted. But is this common world as revealed in experience illusory? That does not follow. The question is not, Is it illusory? but, What kind of reality has it? Science by methods of analysis and description reduces it to a process ever renewed, orderly, conforming to laws. But clearly this is not the whole story. At best the scientific conception is abstract, difficult to realize in imagination, and different from the world as revealed to our senses. Into the process we read thinghood and manifold qualities. The changes

that are supposed to constitute the process, we look upon as happening to the thing. If we are driven from this view by the logic of our thinking, we insist that at least force or energy is manifest in the process. Things are forces, qualities are forms of activity, the common-to-all world is dynamic throughout. By this conclusion we seem to satisfy the scientific demand for continuous change and the common-sense demand for things and qualities that retain their identity in change. But unfortunately we find that science cannot use force or energy any more than it can the notion of material things, if by that is meant something distinct from the process itself. If the force or energy is a reality, it maintains itself through time; if the process is a reality, it continually vanishes and must be renewed from without. On the other hand, there is a contradiction in the idea of a process in which nothing remains self-identical through the changes that constitute the process. As no single event is the process, each event ceasing with its present—a vanishing moment—only the individual vanishing phase of the process at any one instant can exist. Thus the process disappears unless the mind puts into it something that gives it continuity and permanence. Whatever we may call this permanent element, change infects it and logic resolves it into process.

In spite of this logical solvent, all people—scientist and uneducated man alike—are sure that the outside world as a common world actually exists, even though they may not be able to construe the fact. The evidence of the senses is unimpeachable. Every experience of resistance adds to the strength of the conclusion. No amount of reasoning can set aside this ultimate conviction of common sense. But is there no way of actually meeting the difficulty? To this end the following suggestions will be helpful.

The conception of the world as a system of changing events in which nothing remains what it is at any moment, but everything vanishes in process, is a construction out

of the elementary experiences of a world of things. As a construction it is abstract, and yet for purposes of description it is valid. To call this phase of reality the phenomenal element, seems reasonable. But it has been shown that the thing or substance which is the primary fact in experience and which seems so essential to the possibility of a process must itself be as completely a construct as is the mechanical scheme. Both thing and process are thus manifestations; both are retained by us in our effort to understand our world, because each serves a distinctive purpose in the economy of thought. Each by itself looks reasonable enough, but each in relation to the other constitutes a problem. In other words, we can find a thinkable conception of the world only as we combine elements that seem to be mutually exclusive, but really answer to contrasting needs of the mind. This is admissible so long as we view the common world as the work of the mind. But if that world is taken to be extra-mental in origin, then these incompatible characteristics become contradictory; each excludes the other, and hence neither can be true. In short, the very possibility of a world of permanence and change is found only in the conditions of experience. This statement brings us back to the conclusion already foreshadowed in the discussion of the categories. The phenomenal or common world is real, as real as any one wishes to think it, but its reality is in and for mind. It is real, not as a mere mental event like an imaginary creation or a passing fancy, but as having a determinate structure and as a product of activities which we can modify only to a limited extent and in accordance with fixed conditions.

Our common world is not a product of intellection alone. In subtle ways the emotions enter into every construct and give it characteristic features. These features are not easily described. The words we use in description have primary reference to intellectual aspects and carry only a derived emotional significance. Thus we may say that the tone and color and æsthetic warmth of our

world comes from the emotional infusion; but these words must of course be understood emotionally. Furthermore the world is a realm of goods to be appropriated and enjoyed; hence conative as well as emotional elements enter into its concrete meaning for us. The intellectual construction is in itself an abstraction and not the real world at all. The world is a construct that reflects our moods and responds to our volitions. Later consideration of these extra-intellectual aspects of our world will bring us to a more satisfying solution of the difficulties we have been facing. We are ready now to press the question, What is the source of stimulation?

CHAPTER IV

THE SOURCE OF STIMULATION

What is the source of stimulation? When we ask this long deferred question we enter the region of perennial conflict—the Armageddon of philosophy. The clash of theories is what we should expect when we reflect on the tremendous interests involved and the manifold possibilities of confusion and prejudice. An answer to our question would embrace by implication most of the deeper concerns of life and destiny. It behooves us, therefore, in approaching this battle ground of philosophy, to be unusually wary and critical. Here, especially, we should keep in mind the injunction, always pertinent, to accept no theory till it justifies itself against every possible attack, and hold it then only tentatively, subject to revision if new evidence should be forthcoming. Besides all the other difficulties we must encounter, we are compelled to reason from effects that we experience to the productive cause, which in the nature of the case we cannot experience. But the chief source of embarrassment is intellectual confusion, for that opens the way for theories that are intrinsically absurd. Such answer to our question as we may finally be able to give will have to come in installments, for only those parts of it that pertain directly to the study of the sense world are here in place. Our question then is, What causes us to experience a spatio-temporal world of things that we take to be real in their own right?

On the lowest plane of critical insight the persistent theory of common sense may seem plausible, namely, that

the source of stimulation is the objective world itself. To illustrate the intellectual confusion that seems to support this view, let us present some of the most appealing arguments for it. What evidence, one may contend, is better than that yielded by the practical tests mentioned in the foregoing discussion of validity? When we act on the assumption that things themselves are the sources of stimulation, we find an answering experience in harmony therewith. Thus when we think of the radiator as the source of the pervasive heat, and on that assumption approach it, we experience direct sensuous confirmation. Moreover, must not the external object affect our senses in such a way that the agitation is communicated to the sensory nerves and carried by them to the brain cortex? If any of these media fail to function, there can be no external experience. Each sense organ yields its own distinctive elements of information. Conjointly they declare the object. In holding this theory, we need not assume that the object we construct—admittedly incomplete and schematic—is the cause of our apprehending it. That is certainly absurd. But we should recognize the common distinction between the object as it happens to appear to us at any one moment and the real object that continues to exist *in rerum natura*, whether we see it or not. The real object is inconceivably complex and never can be experienced in its entirety; it is this real object that acts on our sense organs, causing us to have our experiences. The experiences may be as objective as we please, but back of all perceptive objects is the world of real substantial things that affect one another and us in characteristic ways. This view of the connection between stimulation and response has the merit of making the objective world explain itself. We do not appeal to an unknowable transcendent cause, but find all the elements of our explanation within possible experience. Such are some of the considerations offered with zeal and conviction to confound the critic of the common-sense realistic views. Let us examine them.

Starting with the last consideration, since it is general in its nature, we insist again that the real cause of an experience cannot itself be experienced. To distinguish the content as independently objective from the experience as mental in origin helps not at all. The content of the experience is the experience viewed as having content. It is throughout construct; as such it is effect and never cause in the productive sense. As soon as we range the cause or source of stimulation on the side of experience we deny its causal character. Thus, when we refer electrical phenomena to electricity as their cause, and mean thereby not merely to designate a general idea covering the manifestations, it is clear that we commit a bald contradiction in making electricity itself, as distinguished from electrical phenomena, an experienced object. The contradiction can easily be committed, however, owing to the persistent confusion of the two meanings of cause, the one being that of initiating or producing the effect, and the other that of being the phenomenal antecedent without which the effect does not take place. The latter meaning is strictly scientific; the former alone is applicable to our problem. The impulsion that we naturally feel to construct imaginatively whatever we think of as real lends plausibility to the confusion. This impulsion is strong as life. It is deeper and more persistent than any of the "drives" discovered by psychoanalysis. Its primal importance in our mental economy is evident. Moment by moment as long as the mind is active or life continues, the work of building our sense world goes on unceasingly. Not only is it the most constant, but it is the most spontaneous form of mental activity. To reason requires an effort of concentration, but to see a vast horizon full of objects constructed on the moment by the imagination, one only needs to open one's eyes. Can we wonder, then, that so many people never consciously get beyond this form of picture-thinking? An entity that is unpicturable is for them non-existent. When, therefore, the force of logic compels us to conclude that a producing

cause of an objective world cannot itself be a part of that world, the picture thinkers are mystified rather than enlightened. In the very act of distinguishing between the productive cause of our having objective experiences and the experiences themselves as effects, the tendency is strong to set the two forms of reality over against each other as mere contrasting parts of our common world, thus making them both of the phenomenal order. This confusion breeds many others and in the end makes a coherent philosophical view of experience impossible.

It is interesting to note also how this imaginative tendency, when subject to criticism, works shrewdly to conceive of entities that may not actually be experienced, yet can be vaguely pictured. These entities (electrons), taken to be dynamic and always in motion, constitute an independent order of stimuli. From this order come the active elements of things as we know them in experience. Such a conception of cosmic cause can easily be confused with the dynamic theory of nature advocated by science, and then takes on a factitious authority. Is it not scientific, and, therefore, is it not beyond any except scientific criticisms? But we need only try to make the real scientific conception meet the requirements of a productive cause, and science will rightly protest. The independent order of energetic entities must stand or fall on other than scientific grounds. It is a chimera born of confusion, and its only progeny is confusion worse confounded.

The legitimate distinction, already alluded to, between the external object as we happen to apprehend it and the object as it may at any other time be apprehended lends plausibility to the view we are criticizing. Since by a shift of interest we can have a new conception of the object without assuming a material change in the character of the stimulations, we inevitably set up in the background of our consciousness the ideal of an object that satisfies not only present interests but all possible interests. This ideal object is never apprehended in its entirety, just

because we can never have all the possible interests (or points of view) at the same time. It must therefore be thought as existing beyond all experience. In this way we arrive at the conception of a world in itself as the source of stimulations. The world in itself is the ghost that haunts philosophy. It has a locus, but nowhere in particular; it is active but changeless; it is without form and void—a figment of a much perplexed imagination.

But what of the sense organs that mediate the perception of an outside world? Are they not directly connected with the source of stimulation? As the actual means of transmission, are they not more than mere phenomenal objects, mere controlled objectifications of the invisible self? These questions raise the same issue in a slightly modified form. They mark another recoil of common sense from the conclusion that the source of experience cannot itself be experienced. We can do no more than insist again that the sense organs and all that constitute the physical body are for us what they are because of the stimulations we receive; they are altogether phenomenal. Whatever supports the conclusion that our experience world is a construct applies without abatement of cogency to the body as a part of that world.

But, argues the realist, is not the body the source of all our feelings of resistance? Is it not the only means of affecting the outside world? Must it not therefore be causally real? Not in the productive sense. At least, there is no rational ground for thinking the body to be real in this sense. When we draw the distinction between the producing cause and the world as response, the body with all its functioning falls entirely on the side of response. Are then the sense organs, of sight, touch and the rest, mere ideas? Again, No. The sense organs are no more mere ideas than are the other objects or parts of the external world. They are the persistent and relatively uniform responses to equally persistent and uniform stimulations received by the self from the source of stimulation.

Turning now to the opposite pole of thought on this question, we must contend that the source of stimulation is not mere activity—the *actus purus* of the Schoolmen—for that would be tantamount to denying that there is any source. Yet hidden in this apparently fatuous medieval doctrine is a truth that we shall need to urge again and again, namely, that whatever the source may be it is not activity plus something that is not active. The notion of a core of being that merely exists in permanent and blissful passivity must be given up, and for the obvious reason that in so far as it is passive, it is, as Hegel pointed out, the same as non-being. It is, to adapt an expression of Huxley's, a mere shadow of the mind's groping, an evidence of unclear thinking.

If, then, rational considerations preclude our finding the source either in the external world or in an independent order of activities, are we not forced to take an agnostic position? Not yet. We can, as a result of the argument thus far developed, positively conclude that the source is not in space or time, and is not a substance in the sense in which that term is ordinarily understood. Hence no characterization of the external world applies to it. Let us dwell on these assertions for a moment.

The source is not in space nor has it any spatial properties. This assertion follows, as we have contended, from the nature of space as the form of the phenomenal world. But may the source not be in a space of its own? What is to hinder its having a world of temporal-spatial experiences essentially like our own? Suppose it had, they would be its experiences, not ours, and the distinction between it and its experiences would hold as it does in our own case. We do not think of ourselves as spread out over the phenomenal world that we apprehend. No more is the source of stimulation to be identified with any experience it may be supposed to have. One consequence of confusing the source with its experiences would be to destroy its unity. In assuming that the source must possess unity, we are not maintaining that there can be

only one source in the universe for all possible forms of stimulation, but merely that whatever can be called a productive cause must have unity within itself. If nevertheless we choose to ignore the demand for internal unity and affirm the spatial character of the source, we find that it thereby becomes as divisible and evanescent as anything else that occupies space.

A similar line of reflection leads to the conclusion that this source is not in the time of the external world. If it has experiences, they may be organized as are ours in a temporal order; we cannot conceive of their not being so organized. But the source cannot be identified with that order, much less with any member of the series. It cannot, for instance, be thought as the first member, originating the series, for in that case it would cease to be when the first member passed out of existence. This point is easily yielded, though it has been a favorite conception with those in the past who thought broadly but not clearly. They have pictured the universe as having been started "in the beginning" with certain potentialities. Such a primeval power which created and then forgot or ceased to be cannot be the ever present, infinitely discriminative source of stimulation.

But that this source is not the temporal order itself may not be so immediately evident. Does not the order alone endure? Events may come and go, but "duration" abides forever. It gathers up the past along with the present and bears them (or as Bergson would say, "gnaws") into the future. What could be simpler as an explanation? But that it could mislead anybody is a mystery. Either "duration" is an unusual name for a power (Bergson¹ refers to it as possibly of the nature of consciousness) that works creatively; or it is made adequate from time to time because the theorizer supplies whatever it lacks at the moment. In either case duration is not mere lapse of time nor the order of temporal se-

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 10 f.

quence; it is this order made over into an active entity that exists through time.

Perhaps, however, if we could combine space with time and make them conjointly the source of all things, we might fare better. This suggestion occurred to a prominent English thinker, S. Alexander, who in his Gifford Lectures² actually undertook to develop a theory of reality with only space-time as the original material. Instead of substance or power, space-time was in the beginning, and these two in one were Deity. Evidently the development of such a thesis is possible only as one reads into space-time the potentialities that are to be realized. By this method the supply of potentialities becomes exhaustless. They must all be in the original space-time, else how could they ever become actual? Thus the mind tricks itself. To be potential is to be actual only ideally, that is, for the mind that anticipates.

That the source cannot be in time in any construable sense is further evident from the now familiar truth that a cause, in order to be genuinely productive, must coexist with the entire series of its effects. This means that we can find no ground for a present existence in that which no longer exists. To get the force of this conclusion, we need only apply it to ourselves as experiencing a temporal order. It is so true that we are never a mere member of a temporal series which we apprehend, that if there were but one temporal series and we completely grasped it, we should have what might be called a non-temporal existence. That is, we, as existing, should be distinct from all temporal characteristics. But in the world with which we have to do, there are innumerable series, only a comparatively few of which we actually apprehend. We cannot rise above them all because we are finite and conditioned. Hence we seem to be in time in a sense not affirmable of the ultimate source, which must coexist with and fully grasp every possible series. We get glimmerings of what this means when we consider the time-transcend-

² *Space, Time, and Deity.*

ing character of the self with reference to a purpose or ideal to be realized. Just as we are in this sense non-temporal in so far as we are real causes, so the source is non-temporal—or shall we say with Royce, “time-inclusive”?—throughout its being. This of course does not mean that the cosmic series is not in time for the source, but rather means that the source is not the cosmic series that is in time.

From what has been said, it will hardly be necessary to argue that the source is in no sense a quality, or a magnitude, or a physical substance. These concepts do not apply; they have a meaning only as characterizing the world of activities. But are we quite sure that the source is not a force or energy? What of the Spencerian principle of “The Persistence of Force”? Perhaps no false explanation ever presented has been so persistently appealing as this one. It seems so simple and adequate. Whereas a very little insight is sufficient to see that matter cannot meet the conditions, because taken by itself, it is inert, the case is different with force. By definition, force is just that which acts upon the senses, resisting, stimulating, controlling. Every activity can be referred to it.

But it does the work only by definition—which means that the work is done, and the name force is given to the mysterious cause. This must remain a purely verbal explanation, unless the term force can be given such a meaning as exhibits its capacity to produce the results to be explained. All attempts to do this have signally failed. Force has revealed itself as a mere hypostatized abstraction, an outcast idea, worse than useless, for it only multiplies difficulties. For instance, if force were to be used as a principle of explanation, we should need as many forces as we have distinguishable activities in nature. A force that presumably explained one activity could not explain any other without becoming another force. The bond of unity would be wholly lacking. This means that we should be merely duplicating the complexity of our world without adding anything to our insight. What

is true of force is equally true of energy or electrons, considered as entities that can exercise the causal function. In general, then, we conclude that the source of stimulation is neither a space-filling substance nor a temporal series, nor a force, nor anything that can possibly be a part of our experience world. What, then, is it?

Herbert Spencer and many of his generation held that the ultimate source is unknowable. According to this way of thinking, our knowledge ends with the observed persistence of force in nature. The ultimate ground of force is beyond human ken. But, as has often been pointed out, this unknowable is known to persist and to manifest itself as force. We know a thing by what it does. To say that we cannot know the power that manifests itself in every objective experience is to outrage intelligence. Nevertheless whatever we may say of the positive character of this source must be by way of inference. We never experience it in itself. This must be insisted upon here, though later we may have occasion to qualify the statement somewhat. That it exists follows, as we have said, from the controlled character of our sense knowledge, as contrasted with the free play of fantasy. In trying to make out what it is, we need only be careful that our inferences are well grounded and inevitable. We must reason from the nature of the sense world to the nature of the cause.

This method seems to contain elements of great hazard and uncertainty. How can we know that our inferences are the only possible ones? May they not simply mark the limits of our extremely limited intelligence, and be anything but objective truth? The answer to such scepticism must be that whenever alternative conclusions appear equally plausible and we are unable because of our limited intelligence to find decisive ground of choice between them, we shall have to suspend judgment. But to reason from effect to cause is our only method of reaching any knowledge other than facts of coexistence and sequence. Take, for instance, the way we apprehend a fellow human

being. We become aware of his acts, his bodily movements, the sound of his voice, and such expressions—all of which we might tabulate and analyze till the end of time without the slightest evidence that they reveal a thinking, feeling, willing, conscious personality. To reach him we must reason from effects, manifestations, to cause. If with the natural sciences we take this cause—a human being—to be itself merely a series of effects appearing in temporal sequence, we must cease to look upon it as cause; it can no longer be to us a human being. But whenever we would transcend the mere arrangement of events and penetrate to their significance, our data are always effects and all explanations point back to causes.

What must we add to observational data in order to reach conclusions concerning their cause? We must interpret the data by reference to what we know about our own nature. The key is within us. All that is outside is effect; nowhere out there do we find a cause, except in terms of selfhood. The cause must be a power that acts essentially as we act when we accomplish a change in our environment. If there is danger in this kind of reasoning, we need not let it trouble us until confronted by it. We may be sure that our choice is between this method and a method that can yield no positive results. Hence in trying to ascertain the nature of the ultimate source of stimulation by reasoning from manifestation back to what could cause it, we follow the only effective method.

Our first conclusion is that this source must possess unity. This follows from the fact that the world as known is orderly, or at least capable of orderly arrangement into a unitary whole. All sense stimuli must come from the same source. We cannot think through the possibility of different independent sources. If they harmonized with one another they would not be independent, and if they did not harmonize the result would be chaos. The unity of the world then argues the unity of the ultimate source. Some have thought to question this conclusion by pointing out that the unity is purely subjective.

But they cannot do justice to the fact of a common-to-all world. If there were one source of stimulation for you and another independent one for me, we should live in two different systems. Intelligent coöperation between us would be impossible unless an overruling power made the two sources act with reference to each other. In that case, the overruling power would be the ultimate source.

This conclusion is closely connected with another which seems equally valid, though not quite so self-evident. The orderliness of nature, its manifest amenability to intelligence, points to the intelligence of its source. The only alternative is unintelligence. We need not here take account of the attempted distinction between intelligence and super-intelligence. This distinction pertains to a different issue, namely, whether the supreme Intelligence is discursive like our own or essentially unique. The question before us is whether the ultimate source knows or does not know what it is doing. The evidence of intelligent action is adjustment to an end. The stimulations as the antecedents of all sense knowledge are perfectly adjusted to our intelligence, not only to the individual but to all alike. This adjustment is such that each mind reacting to the stimulations in its own way produces an experience world harmonizing with the experiences of all other minds. This constitutes our objective world.

When one seriously and in detail tries to account for these very evident facts by the assumption that the cause is blind—not merely a stupid or half-witted being, but a blind, unconscious somewhat—one begins to realize the emptiness and fatuity of the attempt. The absurdity is as boundless as the universe itself. This conception would hardly have needed mentioning, except that some who ought to know better think they find a foothold for the theory of unintelligence in the notion of a persistent force, which has all the characteristics of a supreme intelligence and yet no knowledge of what it is doing. As already noted, this is merely a mischief-making abstraction—the hypostasis of force. A force that is less than a self, less

than an intelligence, can have no unity. In generalizing the forces into a unity, we merely perform a feat of classification which means nothing for actuality.

While these considerations seem conclusive, they are supported by many others, among which are the following. (1) A real cause, as we have seen, must be one that maintains itself through the time process in which its effects appear. So far as we know, only intelligence can do this. We know ourselves as abiding through our experiences. The act of memory by which we bring our past representatively into our present is the act which reveals ourselves as having a continuing existence. It is not thinkable that there should be any other kind of permanence than the permanence of the self and of the substantial world as apprehended by the self. Either, then, we must grant intelligence to the ultimate source of experience, or abandon hope of telling what it is.

(2) This ultimate source must somehow maintain a policy of development such that when all its effects are taken into account, the world will seem to the scientific student to be actually moving toward a goal. This consideration is simply carrying forward the argument from order, by recognizing the generally accepted hypothesis of cosmic evolution. It amounts to saying that as intelligence is the only principle of order we know, the more order, the more intelligence. To have a world that is amenable to orderly arrangement is one thing, but to be able to think of it as a cosmos moving toward some "far-off divine event," and not a mere drift, not mere "cosmic weather," is something far more significant. The Power working through us to cause our world to be proceeds according to a plan of the whole.

(3) We find that the results of this Power's activities as now apprehended, that is, as far as human knowledge has been able to reach, have conserved, and are able to a much greater degree to conserve, human purposes. This consideration is merely mentioned here, since its further development belongs to a later stage in our discussion. Its

bearing on the present issue is evident. All the goods of life, physical, social, æsthetic, religious, are provided for us by this Power. These goods are all conditioned; but when the conditions are fulfilled, the goods are ours. Their misuse entails loss or injury.

In short, the Power that coöperates with us in constructing our world must be credited not only with persistence, orderliness, and forward-looking volition, but with proceeding in such a way as to build up, conserve, and enrich human life. The phenomena of death, the possibility of the universe's "running down" or becoming unfit for human existence, the law of the jungle that holds in the sub-human world and all too much among human beings—these and other apparently inescapable ills raise serious questions which must be faced before the conclusion can be drawn that the ultimate Power is wholly good. If not evidently good, he is not evidently intelligent. The connection is such that we cannot really construe the possibility of an intelligence that is evil. Such a being would perpetually stultify and thwart himself by injuring or destroying his own handiwork. This *a priori* argument does not settle the issue; we must face the facts of experience directly and not shrink from the worst of them. But the further discussion will have to be postponed till the general unfolding of our philosophical view has progressed somewhat.

PART II

THE WORLD OF ORGANIZED KNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER I

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

In considering the structure of our sense world we had to touch upon many questions that pertain especially to the world as science reconstructs it. The two worlds are alike in being the work of thought. The general principles of organization are the same in both. But the world of scientific thought is more elaborate. The task of science as an intellectual enterprise is to bring order and harmony into the sense world by thorough application of thought laws. In taking up the study of the resulting structure and its significance for philosophy, we shall keep in closest touch with the world of sense. As concrete experience is the thing to be explained, we shall have to return to it frequently in order to test our conclusions.

At every step of our approach to the study of scientific construction we shall encounter misconceptions and confusions that need to be cleared away. Many of these false views have, through long acceptance, become so entrenched in popular thought as to seem essential truth. Yet they must give way under criticism. Their greatest bulwark is mental inertia. People not only rest satisfied behind traditional beliefs in spite of destructive criticism but strengthen their defenses, combatting the rationalization of experience lest they lose their cherished falsities. Because of this tendency to hold what one has, even though it may be of inferior validity, our best course in overcoming false conceptions is to move forward in a con-

structive way and attack popular misconceptions only when they lie athwart our path.

The analysis of sense perception reveals a fairly complex mental activity. But as this constructive work by the mind is largely subconscious, thinkers of a certain type attempt to deny its presence in sense perception. They would assume that objects are somehow given. These attempts have signally failed. There is no way of providing for the possibility of experience without recognizing the mental activity that we have been studying. There might well be a difference of opinion as to the number of ultimate principles, since that is a matter of analysis, but their presence in sense knowledge cannot be gainsaid.

The mental activity that gives us our sense world is, as we have said, essentially the same as the thinking processes by which we work over our perceptions into elaborated knowledge. It is the same mind, whether working subconsciously under the influence of stimulations, or consciously impelled by ideas and interests. In both fields we see the mind fixating, arranging, and weaving into a connected whole. Hence our study of elaborated knowledge will simply carry forward the issues started in the study of sense knowledge.

We see how, when our senses are alert, impressions forming a continuous succession bid for our attention. They cease with their moment of activity, unless the mind arrests them and gives them relative permanence. It is important to note how a selective process, begun before the mind is aware of it, is continued within the mental realm in the attempt to reduce the infinite variety of the external world to a manageable simplicity. Of the sun's rays, for instance, that flood the depths of space, a portion reach the earth, a comparatively few pass into the eye, and of these only the ones that arrest our attention or cause a mental response enter directly into the making of experience. The perceived world that results is our sole basis for determining what the macrocosm is. The mind has to find its way as best it can. Hence it proceeds to further

simplifications; the world as revealed in sense perception is still too complex.

The method of procedure is well known. When important similarities are noticed among our objects, we group them into a class, and the mind constructs a simplified model to stand for them all. This substitute, more or less vaguely defined, is our class concept or universal. It may serve merely as a rule for dealing with the members of the class, or it may on occasion be utilized as a guide in constructing an object. When thus utilized, it becomes an ideal to be realized. As soon as our universals are satisfactorily formulated, they, rather than the individuals of elementary experience, become the centers of interest. They thus tend to take over the characteristics of the reality that properly belongs to the separate objects to which they refer.

They are, in fact, as real as the material objects, but in a different sense. Both are valid for experience, and neither is more than that. Validity makes our mentally constructed things real, and validity imparts reality to our universals. The process of concreting or substantializing begins as soon as we have the incipient experiences (sense data) out of which we fashion individual things, and it continues so long as we find concepts that prove serviceable in grouping or otherwise connecting sense objects. It is true that sense objects have tangible qualities and concepts do not; but this difficulty is met by distinguishing two kinds of objective realities, one of things and one of essences. Essences (universals more or less substantialized) are real up to the measure of their serviceability.

When we are interested not so much in objects as in their relations one to another and their reciprocal changes, we proceed in a slightly different way, and get what we call a law rather than a universal, though the law is of the same nature as the universal. Both are rules. The one is a rule for identifying individual objects as belonging to a class, the other, a rule for dealing with objects as related to one another. Just as things change continuously

and every change has characteristic features that differentiate it from all others, so the relations that things sustain to one another are unique and never duplicated. The relations of things in our sense world are in this respect like the permutations of an infinite number of elements supposedly disconnected; but unlike such permutations, they fall into easily recognizable groups based upon similarity. Within each group these resemblances suggest some sort of connection. The things vary together in some definable way. The statement of this connection when sufficiently inclusive is called a law of nature. While the law gets its validity by being exemplified in particular situations, the situations themselves are vastly more complex than the law indicates. Hence the connection expressed by the law has the same sort of validity as have universals, and tends like them to make the connection a part of our real world. Both universals and laws of connection are of such value in understanding and manipulating nature that they command our interest; the individual thing yields first place in point of significance, until we have to make a new test of our law. In fixing our attention on the laws of connection we get the conception of things as having an environment which determines or at least sustains fixed relations to their activities. The laws of nature are thus formulations of the relationships between objects and their environment. The scientist is interested both in objects as related spatially and in the succession of events. Objects are objects only because they embody a temporal series of appearances. To forecast the future of a given situation we must of course know the laws of its development in the past. Hence the sciences, whenever practicable, have made the historical approach central in the study of nature. This is especially true of the biological sciences. That the phylogenetic history of animal or plant forms can be made the basis of their systematic treatment was a discovery of profound significance. Similarities and divergences were thus explained as indicating the closeness or remoteness of blood

relationship. Varieties and species and even genera were seen to be continually, though slowly, in the making. The explanation of how these changes take place, the influences that bring them about, constitutes the theory of evolution.

If now we should ask of laws as we asked of universals, Are they real? the first answer would probably be that they are not. We certainly distinguish, for instance, the growing tree from the law of its growth. We are sure that the law is not a part of the material tree. Yet if we let our thoughts dwell on what the law apparently does in controlling the cycle of changes in the tree, we find no difficulty in attributing to it a power that can belong only to an external reality. Laws are as real as essences, and both are as real as physical things, though only for the thinker. They are real in a deeper sense than are physical things, since they hold over and have a sort of permanence, while things are evanescent, ever passing into something else. Out of things, universals, and laws, the mind constructs its ordered world. The practical value of the selective simplifications thus accomplished is beyond estimate. They are the condition of social intercourse and even of knowledge itself. They are more than the condition, they are the very structure of knowledge, and as such are the greatest achievement of the human mind. By means of them we attain what we proudly call the truth, as distinguished from mere matters of fact.

Truth, then, pertains especially to the organization and structure of experience. This statement means not that matters of fact may not be true, or that truths may not attain to the status of matters of fact, but rather that we advance from the bare apprehension of facts to the grasp of truths as we view the facts in their interrelation and form them into coherent wholes. Antecedent to the apprehension of the individual object or event we doubtless have, as psychology teaches, a vague consciousness of a whole that includes the object or event as a not yet isolated phase. But even such a vague consciousness is the

work of mental construction, though we are entirely unconscious of the activity involved. Then follows the separation of portions of this mass into definite objects such as constitute our external world. When these are studied in their relations one to another, they yield the knowledge we call truth, and thereby make practical life possible.

Because the isolable fact lies intermediate between the relatively unorganized complex of hazy psychic content and the organized whole of experience, the distinction between fact and truth cannot in any given situation be sharply drawn. The one passes into the other by insensible degrees. The more we reflect on the subject, the farther back we carry the idea of truth, until we reach the most elementary awareness of an outside world. Everywhere along the line of advance we find evidences of relating activity. Inasmuch as we start with an ill-defined scheme of the whole which seems to be merely given, and within this scheme construct our objects by a process of isolation, we might make out a case for the proposition that the individual object is an abstraction while the concrete reality is the truth in its articulated completeness.

But not all supposed truth is true. How do we differentiate the true from the false or inaccurate? We put it to a practical test. We ask, Does the conception help us to understand the group of facts to which it refers? Can we act upon it and secure the anticipated results? Does it contribute to our ability to control events in the world about us? Thus we presuppose an objective order in our sense world—an order that we apparently do not make but discover. The discovery, however, is a making, since the order could not exist for us if we failed to take all the steps of analyzing, arranging, and formulating involved in our idea of order. The point of special interest is that all knowledge implies orderliness. Evident in the most rudimentary consciousness of an outside world, it is also the very essence of rationality. Truth as content is simply the order that proves itself in practical life.

Order has two meanings which should be distinguished. It may mean logical necessity and refer to connections of implication. Such order is exemplified in a mathematical system, where every element has a determinate place depending on the nature of rationality. The second meaning pertains to the external world as having observed variety of content variously related. In this latter sense order as contrasted with disorder means simply such an arrangement of the details in any situation as meets our needs or answers to our expectations at the time. All disorder is relative, and as Bergson¹ rightly maintains, nowhere in the realm of experience is there an absence of order of some sort. Even chaos is vaguely apprehensible only as an order not yet mastered. To think at all is to set in order, that is, to select, correlate, connect. The more we think, the more significant become to us the order and connections among things.

Thus every consideration of convenience and necessity contributes to the mind's drive toward system. Theoretically there is no resting place for the mind short of such an exhaustive and harmonious organization of our sense world as will completely define every object therein by its relations to the other members of the system. No one has ever attained this goal, nor can any one ever hope to. In practice we stop the work of organizing and systematizing when we get tired or lose interest, that is, when we satisfy our practical needs. This work of classifying and relating is the chief enterprise of the natural sciences.

We are now ready to characterize the kind of truth that is the goal of scientific endeavor. It is *systematic, descriptive, objective, practical*. These characteristics indicate the scope and limitations of the scientific field. We are interested now especially in the relation of scientific knowledge thus characterized to the question of the real in the objective world. A further word about each of these four characteristics.

The scientific ideal, if it could be realized in full meas-

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 220 ff.

ure, would hardly be looked upon as real apart from experience. Its reality would still consist in its validity and effectiveness in dealing with the objective world. Nevertheless we succeed in working so many of the scientific conceptions into our common-sense world that no one can accurately separate the two. There seems no limit to our capacity to take over the accredited and accepted results of scientific thought and make them a part of objective reality. This process of absorption of thought material from science is steadily transforming our conceptions of the nature of the real. Among other things, it is forcing us to recognize not only the infinite complexity of a world built out of electrons and protons, but also the thoroughly dynamic character of every part of nature. We find increasingly difficult the task of holding fast to the substantial character of the external world while incorporating the intellectual constructions of science. Reality is so vitally connected with both constructions—the common-sense and the scientific—that neither can be dispensed with. We must somehow harmonize them. In other words, our conception of reality must admit of continuous transformations in accordance with the demands of scientific thought, and at the same time allow for the substantial verities of sense perception. The real must be for us an achievement, with various stages and degrees—not static but growing.

We make progress toward this end by recognizing the instrumental character of scientific constructions. As their serviceability in dealing with nature—forecasting and controlling the course of events—determines their quality as truth, the aim is to attain the maximum of simplicity and definiteness. The structure should be transparent to reason, that is, every part should be seen in its relation to every other. In short, the product should be systematic throughout. This ideal is not in the least invalidated by the failure of science to realize it. All scientific attainment is in the direction of this goal. We may even catch sug-

gestions of the goal itself as we consider some of the boldest generalizations of recent physics and chemistry.

In passing we may ask, Are the results of scientific effort less real because of being serviceable? Does their instrumental character take them out of the realm of reality and make them mere intellectual tools, expressive of human limitations? Or is external reality after all a systematic whole? Does it actually consist of an infinite nexus, in which every element is related to every other? Science is not concerned to answer this question. But as students of philosophy, we must in due time find an answer that holds or else give up our problem; for our main interest is in attaining an insight into the nature of reality.

That the entire process of selection and organization characteristic of scientific work is descriptive only can hardly be questioned. Science takes the materials of sense perception, eliminates as far as possible any inaccuracy of observation, analyzes them to find the simpler and more common elements of which they are composed, searches for the elementary laws of their composition, studies environmental conditions, and formulates results in laws of connection. This is, throughout, description. If by chance or inadvertence the zealous investigator ventures to transcend the limits of description and pronounce on the nature of reality as such, his more careful colleagues are quick to discount this part of his work as extra-scientific. As purely descriptive, scientific results are characterized by their strict externality. The word internal has no meaning for science except as that which can be known by becoming external. This is true even of mental states. They are scientific material only in so far as they can be represented graphically, that is, set forth as capable of being sensuously apprehended. This explains also why the self is non-existent for scientific thought, or if recognized as an entity is treated as a problem which can be solved only by a process of resolution into elements open to inspection. However penetrative the analysis and however comprehen-

sive the generalization, science never gets beyond the surface features of experience. The spatially internal becomes external by being thought as a part of the system.

We may ask again, Is this externalism a limitation of science, or does it tell the whole story of objective reality? Is the world of sense perception pure externality? Is its nature exhausted by being perceived? Is it pure system, pure mechanism, pure process? Science answers again that nothing else can be included in the scientific scheme of truth. Many scientists incline to the opinion that the scientific limit of knowledge is the absolute limit, and that human intelligence cannot transcend it. We shall need to move cautiously in dealing with this issue. Science must have full authority within its field. Reality must be system, must be mechanism in so far as it is intellectually apprehensible. But may it not be more? Must it not be if it is real? These of course are philosophical questions and need not trouble the scientist, whereas they constitute our main problem in so far as external nature is concerned. They will be considered in due time, but are referred to here by way of suggesting how much of every science (except pure mathematics) is strictly speaking extra-scientific. The man of science may rightly claim to keep close to the realities of nature. But his realities are always more than descriptions. He fills in, rounds out, completes his schematic results by interpreting them in terms of subjective interests. Events as happening in the space-time continuum he treats as things that change internally and in their space relations one with another. Thus he becomes a philosopher against his will.

Science reduces everything to pure externality because it is strictly objective in its attitude toward the world of possible experience. Its objectivity is its strength. All its triumphs have been due to its strict adherence to the objective viewpoint. To abandon that would be to sacrifice both clearness and cogency, in fact everything of scientific value. Since science has a right to claim the entire field of the knowable as its very own, may we not

plausibly conclude that the objective viewpoint is the only one that can yield accredited knowledge? Whatever we would study or learn about, whether things, essences, relations, or persons, we set over against ourselves to view either with the physical or the inner eye of the analyzing mind. This is evidently the same issue as was raised in the preceding paragraph. We break up the objects into their component parts and study the modes of their activity, confident that both the elements of analysis and the changing states are more than subjective constructions. What that something more is cannot be ascertained by observation, for observation can yield only further descriptive data. The strict use of the objective method must, therefore, leave us quite detached from the realities of experience. The reference to reality is something additional.

After all that has been said, we need not dwell upon the practical character of scientific truth. Its practicality is no more a limitation than is the objectivity of scientific method. To say that such knowledge is practical is to say that it can be tested by experience. The much bandied statement of the Pragmatists that what works is true and what does not work is not true, holds universally, just because it is tautological. Truth is practical or it is not truth for us. An objector might ask, Do not our ideas have to correspond to an objective or extra-human standard? Before we answered this we should need to tell what we mean by objective, and in what sense ideas correspond. The standard must be set up by the mind itself or it cannot be used, and its selection depends on its appropriateness to the end in view. The idea can correspond to it only with reference to some feature which is at the time interesting to the mind. There is no such thing as correspondence in general. Hence both the selection of a standard and the correspondence are ruled by practical motives. When we advance beyond the workability tests of sense experience, the appropriate test is that of coherence or consilience. This requires that truths be consistent internally

and in relation to one another, so that together they may form a harmonious whole. Evidently this test is also practical, though more especially for the higher intellectual realm.

But it is a significant fact that scientific truth is rarely found in its chemically pure state except as mathematical formulae. The generalizations always refer to the world of concrete things and the assumption is always made that this thing world to which the law applies has some sort of independent existence. Take, for instance, such a generalization as Boyle's law concerning the pressure of gases. With mathematically accurate data bearing upon the volume, temperature, and pressure of a confined gas, the physicist can demonstrate the law. When explaining the law and its application, the physicist very naturally refers to the forces at work in causing the pressure, and to the molecules as free to move. Now evidently all reference to forces and molecules transcends description, as we have said, unless the terms are used as mere convenient modes of expression. Even their convenience rests on an unexpressed if not wholly unconscious assumption that they actually mean an existing world of entities.

In short, while science aims at practically usable description of events, it must transcend description in order to be intelligible. This is nothing against science, but it points to the habitual and even necessary use of another type of explanation in dealing with concrete experience. For convenience we may call this other type interpretation. The two types are related, though distinct, at least in theory. They need to be carefully distinguished at this point. In passing from the one to the other we pass from the strictly scientific attitude to the philosophic. Science may make its own interpretations and treat them with indifferent concern until the philosophical question of ultimate validity is raised. Then the attempt to answer the question carries us beyond science.

Scientific description, as we have said, should be not only accurate and unbiased, but impersonal. As imper-

sonal it must practically ignore the connection of the described event or object with the observer. In so far as this cannot be ignored the scientist must find ways of making due allowance for the personal equation and correct the results accordingly. The description must of course represent a point of view; but points of view may be varied, and thus cover all the superficial aspects of a situation. Nevertheless all description involves the selection of material, a clearly defined perspective, a distribution of emphasis dependent on the attitude of the observer or describer, and such other controlled treatment as points to the ineradicable presence of subjective factors. Everything in the description is determined by the dominant interest. Change the interest and the description is modified accordingly. But not only can no one description adequately set forth the object; all possible ones combined fail of adequacy, when judged by the test of ultimate concreteness. Studied accuracy and minuteness of detail only reveal how much in the object is left unexpressed. The concrete object stands over against the catalogue of qualities as something quite apart. The difficulty is not that there is always a vast residuum of complexity, but that no description as such tells you anything at all except as you read into the words used a bit of your own experience, and this is more than description.

So long as we maintain the strict limitations of description, the object is described as having a place in a world beyond the self; yet back of every description is the describer with his limited capacities and interests, and his ability to change his interests indefinitely. Every new interest develops a new insight, a new grouping of significant distinctions, new meanings and values. From this viewpoint, the viewpoint of the experiencing subject, the reality apprehended is just what it appears to be at the time to the experient. At one time it may be rich in qualities sharply distinguished, at another, a mere blur of undifferentiated material—the same reality, yet not the same; different in every particular.

But does not scientific description imply all that is here asserted of interpretation? We have the same diversity, the same intellectual limitations, the same feeling that reality is indefinitely beyond our apprehension. Why, then, attempt to draw a sharp line between description and interpretation, as if they were somehow opposed? In answer to this very reasonable question, we would point out again that the contrast becomes especially significant only when the nature of the real is the problem before us. While the real is referred to in every description, it eludes us when we become critical. We must, therefore, differentiate the two contrasting elements in ordinary description and note what belongs to description because of its distinctive point of view and what is assumed as giving significance to the description.

The assumed element in all description is the meaning of the object for the knower. In interpretation this meaning is brought to the foreground and identified as the reality underlying the description. The close affinity of meaning with the idea of substance is evident. The meaning holds together in a unity a manifold of experiences. It does this not by the laws of association nor by the likeness of the physical characteristics to one another, but by the insight that they belong together in a purposive whole. When the meaning changes, the united experiences fall apart and a new combination is effected. Meaning is the objective side of purpose; it answers the question, What is the thing good for? To understand, then, the philosophical significance of interpretation, we have only to imagine all meaning eliminated from our world. Not only would those indescribable features of reality which reflect our moods have to go, but whatever else is essential to the existence of an objective world. Individual things would have to be surrendered, for they are integral entities only because they conserve a purpose. It is the purpose that holds the parts together. Change the purpose and the combination changes. What would be an individual from one point of view would be part of a larger whole

or would be itself an aggregate from some other point of view. Thus a house is a whole, a unit of interest, when we are thinking of a place to dwell in; it is a manifold of parts if we are thinking of the materials entering into its construction; and it is a part of a larger whole when the neighborhood is our unit of interest. All unities of whatever sort are unities for a knower and answer to specific needs. There are no unities in general, no unities divorced from meanings.

We see in the creations of abstract dynamics to what lengths pure description can be carried. Material things are reduced to mass which is defined as inertia; and energy is evaporated into movement. It is of no importance for dynamics whether the object is treated as having bulk or as being a point of reference. The formula is the thing; the reality may or may not be present. Qualities do not count; only quantitative distinctions signify. Thus as more and more of the meaning is squeezed out of reality, it loses its concreteness until in the end nothing is left but formulae and equations. The world of reality disappears, and diagrams take its place. The diagrams are of great value to us because they apply to the world that we have excluded.

If we accept this conclusion, we must acknowledge that the world of reality is throughout and altogether a human world. Nothing that does not bear the stamp of the human can exist for us. The world is as rich and varied and manifold and orderly and interconnected and meaningful as we are able to make it, and no more. This does not mean that the universe did not exist before we came into being, but that in our present apprehension of reality are indications which we interpret as meaning a past reaching back into remote periods of time. The past of the world is a reality for us only as we can give it a meaning, that is, can connect it in thought with our present.

Does, then, the meaning for a self actually inhere in the external thing as its essential reality? Do we not, rather, merely read into it our own sense of value? At first

thought the question can hardly be taken seriously; it seems to answer itself, so sure are we that the physical world in itself is "brute matter." But this is because, whenever we raise the issue of the nature of reality, we ostensibly maintain the onlooker's impersonal point of view, oblivious of the extent to which we read ourselves into the results. The last thing we think of is connecting ourselves with the world that lies over against us and appears as just that which is not ourselves. The persistent ignoring of this connection, as we have already pointed out, results from the apparent independence of physical nature and its manifest indifference to us in its ongoings. The reality on which we depend and with which we must reckon moment by moment may indeed give rise to human values and have human significance; but to conclude that this reality has its very being in these values or in this human significance seems absurd. Such is the orthodox view of most people, and it is backed up by the tremendous authority of common sense. The unreflective thinker yielding to such a weight of evidence follows the analyst in stripping reality of all but its structural features, and concludes that he has reached the ultimate fact.

But we must, if possible, face the problem without prejudice, and give proper weight to every consideration bearing on the issue. So far as the world is known to us, not only the stable structure but all the changing aspects are the work of the mind. After all that has been said on the subject, this conclusion should be evident. Each situation may appear as variously to different individuals as the individuals themselves differ in character and interests. Meanings necessarily enter into the very nature of physical things. Without this element, this distinctively human reference, reality itself would disappear or cease to be for us. It dissolves away under the logic of the analyst. Our task now is to clear this conclusion of ambiguity and face every objection that can properly be urged against it.

When we say that the cosmic universe is a human world because it is a world for human beings, what do we mean

by the expression, a human world? The entire course of our argument from this point on will help to elucidate its meaning, but just now a general statement must suffice. The physical world is a human world in its substantial character, that is, as consisting of substantial things, as filling objective space, and as being that to which our thoughts refer. This does not say that the source of stimulation is human, but only that the known world is ours because we make it. The substantiality of things consists wholly of meanings. Since meanings concern our practical interests and have to do with purposes, they are essentially human values. The reality of the world as known and experienced, then, is value and nothing else.

By calling things values, we accentuate the fact that while they may be desirable (positive values) or undesirable (negative values), they cannot be indifferent. It is only as an object arrests attention and awakens an interest that it exists for us. Its complexity is the response to a complexity of interest. With a change of interest there is a corresponding change in the object. The intellectual structure may remain the same, just because it is not the concrete reality. But the reality itself is a content entirely dependent on the capacity and interest (broadly interpreted) of the observer. It is well to note in passing that this distinction between intellectual structure and content, while convenient for exposition, is likely to be misleading. The two cannot be separated in the sense that a content can exist without a structure. The structure may have a thought existence as a schematic representation, but the concrete is presupposed. It is the concrete that we take to be real in the objective sense. Whatever may be the structure of this real, it is rich in æsthetic and other affective elements. It is a nexus of values with an intellectual framework, which is itself a value. Take away the value elements, and nothing is left but the skeletonized object of scientific description, and that remains only by grace of the logical indifference which refrains from completing the work of value elimination. It is, as was said, because

values are so various and variable that we persist in thinking of them as merely subjective. Yet as actual features of experience, they are as much physical properties as are colors, temperatures, or even the so-called primary qualities. This statement runs counter to prejudice so deep-seated that the argument here sketched is not likely of itself to satisfy. The conclusion will, however, gain decidedly in plausibility if we (1) examine the dilemma in which the scientific conception of the world culminates; (2) study the various attempts of thinkers to escape from this *impasse*; and finally (3) note how all the attempts succeed only in so far as they imply or approach the doctrine that the reality in the external world is value-content.

CHAPTER II

THE RESULTANT DILEMMA FOR PHILOSOPHY

We have seen how thought by its very nature is systematic. To think is to relate, to form concepts, laws, theories, formulae. When, therefore, we say that science is committed to a mechanical view of the world, we are simply recognizing the fact that science is thorough, exact thinking. In so far as philosophy is a thought structure, it too has system as its goal. Both science and philosophy would comprehend the world as transparent to reason. That none of the sciences have attained this goal even in their own limited field is not strange when we consider the tremendous complexity of their problem. But the reason for stopping short is strictly a practical one. To carry scientific reasoning over into the last reaches of generalization would not only be a superhuman task, but would probably prove of little value either in forecasting the future or in manipulating the present. Nevertheless every science is moving in the direction of the goal, and finds no logical necessity for stopping short of it. Such elementary sciences as physics and chemistry have moved farther toward the goal than have the biological sciences. While physics and chemistry meet arresting complexity even in their simplest units, yet by constructing mechanical models, they can exhibit this complexity as the expression of perfect order. But the biological sciences have a complexity of a different character. At least it yields less readily to thorough analysis. This explains why biologists generally hesitate to accept the strict implications of the mechanical ideal. They would retain at least the idea of physiological units or entelochies or germplasm as

successfully resisting complete systematization. But the existence of such entities is the subject of endless discussion that often degenerates into mere logomachies. The ideal of system is the light of all our seeing in the intellectual field, the guide for every advance toward a comprehension of our experience world. What has not yet been reduced to system must be looked upon as still holding problems for further study.

The law-giving character of this ideal in science is strikingly exemplified by the attitude of scientists generally toward the question of human freedom. There can be no real freedom, so the argument goes, because every event is completely determined by the preceding events and in turn contributes its share in determining the events that follow; everything is linked up with everything else in a system. There are other arguments offered against the doctrine of freedom, but this one lies at the basis of them all. While this ideal of system is a regulative principle for all thought, scientific and philosophical alike, it is for science the ultimate goal, whereas philosophy may and must transcend it.

That science cannot go beyond it and cannot logically stop short of it is the conclusion that interests us now. It is a conclusion that could be anticipated as soon as we saw that science, being essentially observational, is limited to describing how things act. This statement seems to place a special limitation on science; but as a matter of fact, the limitation pertains to all thinking. We start in experience with spontaneous convictions about the reality of the thing world, and these convictions hold to the end, whatever the result of critical study. But by thought alone we reach only relations, connections, organizing principles. As thought advances, these steadily encroach upon the realities themselves, and resolve them into a scheme of relations. To say that we define a thing by its relations is to acknowledge this fact. We here face a genuine crisis in our thought life; we are compelled, while not allowed, to hold that the universe is pure process.

The compulsion is abstractly evident. But one might at this point protest that the argument has left the sure way of experience and passed into meaningless vacuity. The objector might say, "Science describes what it sees, and it never sees mere activity, but always the thing as active. Moreover to think at all we must have a subject that is distinguishable from what we think concerning it and this subject must have a measure of stability. The subject of a judgment is reality. What nonsense to maintain that flying flies or flowing flows when we observe a bird or a stream! Science has as its task the ordering of our sense world and it certainly has no occasion to deny itself and make its task impossible by leaving the substantial realities that are its theme and going off into pure vagaries about process in which nothing proceeds."

In reply we would call attention to the following items:

(1) Science assumes reality and does not need to abjure it on account of analyses or the dynamic theory. Though the theory in the abstract may differ widely from the experience of reality, the one may apply to the other with demonstrable accuracy. And this is all that science aims to show. However abstract and formularistic it becomes, science can always provide itself from experience with substances as subjects of its statements. But when we ask what these substances are, science answers that their inner nature is unknown, that for aught science can ascertain they are nothing more than convenient fictions. The whole point of the discussion lies in the fact that science as such does not raise the question of reality. So long as it occupies itself with analysis and generalization upon observed phenomena, it can carry forward its work as far as it chooses. When the goal—the inevitable logical goal—is reached in thought and the world of experience is viewed as a never-ending flow of events, science need not ask what it is that flows. Its work is done, or rather would be if the goal could be reached in actual practice.

(2) But suppose a person with a taste for reality should press the question, What flows? Suppose, then,

that he should try to find the answer wholly within the domain of science, that is, to maintain the scientific point of view. He would be confronted with the paradox of a flowing world in which nothing flows. It is not science that is here at fault, but a philosopher who would be strictly scientific. Science cannot logically transcend its formulae, expressive of pure process; but there is no need that it should. The whole matter might be dropped at this point, but the scientist himself is always somewhat of a philosopher and therefore has an interest in our question. As a man he is more than a scientist. Our problem then confronts him. Process is unthinkable unless something abides of which the process is an expression. Cut out the permanent, as we long ago saw, and there can be no change; deny continuity of existence, and process becomes self-contradictory. This outcome is largely concealed from unreflective thought, because we so easily supply in our own experienced continuity the one conviction that makes the external process possible for us.

Our immediate problem, however, is not whether we ourselves are real, but whether there is any reality in the outside world. We may in the end have to conclude that these two imply each other, but this is not yet evident. On the one hand, we cannot think of ourselves as a mere part of the external flow of events without losing our identity and becoming as evanescent as the events, and thereby cancelling the possibility of a thought life. Nor, on the other hand, can we transfer the reality of the outside world to the subjective realm, for that would mean the *reductio ad absurdum* known as solipsism—the *bête noire* of philosophy. What, then, is the reality in the outside world, the reality that seems revealed in sense perception, and that so completely melts away under analysis into pure process? Many have been the answers. Those which are representative of the best current thought we shall need to examine somewhat care-

fully. To find the right answer is to solve at least one riddle of the philosophic sphinx.

A student may draw either one of two conclusions from the difficulties we have been facing. He may take refuge in scepticism and decide that reality is unknowable by finite intelligence. This is the easy way of escape from perplexities. The sceptic holds the field so long as no acceptable solution is found. And he can plausibly contend that human knowledge is limited to concepts while real objects are forever distinct therefrom. Once started in the way of doubt, he may, with George Santayana,¹ reason that if we would reach ultimate certainty, we must doubt every belief that is open to doubt, every belief that can be doubted without contradiction—even reason itself. By this procedure we seem to be liberated from all superstition. We can see with an open eye and without prejudice how all knowledge is inference and not reality. But thoroughgoing scepticism of this sort leads to intellectual paralysis. Even Santayana cannot maintain his position longer than to announce his conclusion and then declare that it is practically absurd. Caught in the meshes of thorough scepticism, Santayana tries to justify the exercise of animal faith (“animal” because pertaining to animated beings and presumably shared by all). Since the scepticism of Santayana and his followers claims to be an advanced form of realism (inasmuch as they recognize the reality of essence or the simple data of sense experience), we must leave the detailed criticism of it till we are ready to examine the various forms of realism and weigh their answer to our question. We may remark here that the way of faith is not philosophically satisfactory unless the faith is faith in reason.

The value of scepticism lies in its demonstrating the failure of the philosophy that involves it. Just because no one can rest satisfied in general scepticism, a sceptical

¹ *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, chap. vi.

conclusion becomes a powerful stimulus to further thinking. Only the person who gives up the search for ultimate insight can be content to doubt the possibility of truth, and such a person is almost certain to take refuge in some external authority, the ever ready substitute for insight. We must, then, turn away from scepticism as being essentially irrational and at best only a confession of failure.

The other conclusion is the one we have repeatedly drawn, namely, that our difficulties arise from a defect of method, which philosophy must correct. Philosophy must insist on the insight that the external world as experienced is necessarily related to the knowing subject and that this relation implies the mind's working under compulsion. The logical questions then would be, What does the mind contribute? and, What comes from the independent source of compulsion? The way through the *impasse* of science would then become evident, and the sceptic would be dethroned.

Of the positive answers to our question as to the nature of external reality, three are current that are verbally distinguishable. These are (1) the answer of the realist, that the reality in the external world is independent of the knowing mind; (2) the answer of the mystic, that there is no reality in the external world; and (3) the answer of the idealistic absolutist, that reality is experience but not the experience of any particular individual mind. These three, especially the first and the last, deserve a somewhat extended examination, because they hold the key to most of the philosophical problems of the day.

Realism, for reasons later to be noted, breaks up into various schools, dogmatic or naive realism (so called by opponents), new realism, new rationalism, and latest of all, critical realism. These intermingle in a confusing way, in spite of their advocates' efforts to keep them apart. Mysticism is more a tendency and pious conviction than a reasoned body of doctrine, though some of

the keenest minds of all the ages have been mystics. Idealistic absolutism is even more various than realism. Idealism may pass through absolutism to positivism, with its negative answer to our question, or it may with even greater ease avoid absolutism altogether, and arrive at personalism. Each of these various world-views will contribute something to the understanding of the issue. But our task is far from easy. The great danger is that, in confining our attention to the one crucial question, we shall not only fail to do justice to the thought systems as a whole, but fail as well to get the exact meaning of their answers to our question. Yet we must take the risk and avoid misrepresentations as far as possible.

CHAPTER III

THE ANSWER OF REALISM

Realism is particularly difficult to summarize, because, being a comparatively recent and still developing body of thought, it has all the racy variety and ambiguity incident to a new movement. In general realists ally themselves closely with the positive sciences, exalt analysis as the instrument of knowledge, and try to satisfy common sense. Their answer to our question is not unequivocal, nor simple, nor easily understood. An extensive group of independent thinkers call themselves realists though they have little in common except the conviction that something is radically wrong with the current types of idealism and that science alone can furnish the corrective. They gather recruits from every school of thought. In trying to understand the results of the many realistic attempts at the problem of reality we shall need to bear in mind, (1) the general character of the realistic movement as a protest against the dominant forms of idealism, (2) the consequent heterogeneity of opinions that the term realism must cover, and (3) the obligation to secure the best possible statement of the realistic position as to the reality of the outside world. Our own general sympathy with the realistic endeavor to find "a new way of ideas" will insure our best endeavor to do ample justice while maintaining a critical attitude. No other group of thinkers deserve quite so full and detailed consideration, not only because they represent a forward-looking movement but because our particular question is central in their thinking. They are specialists on the subject of the real in nature. All healthy-minded people share with them

the conviction that the world of objects is in a sense real, and that any analysis of the knowing process or any theory of knowledge that fails to make provision for this reality must be summarily discarded. But we can hardly follow those who deride epistemology and declare themselves pre-Kantian dogmatists. The term dogmatism as used, for instance by W. T. Marvin, a realist of the realists, means that the common-sense or uncritical belief in external reality is basic and criticism must conform unconditionally thereto. The dictum has reference to the Kantian type of thought, but as it is based on a misunderstanding of Kant, only its positive meaning concerns us. As a declaration of policy it looks like the extravagance of intellectual freakishness, a gamboling in a new found freedom. But criticism should not be disturbed by such pronouncements. Nothing in the way of knowledge can be reserved from criticism. The realist has his theory of knowledge, which he endeavors to make coherent and plausible by the same methods that the idealists use.

As a protest against current idealism of the absolutist type—apparently the only type recognized by realists as significant—realism can make out a strong case. The absolutist holds that the universe is experience, not the experience of any one individual but just experience in general, somehow inclusive of all but identified with none. Such a notion of reality issues in the confession that it cannot be known. The doctrine runs into ultimate nescience. This the realist cannot abide, and he is certainly right in rejecting it. Philosophy is an explanation of reality if it is anything. A doctrine of nescience is a doctrine of philosophical bankruptcy. The realist's criticism can be supported in various ways, which we need not review. The realist further charges absolutism with being subjectivistic, with shutting the individual experient in with himself, unable to reach anything external to his own subjective life. If this charge holds, absolutism as a system of philosophy is disposed of. We find that absolutism has had serious difficulty to save itself from this criti-

cism. The efforts of F. H. Bradley¹ to protect his conclusions from a solipsistic interpretation were only partly successful. While we are not now concerned with the attacks of realism on the inner stronghold of absolute idealism, we can appreciate the reasons given for the revolt.

In its more modern form realism began to be especially influential among English-speaking people during the latter part of the nineteenth century, though its roots reach back into ancient thought. In England the movement was given a powerful impetus by G. E. Moore and T. Percy Nunn, who were followed by a group of natural scientists, psychologists, and philosophers, among whom S. Alexander, Bertrand Russell and G. Dawes Hicks are perhaps the most influential. The movement found American thinkers ready to welcome it with more enthusiasm and intellectual abandon than critical discretion. While the number in this country is so great that it has become almost a fashion to be a realist, the two groups that have collaborated among themselves to issue their views in book form may be taken as representative. The first group including E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding called their book *The New Realism*. The later group including D. Drake, A. O. Lovejoy, J. B. Pratt, A. K. Rogers, G. Santayana, R. W. Sellars, and C. A. Strong, believing that they could revise, strengthen, and carry forward realistic doctrine, coöperated in publishing the book they called *Essays in Critical Realism*. We cannot pass all of these writers in review. Each states himself in a characteristic way and naturally refuses to be held for the opinions of his colleagues unless he expressly indorses them. The best, then, that we can hope to do is to formulate, with the help of the realists themselves, the distinctively realistic answer to our question, and to appraise the reasons given in support of the answer.

The realist would reverse the course of the idealistic argument. Whereas the idealist examines knowledge as

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, chap. xxi.

an intellectual product and concludes that reality must conform to the limitations therein revealed, the realist would turn his attention directly to the outside world. He would follow the sure method of science. So long as people occupied themselves with logical puzzles about thought abstractions, the investigation of nature could hardly begin. If, then, a first-hand study of nature is the condition of scientific progress, why should not the philosopher, who also wants to attain significant truth, follow the same method? Why should he not take the world just as it presents itself to him in sense perception, and find out by actual inspection what sort of a world it is? To this appeal we are inclined to yield ourselves. If the idealist were given the opportunity here to make reply, he might say that what the realist proposes is not only legitimate but necessary, though the findings furnish only the starting point for philosophy proper.

The realist urges further that the idealist is wrong in reasoning from the acknowledged assumption that to be known a thing must be in relation to a mind. Whereas the idealist concludes from this assumption that all reality must be mental in origin and nature, the realist asserts the opposite to be true, namely, that the thing must first exist before it can enter into relation to a mind. The supposed fallacy of the idealist has been given the rather formidable name of "ego-centric predicament."² The conclusion of the realist involves the corollary that the object existing prior to being known enters only into external relations to the mind. By this is meant that the relations make no difference with the object itself. The distinctive doctrine, then, of realists as a class is that the world apprehended in sense perception is independent of the knower, that it has laws of its own, and that its being perceived does not in any way affect its reality.

At this point we are embarrassed to know just what is meant by the term independent as applied to the real in experience. The term may mean that the object is dis-

² *The New Realism*, p. 11.

tinct as mental content from the act of knowing it, or that it maintains itself against any mere mental effort to change it, or that its past and future are beyond the individual's reach, or that the world as common to all transcends the individual mind, or that the world not only exists in its own right and with only external relations to the mind, but is a strictly non-mental reality. All of these meanings except the last even the idealist may hold, for they are in a sense involved in the possibility of our having an experience world. It would seem, then, that the last meaning is the one that the realist must maintain if he is to go beyond the idealist. The more sturdy realists recognize this and make it the corner-stone of their system. F. J. E. Woodbridge puts the case graphically when he says, "Things sail into it (consciousness) and out again without any break in the continuity of their being."³ That this conception is quite generally held among realists may be gathered from such quotations as the following.

Alexander in his recent work, says: "No action of the mind is possible without the object and more than a plant can breathe without air. In sensory experience compression with the physical revelation of a physical thing is brought about through the direct operation of the thing upon the senses. In imaging the act of mind is provoked from within, but in the one case as in the other the act of mind is face to face with its appropriate revelation."⁴ Bertrand Russell is a little more cautious in statement; but he leans strongly, especially in his earlier writings, toward an out-and-out indorsement of the realistic view of independence. He holds a commanding position among English philosophers of the realistic type because of his great learning, intellectual acumen, and assurance. In his *Problems of Philosophy*, he says that we want the same object for different people, hence it must be public and neutral. A few pages later he says plainly, "In one sense, it must

³ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method*, 1910, p. 416.

⁴ *Space, Time, and Deity*, vol. i. p. 25.

be admitted that we can never *prove* the existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences."⁵ But he is careful to add that there is no reason to suppose that the whole of life is a mere dream. This admission is highly significant. It means that for Russell the alternatives are independence for the thing or the abyss of solipsism. In his *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, he says "It would be a mistake to infer that they (colors) are dependent upon mind, not real while we see them, or not the sole basis for our knowledge of the external world."⁶ Later he defines a sensible object as being "just that patch of colour which is momentarily seen when we look at the table, or just that particular hardness,"⁷ etc. These quotations may seem very non-committal. In the development of his argument, Russell often uses language that the most pronounced idealist could indorse, as when he defines a thing as a perspective (an average of all the views one may have of the object from varying distances). Then again his language is strongly realistic. The two pitfalls, solipsism and utter agnosticism, are ever threatening him. His reasoning often inclines him to the one, his assertions save him from the other. When he writes within the limits of science he is clarity itself, though scientists may not agree with him. But metaphysical issues are apparently obtrusive annoyances to him. Well may they be, for in metaphysics he must face dilemmas whichever way he turns. In a more recent work, as well as in certain magazine articles, he seems even less sure of himself. He doubts if he should longer call himself a realist, though he still confesses sympathy with many of the realistic positions. It is with reference to the existence of an independent real that he has become sceptical. "Belief in the existence of things outside my own biography," he declares, ". . . must be regarded as a prejudice, not as a well grounded

⁵ P. 34.

⁶ P. 64.

⁷ P. 76.

theory. . . . I propose to continue yielding to the prejudice."⁸ This conclusion that belief in reality is a prejudice results from his inability to bridge the chasm between an image in the mind and such a hypothetical reality. He also finds insuperable difficulty in accounting for objects remembered and anticipated.

G. E. Moore, who brought the realistic movement into prominence by his famous article⁹ published in *Mind*, is quite technical and cautious in his treatment of the question. In the course of a discussion before the Aristotelian Society he asks, "Do sensibles (the sort of entities experienced in sensory experience) ever exist at times when they are not being experienced at all?"¹⁰ His answer though halting, is affirmative. He says, ". . . there is nothing to prevent us from holding that . . . all sorts of unexperienced sensibles do exist."¹¹ Then the question arises whether sensibles and physical objects are the same. This he answers tentatively in the negative. "The natural view to take as to the status of sensibles generally, relatively to physical objects, would be that none of them, whether experienced or not, were ever in the same place as any physical object. That none, therefore, exist 'anywhere' in physical space; while, at the same time, we can also say . . . that none exist 'in the mind,' except in the sense that some are directly apprehended by some minds. . . . Some, and some only, *resemble* the physical objects which are their source in respect of their shape."¹² As to physical objects he says, ". . . to say of a *physical object* that it *existed* at a given time will always consist merely in saying of some sensible, *not* that it existed at the time in question, but something quite different and immensely complicated."¹³ These passages apparently commit Moore to the following statements:

⁸ *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 132 f.

⁹ "The Refutation of Idealism," *Mind*, 1903, pp. 433-453.

¹⁰ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1913-14, p. 366.

¹¹ P. 379.

¹² P. 379 f.

¹³ P. 375.

(1) Sense perception involves some form of mental activity. (2) The sensibles are mental content in so far as they constitute the qualities of the apprehended object, but they may exist wholly apart from and antecedent to experience. (3) The sensibles are therefore not necessarily mental, they are not physical and do not exist in physical space. (4) Hence the sensibles have an undefined sort of existence or reality intermediate between the physical object and the mental content. Though many questions suggest themselves at this point, we may reasonably conclude that Moore indorses the realistic doctrine of independence. The physical for him is the source of compulsion in sense perception.

Among American realists we find less hesitancy, especially within the group of those who call themselves New Realists. Ralph Barton Perry defines the doctrine of independence as meaning for him "that things may be, and are, directly experienced *without owing either their being or their nature to that circumstance.*"¹⁴ E. G. Spaulding is equally explicit. He says, "The knowing process neither causally affects, modifies, or creates that which is known, nor demands an underlying entity to mediate the relationship between knowledge and its object."¹⁵

The ambiguity mentioned as lurking in the realistic doctrine of independence is now evident. The physical object seems to be a nondescript, neither mental content nor strictly non-mental in character, but somehow partaking of both or connected with both while independent. When the reality of the physical object is in question, its independence is asserted with emphasis, yet there is always a doubt whether the asseveration is to be interpreted as meaning a total disparateness from mental content or as accentuating the difference between the object as apprehended at the moment and the object in its determinate cosmic context. Most if not all of the realists recognize that in order to explain the possibility of a knowledge of

¹⁴ *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 315.

¹⁵ *The New Rationalism*, p. 11.

an independent thing, a *tertium quid* must mediate between the thing and the mind. One way of meeting this requirement is to assume a preëstablished harmony. This harmony guarantees the accuracy of the mental representative. The two entities harmonized in this way need not be alike in qualities or appearance, but only alike in varying together according to ascertainable laws. But unless the theory can guarantee all mental content, some way must be found to differentiate illusory content from matter of fact.

This problem of illusion and error is acknowledged to be troublesome to realists, but so is it to thinkers of every school. It is a kind of touchstone by which to test the adequacy of theories of knowledge. Some realists contend that the mental content in illusions and dreams represents actual physical objects, but that some confusion has been introduced on the mental side. This is curious. It suggests the question whether all the qualities apprehended in the mental content or only some of them are represented in the physical thing. On this subject realists are divided. T. Percy Nunn is persuaded that the physical object, considered as strictly physical (does he mean non-mental?), has all the qualities attributed to it and perhaps a great many more not represented in the mental series.¹⁶ He even declares that the stick which appears as a straight stick in the air and as a bent stick when partially submerged is really two sticks, and both are real. This view seems to be held also by Alexander.¹⁷ We are not now criticizing the theory but trying to understand it and its manifest implications. That these implications are embarrassing is evident; for if the mental content simply reproduces the qualities of the physical object in so far as the content is definite, then there must be as many objects as apprehensions of it. In other words, the physical object tends to vanish entirely as an independent entity, and to

¹⁶ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1909-10, pp. 191-231, and 1915-16, pp. 156-178.

¹⁷ *Mind*, 1912, p. 3.

give way to the mental content as the only reality. Thus the specter of solipsism becomes portentous.

It may seem too much to say that realists who appeal to preëstablished harmony have no recourse but to accept the consequence that illusions and dream objects are objectively real. Are illusions real? Do dream objects have a local habitation in the physical world? Bertrand Russell approaches an affirmative answer when he says that "there are no such things as 'illusions of sense.' Objects of sense, even when they occur in dreams, are the most indubitably real objects known to us."¹⁸ But we must not too hastily conclude that Russell means what he seems to say. As has been noticed in other connections, he is here also ambiguous. He is not speaking of objects in the ordinary sense, but patches of color and other qualities of things. By identifying sensations of quality with the quality itself he completes the confusion. This confusion enables him to say: "The sensation that we have when we see a patch of colour simply *is* that patch of colour, an actual constituent of the physical world. . . . The patch of colour may be both physical and psychical."¹⁹ The strange vacillation of Russell in dealing with the problem of reality and illusion is largely accounted for by his special type of psychology. In his *Analysis of Mind*, he holds that the entire content of the mental life consists of sensations and images.²⁰ The sensations are given or produced in the nervous system by external stimuli, while images are of the same character but produced from within.²¹ Knowledge does not arise till we believe something in connection with sensations and images, and belief is a feeling.²² Sensations, images, and feelings are his stock in trade by which to explain the complicated mental processes, volition, appreciation, the knowledge of the

¹⁸ *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, p. 85.

¹⁹ *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 142 f.

²⁰ Cf. p. 143.

²¹ Cf. p. 150.

²² Cf. p. 233.

external world, and all the varied purposive activities. No wonder that this equipment should prove inadequate when he would tell us what the truth is about the external world. He shifts from realism to idealism and then to scepticism or phenomenalism. Elsewhere he suggests that a piece of matter is not a single substance manifesting different appearances to different observers, but is merely a system of connected occurrences including all those which older views would regard as appearances of the piece of matter in question.²³ This is as idealistic as any statement one could easily find in philosophical literature. From the viewpoint of our present inquiry Russell's devious course is the more interesting because he tries to be just to all the factors of knowledge and still remain within the limitations of the scientific observer. He solves no philosophical problem, and he fails most conspicuously in his attempt to explain illusion and error.

What is the status of remembered objects? Do they too exist in the independent realm along with illusions and dream objects? Are they present or absent when remembered? The question could be answered in the usual common-sense way but for the necessity on realistic principles of having the object actually present when the mental content of experience refers to it. The sense data of which the experience consists are given by the object. If no object, then no sense data, no sensations, no images, unless perchance the images are somehow preserved across the intervening time and on occasion pass from the dormant to the active state. But even so, the image is not a new sense experience but a remembered past experience. Alexander meets the issue by saying, "The pastness of the object is a datum of experience, directly apprehended. The object is compresent with me as past."²⁴ On the following page, speaking of an individual he remarks, "The percept of him and the memory of him are two different appearances which in their connection reveal the one thing,

²³ *Nation and Athenæum*, Jan. 6, 1923.

²⁴ *Space, Time, and Deity*, vol. i. p. 113.

the man, whom we know to-day by perceiving and to have been yesterday by remembering. Moreover the memory is as much a physical object as the percept." In the same manner he explains the images of anticipated objects. They are real objects. "Expectation is precisely like remembering except that the object has the mark of future, that is of later than our present, instead of past or earlier."²⁵

This theory of the compresence of remembered object and mental content in remembering seems bizarre. Yet it appears to be a legitimate deduction from a realism that starts with the doctrine of independence, discounts the constructive mental work in sense perception, relies on the nervous system to hold the sense data for later exploitation, and in consequence makes the presence of the physical object necessary to experiencing it. The object is com-present whether we apprehend it directly as present or indirectly as past. The deduction seems legitimate, but the hiatus between the present though independent object and the mental content is not yet bridged.

Russell treats the question of memory with as little illumination as Alexander. He confesses, "If we had retained the 'subject' or 'act' in knowledge, the whole problem of memory would have been comparatively simple. We could then have said . . . the act of remembering is present, though its object is past."²⁶ But his objective point of view in studying mental phenomena precludes his recognizing the mind as other than a series of sense data and images, and these cannot act. They are orphans in the mental world with no one to claim them and no power in themselves. The best, then, that Russell can say of memory seems to be contained in the statement, "Memory-images and imagination-images do not differ in their intrinsic qualities, so far as we can discover. They differ by the fact that the images that constitute memories, unlike those that constitute imagination, are accompanied

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

²⁶ *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 163.

by a feeling of belief which may be expressed in the words 'this happened.' "²⁷ This statement is not explanation, it is not even an attempt to meet the real difficulty; it is a plain case of ignoring, and does not merit further discussion.

The new realists and their near of kin who hold to the doctrine of the independent object have not been able to meet the difficulties of their position. But may not the so-called critical realists whose realism is not so pronounced be able to give a better account of the real in experience? The characteristic doctrine of the critical realists is that the real is essence; all else is inference, more or less reliable. Suggestions of this doctrine are found all through the literature of the new realists. Moore's distinction between sensibles and the physical object, Perry's contention that colors are neither physical nor psychical,²⁸ and Marvin's conception of structure or relations as alone real,²⁹ point to the doctrine. Spaulding, in *The New Rationalism*,³⁰ revives the ancient doctrine that universals as subsistences are real though they do not exist. These subsistences—such as "justice," "ideals," "number," and "ideal systems of mechanics"—are the permanent realities, while objects change.

The critical realist valiantly and hopefully attacks the central problem of independence again from what he considers an entirely different point of view. He holds that the new realists fail because they accept the theory that physical objects, though entirely distinct, are somehow reproduced or represented in the mental content; that is, the sense data as media correctly represent the physical object from which they originate. This conception of the relation between the object and mental content seems to the critical realist to involve the conclusion—to use Pratt's illustration—that a remembered friend, long since

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

²⁸ *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 310.

²⁹ *The History of European Philosophy*, p. 415 ff.

³⁰ Pp. 11, 490.

passed away, is actually present in the memory, though known not to be present.³¹ This absurdity is avoided, according to the critical realist, by giving up the "copy" theory, and adopting the view that the given is the "essence" of the thing, whose existence is not given but accepted as a reasonable conviction. "By 'essence,'" says Strong, "I mean its (the thing's) *what* divorced from its *that*—its entire concrete nature, including its sensible character, but not its existence."³² This passage should be interpreted in the light of what Sellars states more explicitly. He says, "What, then, is knowledge? It is the recognized possession by the mind of the 'form' of the thing, that is, its position, size, structure, causal capacities, etc. It is the mediated grasp of those features of the thing which are reproducible."³³ Again he says, "Physical things are the objects of knowledge, though they can be known only in terms of the data which they control within us."³⁴ Objects control the data, and the data vary with the conditions, such as distance and position.³⁵

Evidently the realism that calls itself critical is moving away from the new realism toward its opposite. The thing, though acknowledged to be independent, is no longer known directly by its floating or sailing into consciousness, but only indirectly as mediated by a causal relation. The effect on the mind may or may not be like the causal element in the thing. Critical realists are not ready to commit themselves on this point; they have no way of determining the question of likeness or unlikeness. In this connection the words of Pratt are significant. He says: "Critical realism does not pretend to be metaphysics. It is perfectly possible for the critical realist to be a panpsychist, a metaphysical dualist, a Platonist, or an ontological idealist of some other type. Only so much

³¹ *Critical Realism*, p. 97.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 223.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

³⁵ *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 200, 203, 210.

of the metaphysical problem need critical realists be agreed upon as is required by the epistemological doctrine which they hold in common. They believe, namely, that 'physical' things exist independently of being known; that they may be our objects, but that they are never our mental content; that they differ in some respects from the quality-groups of our perception (*e.g.* in not possessing the secondary qualities which we find in our percepts); but that they stand in such causal relation to our percepts that it is possible for science to investigate some of these relations and some of the relations between the physical things, and thus to gain trustworthy knowledge concerning the laws of their actions. As to any exhaustive knowledge of the inner and ultimate nature of these non-human entities, critical realism is willing to admit itself ignorant, and, in fact, hands over the question to the scientists and the metaphysicians."³⁶

The metaphysics in this passage is of special interest to us. It includes the assertion that the existent thing and the mental content are not only distinct but are not alike, and that their relation to each other is causal. This is good as far as it goes. But what is the existent? Is it the physical object? Has it any of the properties of the physical object? Or is it what we have designated simply as the source of stimulation? Apparently the critical realists balk at this point and insist that we cannot know the causal reality, because, whether physical or not, it is not mental content. The student need not be surprised, therefore, to see the further development of realism toward an almost complete scepticism.

As already noted, this development was heralded by George Santayana in his book, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. With considerable skill and literary finish, he sets forth his reasons for theoretical doubt of everything that makes life livable. He easily disposes of religious beliefs, then history and literature, then the natural sciences, then the self as a moral personality, then the past as a whole

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

including consciousness and change. A quotation or two will be interesting in this connection, "Belief in the existence of anything, including myself, is something radically incapable of proof, and resting, like all belief, on some irrational persuasion or prompting of life. . . . The point is, in this task of criticism, to discard every belief that is a belief merely; and the belief in existence, in the nature of the case, can be a belief only."³⁷ "My thesis (is) that nothing given exists."³⁸ Arguments many and authorities not a few among the "deep-voiced philosophers" both Oriental and Western are given as supporting this conclusion. But the author seems to be merely exhibiting the keen edge of his intellectual tools and demonstrating their cutting power. His all-embracing scepticism is preparing the way for the coming of his doctrine of essence. The essence is for Santayana a great discovery. He announces it somewhat dramatically. "The unintelligible accident of existence will cease to appear to lurk in this manifest being, weighting and crowding it, and threatening it with being swallowed up by nondescript neighbours. It will appear dwelling in its own world, and shining by its own light, however brief may be my glimpse of it; for no date will be written on it, no frame of full or of empty time will shut it in; nothing in it will be addressed to me, nor suggestive of any spectator. It will seem an event in no world, an accident in no experience. The quality of it will have ceased to exist; it will be merely the quality which it inherently, logically, and inalienably is. It will be an ESSENCE."³⁹

What after all is this essence? We are not permitted to think of it as in any sense a logical product like a universal; its naked simplicity is beyond reason. Nor may we identify it with an event in time and hence it cannot be any part of our experience. Nor finally can it be known as a thing-in-itself independent of experience, for

³⁷ *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 35.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 73 f.

then it would be an inference that is not an inference. It is certainly a nondescript that Santayana can use only after he has by an exercise of "animal faith," re clothed it and given it a determinate place in experience. The whole transaction suggests *opéra bouffe*.⁴⁰ But there is more in it than that. We cannot understand realism and its offspring, scepticism, till we have penetrated to their inner motifs and appraised their underlying assumptions.

The three main objectives of realism have been to win for philosophy the prestige of the natural sciences, to satisfy common sense in its most acceptable and enlightened expression, and to discover a common basis of agreement among philosophical students. The first objective has failed of realization, because science ends in formulae, while realism is for science a leap in the dark into the unexplorable regions of metaphysical entities. The second objective is quickly satisfied, but only until common sense becomes a little more critical. The third objective can never be reached so long as uncertainty remains as to what shall be the starting point. Realism undertook to lay down principles or postulates that would be beyond criticism, but found it necessary to modify them under stress of critical attacks till the postulates had to be surrendered as hostages to scepticism. The realistic objectives have determined the method of procedure and account for the persistent limitations of insight. In particular the realists have had to depend on analysis to furnish ultimate data. They assumed that by analysis of physical complexes, ultimate simples could be reached and these would be the reals.⁴¹ But as we have found, analysis is always accompanied by a process of synthesis and hence can never bring thought face to face with an absolute simple. Then the objective point of view has forced the realist into the camp of the behaviorists, where he must resolve mental phenomena into activities of the

⁴⁰ For a trenchant criticism of Santayana, cf. George Boas, *Journal of Philosophy*, 1925, p. 645 ff.

⁴¹ *The New Realism*, p. 24, cf. pp. 155-247.

nervous system, plus sense data given or produced by an independent physical object. Thus the realistic answer to our question becomes a logical tangle. The physical object is independent of being perceived, yet is the cause of our perceiving it, yet does not actually produce the mental content, yet is manifested in the form of mental content, yet is not always what it seems to be in perception, yet when correctly perceived has at least the primary qualities of the perceived object, yet as non-mental cannot be like the mental content in any particular, yet must somehow function in sense perception. Since its existence cannot be doubted, belief in its existence is a prejudice, not a reasoned inference.

It was this confusion that influenced the critical realist to offer his "essence" as affording a way out. The essence, not being an existence in space and time and not being a substance, escapes from one set of difficulties. Not being psychical content in the particularistic sense, essence cannot be held to involve solipsism and the absurdities that center in that conception. But it is independent only as a meaning is independent of the object to which it refers; it is non-mental only as other than the individual mental content present in a particular sense perception. The "essence" persists in blending with the individual object of perception as soon as it functions at all. Nevertheless it refuses to coalesce with the physical object, inasmuch as the object is definite and particular, never a mere universal. The way of advance for critical realism seems to be either to forswear metaphysics—though realism is a metaphysical theory—or to pass into theoretical scepticism, preparatory to a further advance into some form of idealism.

Before parting with realism, let us try briefly to recast its conclusions in the light of the criticism offered. We can start with the unqualified acceptance of the realistic doctrine of independence, but the independent entity is not some mystical, unreachable thing in the physical world which though never seen is yet somehow known to be there. It is the cause or source of the stimulations that

control the mind in sense perception. The relation between the source of stimulations and the physical object in the world of effects is such that for all practical purposes the object may be treated as if it were itself the source of its being known—causally active in producing itself. The physical object can always be distinguished from the perceived object as being more definite, complex, and permanent, but this is not to be construed as meaning that the physical object is non-mental in origin; it is simply the ideal of an object that satisfies other than the immediate interests. The physical object as apprehended is real, but only as effect, never as cause. Thus every difficulty inherent in realism is obviated. The lesson of realism for us is the necessity of affirming an independent entity, and the impossibility of identifying that entity with the physical object.

As mysticism does not profess to be primarily a theory of the real in the external world, but refers to it only incidentally, we can profitably postpone a notice of this type of thought until the absolutistic views are considered. It will then appear closely affiliated with idealism. We are now ready to ask our question of the idealist.

CHAPTER IV

THE ANSWER OF RECENT IDEALISM

Realism has shown in a concrete way the limitations of the scientific approach to the problem of external reality. It has illustrated the confusions that result when the real is identified either with the cosmic object or with the sense object of immediate perception. It makes a desperate venture when it takes refuge in the idea of essence as a *tertium quid*, for essence is neither physical nor mental, neither substance nor cause, and not even an event except for the mind that thinks it. This doctrine of essence looks very much like an extreme form of idealism or rationalism or, better, scepticism in masquerade. As we turn to idealism for its answer to our question, we may expect to escape many of the difficulties that beset realism, but are not so confident that we may not encounter others equally serious.

Idealists as a class have in modern times been primarily philosophers, that is, they have busied themselves with the problem of reality and the epistemological issues involved, rather than with the objectives and methods of scientific investigation. Instead of falling back on common sense and locating the independently real in the outside world, the idealists have been much more thoroughgoing in their efforts to find a critically satisfactory theory. This is the main distinction between realists and idealists. But the two schools shade off into each other. In fact, most idealists of the present day, except the absolutists, incline to reckon themselves realists, since they too believe in an independent real. On the other hand, every philosopher, from the ultra-realist of the T. Percy Nunn type to the mystic absolutist, is idealistic in some feature of his think-

ing. Moreover idealism has been in vogue so long that practically every possible variation and every degree of saturation have been tried. For this reason the distinction between realist and idealist when not carefully qualified is of little value in characterizing an individual thinker. To get the contrast that may serve our purpose, we must deal with extreme types—the realists who argue for the strict independence of the objective world and the idealists who would reduce the world to a form of experience. The most consistent and thorough are likely to give the most nearly final answer possible to their type of thought.

Idealism began with the belief that thought could find itself in its object. It built on the insight that truth always takes the form of a concept or law and is never a mere sense datum. The two characteristics of a concept, that of having a fixed content and that of representing various and changing objects, constitute its truth. When Socrates isolated these elements of truth he set the task for science. As conceptual content is the material of all knowledge, the substance even of our sense world, we naturally treat it as the basic reality from which all else is derived. It is thus that we reach the notion of essence or raw material of specific existences. Apparently the only alternative to this conception of reality is the view that finds the reality in the continuous succession of sense impressions. If we take the first alternative and hold that reality is the abiding conceptual content, we can build an imposing structure of intellectual elements. Every item of experience can have its definite place and function in the ordered whole, and the universe can be set forth in outline as an infinitely complex network of interrelated elements. As system, then, the universe would include all existences, all realities, hence might properly be called the absolute. Having reached the idea of the absolute as the all-inclusive, we can easily take the next step and conclude that the absolute is self-existent, a unitary whole, changeless yet including change, timeless yet encompassing an infinite number of temporal series.

If we take the other alternative and locate the real in the changing flux, we find, as we have seen, great embarrassment in trying to tell what the flux actually is. It never is, but is always becoming, always vanishing at the moment of appearing. So far from being self-sustaining, it must be from moment to moment continuously renewed. If, however, the real is pure process, there is nothing from which or by which to renew it. If something is assumed that persists and expresses itself in the process, then this persisting thing rather than the flow of events must be the reality. Thus the two possibilities that seem at first so disparate and even mutually exclusive, are found to imply each other. Idealism has wrestled with this problem and tried to do justice to both factors; with what success we shall presently see.

In the modern development of idealism two main currents are distinguishable, both going back to Kant and Hegel for immediate inspiration and guidance. One shows a strong bent toward the objective treatment of all issues. In the thought of those who belong to this movement, the ideal of system is all-determining. Consilience and comprehensiveness are the tests of truth. The whole must be internally consistent and must comprehend absolutely all. The connections within the system are assumed to be so close that nothing can be fully known till its relations to all else in the universe are understood—an obviously impossible requirement. The conclusion follows that we can know nothing as we should, that all knowledge distorts reality to some extent and never does it full justice. This mild form of theoretical scepticism soon becomes pernicious, infectious, and fatal. The other development of idealism started with the Hegelian conclusion that the completely adequate principle of explanation ("Idea" in Hegel's terminology) cannot be a concept, since all concepts refer to other concepts for their full meaning. The ultimate principle must furnish "its own other." By this rather cryptic expression Hegel meant that the reality which would explain the world must in-

clude the world as its own object, and hence could not be merely an intellectual content. Only the self as having experiences and sustaining various active relations to its experiences can fulfil these requirements. The development of this line of thought has yielded the body of doctrine that seems to us to express the utmost limit of present-day insight into the mysteries of existence.

The interpretation of Hegel's doctrine as the apotheosis of system has been very generally accepted. It seems to be involved in his premises, even if it is not what he himself held to be true. Hence we have now to consider this interpretation as marking the main current of recent idealism. By common consent the best representatives of this movement are F. H. Bradley and his school (including Bernard Bosanquet, A. E. Taylor, and Josiah Royce, not to mention the younger adherents).

In his great work entitled *Appearance and Reality*, Bradley subjects realistic metaphysics to a searching criticism. He finds contradictions in every part of experience when the objective world is taken to be other than ideal content. He emphasizes the somewhat ambiguous view that reality is always the theme or subject of predication, yet holds that whatever we may say concerning it is ideal psychic stuff and not reality. Thus the "what" becomes severed from the "that" and thereby declares itself mere appearance. The inevitable conclusion would seem to be that we can know nothing of reality, not even that it exists.

Whenever a thinker attacks the competency of human intelligence to discover truth, he handicaps all further progress by discrediting his only instrument. But Bradley recovers in part by distinguishing between absolute or theoretically complete knowledge and relative or practically useful knowledge. The latter is of course within our limited powers. In the first book of his volume he exposes the lurking contradictions in what is usually taken for knowledge, in order that he may prepare the way for the positive conclusions in the second book. He does his

first work so thoroughly that the reader who accepts wholeheartedly his negative conclusions finds great difficulty in following him in his positive constructions.

Bradley's dialectical work was made all too easy by the use of tests that apply only under restricted conditions. We shall need to examine these tests and their use if we would appreciate his contribution to the problem we are considering. Since he is attacking realism, he tests ordinary conceptions of reality as if they implied the doctrine of independence. Contradictions of course multiply when you treat the sense world as other than the sense world. To make that world independent while a product of thinking is to be guilty of a fundamental absurdity. This thesis is proved by Bradley with great acumen and fullness of detail. To illustrate his method we may take his discussion of substance and attribute ("substantive" and "adjective" in his terminology).¹ He finds it easy to point out contradictions between the two ideas. Substance is nothing without the attributes, yet to identify them is to cancel each. A thing has qualities, but is not any one of them. Thus a piece of sugar is not sweetness, nor whiteness, nor squareness, nor all of these characteristics, considered severally. It is a unity, and therefore distinct from its qualities. But then it must establish relations among its qualities. The puzzles increase as we try to make out what these relations can be. Are they independent things? Then they create the problem of relation over again. Are they mere attributes of qualities? Then they fail to relate; the qualities fall apart. Are the qualities nothing but relations? Then the thing itself disappears; it commits "a kind of suicide." "The thing with its adjectives," Bradley concludes, "is a device for enjoying at once both variety and concord. But the distinctions, once made, fall apart from the thing, and away from one another."

The contradictions here disclosed hold for the experienced thing taken as non-mental reality, but certainly do not hold for experience as such. The substance or thing

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, chap. ii.

is real in its own way, and the qualities are real in their way. Neither is the other, and both are found as aspects of the sense world. The contradictions are avoided by thinking of substance or thinghood as pertaining to the relatively permanent character of the empirical law by which the given successive experiences are thought as changes in the states of a thing. The qualities are qualities of the thing, yet not the thing; because when we think the qualities we are concerned with the various manifestations in the experience. From the diverse angles of interest we have distinguishable features. The relations are not to be thought as disparate from the thing or its parts, but are the way the mind holds the elements together while distinguishing them. This too is legitimate and involves no contradiction. But contradictions abound when these various aspects are thrust into a world of things-by-themselves. Bradley has proved not that elementary experience is full of contradictions, but that contradictions develop as soon as we take it for anything other than experience.

By assuming as a conclusion from his dialectic that contradictions inhere in experience as such, Bradley has made very difficult his further task of formulating his own doctrine of reality. To give reality a positive content and avoid the besetting contradictions is the problem. He is sure that the absolutely real is both substantial and unitary, though not in a sense comprehensible by us. There cannot possibly be a plurality of reals,² for that would involve a contradiction nullifying the possibility of system. Whatever the absolute is it must be system, though of course not like the thought systems we are able to construct. Our thought systems include distinctions and relations, and these cannot without contradiction be carried over into the absolute. They would disrupt its unity. Having discounted thought as an instrument of knowledge, Bradley must deny to the absolute reality all characteristics of thought as we understand it. The

² *Ibid.*, pp. 140, 468 f.

nearest he can come to indicating what the absolute reality is in its inner nature is to call it experience.³ But whose experience can it be? Not yours, nor mine, nor anybody's in particular; nor is it any thought structure built out of human experiences, but it is simply experience in general. It is nobody's and it is absolute. Although it cannot be identified with any individual's experience and is not a mere blending of them all, yet everything that happens to any individual makes a difference with it and is "somehow" (this is a favorite word) taken up into it. Nothing is lost, though all is changed into something else. Our thoughts about the world—so Bradley finally concludes, though without logical warrant—approximate the absolute reality in varying degrees as measured by their comprehensiveness and coherence.⁴ This is his famous doctrine of degrees of truth and reality.

It begins to look as if we should get very little help from this type of thought except in a negative way. The sense world is resolved into "mere" appearance in contrast with the absolute (the reality), yet the absolute is nothing over against its appearances. It can tolerate none of the qualitative distinctions in our experience, yet can dispense with none of them. It is infinitely rich, yet we are forbidden to say anything about it, lest we say that it is something when in fact it is something else. This heaping up of paradoxes is confusing. It is difficult to see how Bradley can escape utter scepticism.

The doctrine of degrees of truth and reality, which is an attempt to avoid the implied negative conclusions, succeeds to some extent, but only in so far as it destroys the grounds on which the conclusions were based. It implies, for instance, the validity of thought laws. Starting from this point, we might reconstruct the whole system and reach quite different conclusions. Why then does Bradley become so hopelessly involved? Why does his masterly criticism of realistic theories land him in

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 144, 173.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 395-400.

such a snarl of contradictions? An answer to this question would have to take into account, among other considerations, two of prime importance.

(1) As just intimated, he has to rely on thought tests to prove that thought is mendacious. The test of non-contradiction, in the first book, resolves everything into "contradictory" appearance. In order to rescue something that he may call real, he has in the second book to modify this test and make it twofold. It now separates into the two principles of coherence and comprehensiveness. These presuppose not only the logical structure of a thought system but a universe of concrete material to be covered by it. If then—we have a right to conclude—an all-encompassing system could be thought through even in barest outline, it would be wholly true in every respect, though not the whole truth. It would be reality in structure. The task then would be to fill in the details as far as possible. Even when the elaboration was carried as far as human patience and industry were able, the system would still be far from complete, but it would be reality up to its measure. Such is the plausible way of reasoning from the principle of comprehensiveness. But this principle could be applied only after all the practical tests had been satisfied. To attain ultimate accuracy as measured by these tests would be the main difficulty.

(2) In maintaining that there is but one reality and that all else is mere appearance, Bradley must deny the reality of the finite self. This leads to all his crisscross conclusions. At the proper time we shall have occasion to examine this reduction of the finite self to mere appearance. For the contrast is not between subjective states and a sense-apprehended reality, but between all articulate experience as known to human beings and a supposed absolute experience which is general and all-inclusive, and at the same time, in a sense, all-exclusive. This absolute experience must do service for two contrasting ideas, namely, for the being who has the experi-

ence and for that which he experiences. The resulting confusions are limited only by the finiteness of human wit. If one should go through Bradley's book and collect into one group all the passages that manifestly refer to the knowing self; into another group, all that refer to the sense world as knowledge; into still another group, all that refer to the ultimate source of stimulation; one would have three groups each fairly coherent internally. Then if one should organize these three groups into a whole in which selfhood as a creative power is recognized, and the universe of knowledge treated as the experience of selves under control of an ultimate power, one might avoid Bradley's paradoxes. But this is just what Bradley fails to do; hence he is unable to answer our question.

Bosanquet moves in the general direction here indicated as yielding more satisfactory results than those of Bradley. But he never quite frees himself from the consequences of treating selfhood as a mere transient and all but negligible manifestation of the Absolute. This prevents his reaching a consistent view of external reality. Royce comes still closer, as we shall see when we consider the doctrine of the self, and approximates the conclusions to which our own reflections bring us. As our problem is sharply defined and must be settled not by appeal to the authority of great names, but by discovering the possibilities in the situations themselves, we shall seem to do scant justice to such men as Bosanquet and Royce. In other connections we shall have occasion to make use of their illuminating insights.

At this point the mystical conception calls for a brief notice. This conception allies itself with idealism rather than with realism. It strikingly contrasts with realism in its superficial aspects, yet the two extremes of doctrine are strangely akin. Whereas the realist insists upon the independence of the real, yet tends to identify the real with the sense object, the mystic starts with the assumption that experience and reality are identical, yet

is able to tell what he means by such a statement only by recognizing a distinction between the knower and the thing known. Mystics as a rule are not much concerned with our specific problem. They generally affect to despise the sense world as the place of illusion, distraction, evil, and unreality. For them the beginning of wisdom lies in withdrawing one's self from worldly thoughts and interests. If we would come into the immediate presence of reality, we must rigorously exclude the things of sense. Only thus can the spirit be purified and liberated and made fit for union with the Ineffable.

The central idea in all this is immediacy. By this is meant knowledge by direct contact without the mediation of the senses or of thought processes. In advance of critical reflection, even sense knowledge seems to bear the marks of immediacy for we are not aware of any thought activity in apprehending an external object. The first crude explanation of such experience is that we see by direct vision, or because of the image on the retina of the eye, or because effluxes of the object pass through the senses into the mind and are there known as a matter of course. While such notions have no standing among critical thinkers, we nevertheless do a certain violence to common sense when we exhibit the perceived object as a result of a fairly complex mental activity. What, then, of those experiences that seem to come to us without the aid of the senses, those sudden inspirations, flashes of insight, decisions, premonitions, convictions that give no hint of their mental origin, yet apparently come from nowhere? The more vague, vast, and strange the experience, the less it seems to be the result of thinking. The mystics teach that the highest mystical knowledge is obtainable only as one withdraws entirely from the world of ordinary experiences and shuts out all vagrant thoughts. The mind must be emptied, as it were, and made ready to be filled with a new content. This may be accomplished in many ways. By following directions a certain virtuosity can be acquired in bringing about

this condition of waking sleep or of ecstasy. The experiences that come to one in such a state are for the most part inexpressible, but only because ordinary language carries none but ordinary meanings, and these experiences are not ordinary.

Much has been written to account for these experiences without resorting to the hypothesis of immediacy; but the success of such explanations is not quite complete. At least they do not satisfy the mystically inclined. Perhaps we approximate the truth when we say that the mystical in experience is just that part which has not yet been subjected to analysis and hence escapes full expression in language. As there is very little in sense knowledge that has not been analyzed or recognized as analyzable, we do not think of such knowledge as mystical. But as we advance to the more subtle, complex, and unusual experiences we find more that defies effort to separate into elements, more that refuses to be reduced to law. Hence the mystic is at home among the ideas that are inconceivably vast in their possible scope and complexity. The supreme idea that to the mystic includes all others, yet is absolute simplicity itself, is that of the Ineffable One. This is so unlike anything in routine experience that we can find no words to express our meanings. We seem to be limited to telling what it is not. Meister Eckhart doubtless had this difficulty in mind when he called the Ineffable One the "Nothing," meaning that in its plenitude of being, its absolute reality, it differed entirely from all derived existence.

From the mystics we may not expect much light on our problem. Whatever of truth mysticism may contain is confined almost exclusively to the supersensuous world. Yet it is interesting and instructive for its very contempt of the external world. Like all forms of philosophical speculation, it is compelled to begin with sense experience, and however negative its attitude, must in the end return to experience for confirmation. Why does the mystic abandon the perplexing problems with reference

to the nature of the physical world? In part it is because he is primarily interested in the inner life of feeling, and decides that as he cannot enjoy both the inner and the outer in fullest measure, he will seek after the inner as being the more desirable. Becoming absorbed in the contemplation of the Ineffable One, he yearns to be free from all that is external, in order that he may attain the supreme bliss of perfect union. From the point of view of ordinary intelligence, he is attempting the impossible and owes his apparent success to his inability to divorce himself entirely from the influence of sense experience.

It is safe to assume that the contents of the mystical experience have the same general characteristics (temporal, spatial, substantial, qualitatively distinct experiences) as those that constitute our ordinary phenomenal world. Their strangeness results from the unusual conditions under which they occur. The credulity that accepts them as immediate deliverances of the ultimate source of all truth is likely to make one a victim of wild vagaries. The basal assumption of mysticism, that the Ineffable One is the all-encompassing reality and there is no other, would seem to yield the inference that the outside world about us is either the expression of his will or else the resistless outgoings of his nature. In either case it should not be lightly esteemed. The mystic would reply that the outside world is illusory, the reflection of our finitude and limitations. We are being fed on illusions until we are able to enter into immediate union with the Ultimate and lose ourselves in its infinity. This may mean that our sense world has no such reality as its abiding source. But illusion it certainly is not, when taken for what it is, a world of changing experience. Mysticism, by dwelling so continuously upon the exclusive reality of the ultimate unity, leaves us with a sense of its own unreality. As soon as we neglect either type of reality, the productive or the phenomenal, the other begins to fade and become doubtful. Hence mysticism seems to have the

haziness of a half-forgotten dream. One would expect it to appeal for the most part to quietistic dreamers.

While this has been the case in the Orient, many Western mystics have proved themselves not only keen of mind, but fearlessly aggressive champions of freedom and progress. Mysticism appeals in an indefinite way to what is noblest and best in human nature. But just as the realist insists that the external world is independently real, though he cannot tell much about its nature, so the mystic assures us that the things of the spirit alone are real and thereby cuts himself off from the richest sources of spiritual knowledge. In the realist and the mystic we have, as intimated, the two extremes which tend to meet. The *realist* would save his doctrine of independence by translating it into a type of immediacy; and the *mystic*, in trying to make articulate what he believes he has discovered, uses the very resources of mediation on which the doctrine of independence is based. The difficulty of keeping these two opposite thought movements apart leads to much that is dramatic in the history of philosophy. Both enter into our experience, and neither has exclusive rights in the domain of theory. We can thus see a direct connection between their one-sidedness and their inability to answer our question about the nature of the real in the world of sense.

From the foregoing discussion the relation of mysticism to idealism is evident. Contrasts between the two are superficially impressive. Nevertheless the mystical emphasis on experience brings them into closest affiliation. Articulate the experience and we have the experience world; ask the cause of the experience and we must refer to the ultimate reality.

CHAPTER V

CRITICISM AND CONCLUSION

The true view of the status of the external world must provide for a knowledge of that world, must leave intact our sense of its reality, and must take over into itself all that makes the other views plausible. Each theory in meeting some of these requirements is partly true; each reveals its inadequacy by failing at a critical point. Our theory must carry us through to the end of all demands and while doing so reveal the reasons why rival theories fail.

We have seen that realism emphasizes analysis as the instrument of knowledge and draws the apparently arbitrary and ultimately pernicious conclusion that the elements thus reached are separate realities having only external relations. This necessitates such an extreme view of independence that the realist's world, in spite of asseverations to the contrary, resolves itself into an infinite multiplicity of isolated units which as such are strictly unknowable. Each realist wrestles with this difficulty in his own way, and each succeeds in proportion as he transcends the initial assumption. To admit the validity of thought synthesis for reality would obviate the difficulty, as not a few of the realists see, but it would also require a revision of the doctrine of independence. More than this, it would imply the recognition of other than intellectual structures in reality as apprehended in experience. This reality would be saturated with emotional and conative elements.

Only by an effort of abstraction do we isolate the intellectual aspects, and make of them simulacra of things.

We might say, then, that in general the root difficulty with realism is its false interpretation of intellectual processes. These processes are all indispensable to knowledge, but they are not so much experience of reality as activities about or upon experience. They reveal, at best, only the structure of reality, not its content, which is almost wholly conative. Realism, as abstract rationalism, transcends the emptiest subjectivism only by positing, without logical warrant, the independent reality of the thought content. Then follow those impossible corollaries about the reality of dream objects, illusions, and abstract universals. The end is scepticism of knowledge. All the excellent work done by the realists in the analysis of concepts will have to be taken over and utilized in the final synthesis; but their exclusive rationalism must be transcended, and the non-rational elements in experience recognized.

When we come to mysticism we find that the difficulty is almost exactly the same as in the case of realism. The two types of thought while sharply contrasting are manifestly complementary, and both move in the realm of abstraction. Mysticism is realism taking refuge from itself. It is rationalism shunting away from its own inevitable consequences and denying its nature. Hence we see the mystic glorying in his paradoxes, exulting in the contradictions of rationalism, and concluding, not to the limitations as well as the value of knowledge, but to the fatuity of all thinking. Like realism, mysticism uses reason to defend conclusions that cancel reason. But mysticism looks in one direction, realism in another. They, therefore, seem to be at opposite poles, yet each turns inevitably to the other in the moment of need because they are essentially so near of kin. They are afflicted with the same one-sidedness. Mysticism yields a kind of knowledge not perhaps otherwise obtainable, but it is a knowledge of the more unusual resources of mental functioning. This is supposed to be immediate intuition, whereas it is the result of forcing the mind by systematic

inhibitions to break out in novel forms of self-expression. The resulting information is primarily of psychological interest. It is no more knowledge of reality than is any other subjective activity. But it is intuitive.

What do we mean by intuitive knowledge? It is the knowledge that transcends the merely intellectual. This does not make it peculiar or especially trustworthy. All knowledge of reality is intuitive in this sense. To take an extreme instance, the simple experience of change involves not only intellectual elements, such as fixation of successive experiences and their arrangement in a determinable order, but also the feeling of difference in passing along the succession. The feeling of change is intuitive; yet without the fixations and the arrangement, the feeling of change would not arise.

We may say, then, in general, that what the mystic seeks as a corrective of a too exclusive intellectualism is this very feeling element. Whenever this element is prominent in experience, it seems to bring reality especially near. This is the secret of the doctrine of immediacy. It also suggests the reason why the more occult and unusual experiences seem to be more immediate, and so more real. The intellectual processes of fixation, analysis, and arrangement come between our immediate sense data and what we consider our workaday knowledge. The more we think, the more we separate ourselves from the sense of immediate apprehension. In calling attention to this feeling element in knowledge and in opening up unusual resources of self-expression, mysticism has a valuable contribution to make. All that is true in it, however, can be taken over in our final synthesis.

Mysticism is essentially a form of idealism, as has been said. In emphasizing the sense of immediacy, it has called attention to the element in experience easily overlooked, namely, that the real is in its very being like ourselves. The real mirrors selfhood. While the apprehension of the real is immediate, it yet involves most intricate activity of an intellectual, conative and affective

character. Idealism so-called centers our attention on the activities rather than the immediacy. It is instructive to note that whenever the idealist is hard pressed by virtue of his too exclusive concern with the intellectual structure of reality, he turns to mysticism for salvation. But mysticism cannot save him until it transcends the amorphically mystical and issues in a doctrine of selfhood.

The type of idealism that we have looked into suffers as much as realism from the rationalistic bias. The ideal of system is so dominant that, for Bradley, it seems to become itself the reality. At no point in the development of his argument does he draw the distinction in a satisfactory way between the reality as a system and the reality which is manifested in the system. The nearest he comes to this is in the chapter devoted to the meanings of self.¹ But there he makes the "subjective" self a sort of thing-by-itself, and the world of experience a mere accompaniment. He has no difficulty in multiplying contradictions in such a combination of incompatibilities. The assumption that controls his criticism of our fundamental concepts is that the reality which contrasts with "appearance" must be extra-mental. Thus in condemning the relation of substance to attribute² as shot through with contradictions, he fails to see that the contradictions fall away when we take the two as mere aspects of our complex experience and as answering two several needs in our mental economy. As aspects, they are different; as independent realities, they would be contradictions. Such ambiguities recur with monotonous persistence throughout the sinuous and labored argument. The two characteristic weaknesses of Bradleyan idealism—the apotheosis of system, which rules out the self as real, and the assumption that the only real which can contrast with "appearance" must be extra-mental—follow from his intellectualism. The mystical element in the final con-

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, chap. ix.

² *Ibid.*, chap. ii.

ception of reality as experience in general is the attempt of intellectualism to recover itself.

But absolute idealism is not the only type that has found currency. It is the extreme form because it tries to carry through consistently the purpose to see reality as idea. In so far as it is strictly logical, it fails to transcend the theoretical goal of science as regards system. Other idealisms differ more or less, as they take over features of what is now being called personalism, or activism, or voluntarism, or ethical idealism. Such labels are of little value in differentiating the various types of current idealism. Each lends itself with ready facility to a broader and a narrower meaning. But the important feature in all these idealisms is their more or less definite recognition of the self as actively coöperating with the ultimate source of stimulation in constructing our sense world. In proportion as the idealistic conception of the world recognizes the decisive role played by selfhood, both in the source of stimulation and in the finite power of response, the intellectualistic conclusions become transformed into conceivably concrete realities. We need not now examine these improved forms of idealism; they may be studied (in English) in the works of Bosanquet, Sorley, Pringle-Pattison, Royce, Ward, Sir Henry Jones, Bowne, Calkins, and Wildon Carr. Only when we recognize the full significance of the distinction between the self as knower and the world as response, can we disengage the tangled threads of realistic-mystic-idealistic thought skeins and make of them a coherent world-view. How this can be done we shall now indicate in broad outline.

As the realist refuses to recognize the essentially dynamic relation between the self and the source of stimulation whereby the objective world is seen to be their joint product, he is compelled to defend an impossible conception of independence, to reduce the self to consciousness and consciousness to a relation. By this time his whole system explodes because of its inherent contradic-

tions. Restore the true relation between the source of stimulation and the self, and every realistic motive finds its rightful place in the world scheme. Independence as applied to the external world comes to mean controlled response by the self to the activity of an independent power, relations are recognized as being external or internal according to the evidence of experience, reality falls plainly into two classes, one of which includes the source of stimulation and the finite selves, while the other includes the phenomenal world and all mental states whatsoever. Accepting this distinction, we can without prejudice determine the nature of the reality in experience by a direct examination of experience itself.

We may say much the same of mysticism. By finally abandoning reason and trusting to the unregulated vagaries of trance or of what is little more than autohypnotic states, mysticism closes the door to the possibility of a coherent world conception. Its doctrine of immediacy can at best give only the bare fact of presence, whereas what we want to know is the nature of this presence and what its relations are to ourselves and the world. The mystic, because of his rejection of selfhood as concentered reason and will, misses the goal of philosophic insight, and is always in danger of plunging into the abyss of pantheism. He is near the truth, and needs only to carry out the implicit logic of his vision to reach it. His immediacy then becomes spontaneity or subconscious response; his truth, reasoned assurance; and his reality, selves and their world-constructing activity.

Idealism is so much committed to the personalistic conception of the world that it fails to reach that conception only by the subtle working of the oft-exposed prejudice in favor of objectivity. Bradley, for instance, repeatedly speaks as if he fully grasped the possibilities of personalism, only to shy away and turn to the conception of an absolute which, being all things, is nothing.

We are now ready to return to our question as to the nature of external reality. Scientific thought, in its utmost

reach of theoretical insight, sees the world as system, but is unable to construe the implications of this view. As mere system, the world is pure process, hence can have no abiding reality. But without abiding reality, the world cannot be even process. Hence there must be more than system. When, over against the system, we recognize selves for whom and by whom the system exists, we are able to locate and characterize the real in the system. To find that real we need not arbitrarily think of the external world as independent, or as illusory, or as idea (intellectually considered), but can take it for what it appears to be in sense perception. It is a world of physical things which have their reality in being the concrete responses of the mind to stimulations. They are what the stimulations mean to the mind. They exist only because the mind attends, becomes interested, evaluates. Hence we can now say with assurance that the reality in the world-system is essentially value-content. Intellectually the world is system, practically it is value. Its reality is therefore a practical element read into the thought structure.

The doctrine that external reality is value gathers into itself what is best in the various types of philosophy that we have been reviewing. The utmost reach of realism was the doctrine of essence. This is very close to the doctrine that reality is value. Both make reality a universal in so far as reality has a logical structure. Both deny reality to things as extra-mental and affirm it only of meanings. But the doctrine that reality is value goes beyond its rival in asserting that the reality is more than logical structure; it is something that can be lived, something that affects us for good or ill, that makes a difference to us, and is equally real in all its distinguishable features. In this sense value has objectivity only because it is through and through and altogether human. Furthermore value is so dependent on human factors, so completely the expression of human interests, that it has a certain immediacy akin to the mystical experience. As all

experience begins in sense perception value is primarily intuitive; it is the sense object as directly apprehended. On this foundation of elemental values we build our world of derivative values, just as science builds its world of concepts and laws on data furnished by sense perception. Finally the doctrine that reality is value is the essence of the idealism that has not lost its way. To call reality experience is meaningless unless it is the experience of some intelligence; but as such it is value. Within this idealistic doctrine we distinguish between the cosmic reality, which is our experience extended in time and space by legitimate inference, and the reality of immediate perception—both are values. We distinguish also between experience as “pure sentiency,” to use Bradley’s phrase, and the articulated results of thinking about experience—both are values.

Experience is never an undifferentiated whole except as a logical abstraction; but as articulated it is always further analyzable into smaller units, till in the end it disappears into process. But this analysis can be stayed, not by declaring that the reality is undifferentiated experience, but by recognizing the integrating value elements in objects. As value every object is an ultimate unity. To analyze it is to destroy it in its concreteness, but to exhibit it at the same time as a logical structure. Thus we see that all lines in our thinking lead to the doctrine that reality in the external world is value.

We are now ready to pass to our next theme, *The World as Value*. Our main task will be not so much to explain the doctrine of value as to protect it from accretions and perversions and diremptions that virtually negate it. If we could approach it with a mind free from those prepossessions born of the objective attitude, we could hardly help appreciating the truth of the value doctrine, not as a conclusion but as an immediate apprehension. The only reality we know is the reality we live. It enters into our experience and makes a difference with us; it is value.

PART III

THE WORLD AS VALUE

CHAPTER I

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT PRO AND CON

In the preceding discussions we examined the structure of the world as experience and found that it is a joint product of stimulation and response; that the response involves a fairly complex constructive work on the part of the mind; that only the completed sense object enters into consciousness; that with advancing experience we are able to develop the distinction between objective fact and illusion or between truth and error; that the world is replete with values in a cosmic matrix of conditions and relations; that the special task of science is to master the conditions for reaching or avoiding the value-content of reality; and that when the scientific results are mistaken for the reality, we reach an *impasse* from which we can emerge only by restoring the value elements as the reality in the system.

We saw how many lines converge on this conclusion. To begin with, the so-called categories of sense perception are all of practical significance. Substance appears to be a device for satisfying the felt need for permanence in the midst of the incipient experiences that follow one another in rapid succession. Change is our way of uniting the states of a substance into an abiding unity. Cause is a further effort to hold events together and make them manageable for practical ends. In like manner each of the other aspects of our experience world has its unique significance in the economy of life.

Again we saw how the mind builds its elaborate scientific structure out of universals, whose only excuse for

being is their value in manipulating nature; how, too, this scientific activity, as logically completed, issues in a dynamic view of the world in which all that is lacking to make it work is that which value alone can supply. This became still more evident when we examined the representative attempts to find the real of experience in something other than value. These attempts failed in so far as they, on the part of the realists, implied that the external reality was independent of the knower; or, on the part of the mystics, assumed that sense knowledge was illusory because it separated thought and thing; or, on the part of the absolute idealists, identified the real with mere sentient experience.

But each of these attempts suggested in its own way what seems to us the true or adequate answer. The realist's independent reality could become known only in so far as it entered into dynamic relation with the knower. As it thus had to come into consciousness, it could have any degree of complexity, dependent on the capacity and interest of the apprehending mind. The independence belonged, not to the external thing, but to the source of stimulation. The mystical identity of thought and thing only emphasized the non-independence of the thing. In trying to make out what such an identity could mean, the mystic was compelled to distinguish the thought process from the thought content. The content then became, as in the realistic view, a function of discriminative attention.

Finally the idealist's contention that reality is experience reset the problem, and suggested that the articulations in experience depend on the mind's interest. Pre-occupation with the task of formulating a view of the world as a thought structure prevented the absolutist from seeing that the reality as apprehended is value-content and nothing else. In calling it "appearance," the idealist did not deny that it has value, but contended that it is not for the absolute what it is for us. This contention may well be granted without prejudice to our

own conclusion, But it means, not that we have illusion, but that our grasp of truth is partial and needs supplementation. In so far as the absolutist recognizes the reality of articulations in experience, he makes the character of the external world dependent on the mind's capacity to attend.

In addition to these lines of evidence we found two corroborative suggestions. One was, that all tests of truth are practical; they have to do exclusively with value-judgments. The other was that judgments of rationality are also value-judgments. This second statement deserves a further word. Unless we find in an enterprise a value that makes the effort worth while, we question its rationality. What determines our plan of action is a value; what we use to attain our end is a nexus of values; what rewards us at the completion of our efforts is a value. All ideals, whether cognitive, ethical, æsthetic or religious, are "plans of action"—values to be attained. Thus from every quarter of our experience universe we get evidence that value has a reality as strictly objective as the reality of the apparently independent world and in the same sense.

This enables us to draw the conclusion that the real is just what it reports itself to be, what we must think it if we are to attain to the needful insight into the course of events. The complexity of the thing measures our interest in it. In view of its manifestly answering other needs besides those at any moment uppermost, we form the conception of a thing that is distinct from and vastly richer than our immediate thought of it. But this supposed real thing is itself a thought; nor is it very definite as it looms in the background of our interests. As an ideal it is never wholly realized. In contrast, the concrete thing is always that which stands before us at any given moment.

What is thus true of sense objects is even more evidently true of scientific constructions. In science every conclusion is determined by the ideal or interest to be

conserved. The primal need is that of consistency; the laws of thought must be obeyed, contradictions eliminated, and the parts so related as to form a harmonious whole. To ignore these laws would land us in confusion and mental bewilderment. But they are the laws of thought, not of things, except as things are thought. They are a practical demand to which the course of events in nature is indifferent. That is, in a changing world where every event is unique, the laws of consistency have no meaning. This is only another way of saying that scientific entities are but working models, practical devices for manipulating nature, and are instrumental throughout. Our cognitive interests determine what kind of order will satisfy us, and the same interests guide us in manipulating sense data till we attain our desired goal.

But difficulties and misunderstandings throng about the conclusion that external reality is exhaustively defined as value. These have thus far been scarcely more than suggested; we must now face them in their full strength. A very general objection might run as follows: After all nothing has been accomplished by your argument further than to define the two expressions, external reality and value, in such a way as to make them identical in meaning. The cosmic universe is as indifferent to human interests as it ever was. You must either humanize the universe—whatever that might mean—or dehumanize the notion of value, if you would bring them together; and if this could be done, the result would be a mere product of logical manipulation and would deceive nobody. This criticism is difficult to meet, principally because it so completely ignores or misapprehends the argument thus far developed. At the same time it confuses the issue. Unless the conclusion that reality is value does furnish additional insight, unless it does make a difference in our outlook upon life and does affect conduct, it is utterly empty.

The criticism is really a misleading statement of the truth, and when taken in its proper context may be made

to help establish the conclusion it would discount or set aside. Experience does and does not remain the same. The sameness inheres only in the general features of experience. Every particular feature, when viewed as value-content, takes on a new significance; or we might say, only then does it acquire significance. Our conclusion brings objective reality within the human realm and makes it, throughout, the expression of selfhood. The material world is viewed no longer as something alien and antithetical to spirit, but as of the very essence of spiritual activity. Moreover it is a great gain just to lift the real in experience above the possibility of dissolution by inexorable logic. This saves us from intellectual embarrassment if not something close to intellectual suicide. While it does not change the laws of nature, that is, the conditions we must meet to attain our ends, it makes the attaining of those ends more worth while. Nature as the expression of selfhood is seen to be the instrument of self-realization.

Yet this significance for the self may easily become a stumbling block to the acceptance of the conclusion. It may lead the sceptic back to the theory that after all values are essentially subjective. This finds plausible support in some very practical considerations. In the struggle to obtain the goods of life, man has been met on every hand by resistance to be overcome, forces to be subdued, thwartings and limitations innumerable. This necessity of putting forth effort, of exercising ingenuity and harnessing apparently unwilling forces, naturally suggests that the values belong to the subjective realm while the difficulties in the way of realizing them are objective and alien. We may critically dispose of this naive view, yet we feel its influence long after it is discarded as theoretically untenable. It is much like the impression still strong within us that the heavenly bodies form a daily procession about the earth. The one is as harmless as the other until a question of theoretical interest arises; then the naive view must be set aside.

But to the popular mind the most formidable objection, as already pointed out, lies in the extreme variability of values. They vary for the individual evaluator with his moods and tenses, attitudes and interests. In contrast, the thing as physical thing may remain relatively the same while it passes through a wide gamut of value-differences, dependent on subjective conditions. To identify reality with value seems from this point of view to set up the most capricious, intangible, aura-like element in the thing as its most substantial and abiding feature. Moreover values in the large vary with degrees of culture, native capacity, and those broad differences that distinguish age from age, nation from nation, community from community. The case seems strong against reality's being value.

But we need to remember that variableness permeates all experience. The only persisting element in our experience world is the generalized content. The nearer we approach the limit of concreteness and individuality, the more of change and movement we find. Were it not for the logical work of fixating and constructing, we should have no substantiality whatever in our world. In the same way that permanence attaches itself to things it may accrue also to values. For instance, the beauty of a landscape has the same constancy of character as the landscape itself—which in its definite features is changing continually. We hardly incline to call an object beautiful unless under changing conditions it continues to excite æsthetic emotion. Hence we are usually somewhat uncertain whether the beauty resides in the thing or in the observer. But utility values seem different. They vary with the immediate interest. An object of use like a car is valuable for various purposes. It may be an object of indifference till we want its services, then it takes on a temporary value, that is, it becomes valuable for that particular service. What could be more transient? Yet we must remind ourselves again that the car as an object of apprehension varies quite as much. When it is of little concern to us

it may appear as a mere blur of light and shade and color which we vaguely feel to be an object identifiable at will. The more interested we become the more definite becomes for us the car. Just as it may be identified in an extremely vague way, when little in our thoughts, so its values can be more or less before our mind as possibilities, even though not realized at the time. Just as we generalize on the different appearances of the car and give it thereby a constancy of character, so we can consider the various values of the car as forming a whole and yielding a permanent balance of serviceableness as against expense of upkeep. In other words we can treat values, actual and potential, exactly as we do things, considered as mere objects.

But can we carry this parallelism over into the world that is shared by all, the world that fills immensity and covers an illimitable past? Our ideas about the world that lies beyond the reach of actual experience are the results of inference from meager data, and hence are necessarily both general and inaccurate; yet this construct of the mind satisfies the intellectual needs that reach beyond the here and now of experience. There is no reason why we should not treat values in the same way. What, for instance, is the value of a given star to an observer? Very little, unless he wants to know something about it, admire its beauty, or learn of its size, chemical constitution, its relation to other stars, distance from our solar system, or what not. Let the interest be slight or shifting, and the star itself would be correspondingly vague and various. Just as we think of the star and every other object in the phenomenal world as indefinitely more complex than any one appearance of it, so the world has a vast surplusage of values which we for the most part ignore or are ignorant of. They await discovery. This means that they await the sense of need which will call them into being. Wherever knowledge reaches, there values are created. In organizing the material universe into a scientific system, we actually construct a scheme of

values. The system as scientifically accurate is throughout value, and all its actual foundations in experience are severally values.

In viewing the world as a system of values, we should keep in mind the problem of their objectivity, as meaning their trustworthiness in meeting both individual and social tests. The parallelism then becomes throughgoing between the objectivity of the world regarded as things and the objectivity of the world regarded as values. In both cases it is validity in a common experience world that is decisive. Values meet the test exactly as do material aspects of things, for material aspects turn out to be, in fact, aspects of value. For purposes of manipulation, then, it is a matter of indifference whether we call external reality value or substance or energy or any other usable term. But when we seek insight the case is different. A recognition that the reality of this world in which we live is value transforms it from an opaque mystery into a human world full of meaning.

Viewing the world as value, we can explain many popular misconceptions and bring into relief the truth they contain. We can see more clearly now why people intent on practical ends should come to look upon physical objects as mere passive things endowed with active energies; why these things along with their resident energies should be so weak to resist resolution into mere process; why such desperate measures should have been resorted to in the effort to save the real in the phenomenal world from disappearing into nothingness or the dark unknowable; why many thinkers at this point should despair of a satisfactory solution by intellectual means and fall back on mystical intuition; why finally the primal distinction, implied in all sense perception, between the source of stimulation and the percipient's response, should be misunderstood. As this misunderstanding has been and is at present the breeding place of persistent difficulties and confusions, it is worth noting how the theory that reality is value serves as a corrective. If we assume that values

alone are objectively real, then the objective world exists only for an evaluator. This points, on the one hand, to the creative activity of the self who evaluates, and on the other, to the coöperative activity of a power, distinct from both the self and the world of values, yet vitally concerned in both.

The conception of nature to which we have come is that of a nexus of values. Just as we say that in nature there is no absolute vacuum, so we may say that no portion of nature is devoid of values. But to maintain this position we must recognize two kinds of value, positive or desired, and negative or undesired. The values that pack the world are of various character and usability. When we want a value that is near at hand, it may be obtained so easily as to seem a free gift of nature. When we want a value embedded in other values which must be set aside, the work involved makes us think of nature as grudging. But in every situation, the values themselves are absolutely free, and there is not a trace of resistance, except as the way to them may be over or through other values not at the time desired. It is because we make these choices and insist on having what we want rather than what is easily accessible that difficulties and thwartings and oppositions are encountered. The values that are in the way of the ones we want are classed as negative—till the time comes when they too may be desired. Our limited range of knowledge is responsible for our not being able to utilize more of nature's values.

The scientific study of nature has brought to light a vast range and variety of values never before suspected.

"More servants wait on man
Than he'll take notice of."

The multiplication of values makes nature bewilderingly rich to the modern man. Along with the increase of actual values has come a great reduction of cost in the labor of obtaining them. The negative values or the ills and discomforts of life have also been the subject of

scientific study, with the result that a great variety of evils, intellectual and physical, have been eliminated. But the very complexity of life tends to develop undesirable intensities and distractions. Science has forced man to exercise more care and intelligence in the utilization of values, and has thereby further developed and refined man's capacity to appreciate. Thus as civilization advances, values multiply, capacities to enjoy are brought into exercise, nature becomes more subservient, and its stings and poisons are neutralized. The negative values are so often converted into positive ones as to suggest that, if we knew all, we might eliminate negative values entirely. It is well known that most negative values have in them a positive value-element, as when an evil endured calls our attention to a good we should not otherwise have found. For the sake of simplicity, we shall, unless otherwise expressly stated, limit ourselves to the discussion of the positive values. Later when the problem of evil begins to trouble us, we shall have to consider the world of negative values.

✓ Values not only have an inherent quality whereby they affect us emotionally, but they may also help in obtaining other goods. When a value is more desired for its serviceableness in obtaining other goods than for itself, it is called an instrumental value. Thus a large bank account or conveniences of travel are primarily instrumental values, while friends and beautiful objects are intrinsic values. But no object is entirely devoid of either type of value. The capacity to enjoy values recognized as desirable depends on the attitude and condition of the self. For instance, if there is a lack of inner harmony, owing to a wrong attitude (*e.g.* a bad conscience), the good that may be desired will yield only a part of its wonted value. This thought cannot here be developed; but when we come to study the ethical life, we may see that the dependence of appreciation on the attitude of the self is the key to some of our most troublesome problems. Instrumental values should of course never usurp the place

of those that are intrinsic. In general we may say that the values which can be shared with others and which grow more valuable to the possessor as they are shared are almost entirely intrinsic. Such are the ideal values of social intercourse and mutual helpfulness.

The first thing that impresses one in studying the world of values is that it is a manifold of universes, each limitless in extent and corresponding to a fundamental interest of the self. There are four of these universes.

(1) The world of cognitive values. These are manifestly all-encompassing. We study nature from every conceivable point of view in the interest of knowledge. While the usability of knowledge may furnish our initial motive, the satisfactions of pursuit and of actually discovering the truth soon become powerful incentives. Thus the field of possible knowledge is an intricate complex of both instrumental and intrinsic values. This is the world of science and philosophy. It appears as orderly, analyzable, responsive to logical manipulation, transparent to reason; it is the world of description and interpretation.

(2) The world of æsthetic values. When our interest centers in the emotional satisfactions that accompany the mere contemplation of an object, the emotion is called æsthetic, and the object that awakens it is called beautiful. Like the cognitive, the æsthetic values are all-embracing. By this is meant that every object and every situation within experience is capable, under proper conditions, of stimulating the æsthetic sense in varying degree, though a person may not always be in a mood to appreciate this quality in things.

(3) The world of moral values. These include the whole range of values considered as affecting human welfare. They arise whenever we are called upon to make a choice. As most goods have to be earned or obtained by effort, it is of prime importance to know which goods are most worth while, and how goods are related to one another. This study forms the basis of rational choice.

Practically every situation in life presents competing alternatives which require us to make decisions of moral significance. Throughout our conscious life we are necessarily exercising the moral prerogative. There is no escape, for we choose when we refuse to choose. The moral quality resides not in the goods themselves, but in the attitude we sustain toward them. Hence moral values are related to other values in much the same way as the scientific structure of concepts, laws, and formulae are related to the concrete objects of experience.

(4) The world of religious values. Religious values emerge when we become interested in the future of values, and in the grounds of belief in their ultimate conservation. This study involves especially a consideration of our destiny as the appreciators and in a sense the originators of value. Through the study of experience in all its aspects we may come to the conclusion that the ultimate Power manifested in the universe is the Giver of all the goods we enjoy. The consciousness, then, of being in his favor and of belonging to him in a filial sense, is the essence of religion. From this point of view, every object within our ken associates itself with the ultimate Source of good, and the world becomes throughout a universe of religious values.

Thus to the four great interests of life correspond the four types of value in our objective world. Besides these, or rather included in them and representing more restricted fields, are such varieties of value as the social, economic, educational. These all yield a world of values as extensive as the reach of our interest, and help to constitute the objects of our experience. Hence the external world, far from being a mere aggregate or system of inert and dead things, is instinct with values as various and rich as the capacities of the evaluating self. The world grows as the self develops. In carrying out Herbart's wise injunction to cultivate a many-sided interest, one creates new sources of value and thereby puts new qualities into one's world of objects.

The grouping of values into cognitive, æsthetic, moral, and religious is the one we shall follow in our further study. All values that may seem to fall outside these groups can by a little ingenuity be brought within their scope. A brief survey of each group is now in order. Since philosophy is primarily an attempt to satisfy cognitive interests as such, there is little need of extended treatment of this group separately. They are the theme of all our discussions. We have thus far sketched the nature of sense knowledge, and have taken one look into the realm of philosophical insight. Our further study will be almost entirely within the confines of strictly philosophical issues.

CHAPTER II

COGNITIVE VALUES

That cognitive values are fundamental and all-inclusive is evident. Whatever value aspect in an object may arrest our attention we first want to know the nature of the object—how it acts under ordinary conditions. We must know in order to evaluate. Knowledge is also itself an evaluation. The influence of the scientific attitude toward nature has led us to think of knowledge as restricted to intellectual apprehension, in which only thought structures have part. But such knowledge is abstract and general, whereas knowledge may include every element of concreteness found in our world of appreciation. As every effort to acquire knowledge is controlled by an interest (a value sought), so the character of the information is determined by the degree of completeness with which we comprehend the concrete situation as a complex of values.

In furnishing the basis for action and determining what values to seek as well as what to use, knowledge is primarily instrumental. As such it should be accurate and definite up to the measure of the purpose to be realized. The purpose in view determines how thorough shall be the analysis and the reconstruction. Fortunately our needs are so related that knowledge acquired in satisfying one need generally serves more or less adequately in meeting some other need. Through long ages of experience and study, types of knowledge have been worked out that serve a maximum number of human needs. These types constitute the race's inheritance, passed on from age to age. They range from the

popular wisdom of tradition to the most advanced scientific information. Whether popular or scientific this knowledge is all more or less limited, vague, and subject to revision as the interests of civilization change. The change, however, is far less than one might suppose. A new expression of the old belief often passes for a new belief. The ancient doctrine thus becomes quite modern and up-to-date. On the other hand, the same form of expression may conceal a variety of meanings; the sameness then pertains only to the general aspects and not to the specific situations. Thus we may find in ancient writers most if not all of the ethical principles recognized as valid to-day. But from age to age these principles have so changed their meaning and application that their identity consists largely in the form of their expression. The vagueness of the principles by which we live necessitates their reëxamination by each succeeding generation. Truths of one period become problems for the next and must be reëstablished or revised. The constant demand for revision makes the race inheritance not only a treasure to be conserved but material to be worked over. This is a great advantage, as only by working over our stored intellectual wealth can we appreciate its value and make our contribution to it.

Knowledge is not only of prime importance as an instrument for obtaining the values of life; it is a constituent element in those values. To know a value is to appreciate and enjoy it. This kind of knowledge is first-hand acquaintance. Popularly the term knowledge is reserved for second-hand information. But such knowledge must be assimilated; it must in a sense become a part of our experience.

The pursuit of knowledge is itself a value. It means concentration of purpose and a consequent integration of character. It develops a devotion to actuality as against sham and falsity. It makes for intellectual vigor and power of inventiveness. In fact, it exercises all our spiritual resources and thereby contributes to the higher

ranges of self-realization. Hence in the pursuit of knowledge the goal has a luster of attractiveness that it loses to some extent after it is once reached. What may, as a finished product, seem but a register of scientific or historical items may represent the eager life-work of many investigators who were sustained in their toil by unfailing joy. So spontaneous is mental activity that, when once awakened by some interest, it tends to draw into its service all other resources of the self.

The two aspects of cognitive values, the intrinsic and the instrumental, are as experience inseparable. Knowledge that is thought to be in no way serviceable may be cherished for its own sake, but it thereby does actually enrich the life of the possessor. As a general thing our interests are so rooted in the problem of getting on in life that knowledge not having direct or ascertainable bearing on this problem tends to lose its popular appeal. On the other hand, knowledge comes to be cherished for its own sake when it proves instrumentally valuable. This distinction between the intrinsic and the instrumental aspects of cognitive value ceases to be significant when we reach the higher ranges of intellectual effort. The satisfactions of such effort are their own excuse for being.

The obvious necessity of satisfying our cognitive interests determines most of life's problems. How to obtain the truth in a given situation—secure the pertinent facts and so penetrate into their inner connection and meaning that we may draw practically valid conclusions from them—this is our absorbing task. As our intellectual interests become more and more inclusive, we outrun our practical needs and form the ideal of an all-inclusive, completely unified body of knowledge. This ideal then becomes a kind of touchstone for testing the ultimate truth of any particular intellectual acquisition and starts the question whether any truth is wholly true, whether all truth is not relative.

One who denies that we can attain to absolute truth

is usually called a sceptic or an agnostic. Such a person is likely to be looked upon with a certain popular disfavor, but in most cases unjustly. The issue is far from simple. As we noticed when considering the nature of scientific knowledge, truth is doubly relative; it has to do with relations, and it is truth only for human intelligences. When the sceptic defends the doctrine of relativity, he may have the second meaning in mind and then he becomes subject to destructive criticism. When he contends that truth is a human commodity, good for finite creatures like ourselves but of no validity for the absolute, we may reply that he must produce his absolute and make sure that he is right. We all have a vague ideal of completeness, and no one has ever come within sight of an ultimate limit to man's capacity to know. In the nature of the case a limit recognized as such would thereby be transcended. So long as a belief meets our tests of validity, it is absolute for us. In short, all absolute knowledge must be relative to a self. Where there is no self, there is not only no knowledge, there is nothing that a self might conceivably learn about.

The practical character of truth has already been dwelt upon. Truth always has reference to an end beyond itself. It is that which extricates us from intellectual perplexity or illumines some dark spot in our experience. It is that which brings together into a rational order what had before seemed only externally and casually related. Because of its essentially practical character, truth cannot be wholly detached from life. This fact is made much of by the sceptics. They argue that truth is a matter of the will guided by the emotions and prejudices. They point out that as soon as the initial data of sense are before us, we begin manipulating in order to make the data fit our preconceived notions or satisfy our dominant interests. Everything is transformed and distorted by our human point of view. This is the way Santayana, for instance, reasons in developing his doctrine of scepticism. By doubting whatever can

be doubted in human beliefs, he reaches, as we have seen, the ultimate datum that cannot be doubted—the realm of essences. It is interesting to note that to believe anything concerning these essences is to infect them with the virus of doubt, since, for Santayana, all belief is extra-rational.¹ Nevertheless he contends that these essences are infinitely numerous and various, are simple in structure, changeless, and unconnected both among themselves and with the knower. They are the definite sense data in their utter particularity, revealed for the instant in the act of sense perception; but as revealed, without duration, without local habitation in space or time, without substantiality, and without human reference of any sort. The knowledge we may have of these essences is contemplative, not practical, though we may enjoy imaginative flights into the infinite wilderness of their habitations.² In thus depicting a world of ultimate reals unconnected with human interests, Santayana is simply deceiving himself. What he describes as the changeless, particular, isolated essences have all the characteristics of being human creations, playthings of the abstracting intellect.

“What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer.” With these words Lord Bacon begins his famous essay on truth. The question would forever remain unanswered if what were sought were something that could be detached from actual experiences and completely isolated. Truth is always about something, never truth in general. When we can point out what is the common element in particular beliefs, we have reached the limit of generality. Truth then is truths, and they are true only in the sense that they meet our tests. Just as we cannot by analysis or by the method of doubt and elimination reach the ultimately simple of Santayana’s speculations, so, although by the method of synthesis we may reach truths of great generality, we

¹ *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, pp. 1-76, especially p. 35.

² *Cf. Ibid.*, chap. x.

can never attain to truth in the abstract as the quintessence of all beliefs.

The opposite of truth is error. We are all sure that we know what error is, for we dwell in the midst of it. The struggle of life is in the direction of the truth, with error ever present. We rest satisfied when we reach a degree of accuracy sufficient to make the result usable for the purpose in hand. Each of the sciences has its own more or less elaborate technique for the elimination of errors arising from personal bias in observation and inference, the influence of social contacts and of tradition, and such other sources of mental prepossession as interfere with trustworthy thinking.

Errors are beliefs that have failed to meet the tests of experience. They are positive in content and refer to a possible world of reality. This fact has given rise to a discussion whether error may not be truth misplaced. Is it not conceivable that, in some other world or under some other conditions, what is error to us might be found to be the veriest truth? An affirmative answer to this question is given by Bradley. "Error," he says, "is content made loose from its own reality, and related to a reality with which it is discrepant."³ "Error is truth when it is supplemented."⁴ "The idea, rejected by reality, is none the less predicable when its subject is altered."⁵ These statements presuppose a background of immutable reality, inclusive of all that can possibly be affirmed or denied of it whether the affirmation or denial is true or not—a curious assumption. If then, a given statement is found not to apply, it is simply misapplied or some qualification is wanting to complete its perfect adjustment. Without this presupposition of an unchanging reality that limits the range of possible affirmation, the quotations would amount merely to the inane statement that an untruth can be made true by being

³ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 188.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

sufficiently modified. As we have no evidence that Bradley's absolute reality exists, his characterization of error with reference to that reality is not very illuminating. We may better hold that error is simply invalidated belief, a belief that fails to function and hence has no existence except as belief.

The causes of error are as numerous as the forms of carelessness in thinking, of inadequacy in observing, of impulsive prejudice in judging. The important fact is not that we give way to prejudice or form snap judgments, but that we can recognize our mistakes and find a way to correct them. The causes of error are partly under our control. The ideal of truth we can definitely set before us as a goal to be striven for. Nothing in our nature as human beings is so significant as this capacity to lift ourselves out of error and confusion by the power of persistent thinking. Philosophy is the search for the ultimate principle of coherence as a prerequisite to the attainment of the far-off goal—the kingdom of truth.

CHAPTER III

ÆSTHETIC VALUES

Æsthetic values are such as cause us to pronounce an object beautiful. As here used the term beautiful includes the sublime and the comic, though in an elaborate treatise, the advisability of such inclusion might well be questioned. What is beauty? No characteristic of reality is more elusive. For beauty is not a homogeneous quality of things. Whatever satisfies us, whether in the practical, scientific, literary, ethical, or philosophical realm is beautiful. Nor can we draw a line and say that there is one type of beauty in nature and another in art. Each object in nature and each creation of art has its own unique beauty. Moreover the sense of the beautiful varies with the individual and in the life of the individual at successive stages of his development. Thus beauty has a subjective character, like taste or smell, and yet pertains to the object, since the object alone awakens the sense of beauty. This double reference complicates the problem. Definition is rendered difficult also by the fact that the æsthetic experience stimulates to a spontaneous activity of self-expression, and this self-expression tends to become identified with the æsthetic experience itself. The creative activity on the part of the mind as it contemplates the beautiful object is one of the main sources of satisfaction, yet it is not exactly the æsthetic attitude. Rather it is a sequential experience which makes the beautiful object much more significant to us.

In general we may say that the æsthetic satisfactions, contrasting with the intellectual and the practical, manifest themselves in a free play of the mind. Perhaps this

sense of liberation from constraint is the most characteristic feature of the æsthetic attitude. Throughout the whole extent of the intellectual life, the mind is engaged in the formulation of definite and relatively permanent conceptual elements. Beginning with the initial act of fixation whereby we get our sense objects, it builds its structures out of concepts and laws that are supposed to hold for an apparently independent world. This is needful for manipulating nature, and also for storing and communicating knowledge. Whether our interest is practical or theoretical, that is, whether we would control environing conditions or merely make a record of what the conditions are, our attention is held by the external situation. We are in a tensive attitude. The bent of the mind is so dominantly practical that the attitude of constraint seems native. But when one stands before a beautiful object, this tension or constraint becomes perceptibly less and may cease altogether. The æsthetic attitude follows upon a sense of satisfaction. In the presence of that which brings release from desire we no longer strive. We do not feel for the moment the need of prescribed thought themes, nor do we care to bend nature to our will. Hence the forced fixities of articulate experience give way to a spontaneous activity in which distinctions tend to fade out and the mind enjoys itself in free creativity. Memory and fantasy contribute their treasures to heighten the experience. Æsthetic appreciation thus becomes a characteristic expression of the inner life. The self revels in its own creations. It is this unique joyousness of free activity that the poet Schiller evidently had in mind when he identified beauty with the object of the play impulse.¹ This also inspired the philosopher Kant to affirm that the essence of beauty in an object is its capacity to stimulate the powers of the mind to harmonious activity.² The fluidity and freedom in the æsthetic experience explain

¹ *Ueber die æsthetische Erziehung des Menschen*, 27 Brief.

² *Kritik of Judgment*, part i. § 9, p. 65.

nearly all the characterizations of beauty that have gained favor among thinkers, and show their underlying identity.

Goethe somewhere says that "beauty is inexplicable; it is a hovering, floating, glittering shadow, whose outline eludes the grasp of definition." It is so because in the æsthetic attitude, the mind does not hold itself down to anything that remains self-identical long enough to be defined. Under the spell of beauty, all minds respond more or less. Some are dull and sluggish, some highly sensitive and resourceful, some have little spontaneity, some have much; yet none are wholly indifferent. But the responses to the æsthetic appeal show great variation.

Schiller's identification of æsthetic satisfaction with play is instructive. The two are not quite the same, yet they have much in common. Both are of absorbing interest, both bring pleasure. But play has a goal to attain, while æsthetic appreciation ends in itself. Perhaps Carritt is right when he says that Schiller used the term play in a specific sense "as an impulse whose *only* object is beauty Little more is gained by such a use of the word 'play' than the distinction of beauty from truth and morality."³

Benedetto Croce maintains that beauty is expression.⁴ He makes it consist not in the physical or outer embodiment, but in the inner vision, the imaginative creation of the artist. That an artist should produce his vision in color or should sing his song or play his symphony is a mere accident and not essential to the beauty itself. Since, according to Croce, all expression is beautiful, there can be no degrees of beauty. On all these points of his theory he has been confronted by the critics. They have recognized that in calling beauty expression, Croce has touched the essential character of all self-activity but has not distinguished beauty from its opposite. All activity in experience is expression, yet not all is beautiful. Croce re-

³ *Theory of Beauty*, p. 15.

⁴ *Aesthetic*, trans. by Ainslie, 2d edition, part i. chaps. i., ix., x.

plies that the ugly is just that which inhibits full expression. "Faulty expression is no expression." Nevertheless this reply does not do away with the distinction between the expression that satisfies and the one that does not ("faulty"). The critics contend further that expression is complete only as bodied forth in tone or color or marble or verse, and in some way given definite form. This would seem to harmonize with ordinary views of æsthetic experience. The point is not vital. We need only recall the distinction already made between the experience world as it exists in the concrete for the individual and the same world as prepared for social exploitation. The one is private, the other communicable. So the individual artist may enjoy his own fantasies. But these have a social significance only when expressed in terms of the common world. Finally the conclusion that there are no degrees of beauty, while following from Croce's premises, is plainly at variance with actual experience. Our æsthetic experience may vary from the keenest delight and self-absorption down to indifference and thence to distaste. Yet we may say with Croce that the æsthetic experience is expression, provided we mean by the statement that it is free expression. It would be better to say that the satisfying experience awakens to spontaneous creativity. Such creativity is in the strictest sense self-expression.

Theodore Lipps⁵ varies but slightly from this conception when he says that the æsthetic experience is a thrill of sympathetic feeling. (*Einfühlung* is the word he uses. Titchener in his *Psychology* uses the word "empathy" to express the same idea. It is to be distinguished from sympathy as being more a feeling as if from within the object than a feeling with it.) In expounding this view, Langfeld says that in empathy "one's own personality is merged and fused in that of some external thing."⁶ Empathy prompts to imitative response, revealed often only by a slight tension of the muscles involved or a diffused feeling

⁵ *Asthetik*, 2. Aufl. Bd. i. p. 105 ff.

⁶ *The Aesthetic Attitude*, p. 137.

of muscular responsiveness. The imitative motor impulse is the characteristic feature of empathy. That we have in this theory a large measure of truth can hardly be doubted. But the imitative activity is only a part of the effect, so blended with the actual experience as not to be separated except ideally. The essential fact is that the beautiful object satisfies and therefore sets free. The abandon that follows may express itself in a variety of ways, dependent on capacity and interest.

Miss Puffer describes the beautiful object as one that possesses those qualities which bring the personality into a state of unity and self-completeness.⁷ The sense of unity in the self is the subjective side of beauty, the æsthetic attitude. Whatever inspires in one the sense of unity and self-completeness is objectively beautiful. The critic might find some obscurity in this characterization. What is the state of unity? Is not the sense of unity keenest when we gather ourselves together for a difficult task? Does this not grow less when we relax and enjoy æsthetic satisfaction? Miss Puffer might explain that the unity here meant is that which for the nonce looks no further for its completion. In other words, it is the self in possession of an experience that satisfies, and hence liberates from desire, frees from tension, stimulates to joyous activity. As the practical tension is released, the spontaneous activities start up. Thus the representative characterizations of beauty, subjectively considered, all imply a distinctive development in the mental life consequent upon the sense of liberation felt in the presence of the object that satisfies.

Certain other features of the æsthetic experience are very generally recognized. Of these the two most important are the disinterested character of the experience and the objective character of beauty. (By the latter is meant that what is beautiful for one person should be beautiful for others of like training and culture.) Æsthetic appreciation is disinterested. To be able to enjoy

⁷ *The Psychology of Beauty*, p. 49.

a beautiful object without wanting to own it is to transcend the purely practical point of view and enter into the realm of beauty.⁸ Perhaps the disinterestedness arises from the fact that æsthetic appreciation is possession in the deepest sense and needs no supplementation. The beautiful object pleases by its mere presence, in and for itself; its benign influence permeates one's nature; it is enjoyed to the full in mere contemplation.

That the æsthetic experience is rooted in the objective world can hardly be denied, despite the extreme variety of experiences that the same object may evoke in different people. But is beauty itself objective? Yes, we must answer. It is as objective as sound or color or substantiality. It is subjective, too, in being so changeable and various. There is no disputing about taste, as the proverb runs. Each person in judging æsthetically knows that he is right, each enjoys the picture or the poem or the song for himself; others may think what they please. Yet there is a tendency to adjust our likes and dislikes so as to make them harmonize with the judgment of those who are known to have more highly developed taste. That beauty is subjective in this sense in no way compromises its objective character. It is objective in its changeability and individuality, just as every experience is. Furthermore it adheres to some object, whether in the physical world or in the realm of the imagination. The presence of the object is necessary to the experience. A change of objects brings a change of experience. Each embodiment of beauty produces a unique, strictly incommensurable pleasure. Moreover an object adjudged beautiful is thought to have that quality for others besides the one judging. In the case of beauty as in the case of any other experience, to reach the common-to-all, there must be adjustment and a certain amount of substitution, since every experience of whatever sort is unique. Finally we can

⁸ For criticism of this contention, see G. Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 37 ff.

see, even in Croce's idea of beauty as expression, a reason for making it objective. From the point of view reached in Part II we can have no difficulty in agreeing with both conceptions, so far as they are positive. Beauty is subjective as an experience and objective as an expression. It originates in the æsthetic attitude and depends on a specific adjustment of the self to the object.⁹

What in the object justifies our calling it beautiful? What gives it the power to satisfy the mind in the mere contemplation of it, to free the inner life for the time from the control of practical interests and stimulate to happy thoughts? The answer must be somewhat general and vague. The elusiveness of beauty as a characteristic of objects has been dwelt upon by many students, and is evidenced by the many attempts to define it. Palmer voices a common experience when he writes, "Almost everybody who has tried to track the shy thing has been obliged to acknowledge that it finally takes covert in mystery."¹⁰ But we can be sure of one characteristic, for every critic makes much of it. To be beautiful an object must be symmetrical, must express a unity that contains no obtrusive or inharmonious parts. These terms—symmetry, harmony, unity—are teleological; they have a meaning only with reference to an ideal in the mind. Perhaps the same thought might be better expressed by saying that an object is adjudged beautiful if it fulfils its nature, expresses itself fully and without fault. This statement, like the other, implies a standard of judgment. What is the nature of a thing? What constitutes an obtrusive development? Questions of this sort can be multiplied, and each must be answered differently for each individual object. In the exercise of taste, therefore, there is wide room for differences of opinion depending on the range and character of our education, aptitudes, interests. The force of social approval tends to reduce these differences of æsthetic judgment. But whatever the variations of taste, the object

⁹ Cf. Langfeld, *The Aesthetic Attitude*, chap. iii.

¹⁰ G. H. Palmer, *The Field of Ethics*, p. 94.

must present to the mind such a unity as satisfies and leaves no desire to emend.

Artistic beauty is the embodiment of an artist's ideal, and expresses an emotional attitude toward a depicted situation. In this embodiment there must be a completeness of finish that excludes the suggestion of partial failure. Besides this evidence of skill and competency in the realization, the work must possess what has been called sincerity or æsthetic truth. These expressions are meant to exclude unbecoming triviality and such artificiality as offends good taste. Whatever degrades or minimizes the worth of the distinctively human, sins against æsthetic truth. Æsthetic values express so completely the inner life of the spirit that they become self-stultifying when they compromise human nature; but æsthetic truth is preserved by whatever expresses or suggests some essential aspect of the emotional life. This requirement can be met in depicting even the fantastic and grotesque. Furthermore beauty is so joined with life that it can hardly be said to exist in what yields no suggestion of the vital and organic.

In trying to summarize the wisdom of the critics as regards the conditions of æsthetic satisfaction, we can hardly do better than to follow the lead of Volkelt in his great work on *Æsthetik*. He gathers into four brief statements what seem to him the fundamental norms of æsthetic taste. In the formulation of these norms he has recognized both the subjective or psychological and the objective points of view. As given below these statements are paraphrases rather than translations of the German *Normen*.¹¹

1. *To be æsthetically satisfying a work of art should be emotionally picturesque, and should express harmony of form with content.*

An object is emotionally picturesque when it lifts the percipient above the fragmentary, flat, and commonplace

¹¹ *System der Aesthetik*, vol. i., pp. 392-585.

into the ideal world of the novel, quickening, liberating emotions. That the perception should be pure emotion is the goal never actually reached. It is approached in music and in poetry as recited. For a poem æsthetically satisfying, the poet must select words charged with emotional content, not the coin of ordinary commonplace interchange. Words wear smooth and wear out. The requirement of emotional picturesqueness would be violated by a painter, for instance, who should set forth on his canvas, even with great skill, a group of figures or a situation that left the beholder indifferent. A novelist might show great ability in portraying an utterly commonplace character and fail to arouse a sympathetic interest in the reader. His creation would be æsthetically faulty. In like manner a dull emotionless work in music or any other art is rated low in æsthetic quality.

The objective counterpart of emotional picturesqueness is harmony of form and content. The form includes all surface features. In painting or sculpture, for instance, it would include not only spatial aspects but materials, colors, light and shade—whatever serves as a medium of expression. The content refers to the meaning or significance of the production. The norm requires a harmony between these two aspects. The harmony of form and content corresponds to the blending of vision and emotion. No meaning should be unembodied. The æsthetic object is through and through a form embodying a content. The form full of meaning and the meaning entirely expressed—this is the ideal.

Every medium has its own range of expressiveness. The artist who would try to make one medium express what is appropriate only for another medium would be guilty of æsthetic impropriety. His work would suffer from want of unity between form and content. For instance, the attempt to depict a very complex situation through the medium of marble is almost sure to fail. Historical paintings are apt to be weak in æsthetic quality for the same reason. In like manner "program music" has

been sharply criticized as violating the law of unity, since music is supposed not to have any power in itself to express definite situations in time or space. This does not mean, however, that music may not start a train of emotionally picturesque experiences that in themselves are definite, but only that the emotions may have a varied background of experiences. Purely æsthetic enjoyment is diminished when a description of meaning must be furnished with the music.

The norm would condemn whatever seems isolated and without human significance. Deformities in man are not proper subjects for æsthetic treatment. The norm excludes also the tedious and flat. Yet the requirement of unity does not predetermine the limits of any medium of expression. It is for the artist who ventures into the field of program music or the commonplace in poetry or the historical in painting to demonstrate his success in making his work humanly significant. The development of art has been marked by achievements in defiance of established rules. In music, the introduction of discords and complex harmonies, in drama, the ignoring of the ancient Greek requirement for unity of time and place, in poetry, the exaltation of the lowly and common, and in the field of the novel, ventures into realism, illustrate how the scope of the arts has been vastly extended by transcending generally accepted norms.

But this twofold principle of emotional picturesqueness and harmony of form with content permits of an exhaustless range of productivity. In a sense the principle applies beyond the good ethically considered; for an art production may represent the working of fate, the spontaneous ebullition of joy or sorrow, the presence of fear, astonishment, in fact, the naive in all its forms. Only that which for us is empty, unintelligible, bizarre, or deformed is excluded.

2. *The work should enlarge our emotional life and show a plenitude of human significance.*

This norm is almost identical with the first, but carries

us a step further. The extension of the emotional vision results from seeing the typical in the individual and unique. Such apprehension is not exactly the same as conceptualizing in the field of intellectual cognition, though the analogy is close. In the æsthetic experience the typical is felt rather than defined. We reach the typical in what is deepest and most essential in our emotional life. The more successfully a work of art can appeal to the elemental emotions, the greater its æsthetic worth. Such creations in literature, for instance, as Hamlet and Faust, unique as individuals yet highly typical, permanently enrich our lives.

This norm, objectively considered, limits the preceding norm not only by excluding the trivial, worthless, foolish, erratic, but by insisting that the content shall be essentially significant. It takes issue with both the formalists and the naturalists. The first emphasize technique at the expense of content; the second hold that everything merely because existent has artistic worth. But beauty inheres only in what interests man. To be æsthetically satisfying a work of art must speak to us of the characteristically human. Beauty pertains to the teleological aspect of nature, not to the merely mechanical. When we view life æsthetically, we find the self coming to the fore, and we see its worth and destiny as of paramount significance. This vitally connects the æsthetic with the moral. In fact, it brings all the great values—the cognitive, æsthetic, moral, religious—into closest connection. All that is below the human plane takes an æsthetic worth as symbolic of the human. And all that is superhuman must be represented as being essentially human in emotional life, however much it may transcend the human in power and cognition.

3. *The work should loosen the hold of reality and induct us into an ideal world of the imagination.*

Into this norm are gathered such partial truths as that the world of beauty is one of illusion, of play, of contentless form, of disinterested contemplation. The sense

of reality is developed in the presence of resistance to our wills. The seeking for material gain or knowledge or moral worth is a seeking for the sense of reality. The æsthetic attitude, not being an attitude of work or of planning or of research, apprehends reality with less intensity and less sharpness of outline. It creates a new type of reality, weaker, less lasting, less obtrusive. In the presence of this less substantial reality, the commonplace, care-producing interests fall away, and in their stead comes a feeling of restfulness, relaxation, and freedom. The "dry and driving" practical man of the world finds it difficult to let go of the prosaic reality in its ordinary aspects. He is literally bound. Whatever might free him to enter into the world where beauty makes its alluring appeal and brings its rest and peace would be of supreme value to him. The artist finds beauty everywhere. He re-groups objects, gives them a new setting, adorns them with what only the inner eye can see. With the weakening of reality a qualitative change comes into our world. The emotional accompaniments of the æsthetic attitude are not the same as the emotions of real life. Love, longing, sorrow are so transformed as rightly to be called make-believe emotions. Yet they are none the less strong and genuine. The world of beauty is an ideal world, the work of creative imagination. As detached from the world of struggle, disappointment, anxiety, it becomes a world of conscious illusion, or of play reality. As soon as the mind lets go its hold upon the practical concerns of life, where the mechanical holds sway, it builds its world of beauty. This attitude is not rare, it is not one that requires conscious preparation, nor does it involve any special effort. The mind can enjoy itself amidst objects of beauty, whenever it can even for a moment drop its interest in practical affairs.

4. *A work of art should stimulate mental synthesis, and should set forth the object as an organic unity.*

The æsthetically satisfying stimulates to mental synthesis, or rather it frees the mind for a spontaneous activ-

ity of integration. This activity begins as soon as one realizes that further analysis is not of practical value. We break up a whole of experience in the interest of knowledge. We divide to conquer. Analysis is needed for the life of volition and accomplishment. With that need in abeyance for a time, the mind indulges itself in making new combinations, tracing new connections, building new unities. We view a situation æsthetically only when we view it as a whole. Emerson, the poet-philosopher, expressed this thought in a concrete way when he said: "The charming landscape which I saw this morning is indubitably made up of some twenty or thirty farms. Miller owns this field, Locke that, and Manning the woodland beyond. But none of them owns the landscape. There is a property in the horizon which no man has but he whose eye can integrate all the parts, that is, the poet."¹² Fortunately we are all poets in some measure.

Detailed study involving careful analysis is often necessary to bring out the complex and half-hidden elements of beauty; but this work is preliminary, and means nothing æsthetically until the attitude, not of research, but of appreciation is attained. Then the details of a complex situation are melted together by an emotional synthesis into a living whole. Now wholeness always implies purpose in some form, and purpose is practical. Yet the æsthetic attitude contrasts with the practical. This seeming conflict of ideas can easily be adjusted. The term practical may refer to practice, and then it involves desire for change, or it may mean, pertaining to value. Only in the second sense is the æsthetic attitude practical.

The universality of the æsthetic sense points to an essential human need for free play of the creative imagination. The mind constructs for its own pleasure. The only occasion it needs is the sight of a beautiful object, a work of art, or a bit of nature that satisfies. This arrests its attention and holds it fast with the greater ease, be-

¹² *Complete Works*, Centenary edition, vol. i. p. 8.

cause the mind feels most at home in the presence of beauty. *Æsthetic* pleasure makes the mind frolicsome.

To be *æsthetically* satisfying the object must manifest an organic structure—unity in variety and variety in unity. The ideal is the completest unity encompassing the greatest variety. Without manifest unity the work would tend to distraction. Without variety the work would soon become monotonous. A novel so simple in plot as to give the mind little of synthetic work to do illustrates one fault, and a long novel too intricate in plot to be comprehended in a general view illustrates the other. In bringing out the sense of organic unity, much depends on the grouping of events or situations. The parts must be so instinct with a vital principle of connection as to suggest life. The superfluous, the incongruous, the loosely attached, the discordant, the meaningless, detract from this suggestion of organic unity, and spoil the *æsthetic* effect. They suggest weakness, if not something worse.

We may say then, in general, that beauty resides in the object and is of subjective origin; that it is a something in the object which by its symmetry, proportion, and meaningful character expresses to the mind an ideal of completeness; that in thus satisfying, it relieves the mind of volitional tension and sets it free to enjoy its own creations of memory and fantasy. The *æsthetic* attitude is elemental in its simplicity, yet it may involve all the complexity apprehensible by the human mind.

Certain questions that arise out of the foregoing discussion concerning the nature of beauty deserve a passing notice. Is there a hierarchy of beauty? Can there be found anywhere or conceived as an ideal a beauty so evidently supreme and dominant that all other manifestations of beauty must be ranged under it? Croce and others answer in the negative. Beauty for them is the same in essence wherever found, and it has no degrees of intensity or quality, since all expression is perfect expression. But their conclusion does not seem to harmonize

with the facts of experience. Beauty as expression may vary in adequacy and finish, just as that which is expressed, the meaning, may be much or little. Richness or amplitude of meaning, that is, the amount of pleasure and inspiration that a beautiful piece of art can induce, depends upon many factors none of which are constant. Some beautiful objects satisfy more than others. The ideal of perfect beauty that satisfies altogether, always, and in supreme measure would doubtless be found in the realm of selfhood. It would have to be the ideal personality. But could such an ideal be used as a principle for organizing æsthetic values into a comprehensive system? This would hardly be possible, though the difficulties would be practical rather than theoretical. The data are available, but are too complex and subtle for exact scientific treatment. While there is a sameness of essence in accordance with which we call an object beautiful whether it be a vase or a melody or a lyric or a painting or a cloud effect or a mountain scene or a human face, yet each object is beautiful in its own unique way. No one form can take the place of another. There is a strict individuality in beauty that not only differentiates it from all other forms of value, but differentiates each expression of beauty from every other.

Moreover each medium of expression has its own range of possibilities, its own laws and limitations. A person may have a preference for one of these media rather than another; but his preference is not based on any law of human nature, it is dependent on aptitude or some other adventitious condition. The worker in marble finds his world of beauty exhaustless so long as he obeys the laws of his medium. Likewise the poet is satisfied with his field of creative activity, and the musician with his. Of all media of emotional expression music has seemed to many æstheticians the best adapted to the creation of beauty. The reason given is that in music there is so little of the purely physical and tangible, so much of the ether-eal and spiritual. Music seems to be pure stimulus, pure

incitement, pure inspiration. While the musician might accept this statement, it would hardly satisfy the poet or the master of the brush. All can agree, however, that those forms of beauty are the highest which express most richly the aspirations of the self in its moments of fullest life. But this statement is too vague to be used as a basis of classification.

A question suggested at the beginning of our discussion of æsthetic values but passed over at the time concerns the reason for treating the sublime and the comic as forms of beauty. As for the sublime, one might ask, is it not distinctive? Does it not characteristically overawe, enthrall, and check the free activity of the self? And does it not really have a depressing effect that may be far from pleasant? Does it not contrast with the beautiful in many ways? Really the main difference is one of intensity. The sublime may be tremendously impressive, but if it actually overpowers and terrifies it does not manifest its sublimity until the self recovers sufficiently to appreciate the vastness before it. The sublime awakens in the self unwonted activity, heightened to an almost painful intensity. This means inner liberation, self-assertion, a deep joy in living. When once the mind gets possession of itself in the presence of the sublime, its inspirations differ only in degree from the joyousness felt in the presence of beauty.

The comic is in sharp contrast. It pleases by its incongruities, its quick transitions, its surprises. Can the grotesquely comical be beautiful? Can a situation which calls forth mirth by its very awkwardness have the quality of beauty? In so far as it pleases and sets the mind free for creative activity it must be adjudged beautiful. From this point of view the comic may have beauty in a high degree. But its quality is dependent on the subtle influence of the normal, working by way of contrast. The experience of the comical is, therefore, apparently more complex than of other forms of beauty.

Finally, what is the relation of æsthetic to moral values?

This might better be discussed after we have considered moral values in detail, yet something can be said at this point if only by way of transition. Æsthetic values like all others are values for a self. They differ in quality according as they promote self-development. Each makes its own characteristic contribution, but some are more effective than others. Just as they all must be known to be appreciated and thus become cognitive values, so they must vary in desirability and hence furnish the basis for moral values. In so far as any values whatever please and satisfy without the need of what lies beyond them, they call forth the æsthetic attitude and reveal the elusive quality we call beauty. The connection, then, between moral and æsthetic values is necessarily very close. As beauty can be shared without loss, even be enhanced by sharing, it belongs to the higher values of life. Its appreciation is an unalloyed pleasure, unmixed with any elements detrimental to the interests of the self. Hence its cultivation is one of man's permanent duties, and hence it has direct moral significance. Such appreciation cannot take the place of active volitional effort, but that is not to its discredit. It helps to refine and elevate the emotions, render us more sensitive to spiritual values of all kinds, call out the affections, and sweeten all of life. When we come to study the self in its relation to the manifold spheres of value, we may find reason to see still more in æsthetic values than is here indicated.¹³

¹³ Cf. Palmer, *The Field of Ethics*, p. 90 ff.

CHAPTER IV

MORAL VALUES

The moral life begins with the first act of choice. How early in the life of an individual this first choice takes place no one can tell. Presumably we begin to choose when we begin to live. In so far as this is true we are moral in being human. But large allowance must be made for immaturity and changing insight, not to mention self-control. Just as a child at first is scarcely more than a bundle of wants and reflex impulses, so its moral life must begin in what is essentially sub-moral.

Distinctively moral values pertain primarily not to the objects sought after, but to the attitude of the self toward competing goods. This statement, rightly understood, seems self-evident. Yet it can easily be misconstrued into meaning that morality has to do only with intentions, let the consequences be what they may. Such an interpretation is absurd and mischievous. The attempt to separate the moral intention from the consequences of an act must be as futile as the attempt to sever the connections of the two poles in a magnet. They get their whole significance from each other. A genuinely moral attitude presupposes not only a will to make the right choice, but a knowledge of what is involved therein and a will strong enough to realize the choice. If the requisite knowledge is lacking the attitude is defective; and if the will is weak in execution, good intentions will not save it from moral condemnation.

Because of this intimately personal character of moral value, students of ethics who would confine themselves exclusively to the objective point of view unduly limit the

field. They do well in striving to make ethics as far as possible a positive science of values. By studying concrete situations they are able to discover the rules of conduct most conducive to human welfare. This task is of prime importance and is in line with the scientific treatment of other great human interests. But such a treatment presupposes a basis of general theory that needs critical examination. If revision is neglected, the underlying theories are almost sure to harbor crude and conflicting ideas. For instance, detailed objective study must assume a working conception of man, his main interests and his destiny. An inadequate conception of man's nature is certain to distort one's estimate of values and may lead to tragic results. The world war from which we are still slowly recovering is a case in point.

Fortunately the objective treatment of the moral life tends to correct itself. To the reflective student it quickly reveals its inadequacy. Questions arise as to why certain clamant interests rather than certain others should be satisfied. Why should economic prosperity be such an absorbing objective? Why should society be so exercised over matters of dress and social prestige? What makes life worth living? Such questions, in time, become insistent. They compel one to turn aside from the pursuit of the objective sources of value, to consider the self as the evaluator for whom alone the values exist. One needs to take account not only of man's impulsive nature, his appetencies and interests, but of his possible future as a developing intelligence. Values change in relative importance as one's conception of destiny changes. Especially does one need to appreciate the significance of man's power of intelligent choice. This may seem to have no direct bearing on the problem of moral values. But, in fact, it carries the heart of the moral issue. We are moral because we can assume a right or wrong attitude toward the goods of life, can suspend or reverse a decision.

Those whose scientific interests hold them persistently to the objective treatment of moral values discount the

subjective element of choice and intent. In a moment of depression when the problem of objective right and wrong weighed heavily upon him, Huxley declared, "I protest that if some great Power would agree to make me always think what is true and do what is right, on condition of being turned into a sort of clock and wound up every morning before I got out of bed, I should instantly close with the offer."¹ This can hardly be taken as his deliberate judgment. It would mean the loss of all that gives zest and significance to life—the eager uncertainty of seeking, the exultation of achievement, the growing consciousness of mastery in overcoming, the enrichment of personality through struggle, the approbation of those whose approval we most desire. Values would become insipid, and their insipidity would have to be taken as the upper limit of emotional satisfaction. Fortunately to choose among goods is not only our prerogative, but a compulsion from which there is no escape short of imbecility.

Since every situation presents competing goods and these may differ widely in their desirability, the central problem of ethics is to find a principle of organization which can serve as a guide in making our choices. Whereas æsthetic values are too individual and unique to yield to classification and system building, moral values are by their nature relative, and exist only by virtue of some organization. Until there is a basis of judgment concerning relative desirability among values, the moral personality remains bewildered and distraught. But to bring order into the world of values is extremely difficult. Attempting it we are confronted by all the complexity of the objective world where the values are found, and also by the unfolding complexity of human life where the values are appraised. We project our wills into this world of change, and deflect however slightly the course of events. The result may or may not be immediately satisfying to us; we may or may not secure the good we intended. But the immediate effects are only the beginnings; what of

¹ *Methods and Results*, p. 192 f.

the distant consequences in the outside world and in ourselves? Our grasp of any situation is limited to a few of the nearer and more obvious aspects; where can we get the larger insight that we as moral beings must have? Who can tell how to organize our vast heritage of values? This is the ethical problem of the ages. The quest is for the highest good—the principle of organization—as a standard for determining what for us as human beings is of most worth.

The meager success attending past efforts and the continuous recurrence of the same problems have disheartened not a few students and turned their thought to the field of empirical generalizations, the discovery of the laws of choice which change with social, economic and cultural conditions. Can we ever get such a view of objective values and such an insight into the deeper recesses of the developing self as to see the whole dominated by a unitary principle? As each period in the life of the self has its own preferential values, so has each stage of culture in the social whole. Must we, then, conclude that there is no final standard of value applicable to all stages and conditions? This is a position taken by some influential writers of the present day.

A. E. Taylor summarizes his view thus: "But we say, first, moral progress is not an *ultimate* fact; our moral gains, as we can often see in particular cases, have had to be paid for by losses of one kind and another; and next, moral progress is progress towards the realisation of an ideal built on compromise—an ideal that falls to pieces the moment it is subjected to serious and honest philosophical analysis; and therefore what appears as progress, when judged with special reference to one of the materially conflicting aspects of the ideal, may be looked upon as retrogression when estimated with reference to the other."² Much can be said for such a position. The fashion of the day in intellectual matters favors it. We are in revolt against finalities of every description. Why go on a boot-

² *The Problem of Conduct*, p. 302.

less search for what is really transcendental when there are urgent practical issues close at hand?³ This argument has the ring of moral earnestness and common sense. It calls us back to the daily situations that we must confront. It is moral realism of an appealing sort. But it is also moral scepticism, insidious and all-pervading. It affects deleteriously every major interest of life, lowering the moral tone, weakening aspiration, and undermining confidence in one's self. The abandonment of the quest for the highest good is simply intolerable to any one who sees what it means. Many failures do not justify a final scepticism of man's ability to reach the coveted insight; for nothing less than the unity and destiny of the self is involved. Let negative criticism be as keen and destructive as it may, it can only establish more securely the solution that survives. This intellectual urge from the depths of selfhood is itself suggestive of what the highest good must be.

The advantageous method of approach will be to consider the general characteristics that the highest good must possess, and then look about within the compass of our moral horizon for what may meet the requirements. Incidentally this will enable us to pass in review the typical solutions of our problem and to meet the criticism of Taylor and others.

Evidently a good to be supreme and of unconditional value, capable of dominating all other goods and furnishing the law of their organization, must itself be supremely inclusive. It must be capable of taking over into itself whatever the experience of mankind pronounces good. In short, it cannot be a good set over against other goods, a good to be chosen instead of them. To this extent Leslie Stephen was right when he said: "The dread of hunger, thirst, and cold; the desire to gratify the passions; the love of wife and child or friend; sympathy

³ Cf. Leslie Stephen, *The Science of Ethics*, p. 461; also Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

with the sufferings of our neighbours; resentment of injury inflicted upon ourselves—these and such as these are the great forces which govern mankind. When a moralist tries to assign anything else as an ultimate motive, he is getting beyond the world of realities.”⁴ The reason for this requirement of inclusiveness is plain; such a good as might come into competition with others would be subject to the vicissitudes of our changing emotional life. It might at any time be set aside without manifest moral absurdity in favor of a rival good; for the issue would be simply, which makes the greater appeal? A blessedness that palls is ready to be superseded.

Again this supreme good must be capable of internal development, so as to adapt itself to the capacities of the developing self. This requirement is almost identical with the preceding, since to be all-inclusive, the good must have perfect adaptability to differing ages and degrees of culture, as well as to all the fluctuations of individual sentiment. But to mention this requirement separately is to give added emphasis to the principle of growth which must be embodied. Yet how can such a good, being so various, have any unity? How can it exist as the supreme good when it must identify itself with every other good of life? What can save it from utter vagueness?

These questions bring into relief a third requirement as important as either of the others. The *summum bonum* must be sufficiently definite to serve as the principle of organization for the whole world of values. This requirement would appear to be the most difficult one to satisfy. As an organizing principle the highest good must not only be definite, but must maintain its identity. Otherwise confusion would result. One need not wonder that the quest for such a good should seem so nearly hopeless. The three requirements—*inclusiveness, adaptability, definiteness*—are to all appearances incompatible. One thing is sure, they decisively rule out all objective goods, that is, goods

⁴ *The Science of Ethics*, p. 461.

identified with the objects of the external world. These are definite but exclusive. They may have some adaptability, yet not enough to prevent their being outgrown. They depend for their value on the changing tastes and attitudes of people.

But if the highest good is not anything we can acquire from without—not wealth or position or power—where can we look for it? Religiously minded people might say, “To do God’s will is our highest good”—“To glorify God and enjoy him forever,” as the Westminster Catechism has it. This comes near to meeting the conditions. It is all-inclusive, or should be. It should be—and that is the difficulty. What is God’s will? Every creed has its answer, and every individual who subscribes to a given creed interprets it in his own way. Each one’s interpretation can be justified only by appeal either to external authority or to experience. External authority has no place in this discussion, for it is simply a foreclosure proceeding. If we are to think our problems through, we must not be cut short by a dictum, however sacred the authority. In facing the issue we can recognize no authority except that of insight. If we hold that God’s will is our highest good and yet appeal to experience to learn what that will is, experience itself appears as our real authority and God’s will as an afterthought.

A further difficulty arises when we consider the future. How can we adjust the theory to growing insight? We must either acknowledge that what we had thought God’s will was not actually his permanent will, or that the new insight, if incompatible, is a false and pernicious belief. In either case we encounter embarrassment. The possibility of our being mistaken as to the content of God’s will must either turn us back to experience for support or make us into obscurantists, intent on blindly establishing an outgrown creed. The “will of God” is but a name for the highest good. The sanctity in the name tends to fixate the content. As a people’s moral life develops,

this content may come to seem immoral. History furnishes many illustrations.

If, however, we introduce the principle of growth, we might look upon God's will as always right, but as progressively revealed to man according to man's ability to understand. This would allow for a good deal of guess work, of trial and error, of misunderstanding and revision. Thus God's will would become practically equivalent to the categorical command of conscience to seek the highest good when we know what that is. Once we find the highest good and recognize its power of growth, we are at liberty to identify it with the will of God. This identification has great value. It transforms duty into an expression of personal allegiance to God, and thus gives devotion to the right a depth of meaning not otherwise possible. Nevertheless only mischief is likely to result when the order is reversed.

We may conclude, therefore, that in man and in man alone can be found the highest good. This conclusion seems reasonable on the face of it, since the good as such exists only for man. He is the judge; he alone can set up a standard. If, then, we turn to the self as carrying in its own nature the highest good, what features of the subjective life can satisfy the conditions? Viewing the history of thought on this subject, one is impressed with the persistence of the hedonistic conception that the highest good is pleasure.

This conception makes an immediate appeal, for pleasure is evidently a common element in all goods. Apparently, too, it is the only common element. Goods differ among themselves, but they are good because they please. No person in his right mind would freely choose discomfort or pain as his good, unless he were persuaded that it had to be accepted as a means to the attainment of outweighing good. With pleasure regarded as our highest good we might conceivably arrange the goods of life in accordance with such tests as relative intensity, duration, and quality of after effects, and thus form a hierarchy of

goods. If such a scheme of relative desirability could be worked out in detail, we might apply it with comparative ease in every case of doubt. The suggestion is near at hand that a calculus of values, mathematically exact, might be constructed, if only we could get the requisite data. Hedonism then must be recognized as containing much truth. It certainly cannot be ignored by a serious student of the moral life. Before it can be validated, however, it must be cleared of certain ambiguities.

What is meant by the term pleasure? It may have the widest range of meaning. At one time it may be confined to the sensuous gratifications of the voluptuary; at another, it may be extended to cover the shrewdly calculated satisfactions of the cultured but selfish man of the world; at another, it may include the inspiration which comes from devotion to a great social ideal. A principle that may thus be broadened to include all possible satisfactions, or contracted till it means only present, passing, sensuous feelings, can be of little value as a standard. By a mere shift of meaning from the agreeable affective states in bodily functioning to the higher ranges of æsthetic and social interests, one may make contradictory statements concerning pleasure. In its most restricted meaning as the satisfaction of the physical senses, pleasure is manifestly inadequate, except for those who have once for all abandoned themselves to brutishness. The low lines of application in this sense condemn it.

On the other hand, when we make it cover all sorts of satisfactions, it becomes a blanket equivalent for good in general. As such it yields no special insight into the relative desirability of goods. The initial difficulty, then, with hedonism is that its fundamental conception is ambiguous. In attempting under the stress of criticism, to clear the doctrine of ambiguity and develop its possibilities, hedonistic thinkers, especially recent ones, have moved toward a somewhat contrasting conception. They early recognized that hedonism must transcend not only the lower types of sensuous pleasure (Cyrenaicism), but also

every form of merely selfish gratification, however extended and refined, if it was to commend itself to the healthy moral consciousness. This led to its development into what, since the time of John Stuart Mill, has been called utilitarianism. In several respects this doctrine is an advance upon its prototype.

Improvements were attempted in three directions. (1) The tests of relative desirability among pleasures were elaborated. (2) A qualitative distinction was introduced as a decisive test of desirability. (3) Social obligation was recognized as equally significant with individual interest. The first and last of these improvements were developed by Jeremy Bentham; the second, by John Stuart Mill. Bentham tried to show how pleasures could be classified according to strict scientific tests, of which he enumerated seven.⁵ By applying these in any given case, the relative desirability of a pleasure could be determined. Of any given pleasure as compared with other pleasures, we want to know the relative intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, purity, and extent.

Without stopping to discuss these several tests, we note that the last is of special significance as carrying us beyond mere selfish or egoistic motives. The individual should will not only his own happiness, but the happiness of all. "The greatest happiness to the greatest number" should be one's guiding ideal. To give definiteness to this ideal, Bentham laid down the principle that everybody is to count for one, and nobody for more than one. As a basis for reform legislation, of which England at the time was in sore need, this exposition of hedonism was of great service. But as a theory of morals its inadequacy was soon revealed when the critics pointed out that all the tests might be satisfied on a very low plane of living.

John Stuart Mill tried to save the theory by introducing the notion of quality as a mark of distinction among pleasures. He said: "It would be absurd that while, in

⁵ *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 29 f.

estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. . . . It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied."⁶ Few would question this pronouncement. But a qualitative test seems to transcend hedonism. Dignity or worth as the differentia refers to the self as a whole. Nor does the conception of the greatest happiness to the greatest number follow from the hedonistic premise. Why, for instance, should I will the happiness of another, unless I am persuaded that I thereby increase my own happiness? How can I be sure that in this way my own happiness will be increased? Experience on the whole seems to be against such a conclusion. In uncertainty we must appeal not to pleasure as an agreeable feeling, but to the self and its nature as a social being.

The basis of social obligation, according to utilitarians generally, is sympathy. But if sympathy is to meet the requirements, it must be thought as more than mere feeling. It must be able to justify all our moral judgments—justice, benevolence, honesty—and must explain the moral emotions of remorse and self-approval. This is a big contract for the emotion of sympathy, unless it is supported by all the resources of the self. When, therefore, all the elements involved in the emotion are included, the self in its entirety stands before us.

One of the most influential moralists of recent times, Henry Sidgwick, undertook to rehabilitate hedonistic utilitarianism by arguing (1) that qualitative distinctions among pleasures could be reduced to quantitative by the simple device of giving them a higher quantitative rating to correspond to a higher qualitative value;⁷ and (2) that the basis of social obligation is found in native intuitions that give binding authority to justice, benevolence, and their derivatives.⁸

⁶ *Utilitarianism*, chap. ii.

⁷ *The Methods of Ethics*, bk. i. chap. vii. § 2.

⁸ *Ibid.*, bk. iii. chap. xiii.

On the first point one need hardly remark that qualitative distinctions are not actually reduced to quantitative; they remain as unique and incommensurable as ever. To give them quantitative expression is a matter of convenience in manipulation. Their uniqueness must be recognized, and can be accounted for only by reference to the feeling of selfhood and its essential worth. The second point raises many questions, some of which we cannot stop to consider. But plainly intuitions are not necessarily valid. No ultimate obligation can be established by appeal to them. This is so evident that it need not be argued. If there were no other ground for setting aside Sidgwick's contention, the fact of conflicting intuitions would be sufficient. The moral judgments, justice, benevolence, and the like, are authoritative because they express the fundamental demands of selfhood. These demands make such a spontaneous appeal to the developed moral personality that they seem to be intuitive. They are intuitive in the same sense that the apprehension of the outside world is intuitive—we are not conscious of constructive mental activity in such acquisition.

In justice to Sidgwick we must say that he did a real service in bringing to light certain limitations in the theorizings of previous utilitarians, and in showing that these limitations can be overcome by extending the meaning of the term pleasure till it covers all satisfactions whatsoever. A significant statement indicates his final conclusion as to the adequacy of hedonism: "For my own part, when I reflect on the notion of pleasure—using the term in the comprehensive sense which I have adopted, to include the most refined and subtle intellectual and emotional gratifications, no less than the coarser and more definite sensual enjoyments—the only common quality that I can find in the feelings so designated seems to be that relation to desire and volition expressed by the general term 'desirable,' in the sense previously explained."⁹ This statement is in harmony with the view just expressed,

⁹ *The Methods of Ethics*, bk. ii. chap. ii. § 2.

that the self and its attitudes determine what is good; for a will attitude is an attitude of the self in willing. The good then turns out to be anything that satisfies desire. What desires should be satisfied? Some are suppressed in every choice. Thinkers belonging to a school opposed to hedonism reply that reason alone should determine the choice.

This school has borne various names at different times in its history—stoicism, intuitionism, rationalism. It has expressed itself also in various forms according to the individual thinker's estimate of what is significant in such questions as, Is there a moral sense? What is conscience? Are there moral intuitions? What is the seat of authority in morals? Are there unconditionally binding moral laws? Which is more fundamental, egoism or altruism? Yet the school is characterized in general by the doctrine that the highest good is life according to reason. This school, more than others, has emphasized the intent of the act rather than the objective goods as of moral worth. The man of good will, even though he may under adverse conditions fail of his purpose, is the man whom the moral sense of a community approves. Without the good will, all other goods are of doubtful value, nothing is what it ought to be. The man who consistently exemplifies the good will has attained the highest good.

The good will, as the source of obligation, expresses itself in a law of universal application. Kant's formulations of this law have become classic for rationalism. Kant's most frequently quoted statement of it, "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature,"¹⁰ seems, on the face of it, purely formal. Critics have maintained that any act whatever can be universalized and made to meet the requirements of the law. A liar could will that all men lie, and a thief that all men steal if they wished. But such a criticism borders on the absurd, as Kant himself shows

¹⁰ Kant, *Theory of Ethics*, trans. by Abbott, p. 39, cf. pp. 38, 119.

in his exposition. The maxim must be worthy to become a universal law. This is Kant's evident meaning. Another formulation of this "categorical imperative," as Kant calls it, brings out better the meaning he had in mind: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."¹¹ This brings us to a new point of view. The good will is now represented as good because it wills the good of rational beings. This contention clears the moral atmosphere. It calls man to a strict accounting for his every deed. It meets every moral situation with a "Thou shalt" or "Thou shalt not." The thief, the liar, the slacker, the cheat, come under condemnation; they treat other human beings as mere means to the realization of their own selfish ends.

We can forgive Kant's excessive zeal in emphasizing the goodness of such a will apart from the question of consequences, for he was calling attention to a vital but neglected factor. When we interpret him broadly—and his entire discussion amply justifies our doing so—we see that he has come close to the insight we are seeking. To treat humanity as of supreme worth and arrange all values with reference thereto is to supply the moral life with a basis both comprehensive and authoritative. But Kant's statement seems still a little abstract. The humanity in the individual may mean that which the individual is because of his rationality. This evidently was Kant's meaning. But we are much more than merely rational, as Kant well knew. We need to give Kant's thought a more concrete expression. In trying to do this we see that whatever, in utilitarianism, is excluded by the Kantian conception must be reinstated. The good will must find itself in the world of objective goods. It can act only on a knowledge of relative values. Hence to meet all the conditions, what is needed is a conception that will embrace not only the good will but the principle of relativity among objective goods. Such a conception can

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

be none other than the conception of the self, the creator of values, the being for whom all values exist. It is in the well-being of the self and nowhere else that the subjective and the objective factors are united. Goods become moral when they are chosen in preference to some other goods. This choice is the subjective factor. It refers the moral quality not so much to the goods chosen as to the attitude of the one who chooses. On the other hand, the intention to choose the good must eventuate in a right choice, and this involves a knowledge of objective conditions. A completely moral act, then, must include knowledge of consequences. This is the objective element.

From our present point of view we can more accurately appraise hedonistic doctrines. Is it pleasure that we seek? Not always, nor even generally; rather it is the object that we seek. Pleasure accompanies both the seeking and the attainment of the object. But the quality of pleasure in every case is different, depending on a multitude of subjective conditions. Pleasure seems at first to furnish an adequate basis for the organization of values, just because it unconsciously borrows its quality from the situations themselves in which the good is sought. As purely subjective, it may simulate every variety of satisfaction and thus seem exhaustlessly resourceful. But when taken in this sense, it is mere feeling, and notoriously changeable. Being without internal structure, it is devoid of any basis for organization. All that makes it significant is derived from that which is not mere feeling, such complex states, for example, as relief from anxiety, the fellowship of friends, the interest in a good book, the satisfaction following upon some achievement. These are all qualitatively different and incommensurable. They involve objective factors.

How can the exclusive subjectivity of pleasure be corrected by an objectivity that does not exclude it? The answer has already been given. Only the self with its subjective life of emotion and its objective expression in world construction can accomplish this union. And the

self exemplifies it perfectly in every conscious experience. Hence whether we start with objective goods or with some subjective factor, we are carried forward to the idea of the self in its entirety as alone meeting the conditions of the highest good. All other conceptions emphasize some aspect of selfhood to the exclusion of others, and therefore fail. The self cannot be thus divided, nor can one of its phases be isolated from the rest without fatal results for the moral life.

In making self-realization the goal of life and the unconditioned good, we face many difficulties. Some of these are cases of misunderstanding and some of confusion. But there are some also that simply reflect the complexity of selfhood and its indeterminate character as a growing entity. Perhaps the most persistent ethical difficulty is the feeling that self-realization as the supreme objective would tend to make one self-centered, morbidly introspective, and in subtle ways, selfish. Closely akin to this criticism is the contention that since self-perfection means perfection of function, and every experience, good or bad, contributes to the development of function, the ideal of self-realization fails to yield any principle of organization, fails to distinguish the desirable from the undesirable. These two are the most formidable difficulties that beset the recognition of self-realization as the highest good. There are others of minor significance, but they are for the most part mere specifications within the range of the two major criticisms. For instance, How can we reconcile self-realization with the ethico-religious ideal of self-sacrifice and self-denial? What is the relation of this ideal to agreeable feeling? In taking for granted that the development of selfhood involves a corresponding increase of happiness, are we not making an unwarranted assumption of cosmic support? How can we know that an enhancement of self-consciousness and the development of a more sensitive attitude toward the hard facts of life will not aggravate our sense of pain, failure, and the ultimate futility of life? It would be easy to bring forward

instances of spiritual depression following upon sensitivity to the adverse conditions of living. Increase of sympathy means increase of sorrow. Might we not come in time to the oppressive conclusion that all is "vanity and a striving after wind"? In view of this possibility would it not be the part of wisdom to turn away from the highly problematical ideal with its indefiniteness, its unproved assumption of cosmic indorsement, and give our attention to the objective values, known and proved? Not only may we know these values by direct experience, but we have ways of determining their relative desirability. Why not make sure of these values and discard the vague ideal of self-realization? What, after all, is the connection between objective goods and the ideal? May not this connection be such as to preclude our seeking both objective goods and self-realization at the same time? May they not be in large measure mutually exclusive?

Critics further contend that we know too little about the self and its possibilities to make its perfection or consummation the goal of life. Better abandon altogether the fruitless task of defining the highest good and attend to the values that experience actually reveals. Sometime in the dim future man may know enough about himself and his relation to the world to make the final generalization that will exhibit all goods as having their place of relative desirability in an all-embracing system. When that stage is reached, the highest good will appear as just the world of goods thus organized.

Our reply to these difficulties and objections contains three points:

(1) The objective study of goods with a view to determining relative desirability is essential. It is the whole ethical problem viewed objectively. But this problem cannot be solved from the exclusively objective point of view. If we were in the midst of such an effort we should inevitably encounter the question, What is the ultimate reason for saying that one good is more desirable than another? This would precipitate the problem of goods

for a self. If goods are goods because a self has the capacity to enjoy them, then an increase of selfhood must mean an increase of capacity to enjoy, an increase of objective values. From this point of view, self-realization and increase of capacity to enjoy are practically interchangeable terms. We regard as relatively undeveloped the self that has but few contacts with its environing world of values. Its sources of joy are few, primitive, elemental. As the nature of the self unfolds, its contacts multiply, it becomes capable of appreciating myriads of values in the realm of the intangible and social that are practically non-existent for the more rudimentary self. Its greater range and subtlety of appreciation mean its greater development, its movement toward ultimate self-realization.

(2) No system of moral values is possible without a supreme principle of good, one that stands out distinct from all others as of unconditional worth. This has already been insisted upon. It is manifest that in a scheme of values all other goods must get their rating from the supreme good. Now the lesson of the centuries is that not only do objective goods, as objective, fail to qualify for the supreme good, but likewise all such subjective ideals as pleasure, happiness, and reason, fail. These ideals fall short only because they are mere phases or aspects of the inner life. They severally express in part the activity of the self. When taken in their relation to one another and as inseparably bound up in the life of the self, they acquire a merit of a different order. It is the self that must say what is good and what evil. We must wait for its decisions to get any light on ethical issues. When we say, then, that a good is a good for a self, we must mean that the good of the self is the only good.

(3) We know more about the self than we do about anything else in the universe. It is our sole standard of interpretation. When we ask what a given object is, what its nature is, we answer in terms of selfhood. There is nothing else that we can do. The self is our principle

of insight into the nature not only of other selves, but of all objects, even the inanimate, of which we know so little, because they have so little of the nature of the self. They can move when started by something else, but—if the mechanical view of nature is correct—they can neither stop nor change the rate or direction of motion, once they are started. Something else must do it for them. There is not much of selfhood in such objects; yet our knowledge of their motions is derived from our experience of our own movements. While we may not know what in the far-off future the self may be capable of becoming, we have even now the general lineaments of all possible development of selfhood. The essential nature of spirit, that is, the self in its social expression, is known to us; and if spirit is the highest manifestation of life, we can be sure of the direction that self-realization must take.

True, one may reply, we know about the self, but do we know the self? If we consider the variety of theories as to the nature of the self, there seems to be nothing in the range of experience so little understood. Some think that the self is a changeless core of being in the midst of mental states; others that it is a complex of such states; others, that it is a canalized medium through which a supposed ultimate power expresses itself; others, that it is the sense of awareness accompanying mental states; others, that it is nothing but an epiphenomenon—a bad name for it as a troublesome non-entity. But these theories of the self need not disturb us at present. When in the next part we have occasion to study the nature of selfhood, we can gather up for critical review the typical conceptions.

But the theory of self-realization here advocated cannot countenance the practical denial of the self's existence or its resolution into a mere interpenetrative succession of mental states. The minimum of assumption is that the self has experiences, knows them as such, and is able in some measure to control both its own inner states and

its external environment. So much is the plain teaching of experience, and its denial is always in the interest of some general theory born of a scientific preoccupation with the mechanics of the thing world. The self to be realized is the self of experience, not a psychological representation of it.

An experience of selfhood can have a wide range and can vary in depth. What self is to be realized? Here we need to distinguish between the idea of the self as shut in, centripetal, greedy, and the idea of the self as realizing itself in society, that is, as giving of its own resources and thereby enriching itself. These two conceptions are not mutually exclusive, they merely mark different stages of insight into what the self actually is. The notion of the self as nothing more than a value-receiving center, an appropriator of goods, is accepted as a matter of course by those who have not thought seriously about life. Such people conceive of the self after the analogy of physical things that grow by accretion, at the expense of other things. Though ordinary experience, when carefully considered, does not support this crude notion, it is all too dominant in practice. Especially is this true in the economic world. But the self to be realized is the social self that grows by giving and receives that it may have more to give. This self alone is the concrete reality. Since this conception provides for unlimited growth toward the ideal of ultimate human possibilities, it cannot be transcended by any future development. In fact, race progress may be measured by it. Within its scope one may be as individualistic or as communistic as one likes; egoism ceases to be a moral menace, altruism may no longer mean the sacrifice of true self-interest.¹²

But the critic may argue that self-realization presupposes that the good of society is always the good of the individual, and *vice versa*. The theory practically maintains that real self-denial is impossible, whereas one can

¹² Cf. Warner Fite's penetrative study, *Individualism*, pp. 122, 159-162.

easily imagine a situation in which loyalty to the social ideal apparently involves the sacrifice of the larger self,¹³ as when one voluntarily chooses to live a cramped life in order to help a dependent relative. The answer to such a criticism is not easy. To be fully satisfying it would have to draw upon all that can be known concerning the nature and destiny of selfhood. But a suggestion may help. Every moral situation has many unrealized possibilities both of culture and of emotional satisfaction. What may seem from the observer's point of view a dreary monotonous task, may, to the one performing it from a sense of duty, yield a continuous inspiration and serve as the occasion of deepest spiritual contentment. When, for instance, a young man gives up his cherished ambition for a college education and returns to his old home to take care of his indigent parents, he does not necessarily forfeit the cultural value of such an education. He can make himself great and spiritually rich in spite of drudgery and pinching poverty. But it often takes a long look into the future to make this idea effective in actual practice. Because we are moral beings, our desires must be dominated by the ideal of what is right. The self thus dominated can draw sustenance from any situation where it is doing its duty. In weighing the criticism, therefore, we should face the alternatives—the transforming, refining, inwardly satisfying goods that are possible only to the loyal self, and the blighting deteriorating effects of disloyalty. As we further study the nature and destiny of selfhood, the answer to the criticism may be made more satisfactory.

The ideal of self-realization takes over and harmonizes all competing conceptions of the *summum bonum*. It does this by showing their limitations and re-interpreting them as aspects of itself. But can it be made sufficiently definite? Will it yield the principles whereby we may arrange the goods of life in a true moral hierarchy? This is really the crucial issue. There can be little question of

¹³ Cf. G. F. Fullerton, *A Handbook of Ethical Theory*, p. 262 f.

the ideal's comprehensiveness or of its adaptability; but what of its definiteness? The critic points out that any good, or for that matter, any experience whatever tends to realize the self. But this criticism fails to note that the self to be realized is the social self, that is, the self in its concrete completeness. When this is borne in mind, the task of formulating principles of organization to guide in the selection of goods is a matter of detail. For instance, we may start with the general principle that social goods are to be preferred to those that are exclusive. The other principles and maxims follow.¹⁴

This conception of the highest good solves many perplexing problems of the moral life. It alone satisfies the moral demand for authority. It requires that in all cases of reasonable doubt a satisfactory investigation be made into the relative desirability of competing goods. To be neglectful or careless at this point is morally reprehensible; the plea of ignorance does not save from condemnation one who has blundered. After the decision has been reached and one is reasonably sure what the choice should be in the light of the ideal of self-realization, then the authority of the ideal is absolute. From it there is no appeal. Kant's categorical imperative is here in place. This ideal illuminates the meaning of duty and explains the attractiveness of virtue. Duty is the sense of obligation felt in cases of conflict between what is impulsively desired and what sound judgment indicates is on the whole desirable. The old distinction between duties to one's self and duties to others becomes almost meaningless, since all duties have the double reference.

Yet because of our limited insight, a question may easily arise as to how far one is justified in devoting one's energies, say, to self-culture in ostensible preparation for a career of social usefulness. When, for instance, should one's schooling end and active social duties be taken up? In a general way, such issues are met by appeal to conventional verdicts, which express the wisdom of society,

¹⁴ Cf. H. W. Wright, *Self-Realization*, parts iii. and iv.

But in all cases of doubt the ideal of the highest good alone can decide and that decision is final. It does not avail against this authority that we may be utterly and flagrantly mistaken as to what the ideal requires; it is our duty not to be mistaken; we must pay the forfeit when we are.

Once duties are recognized, virtue is the permanent attitude of loyalty to what is thought to be right. It means inevitable progress in self-realization. At least this is a reasonable faith, resting on wide experience as well as on a study of the relation of the self to its world. People usually accept it as a matter of course. Hence the center of one's interest in the moral life need never be self-realization as a task. One can achieve the result better by considering what on the whole will promote social welfare, and then undertaking to do one's part in accordance therewith. This requires preparation, equipment, and the proper conservation of resources. It means care of one's health, freedom from undue anxiety, the cultivation of hopefulness and good cheer, and all that may tend to develop physical vigor and spiritual health. In short devotion to the social ideal as embodied in home life, society, church, state, school, carries with it devotion to our own good.

Our ideal explains also the feeling of remorse which follows moral lapses. This feeling is not merely a sense of disappointment or regret for failure to win a coveted good (as utilitarians would naturally hold); it is far more poignant and personal. It differs from disappointment also in being keenest after the first offence, and growing rapidly less with each repetition, till it fades away entirely. Remorse is the consciousness that the self has sustained a serious injury, that its integrity has been violated, its ideal of good sacrificed. The reason why this sense of personal loss becomes less with each repetition of the moral offense is that the moral ideal itself becomes lowered. The real social self tends to lose its distinctive character and degenerate into a mere absorber

of values which thereby become exclusive. The social self shrinks into the centripetal self of ordinary selfishness.

Self-realization as here interpreted provides further for the objectivity of moral values in a most satisfactory way. Just as the world of experience is the individual's own construction, yet becomes, through a process already sufficiently described, a common world with the marks of empirical independence, so moral values, when tested by the standard of self-realization, are seen to be values not only for the self, but for society. When this is accepted as a practical basis of living, a wholesome attitude of self-devotion, or even of self-abnegation, naturally follows. In other words, we need give very little direct attention to our governing ideal. Instead of causing us, as some critics suggest, to brood over our own states of mind or carefully to calculate the effect on ourselves of a contemplated course of action, our ideal should induce a spirit of self-forgetfulness. It should put a new and deeper meaning into such paradoxical maxims as "He that loseth his life shall find it," "Die to live."

The conception of the self as essentially social is recognized to some extent by most thinking people, though its full significance is far from being realized. As an ethical ideal it is as old as Christianity, if not older. But it has never yet had a chance to reveal on a large scale its transforming efficiency. Whenever it has begun to be a potent factor in the life of Western nations, it has tended to a one-sided expression that has really amounted to a perversion of its true meaning. Two influences have been at work, the lack of theoretical insight and the dominance of institutions over the lives of the people. Christianity had scarcely become the official religion of the Roman Empire before the tyranny of ecclesiasticism began to suppress individual initiative in matters of belief and conduct. The individual was lost in the churchly hierarchy. Submergence of the individual has burdened society with militarism, excessive nationalism, and an overgrown capitalism—to mention only the three most influential institutions

that have worked against the ethical ideal. Militarism reduces the individual to a unit in a fighting machine; nationalism provincializes the ideal and makes of it a political shibboleth; capitalism tends to mechanize life and reduce the individual workman to the status of an economic factor in producing wealth. Until these institutions can be so modified as to make the ethical ideal possible of realization in the social whole, we as individuals must continue to suffer together the loss of life's supreme values.

Two outstanding problems remain. If our conception of the highest good can dispose of these, or even show how they may conceivably be met, it has presumably answered every reasonable test. These are the problem of freedom and the problem of evil. While neither of these can be treated with any approximation to thoroughness, we may consider them enough to point the direction in which a solution must be sought. As problems they confront every theory of morals, though some theories succeed in largely ignoring them. The more objective the treatment of the moral life, the less apparent the need of discussing either freedom or the problem of evil. But the theory that makes self-realization the moral goal encounters these problems in their full significance. Nevertheless an adequate treatment of them must wait upon a development of the doctrine of selfhood.

From the standpoint of self-realization, freedom is the power to act according to the ideal of the morally good. Thus defined, freedom lies at the basis of the moral life and makes that life possible. On first thought there seems to be no problem. The direct evidence of experience in choosing and striving is apparently sufficient to establish the doctrine of freedom. But science, in analyzing human nature and human conduct, relates them to antecedent conditions and to the immediate environment, and thus exhibits conduct as a resultant of natural causes. Some who feel the force of this kind of evidence seek a way of escape in the notion that freedom has only a

negative meaning. We are free, they would say, when no external compulsion is felt, though at the same time we are determined internally by the forces that build character. These forces, expressed in the native constitution of our being, are not felt as constraint, but gain expression as impulse, desire, and even rational appeal.

Such a conception of freedom cannot satisfy the demands of the moral consciousness. It makes real freedom an illusion and leaves the moral life bound. The elaborate attempts to explain moral experiences while holding the negative conception have failed and will continue to fail, because instead of explaining choice and purposive action with reference to a self-originated ideal, they simply explain how terms used in moral discussion can be given a different meaning in harmony with thoroughgoing determinism. The alternatives are the moral life, implying freedom in a positive sense, and a thoroughly mechanized life that but simulates morality. In doing away with freedom as a power of intelligent choice, the theorizer disposes also of the self, and hence reduces the ideal of self-realization to a case of self-deception in which there is no self to be deceived. That this is the outcome of a strictly scientific treatment of conduct is evident as soon as we recall the objective and observational character of scientific research. To recognize a self, one must transcend the objective viewpoint.¹⁵ As for freedom, nothing but a self can be free, hence the idea of freedom—and shall we say morality?—is extra-scientific.

But what of evil? It is ever present, thwarting endeavor, weakening capacity, bringing sorrow, pain, unrest, remorse, and ultimate failure in death. This grim fact raises doubts concerning the worth-whileness of moral endeavor, and tries one's faith in the feasibility of self-realization as the moral ideal. Before any discussion of the subject is entered upon, it is well to recognize that

¹⁵ Cf. Morton Prince, "Three Fundamental Errors of the Behaviorists and the Reconciliation of the Purposive and Mechanistic Concepts," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1925, p. 101.

no final solution of this problem is possible to finite intelligences. Evil pertains to the universe and involves cosmic issues. All that is and was and is to be is implicated. Yet we can come to a provisional solution, covering our moral needs, by reflecting on how life's ills actually help to self-realization. To make this line of thought entirely convincing, however, one must posit "a life beyond life." Short of this assumption, one can get some satisfaction by considering the manifold ways in which nature is adapted to be a training-school for the development of selfhood. The very indifference of nature to our individual preferences is the growing evidence of its adaptability. If self-realization is possible only through self-activity, and if that must be guided by intelligence, then evidently the self must have unshaken confidence in nature's laws. Consequences must be inevitable, every act of ours must call forth its definitive and appropriate reaction. In this sense the world must be a mechanical world to be the basis of the moral life.

Suppose that the severity of the law of consequences might at times be relaxed, what would be the effect on us as moral beings? It would undermine the very foundations of the moral life; we could never be sure of the future, never count on nature's being true to itself; what is order to-day might be chaos to-morrow—or rather it would all be chaos. Neither the intellectual nor the moral life can be developed and satisfied except in an impersonal world that can be trusted in its mechanical processes. In such a world evil consequences reveal our blundering or our turpitude, and in so doing stimulate to greater watchfulness, closer study of conditions, more persistent effort. This is the kind of world we are living in, a world, consequently, of mixed good and evil, where the evil in revealing itself urges us on to seek greater goods. Every evil mastered makes available goods that would not otherwise be within our reach. Nature is not only on the side of the enlightened moral will, but at every stage of human development yields goods that pre-

pare the self for a larger life and greater goods. The increased capacity is met by a vastly wider range of satisfactions. The relation between the increase of capacity and nature's response is not reducible to a mathematical calculus. So exhaustless are nature's resources that a slight increase of capacity on the part of the self is like a key that may open up a whole new world of values. Thus nature more than keeps pace with the needs of self-hood.

Goods within goods and beyond goods are characteristic of nature. As for pests and disease germs and thwartings and separations and physical decay and death—these must be viewed in the light of their service in promoting the higher values of life. Even death, for aught we know, may be a gain. But the mystery of evil is ever with us, and only infinite insight can completely solve it. In later discussion of religious values, a further step toward a working solution of the problem can be taken. By considering how nature seems adapted to the development in us of all the capacities of our being, for the production of the higher values, and by considering how those values which are of most worth are apparently least dependent upon physical sources, we are encouraged to believe that what is true within experience will continue to hold when the present form of our experience ends. Whatever strengthens the moral life makes this belief easier; but it is not likely to become a certainty while the present life lasts.

The sting of pessimism is removed when we advance beyond the hedonistic outlook and see the self unfolding, finding at each stage of its development a world of goods adapted to its needs. The perverted or evil will may infect the stream of life with a poison that generations of suffering cannot eliminate. Wanton destruction, as in the world war, must carry its baneful consequences into the homes of innocent millions. We cannot escape consequences, and well that it is so. But in the working of the law of consequences the good is as inevitable as the evil.

The good is good because it is stronger than the evil, so that when given its chance it is certain to prevail. Let the enlightened good will have its way in the world and unimagined resources of nature will be uncovered for the common good, society will be redeemed, the laws of heredity will work for the advent of the higher type, and the world will become a human brotherhood. Self-realization, as the supreme good and the goal of all endeavor, meets every test except the mystery of evil, and it comes nearer than any other conception to solving that mystery. It makes for faith in a progressive triumph over evil and its utilization in the development of the higher human values.

Self-realization, then, is the goal of life, the unconditional good to which all other goods are to be subordinated. It gives the law that determines ultimately all questions of relative goods; it is the source of all obligation, the basis of moral approval, the authority from which there is no appeal. Granted that this is true for the individual, what of society? Can we look forward to a social life that will be adequate to the completed self of the individual? Certainly not in a society constituted as at present. Much that seems necessary to its very existence must be outgrown. It would be foolish to venture into prophecy at this point, and suggest the essential structure of the ideal society. The many Utopias that have been pictured are so out of touch with actual conditions as to seem utterly impracticable. But we may be sure that when self-realization has advanced even a very little beyond the present, certain evils that dog us now will be done away. While the structure of our economic life now is pagan in its individualism, and puts a premium on greed and cunning, we see forces at work to modify it in fundamental respects by introducing the principle of coöperation. When this principle is embodied in the very structure and mechanism of society, the course of development will seem more clearly marked and more easy to

attain. Society will be perfected in the realization of the individual as a social being.

But doubts and questions swarm about this vision of the future. What of the limitations of human life as physically conditioned? With advancing civilization human beings will become more and more specialized; may it not be that over-specialization will end in maladaptation and final extinction, as has been the case with myriad forms of life during geologic times? Furthermore the physical sources of life are apparently becoming depleted; what right have we to assume that they will not, with the lapse of centuries and milleniums, drop below the limits of human well-being? Then, in thinking of the future, we should not forget or ignore the selves that are now striving ineffectually to realize their individual good. What connection can they have with the ideal of a society separated from them by æons of time? What, too, of the abortive, defective, perverted, immature selves who can have no inspiring outlook, no ideal? When the individual ceases to live, his values go down with him. What right have we to deny that in this way all human values will in time vanish? Such questionings as these make the moral ideal look like a fading dream. Life appears as a series of beginnings, full of promise but meager in fulfilment. What right have we to believe that the values dear to human beings will be conserved? To answer this question even in a provisional way, we must pass to the consideration of religious values.

CHAPTER V

RELIGIOUS VALUES

Our present interest in religious values will be limited for the most part to those which issue from the highest forms of religion. The religious life of primitive and semi-civilized peoples is full of interest to the scholar, but is not our present concern.

What are religious values? They are the values that come into existence with an accredited belief in God as the helper and protector of human beings. Just as different people may have widely divergent conceptions of God, so religious values may vary. Almost any ideal of supreme attractiveness may coalesce with the God-idea and in this way become the source of religious values. Thus nature, as physical energy, has been deified; so has the universe as the quantitative all or absolute; so have such abstractions as social influence, fame, wealth, culture, humanity (as a super-individual entity). But whenever such ideals are set forth as worthy of religious homage, doubtless much more is implied than is expressed in these concepts. Whatever is whole-heartedly loved calls into expression an attitude closely akin to worship. This fact enables the psychologist to trace a connection between religious emotion and emotions from a less exalted source, like the libidos of the psychoanalysts. It also explains the perversions of religious emotions by ignorant devotees who confuse intense feelings, whatever their source, with worship. Like all other experiences of value, religious values must be tested in the light of the whole context of experience.

Religious values inhere in other values and presuppose them. Every interest in life has the capacity to yield

a characteristic religious value; that is, whatever affects us for good or ill takes on a distinctive quality when viewed as the expression of God's providential care. The good is enhanced in value and the evil is transformed. Thus religious values have an instrumental character. But they are also cherished for their own sakes. They may, in the mind of the believer, so far transcend all other values as to seem to be the only values worth seeking. As instrumental they give assurance that what is of greatest worth to us will somehow continue to be ours in spite of life's vicissitudes, that nothing can come between us and the supreme Source of all value. This assurance is based on the assumption that divine and human interests are essentially the same, and that what man most cherishes, God will use his power to conserve. So important is this aspect considered by many thinkers that religion may for them be defined, in the words of Hoeffding, as "a belief in the conservation of value."¹

But if religion should mean as much as this to us, it would mean much more. The belief that what we esteem most highly is sacred in God's sight, and that he is deeply interested in our well-being, would awaken in us the strongest emotional effects of which our natures are capable. The world of values would become infused with God's presence, all goods would be looked upon as his gifts, all thwartings, as his method of preparing us for a closer communion with him. This intensely personal relation to God, if realized, would be by far the most powerful stimulus to loyalty, to high endeavor, to self-forgetful devotion. Thus religion would become the main-spring of all that is most forceful in us. It would conduce as nothing else could to spiritual health and peace. By blending the moral ideal of self-realization with the ideal of doing God's will, it would complete the transcendence of the egoistic attitude; the worshipper would become God-centered.

An adequate definition of religion is difficult to formu-

¹ *The Philosophy of Religion*, § 72.

late because religion is the expression of our whole nature and permeates every interest of life. While Hoeffding may emphasize belief, others single out the element of feeling, and still others find the essence in good works.² As an emotional experience religion expresses itself in worship; as involving our active nature it issues in doing God's will; as intellectually grounded it is a body of beliefs. Without the beliefs the emotional expression would be hazy, if not impossible, and religious values could hardly exist. Hence our concern will be primarily with the nature and grounds of religious beliefs.

Have we a right to believe in the validity of religious values? May they not be illusory? This portentous question cannot be wholly evaded, though most people avoid its deeper consideration. Many who do not care to think much on the subject satisfy themselves in part by assuring themselves that in the realm of religion everything depends on faith. If we believe that the values are real, they by that act come into being for us. May not a strong faith remove mountains of difficulty? The quantum of truth in this view readily assimilates with the accompanying emotional experiences, and thereby renders the believer immune to criticism. The circle of his thought is complete. He knows because he has faith to believe, and his experiences establish his faith. Nothing could be simpler or more convincing—until we become critical and want to know the real grounds of our beliefs. Doubtless faith does play an important part in beliefs. As an act of will supported by emotional prejudice, faith can determine what facts of life shall be admitted to consideration, and what their relative importance shall be. It can pack the jury and insure the verdict. But in doing so it demonstrates, not the authority of truth, but one's capacity to believe. Among devout people may be found abundant illustration of faith in puerilities that have become sacred by being believed. Such an attitude toward doctrinal matters in

² For definitions of religion see Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, Appendix; Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, chap. i.

religion blocks inquiry, impedes progress, and perpetuates ancient errors that the world at large has cast out. It means, first, self-deception, and then obscurantism. Even as a demonstration of faith, the attitude is faulty. To doubt reason is the fundamental heresy, and when the devotee takes refuge from rational inquiry in an appeal to faith, he exemplifies a pernicious type of scepticism. He virtually says that if all the facts were faced with an open mind, his beliefs would be confounded. Faith has its essential place in the religious life, as elsewhere; but being based on evidence, it must not usurp the place of evidence.

Faith, however, as the act of venturing upon evidence, making the hazard in spite of uncertainties, brings to light further evidence. It is the primary means of testing conclusions, whether in the field of religion or elsewhere. Moreover the word faith may cover the unanalyzed residuum of our experiences that impels to belief. We seldom, if ever, can tell all the reasons for a given decision. This is true even in the most ordinary affairs of life. It is more manifestly true in those complex and less understood realms of the higher sentiments and abstract constructions. A belief represents the assent of the entire self, and no one, however skilled in self-analysis, can set forth all the hidden sources of conviction. Hence after all the known reasons are given we often have to say that we believe because we believe, recognizing that the main sources lie in the unfathomed depths of the self. Psychological analysis is bringing to light some of these sources—racial inheritances, habits of thought and emotional expression, drives and bents of nature that assert themselves in unaccountable ways. These and many not yet singled out have their place and influence in determining belief. The term faith may by a legitimate adaptation include belief arising from such elemental sources. It is also true that we act upon genuine evidence of which we may not at the time be conscious. We interpret a quality of voice, a foot-step, a motion of the body in walking, as meaning a particular individual in a particular mood. We act thus on

faith. Accordingly the term faith has an honorable place in the vocabulary of religious belief, even though it cannot take the place of such evidence as can be logically tested according to recognized principles of evidence. There is no substitute for facing the facts of experience and letting them have their due authority over us. Yet when, without prepossessions, we seek to read the indications of nature and of human life, we find a mass of confusingly ambiguous evidence. To make this yield any plausible conclusion whatever, it must be broadly interpreted in the light of all we have thus far studied. When the evidence is all in, faith will have its right to appropriate and apply.

The question of validity may be considered from three points of view—the historical, the authoritative, and the philosophical. Each gives important material affecting our decision. Later we shall see how these are interrelated. Let us consider them in order.

So far as is known, every group of people, whether clan, tribe, or nation, has some form of religion. In the earlier stages of civilization, religion was so intertwined with social custom as to seem its supernatural sanction. Since tribal customs were the essence of tribal wisdom and had divine sanction, variations from them were severely punished. Tradition ruled supreme. As intelligence advanced, the distinctive features of religion were slowly differentiated from the workaday life, and a sacred caste grew up that had charge of religious interests. Thus the priesthood became a part of the institutional life of the people. The priest by virtue of his position as custodian of sacred things—temples, totems, ritual, sacrifices, magic formulae—was the main conservator of the old as against innovations. But as tribe was compelled to join with tribe for mutual protection or by reason of defeat in battle, traditions were disturbed and the way was opened for progress. At first the gods were looked upon as little removed in power and wisdom from the worshippers. Hence the ethical element in religious observances was not much in evidence. But the changes that were introduced

with the rise of nations tended to exalt the gods and stimulate the worshippers to a higher type of living. Morals became an increasingly vital part of religious practice.

There seems to be trustworthy evidence that practically all primitive peoples believed in a diffused spiritual power, quasi personal and manifested in the activities of external objects.³ This all-pervasive power has been christened *mana* (a Melanesian word, meaning about the same as the Indian word, *manitou*). Some students of early religions have inclined to the belief that the widespread worship of *mana* indicates that the original religion of mankind was monotheistic. But this theory has little except an imperfect analogy to support it. The conception of *mana* seems to have been extremely vague and elusive. Even now after much observation and study, anthropologists are not agreed as to whether *mana* was an all-pervasive, attenuated substance called spirit, unitary in nature though many in its manifestations, or whether it was as multifarious as the forms of its expression. The evidence seems to indicate that primitive man had a confused sense of a presence which could pass from object to object, from person to person, bestowing unusual power on the recipient. It was one in being power, yet it became so much a part of the object it inhabited that it seemed capable of unlimited division. That primitive man did not think of this presence as a definite personality is evident from all that we know of primitive ideas and customs. In the initial stages of culture people did not possess the conception of personality as we now understand the term. They had the tribal consciousness. The individual tribesman simply thought and acted in accordance with tribal traditions.

Nevertheless they peopled their world with quasi personal spirits, infused with the power of *mana*. These spirits were charged with responsibility for all that happened. Because the modern conception of natural law had not yet been worked out, the technique of control over

³ Cf. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 192 ff.

the spirits was extremely crude. The practice of magic was all the applied science that primitive peoples knew. It entered into every phase of their religious and social life. So implicitly did early man believe in magic that, even among relatively intelligent peoples like the Hindus and Persians, the power of magic formulae was thought to be irresistible, controlling the great gods of heaven. These pre-scientific methods of influencing the higher powers seem childish to us now, but they testify to the universality of a certain god-consciousness.

With the advent of modern science a new way of looking at the forces in nature began to prevail. No longer did it seem necessary to assume a God in the heavens; nature's activities could all be referred to the "reign of law." But even with such an outlook, man continued to be religious. His innate cravings sought satisfaction in various ways. Many devout people turned against the findings and reasonings of science. They preferred to cling to their beliefs at all hazards. Others tried to hold their science in one compartment of their intellectual life and their religious beliefs in another. This worked badly for obvious reasons. Still others, accepting science as their guide, yet unable to avoid sceptical conclusions, invented the "Religion of Humanity." This religion was sufficiently vague to appeal to the emotions and fire the imagination. It kept the mind and heart of the worshipper close to the moral task of service to society, and thus satisfied in large measure the moral sense. So long as no attempt was made to interpret the ideal of humanity in terms of actual human beings, the object of worship might be a god who looked like a man. Yet these various attitudes were essentially makeshifts, and could not permanently meet the needs of growing intelligence. Their persistence even into the present emphasizes the ineradicable need of religion.

History, then, points to the prevalence of religion in some form, but does not, except in a general way, indicate what beliefs the *consensus gentium* would validate.

May we conclude that in this way we are authorized to believe in the overruling Power who shapes human destiny? If we could find in history a justification for this belief, we might by means of it validate many other beliefs. But a general demurrer against this conclusion might run as follows: Belief in God or gods has heretofore been a necessity, because man lived in the presence of forces he did not understand. But he is slowly bringing all these forces under natural law, and thereby making belief in supernatural interposition quite unnecessary. In time life will adjust itself to this intellectual situation, and religion will vanish from the earth. To set this reasoning aside, something more than history will be needed.

In the confusion and uncertainty of conflicting beliefs, the vast majority of people take refuge in authority as determining for them what they should believe—the authority of sacred scriptures, of an inspired church, of a general council, or even of some great personality. A man who thus surrenders himself may be sure of spiritual comfort. He need no longer be harried by questionings and doubts. “The sages of old spake as they were moved by the spirit of God. Who am I that I should gainsay them?” The appeal to authority has much in its favor, especially when that authority, as in the case of the Christian Scriptures and the creedal statements of the churches, represents the best in the religious thinking of many centuries. One may well argue that the sacred writings became sacred just because they so adequately met the needs of the people. What folly then for the individual to turn away from such teachings and set up himself as a higher authority!

And yet external authority is always open to attack from various quarters. To begin with, there are many authorities and they conflict. Deciding among them means using private judgment. If some law-giving body promulgates an official decision, it begins immediately to handicap itself and mortgage its future. For either the

decision must stand for all generations, even though out of harmony with the best thought of religious people, or the decision must in time be revised in the light of additional insight; and that involves the exercise of private judgment. In fact the original pronouncement cannot be other than the judgment of some individual or group of individuals. It is not a question merely between primitive beliefs and those that appeal to the more enlightened mind. No creedal interpretation, however definite and official, can be wholly without ambiguity. Every believer must exercise his best judgment as to what the accepted statement may mean. In spite of all authority, one's conceptions of God and man and destiny reflect one's whole experience of life, and vary accordingly.

Moreover the appeal to authority in crucial issues is unsatisfactory because it halts the search for pertinent evidence. It is an act of despair, an expression of unfaith in one's self, a surrender of one's dearest prerogative as an intelligent being. Founded on human weakness, it has no abiding strength in itself to sustain the shock of critical attack. It provokes scepticism, if indeed it is not itself a form of scepticism. The appeal to authority, therefore, may well call out the retort that such support makes religion pre-scientific, a relic of the age of magic and spiritism. Then might plausibly follow the prophecy made by not a few critics of religion that the day will come when all religion will be looked upon as merely a pleasant form of illusion. The only way to meet such criticism is to bring religious beliefs out from under cover of authority and submit them to the severest tests of reason and experience.

Of course the venturesome student who asserts his independence of external authority and hazards thinking for himself assumes a grave responsibility. Authority in religious beliefs like authority in morals and politics represents many generations of experience and earnest thinking; it is the compacted wisdom of the past. To have a right to take issue with it, one should show that he has

mastered its best expression, that he knows the elements of truth contained in it and knows that it is not adequate. This means that the innovator has no moral right to his opposing views unless he has done some arduous thinking. The debonair attitude of some present-day writers on radicalism in religion and morals is to be deplored. They are usually ill-informed. It is much easier to command a brilliant style in catering to the reckless spirit of the times than to subject oneself to the labor of searching out the truth. Authority rules in most of life—the authority of convention in matters small and great. Were it not for the authority of our social heritage, we should lapse back toward the pre-stone age. But authority in religious belief is especially unattractive at the present time because of the conviction that vast progress has been made during the recent centuries. Accuracy of analysis and measurement has given us many new insights into life and its subconscious drives. Nevertheless the very concentration of attention and effort upon the objective aspects has meant the neglect of much that is of the most vital significance to the spiritual life. The only escape from authority in religion is by way of laborious reëxamination of the field of modern knowledge from the standpoint of the self. This means the philosophical approach.

What, then, of the philosophical approach? This method of attack has a signal advantage over all others inasmuch as it includes, appraises, and transcends them. By a justifiable extension of the term philosophical, we may make it cover all critical efforts to find out the truth of religion. Religious beliefs are beliefs in certain forms of reality, hence are strictly philosophical in their character. If philosophy cannot justify these beliefs, thinking people will have to discard them. When once the ultimate grounds of belief or doubt are found, the supplementary value of the *consensus gentium* and of authority can be utilized in producing conviction. If there is a solid basis for belief in God and his effectual interest in humanity, we should find in every department of life indications

favoring such belief. The more deeply we probe into human nature and its essential interests, the more unequivocal and convincing should these indications become. A preliminary suggestion, therefore, will prepare us for the more difficult considerations that follow.

It is a commonplace among thoughtful people that one who makes the lower (or exclusive) goods of life his aim quickly reaches the limit of enjoyment. Nature is soon exhausted in its resources, and can only duplicate without enhancing such goods. These values are ephemeral though basal. Besides there is no necessary connection between the health and well-being of the self and the particular kind of basal values that make life possible. That is, the physical basis of life, and with it all the goods that center in the physical, might conceivably be other than they are. We might, for instance, be so conditioned in our bodily expression as to live with perfect ease and comfort in the sun. But when we advance to the social values the situation is different. The self is essentially social. Its more permanent and all-encompassing values are social in their nature. As these values are cultivated and made the goal of endeavor, we find nature able with increasing ease and simplicity to furnish the conditions of their attainment. The simple life with spiritual values is the life most favored by nature. It means plain living and high thinking. Such facts suggest that the goods most valued are the ones most conserved even by the physical structure of the universe.

Another fact of common observation tends to support this suggestion. Nature is marvelously adapted to teaching through experience just those lessons which make for the development of the self. No good that physical nature yields gives all the satisfaction anticipated, because the effort to obtain a given good develops a capacity, opens up the self to a larger good, one more desirable. Thus nature seems to lure us on to self-expression and self-development. This points to the possibility of a cosmic plan in the very structure of physical nature for the reali-

zation and conservation of the higher human values. Such a conclusion has frequently been drawn, but as it is evidently of supreme significance in a religious world-view, the heaviest guns in the arsenal of thought have played upon it. The more man wants it to be true, the more critical he should be. We shall need, therefore, to face every form of adverse criticism, and let nothing deter us from doing full justice to such criticism, inasmuch as life's major interests are involved.

The attack upon the theistic belief may come from the intellectual (theoretical) or the practical side of life. From the one we are made to understand that the existence of God cannot be proved by logic. From the other we are presented with the portentous problem of evil. In the study of these two sources of scepticism, we will endeavor to show that the intellectual inconsequence in the theistic argument is indecisive because it arises from a defect of method, while the problem of evil may still remain a problem without shattering our belief, because after the worst is said, life normally proves abundantly worth living. If, on the way, we can succeed in finding a satisfactory method of approach that will correct the intellectual inconsequence, and also an insight into life's real meaning and destiny that will solve the problem of evil so far as human interests are concerned, we shall feel justified in concluding that the religious values have been validated.

The spirit of our age is impatient of all reasoning in the field of religious belief that does not lay hold on experience. Such impatience has behind it the centuries of futile effort when the keenest minds failed to produce abiding conviction by their persistent and subtle dialectic. But the traditional arguments that have survived the centuries have more than a mere historical interest. Their vitality in spite of their inconsequence points to an abiding quality that the form of the arguments partly conceals. These traditional arguments are three in number and are known as the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleo-

logical arguments. To them should be added a fourth, the moral argument, which mediates the transition from the purely intellectual to the practical appeal.

The most abstract of these arguments is the ontological, so called because it pertains only to the being of God. It originated with St. Anselm, but received modifications and additions from later speculators. The argument concludes that the very idea of a most real Being (*ens realissimum*) implies its existence, since a being would be less than the most real if its reality were only conceptual.⁴ Descartes, in restating the argument, added that the idea of an infinite Being could not have originated in a finite human mind, and hence must have been implanted there by the infinite One himself.⁵ Modern psychology sets aside this Cartesian suggestion as of no evidential value. The Anselmic form of the argument called out the Kantian rejoinder that the thought of a most real Being no more implies its existence than the conception of a hundred dollars implies that they exist.⁶ To this criticism Hegel replied that the idea of the most real Being is unique, in that it is the only idea adequate to its reality, all others being defective because they leave something unexpressed.⁷ This reply carries weight only for those who agree with Hegel, that the rational is the real and the real the rational. Without discussing at present this Hegelian dictum, we shall go on to consider the other two arguments.

The cosmological argument was so called because it undertook to advance from the fact of order and dependence in nature to the conclusion that an unconditioned First Cause existed. This argument was also criticized by Kant as being essentially the ontological argument in a disguised form. He contended that the cosmological argument, of itself, could prove at best only the existence of a power adequate to produce the known effects, which

⁴ *Proslogium*, chap. iii.

⁵ *Meditations*, Med. iii.

⁶ *Critique of Pure Reason*, A, p. 599.

⁷ *Logic*, p. 107 f.

seemed to Kant to fall far short of proving the existence of an absolutely unconditioned Being. To reach the latter conclusion one must pass over to the ontological argument by arbitrarily identifying the more or less limited first cause of the known effects with the *ens realissimum*. Kant pointed out also that the unconditioned is really unthinkable, since to think is to condition.⁸ This criticism seems to be valid. So long as we move on the intellectual plane we can never reach an unconditioned. Nor can we on this plane pass logically from the idea of a most real being to its reality. The inconsequence in these two arguments is evident. It is well to note also, in this connection, that while we remain on the exclusively intellectual plane, we cannot even prove the existence of the finite self. The idea of a finite self does not imply its existence, nor does the idea of conditionedness in experience imply that a self exists on which the conditioned in experience depends.

But the third or teleological argument carries us somewhat beyond the vicious circle of intellectualism. It concludes from the evidence of purpose in nature to the existence of a supreme Being who works according to a purpose for the whole of nature. In living organisms, if not in the rest of nature, we meet conditions that cannot be entirely explained by mechanical laws. An organism is a complex unity in which the parts function with reference to one another and to the whole. It seems to embody and progressively to realize a purpose or end. If on the strength of this seeming we decide that it does, then we may feel justified in concluding that purpose or design is the higher category inclusive of mechanism, and that the power adequate to the production of nature must be an intelligence. Kant's criticism of this argument was less successful than his criticism of the other two, just because he was unable to maintain in his criticism the strictly intellectual point of view. He held that the teleological

⁸ *Op. cit.*, A, pp. 603-614. Cf. Mansel, *The Philosophy of the Conditioned*; also H. Spencer, *First Principles*, pt. i. § 13.

argument (called by him the physico-theological argument) could at best prove only an external artificer or cosmic architect.⁹ But one might reply that the argument must prove either more or less than the existence of a world architect. If design in nature is interpreted with strict reference to intellectualistic limitations, nothing is proved except that the idea of design suggests the idea of a designer. If, however, the argument means that the objectively real world gives evidence of design or of expressing purpose, we can conclude from our own experiences of purposive activity that an intelligent Power is operating in nature. We should then be reasoning from the concrete existence to the concrete cause. But the crux of the teleological argument is the proof that such a thing as objective purpose exists in nature.

These three arguments in their traditional form are faulty in so far as they ignore the practical or volitional side of life. Their overweening intellectualism not only holds them encased within the limits of mere concepts, but keeps them apart in bald isolation. If we try with Kant to bring them into connection, they seem to coalesce in the inconsequent ontological argument. This is certainly true of the first two arguments. The teleological argument apparently stands on a different footing, just because it can hardly be stated without reference to volition. All three arguments contain elements of truth that only need restating from the viewpoint of practical experience to render powerful support to the theistic conclusion. But this restatement must recognize the whole of experience including the self as the experient.

What, then, do these attempts at theistic proof mean when interpreted, not as logical manipulations of objective data, but as referring to the world of experience? The change of meaning is momentous, resulting in a great enhancement of convincing power. The ontological argument is now seen to accentuate a thoroughly attested truth, namely, that the world we know and reason about

⁹ *Op. cit.*, A, pp. 620-630.

has a thought structure which we ourselves give it, and that its reality is a product of the experiencing self working responsively, in perfect coöperation with a Power which must be of like nature. A moment's reflection will make this rather sweeping conclusion seem inevitable. It follows from the known character of all our experiences of the phenomenal world. The objects that constitute external nature are such that we can trust them implicitly, in so far as we know the laws of their ongoing. As they are for us what they are because the self is controlled in its apprehension of them, their knowability means that the Power operating on and controlling the self adapts itself momentarily and perfectly to the active nature of intelligent selfhood. Nothing short of a supreme Intelligence could do this. The ontological argument is in harmony also with another consideration which strengthens, if possible, the conclusion just drawn. The world of actual sense perception is vastly simpler than the world as it would appear to an infinite Intelligence. It is this world as it would be for infinite Intelligence that we take to be the real world and the ultimate standard of comparison by which we determine the approximation to reality in our own objective constructions. This real world then, if it exists at all, can be the experience only of an Intelligence immeasurably above our own. His thought would be completely adequate for reality, whereas ours is not, because we are finite.

The cosmological argument from the viewpoint of experience is no longer a reasoning from the existence of conditions to the reality of the unconditioned considered as intellectual content. Viewed as the experience of a self, the world in which can be traced the dynamic connections of dependence is a world in which the principle of order is exemplified. It is a world of law, order, mutuality. This is the primal fact, and the further statement that the parts are interconnected is an inference. The basic truth of the argument, then, must be found in this primal assertion of order, not necessarily in the theory

of dynamic connection. In fact the term dynamic loses most of its significance when subjected to criticism, since it is not by hypothesis permitted to retain any trace of productive causality. But the more we reflect upon the fact of order in the outside world, the more significant it becomes. Intelligence is our only principle of order. That a world practically infinite in complexity and ever changing should exemplify, throughout its entire extent, moment by moment down the ages, perfect amenability to the principle of order, is evidence that it is the work of intelligence. This statement recognizes the part played by the finite mind in "discovering" order by judicious selection of material and generalizations in which particulars in their uniqueness are ignored. The world is thus adapted to our finite mind. If we knew more and could think better, we doubt not but that the adaptations would appear more striking. The knowability of the world points to the intelligence of its Source.¹⁰ When we try to think out the implications of the theory that the ultimate source is unintelligent we can find not the least suggestion that its activity could issue in anything other than utter chaos, opaque to mind whether finite or infinite.

The teleological argument brings us into the presence of concrete experience. It gathers up into itself all that is especially valuable in the other two arguments and adds its own elements of strength. It interprets the intelligible structure of the world, the presence of order and coherence throughout nature, as meaning that the ever-changing universe is moving toward a goal known, at least, to the ultimate Intelligence. It declares that this inconceivably vast generalization is justified both by the considerations mentioned and by the detailed study of nature, especially in connection with the phenomena of life. A living organism, as Kant pointed out, is that in which all is reciprocally both means and end.¹¹ It may be analyzed into mechanically related parts, but as alive it forms a

¹⁰ Cf. B. P. Bowne, *Metaphysics*, revised edition, p. iii.

¹¹ *Kritik of Judgment*, § 65.

whole, a unit with manifest purposiveness. As Kant further argues, if there are such products in nature, products that cannot be explained by purely mechanical laws, a teleological principle, which alone can explain them, must take precedence over the mechanistic principle. When the self is made central, all this needs very slight restatement. The self reënacts itself more or less completely in every object. Inasmuch as its objects are its experiences, they are throughout purposive; and inasmuch as they are the joint product of the self and the independent Source of stimulations, the two working in perfect accord, the inference seems inescapable that the controlling Power must itself be purposive in its activities. This is the revised teleological argument on the lowest rung of its meaning. When it is made to include the experiences of the world as value, the world as a social whole, the world as a fit place for the development of selfhood, the argument becomes decisive.

We seem shut up to the conclusion that whatever complex activities are construable by intelligence must ultimately be the work of intelligence. Nothing in our experience contradicts this, and within the limits of experiential proof everything seems to support it. Thought itself is essentially purposive and cannot rest in any explanation—such as the mechanical—that stops short of the purpose involved. Either the world is the expression of purpose or it is opaque to reason. On the authority, then, of the self, trying to understand itself and its cosmic environment, we may conclude that the universe is the expression of a Self working purposively.

But it is easy to make out a case against this conclusion. One may urge the ever-present and ominous fact of evil. The element of evil in experience includes not only physical pains and suffering, but spiritual unrest, hope deferred, tedium, dread, fear, the sense of failure, and forebodings of ultimate extinction. What of a being that fills our world with such things? Nature seems to be indifferent to us. It is apparently more concerned about the dance

of atoms than the preservation of human beings. Thus we confront again the problem of evil. The consideration of the theistic bearings of this problem leads to the moral argument. This is the most vital argument of all; for what needs proof is God's goodness, not his existence. How can we vindicate God's goodness and yet recognize the prevalence and persistence of all the ills that plague us? Some of our keenest thinkers accept the dilemma—either God is not all-powerful and all-knowing, or he is not good; and they prefer to believe in his goodness. God means well, but he has to deal with intractable conditions.¹² To many, on the other hand, the conception of a finite God (or Absolute) is obnoxious; it is tantamount to a denial that there is a God. Among these, some, like F. H. Bradley, hold that the Absolute, while infinite in power, is indifferent to moral distinctions and to human interests.¹³

The believers in the finiteness of God call attention to certain obvious facts. Human beings are separate entities exercising a measure of freedom. God is morally obligated to let them have their way within prescribed limits. Moreover God could not create a moral universe and not include the possibility of evil. He did the best he could. His limitations were self-imposed, since he chose to create man and to make the world a training place for character. They insist further that the conception of God as indifferent to moral values seems seriously to discount his intelligence; it makes him appear to us as managing a vast enterprise, involving æons of time and unlimited energy, without any sufficient reason. The reply that he may be cosmically active for his own pleasure fails to save his intelligence. When the human or value-producing element is removed from the world, only meaningless motions of atoms remain, which

¹² Cf. J. M. McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, chap. vii.; William James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, Lecture viii.; Hastings Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. ii. p. 344 ff.

¹³ *Appearance and Reality*, chap. xxv.

can at best yield but insipid pleasure. It is not strange, therefore, that those who think of the world as a "fortuitous concourse of atoms" should deny that the ultimate power is intelligent.

But what of the evils of the world? For thoroughgoing hedonists they are still evils and only evils. As we saw when discussing the nature of the moral values, hedonism leads to pessimism, wherein nothing is in the end worth while. Such hedonism as escapes this outcome is so modified by considerations of human worth that it should no longer bear that name. As we advance from this demonstrably unsatisfactory moral ideal to that of self-realization, we notice a progressive transformation of the problem of evil. Two insights are decisive in this transformation, to both of which we have already referred.

First, the possibility of evil is involved in the very nature of a moral order. If selves are to be developed and matured into the fullness of life, some such order as we find in nature must be the condition. Every act must carry with it its own consequences as provided by the physical structure. Blundering and the evil will must mean suffering. A Being who is infinite in power and is infinitely good could apparently not do otherwise than carry out undeviatingly our every volition, whatever that may be, when we meet the conditions provided in nature. This constitutes the perfect school of experience and cannot be improved upon. We have only to reflect on the moral and intellectual havoc that would result if the ultimate Power were a respecter of persons, arbitrarily favoring and shielding some from the consequences of their acts, while leaving others to their fate. This would not only make a vigorous moral life impossible, but would undermine the foundations of science. History teaches us this lesson in a variety of ways. Such a conception of God, once held by a considerable portion of the Western world, is now seen to be intolerable. The presence of evil, then, is indirectly an evidence that nature is on the

side of forethought, loyalty, justice, and the other moral qualities that make for abundant life.

But some are inclined at this point to press the objection that if the physical order is at the same time a moral order, it should favor the good will because it is good, whereas there is no evidence in experience that such is the case. The best of intentions will not save a good enterprise or protect the well-meaning operator if the objective conditions of success are not satisfied. Nature does not consider intentions, good or bad; it concerns itself only with the conditions. When they are met the results follow, with no regard for the feeling or fate of those involved. One ignorant but well-meaning individual can cause a devastating fire or an epidemic or the betrayal of a whole nation in a critical moment of its existence. Nature responds to his blundering in exactly the same way as it would if the consequences had been most desirable. How can such tragic indifference to human welfare be squared with the belief in a beneficent Being supreme over nature's processes? The answer has been given in the preceding paragraph. What a world this would be if good intentions of themselves should exercise any influence in its management! We should quickly betake ourselves to the pleasant task of formulating and cultivating right sentiments. "If wishes were horses." The absurdity of such a scheme is evident. It would be morally intolerable. Nature must be impersonal in its activities, its responses to will attitudes must be inevitable, or there would be no orderly world, no home of the spirit, no nature. The last word of nature is always, Take heed.

The other insight, which follows from the foregoing, is that cosmic or physical evil is relative to good and gets all its meaning from this connection. The more manifest and abundant the goods, the more inevitable the evil, since the goods we do not want at the moment or that we do not yet know how to use are more or less an incumbrance; they get in the way. From this

point of view, evil is a felt superfluity of goods. In the case of the misuse of goods, the uncomfortable consequences (pain, sickness, loss of power, and the like) may serve as moral and intellectual awakeners, and thus make for progress in the moral life.

In this connection it is often pointed out that human beings are brought into the world without their will, that they are weighted by their heritage, and often so mortgaged to an evil life or so poorly endowed with discernment that their course of blundering and criminality is at birth already predetermined. Multitudes are born to suffering and failure. No one is what he might be. Quite true, must be the answer. It means that the generations are linked together in a thousand ways for better or worse, that we are not only our brother's keeper, but are profoundly responsible for the character and comfort of succeeding generations in so far as we contribute to them by parenthood or influence. But this is only a striking and impressive exemplification of the law of social development. Our every act has a significance beyond ourselves, and a little carelessness or a little unusual forethought may have consequences momentous for multitudes of people. No wonder the human race progresses so slowly when its worst members can thwart by their incompetence and maladjustments the good that many times their number may be able to effect.

Two closely related suggestions go far to relieve the portentous character of this charge against the essential goodness of the world Power. The first is the converse of the charge. Just as one generation can bind the next and the evil from generation to generation can become cumulative, so the good will, taking advantage of the law of connection, can greatly accelerate advance in all desirable ways. The laws of social solidarity have limitless capacity for good in building up through the centuries a higher type of manhood. The second suggestion is that the sense of responsibility which the laws of heredity awaken in the individual becomes normally a powerful

stimulus to right living. One is not likely to become reckless in his manner of life if one realizes that future generations are to suffer as a result. Then, too, the very sense of connection makes the attachment of parent and child the source of many spiritual values not otherwise conceivable. The binding together of the generations in mutual responsibility and interest may be beneficent through and through. But like all other natural provisions that have vast capacities for good, it can be perverted to evil by the will of men. Responsibility for the mischief wrought by the evil will—and who can measure it?—must be shared by man. When we have cleared our own record, we may be able to see how God can be good and let the evil will do its worst. By its very nature the evil will thwarts itself.

But such considerations are apt to lose much of their persuasive power when we fix our attention on the sub-human world and there see so much that is un-ideal. No such reason as self-development can be offered in explanation. We should not, however, draw hasty conclusions in this field. The pain and suffering incident to the struggle for existence can easily be exaggerated. Animals do not trouble themselves much about the struggle for existence or the survival of the fittest. They know how to have a good time; their death is generally sudden and with little pain. Without remorse or an accusing conscience or a haunting imagination of impending danger, they are consistent hedonists, living in the present moment of good or facing with courage and cunning the danger that may impend. Moreover we do not know what purpose they subserve, nor do we know anything about their destiny. They have rights, however, that even man should respect. As among humankind, so throughout the animal world, the obligation not to produce unnecessary suffering is binding on all. The more we know of animal life through sympathetic contact and association, the more we are apt to find there indications of beneficence in the possibilities of happiness resident in animal nature.

But the situation in the sub-human world is not our problem. The subject is mentioned here only to suggest that we are not justified in reading into the lives of animals the restlessness, depression, anxiety, remorse, and forebodings that make up a large part of human ills. The evils that beset the developing self are the ones we must face. To see that they result from nature's guarantee of fidelity in carrying out our volitions is to shift the burden largely from nature to ourselves.

Yet there is one evil which tops them all and which no forethought can avoid—the last great evil, which in terminating life cuts short the career of self-development, renders futile all our plans, brings to naught all values. Death seems so useless, so wanton, so diabolical a destruction of values that mankind has been loath to accept it as being really what it seems. The prevalence among practically all peoples of a belief in survival bears witness to the revolt of human nature against its greatest enemy. What right have we to such a belief? Our wishes, however deep and strong, are not sufficient. That man should shrink with horror from the thought of annihilation may be for aught we know but another evidence that the world is run without reference to him, that he is in fact an interloper, a misfit.

Only the briefest outline of the argument to set this pessimistic suggestion aside and to support the belief in survival can here be given. There is, in fact, only one consideration that has any independent weight; all others are derived from this one. It is the evidence from experience that the human self is of sufficient value in the eyes of the ultimate Source of our being to justify its continued existence. Our studies up to the present have tended to establish a high degree of plausibility for the following propositions. (1) That God, being intelligent, has a plan for the universe, which justifies whatever happens within it. (2) That God is unlimited in power, and therefore, so far as the merely physical is concerned, the time process does not mean that he must manipulate

to gain his ends. The universe at any one moment is exactly what he wills it to be. Hence the world-process must have its *raison d'être* in the realization of some end that involves incessant change. The only aim that does involve the cosmic process and also justify it is the culture of intelligences, the development of selves. This, then, must be the goal of cosmic evolution. But we are not to infer that human personality is alone a sufficient goal. At most we may believe that human beings belong to the spiritual hierarchy for whose well-being the universe exists. If, then, selves are of such value to God that he organizes his cosmic activities with reference to their nurture and unfolding, the inference seems permissible that when the period of apprenticeship in this life is ended, the self will enter upon another form of existence.

At present there are those—as there always have been since man became critical and sophisticated—who decry a belief in immortality as selfish and cowardly. They do not consider all that is involved. This belief alone justifies the moral ideal of self-realization; it alone solves the problem of evil and enables us to believe in a God that is good; it alone explains nature's marvelous adaptations to the fostering of human life and well-being; it alone gives a worthy goal to the cosmic processes. The belief, then, in the continued existence of the human personality after death can claim a high degree of probability.

It seems evident that all religious values depend for their validity upon the existence of a God who is perfect in power and goodness. He must realize in his character the highest ideal of the moral life, since ultimately nothing counts except his will. Philosophical considerations drawn from the universal aspects of experience and from those major issues of the intellectual life which we have been discussing tend to support a belief in such a God. There are, in addition, lines of evidence that appeal only to the deeply religious, and hence can be recognized by philosophy only with a definite understanding of their

limitations. To the religiously minded who have made the great venture and staked their all on a belief in God as the supremely gracious all-wise Father, there comes an assuring response which as an inner experience of certitude abundantly satisfies the worshipper. The experience is subjective, says the psychologist. But that does not disturb the devout worshipper, for to him the response is as real and objective as any communication from another person could be. He holds that his experience of response can be tested in appropriate ways and that every test brings him further confirmation. He might point out also that, psychologically considered, all experiences are subjective. The only way, then, that one can escape solipsism is to discover an extra-subjective ground for the experiences. Just as the objective character of the sense world is explained by reference to the common source of stimulation, so the religionist may claim, with some show of justice, that the sense of God's presence and of his friendliness may have an objective source. But this line of thought would of itself have little value as evidence unless supported by many other considerations. It would then have a certain corroborative force.

The real question, as we have said, is not, Does God exist? but, Is God good and powerful enough to validate the implications of an ideal religious life? Every human being of average intelligence has a god in whom he believes. This is true even of those who make light of religion and repudiate religious beliefs. They discard the being we call God for a substitute of their own. We call them godless only because their worship of wealth or pleasure or the mechanical universe or "humanity" or themselves is so out of harmony with our own conceptions. The theistic proofs do not refer to such gods. When, therefore, we ask, "Does God exist?" the relevant answer is the question, "What God?" for there are many. Which one are we justified in accepting as our God? If our conception of him is to meet the test of experience,

we must think of him as creating and maintaining the universe, and as making nature a fit place for the development and realization of personalities. Only such a concept can validate belief in religious values.

Having previously touched upon the general nature of these values, we have now to consider them somewhat more closely. The greatest and most inclusive religious values are the following: (1) Religion promotes the integration of selfhood, and justifies the highest ideals of self-realization. (2) It furnishes a conception of society that meets our deepest needs as social beings. (3) It interprets life as coöperation with God and makes possible belief in prayer as a form of this coöperation.

First, let us consider the effect of religion on the integration of the self. Selfhood is an ideal always in process of being realized. It comes into being gradually through the constant interplay of native impulses, or drives, and the environment. The drives belong to the very constitution of the self and do not need conscious intelligence to call them into exercise. Nevertheless they become distinctively human only as they are brought under the control of conscious volition. On the plane of conscious selfhood, the will is the controlling power and determines the course of higher development. Hence whatever strengthens the will and gives it a worthy object contributes to the integration of the self. Religion does this in fullest measure. It is the supreme act of the self in taking over the highest values of life. Not only does it set the well-being of the self above all other values, but it encourages the self to find its abiding satisfactions in the ideal of a community wherein God is the great Socius, and all human beings are his children. Religion actually implies that God's interest in his human family is such that the physical universe is run with exclusive reference to the realization of such spiritual potencies as they might conceivably attain. No other influence can be so powerful in awakening dormant spiritual resources; none can so unify and strengthen the self. All that is

suppressed or ignored in the distractions of daily work comes into rich expression in the exercise of religion. Worship begets confidence, a sense of security, a consciousness of being at home in God's world. These make for self-respect and spiritual vigor. The lesser values that cost such effort to acquire, the cares and anxieties incident to the struggle for power, position and prestige, tend to fall away and give place to the assurance that, as God's own, we are already above the need of such things.

At the same time religion creates in us the conviction that our supreme life-task is doing God's will. His will is interpreted as meaning devotion to the highest ideals of service. Every principle of personal morality is thus reënforced; zeal and loyalty are stimulated to the utmost. In a twofold sense, therefore, religion is a powerful integrating force. It magnifies the values that exalt selfhood, and it furnishes an adequate life purpose. In adopting the life purpose that religion offers, we also escape that most disintegrating influence, a sense of failure. To do God's will is to succeed; this is the voice of religious confidence.

Secondly, the religious ideal of society satisfies every requirement. Are we tired of war? Religion teaches that, as children of God, human beings are of infinite worth. Do we despair of economic justice, because selfishness seems to be the ruling motive in the business world? Religion counsels coöperation and mutual helpfulness. Are we depressed by the prevalence of crime, cruelty and social vice? Religion brings the utmost pressure to bear upon the individual and society to turn from evil and learn to do good. The religious ideal of society is that of an all-inclusive family. The good will, forbearance, and mutual helpfulness exemplified in the ideal family are in principle appropriate for the society that religion would realize. Overthrowing the rule of selfishness and greed, religion would establish the Kingdom of God, the "Beloved Community," where each will work for the good of all.

Thirdly, religion justifies belief in prayer as a form of coöperation with God. Prayer is the religious value that

conditions all others; it is the *summum bonum* of the religious life. If the worshipper were deprived of this privilege, nothing would be left to him except magic; and magic has, at least formally, been repudiated by the modern man. A haunting fear and dread would take the place of the confidence that a belief in prayer inspires. True it is that many who do not pray in the ordinary sense are apparently free from this fear and dread. But prayer may range from conscious communion with God as Father down to the effectual conviction that obedience to natural laws will bring its appropriate results. Nowhere between these extremes can one draw the line and say, This is prayer, this is not. But the difference is great between the extremes of type.

Belief in the objective efficacy of prayer is called in question by many. The natural scientist is likely to hold that it contravenes the law of cause and effect, since it would accomplish results in nature without the use of natural means. To the moralist it might well seem unjust, for it would give the suppliant an advantage over the person who honestly worked but did not pray. The psychologist might point out that all the phenomena of prayer are subjective throughout, beginning and ending in the psychic life. Finally the empirically minded might contend that the belief finds little if any support in experience; many prayers as petitions are manifestly not answered, and the others may be explained as mere coincidences. To maintain, therefore, that prayer brings its appropriate response not only in the subjective life but also in external nature is to risk one's reputation for philosophic sobriety. The importance of the issue justifies a brief statement of the rational grounds for a belief in prayer.

Two misconceptions must be cleared away. One is the notion that through prayer a person may gain his own private will without reference to the well-being of his fellows. Manifestly such a notion runs counter to the conditions of a moral world-order and cannot be tolerated.

It makes God partial, unduly favoring selfish but insistent piety. The other misconception is that law actually reigns in nature as an all-compelling "natural necessity," determining events and precluding other than physical influences. But evidently law is not such a power; it merely expresses in a generalized and formal way the investigator's findings in his study of nature.

Prayer begins with a sense of need. Whatever else prayer may include, its nerve is petition. It is as petition that prayer starts the question of objective efficacy. Petition is a will attitude; it is something more than a wish. Wish prayers, however enlarged their borders, are sham prayers, just as wishes are abortive substitutes for volition. A voluntary act as ordinarily understood includes both a change of will attitude and a change in bodily functioning. We seem by an act of will to set free characteristic forms of energy that express themselves in bodily movement. But, strictly speaking, only the change in the inner life of the self can be reckoned as our part of the transaction. What follows in the external world, including the body, is the response of the ultimate Power in carrying out the volition. The two factors, then, are the subjective appeal and the objective response. Nothing is contributed by the self except the suppliant attitude. The act of volition is a change of inner state and nothing more. The self may make the mistake of thinking that by its own power it manipulates nature; but when by analysis the facts become known, a volition is seen to be essentially petition. It is an appeal to the Power on which we depend. The self wills, the Power executes. The response on the part of the Power is prompt and appropriate. Thus all volition is in a sense prayer, and prayer is volition. They both imply, in some degree, communion with the ultimate Power.

Since both volition and prayer are changes in the attitude of the self toward the world of values, the conditions of success in volition and the conditions of success in prayer are essentially the same. The universe is of such a

character that when a human being rightly wills a certain good (that is, a desirable change in the environment), that good comes to pass. The inevitableness of the result is impressive. Nature is our servant. To the worshipper this means that God stands ever ready to carry out our wills, when we carry out the conditions. These conditions are all moral, because we live in a moral world where good is obtained by request and only so. Need is felt, desire is awakened, a good is sought. The volition is in the seeking. The response is conditioned on the character of the volition and the exigencies of the entire system to which the individual belongs. Whatever the response, it has to do with the bestowal of a good. The great problem of the intellectual life is to find out what goods are on the whole desirable. The volition may fail to realize the specific good sought, and yet not be wholly futile. Some results always follow a genuine volition. It is evident, then, that the universe is infinitely sensitive to will attitudes. We are called upon to utilize this sensitivity to our profit.

When we say that we live in a moral world, we mean that its all-explaining purpose is the perfecting of self-conscious beings.¹⁴ If, then, the needs of the moral life are the real determinants in the universe, every change in the moral attitude of any individual self must make a difference felt everywhere. This is simply the teleological version of the doctrine that nature is a system—the slightest change anywhere affects the whole. Since prayer involves a change in the moral attitude, it inevitably brings about its appropriate result. As a functioning of the self in willing, it releases energy and makes actual a situation not till then possible, because the moral conditions did not before exist. Not all prayer is successful as measured by the petition itself; so it is with volition generally. The universe as a whole is involved in every volition, and therefore in every prayer. We can never be sure that we have met the conditions for obtaining just the goods we pray

¹⁴ A fuller statement of the grounds for this conclusion will be found in Part IV,

for—often this is a fortunate outcome. We seldom know how to pray as we ought.

As prayer lifts volition to the consciously moral plane where the transactions are recognized to be between persons, the human and the divine, we may expect that the immediate enrichment of selfhood in prayer will be the most manifest result. Whatever changes may follow in the external world will rank as of secondary importance, even though in many cases they are far from negligible. This needs emphasis because we are immersed in the experience of the world as physical rather than moral. The chief difficulty in understanding answer to prayer lies in getting an adequate conception of the moral significance of the external world. All physical change is subsidiary and instrumental to the development of selfhood. Hence all prayers that enrich the self, whether through nature or through spiritual contact with God, fulfil the inner purpose of all volition. Before praying we are more or less distraught, uncertain. Through prayer we come consciously into the presence of God, and thereby get a new moral perspective. We see all values in the light of the whole. Little annoyances and vexations fall away, petty grievances no longer irritate, spiritual depression gives place to an inflowing joyousness, and we become strong for our tasks. Communion with God in prayer is the supreme experience of life.

If we should pursue the subject further and ask, What are the specific conditions of success in prayer? philosophy could give only hints and suggestions. In general we may be fairly sure that the following conditions hold. (1) Prayer as genuine volition must enlist all our resources, physical and spiritual, to achieve the result. Only on this condition could we rightly expect coöperation on the part of the ultimate power. The prayer, therefore, should be for something we consider intrinsically better than what we already have. When we are mistaken as to the desirability of the good we seek, we may not expect the answer to be in exact accord with the request. Our limitations of

insight, on the one hand, and the cosmic character of the interests involved, on the other, make it necessary for the worshipper to pray in the spirit of the great petition, "Not my will, but thine, be done." (2) The principle of preference among objectives should be that spiritual (social) goods are to be preferred to material (exclusive) goods. This principle brings us into the heart of all sane religious experience. To be consciously in God's presence, to yield our wills to him for guidance, brings spiritual peace and renewal.

In the foregoing discussion of religious values a certain conception of God has been assumed. If this conception is untrue in essential features, the values identified as religious are other than described or are altogether fictitious. One's conception of religion depends on one's conception of God. As that conception is the fruitage of one's own experience, it must differ from period to period in one's individual life. The conception must differ also from age to age in the life of mankind. Yet certain universal elements change only in the sense that we become more appreciative of their scope and significance. For instance, it may be a question in the minds of some whether God is really infinite in wisdom, power, and goodness. The facts of experience do not immediately support such a conclusion. Even after much pondering, with an open mind, sympathetic toward all that scientific and philosophical reflection may teach, we may still be at a loss to know how God's power and his goodness can be reconciled. The practical necessity of harmonizing them and the intellectual difficulty of doing so furnish the occasion of an ever deepening insight into God's infinite nature. The issue here suggested will come up again for consideration when we study the self in its relation to the world.

How are religious values related to cognitive, æsthetic, and moral values? A summary answer would be that in religious values all others culminate. But this needs a further word. Knowledge is not necessarily religious. Yet we can pass by insensible degrees from knowledge that

seems wholly secular to knowledge that is indubitably religious. As soon as we enter the field of cognitive values we become logically committed to the idea of a world of values expressing the will of an intelligent Power. Such a conclusion, if reached, would not be scientific knowledge, because it pertains to the problem of reality and that is the characteristic problem of philosophy. It is just as trustworthy as scientific knowledge, due allowance being made for its greater scope and complexity. When once the student reaches the insight that he lives in a world charged with meaning and replete with values, he can find occasion for the awakening of the religious consciousness in his every experience. Progress in scientific knowledge might then only deepen and enrich this consciousness. The entire body of doctrine on which the religious life rests and from which it draws its nourishment is philosophical in character. The æsthetic and moral values are just as profoundly related to the religious. They seem to contrast with the religious in their lower ranges, but the differences grow less as we advance. An artistic production or a bit of nature may appear beautiful to a person who is not consciously religious. He may feel as if it were a long way to the experience that can be realized only in the presence of the great Spirit. But by a flash of insight the distance can be covered in a trice. Every form of beauty may induct the beholder into a religious attitude and reveal a religious quality. Religious values, then, are æsthetic values expressed in the highest ranges of experience. The distinction between religious and moral values can apparently be sharply drawn. Moral values arise in everyday choices, as we try to get on in life. The moral judgments are valid in their own right; obligation to obey them rests on empirical knowledge of their worth as guides to the goods of life. Yet the moral choice encompasses all the goods of which we are capable and especially the *summum bonum*. Hence the supremely moral choice is religious in character. From the religious point of view, all acts of life may express devotion to God's will. A cup

of water only may be given in his name. Religious ideals condition the moral life, and loyalty to them is a moral attitude. Nothing short of these religious ideals can fully justify the final authority of conscience; nothing else can reveal the scope and meaning of such principles as justice, honesty, benevolence. On the other hand, when religious beliefs are not up to the standard of moral insight, the effect is mischievous. The moral test is final in religion as elsewhere. This test is progressive, changing with increase of insight. The moral test is not really a limitation to the authority of religious beliefs; rather it is the only rational means of ascertaining what beliefs should have authority. When this test is applied, religion is morality at its best, informed by the consciousness of God's approval and help. Thus, while we may distinguish the various types of value, they blend in the highest experiences of life.

Having briefly considered the world of values, we pass to the study of the self, the originator of value.

PART IV

THE SELF IN ITS WORLD

CHAPTER I

THE CENTRAL POSITION OF THE SELF IN PHILOSOPHY

All distinctively philosophical problems have their ultimate solution in the self. Whatever the question asked of reality, its final answer must wait upon the principle of selfhood. This is the conclusion to which our studies have brought us. If it were generally recognized in contemporary thinking, philosophy might enter upon a period of fruitful development, comparable to the great synthetic movement that signalized the early part of the nineteenth century. The time is ripe for such a development. Our knowledge of nature is massive and detailed, but who can furnish the organizing principle that will bring order into it? The generalizations within the basic sciences have carried forward the problem of organization to a point beyond which—except in matters of detail—science may not be able to go. At least the direction of such advance within scientific limits is not evident. The problem is one for philosophy to solve. Many have been the attempts both in the distant and the recent past. The dissatisfaction with the prevalent type of idealism has been abundantly justified, and the drift toward some form of realism is a wholesome protest. Yet the realisms that have been offered have so completely failed to solve our elementary problems that they too are coming into disfavor. Under critical fire the realisms have moved more and more toward the characteristic doctrines of idealism. The

naive variety has passed over into the New Realism, and that in turn has found a vigorous rival in Critical Realism. The struggle is on; neither can maintain itself, because both are transitional types of thought. While the new realist's independent object refuses altogether to connect with thought-content, the critical realist's essences atomistically conceived are forced to function not only for the complex independent real, but for the content of sense perception, for the universal element in thought, and, it would seem, for the thinker himself who weighs and considers and blunders and concludes to a reality he affirms but cannot know. It is high time that realism take the next step and become personalistic.¹ Its riddles would then be resolved, its incoherences adjusted, and its line of advance made clear and definite.

But we cannot hope that this next step will be taken by contemporary thinkers except under logical compulsion. Every possible substitute for the self as the explaining principle must be tested to the limit, and every misconception of the self must be removed. This shying from the self as the central issue and ultimate key in philosophy can easily be understood. The self is the most intimate fact in our experience and therefore can most easily be ignored in favor of the less familiar. The self, always present, becomes elusive. We sally forth from ourselves into the world of experience; we choose to live among the self's creations, where the self cannot of course be found. We look within and we look without, the self is not there. The closest scrutiny fails to reveal anything anywhere other than mental states, *sensa*, more or less connected in consciousness. The propensity to look away from the self is encouraged not only by the practical needs of continuous adjustment to the outside world, but by the fond conviction that thought must find solution for life's problems in terms of thought. Since all thought is abstract, its utmost reach must be some such comprehensive abstraction as force, idea, system, experience, absolute. Further-

¹ Cf. J. E. Turner, *A Theory of Direct Realism*, chap. xxii.

more when we think we know the self and try to use it, we are likely to be confounded, for the self cannot define itself. It has no bounds; it seems but the nebulous background of its activities and, as such, a hazy blending of contradictions and confusions, at one moment identified with the totality of its passing experiences and the next moment with another totality of experience. Now if the self is to prove adequate as a principle of universal explanation, it must meet apparently conflicting requirements. It must apparently be as complex as the whole universe of thought while it remains the ultimately simple and unitary. If the self does not contain the complexity to be explained, how can it adequately explain? But if it does contain the complexity, how can it be thought as simple and unitary? This difficulty we shall have to face when we come to consider the nature of the self. We shall then argue that the difficulty vanishes when we distinguish the unitary self from its experiences.

The great lesson that the history of philosophy teaches with the emphasis of repetition is the fragmentary character of all world-views that ignore the central position of the self. Generations of thinkers have explored the field of thought to find the ultimate principle of explanation. May not this principle be the idea of a universal persistent force that acts unconsciously? May we not find the principle in the conception of a pure self-regulative mechanism? May not experience itself, all-inclusive and perfectly exemplifying the law of consistency, be the key to nature's secret? These are among the suggestions most frequently followed by those who turn away from the principle of selfhood. They all make a strong appeal and promise much; but they all fall short and in the end leave the mind bewildered. The assertion that force persists in nature adds nothing to the experienced fact that nature continues active. As blind or unconscious this hypothetical force does not even suggest an explanation of orderliness in nature. When the attempt is made to save the theory by referring the force and its orderly persistence to

a cosmic unknowable, its failure as explanation is complete. The theory that the world with everything in it constitutes a perfect self-regulating mechanism emphasizes the universal presence of order, but does not explain it. When elaborated this theory is merely a description of generalized experience. It leaves the question open as to the nature of the power that causes the world to be what it is from moment to moment. More important still from the standpoint of explanation, it leaves the presence of selves in the midst of nature an opaque mystery. Philosophy must advance beyond mere description or surrender its prerogatives and leave the field entirely to the natural sciences. Finally the theory that reality is experience states the problem in a suggestive way. To recognize the self as the implied experient seems inevitable. The golden key is in our hands. But are we sure that this is true? The fact that down through the ages thinkers have sought some "new way of ideas" in which selfhood, if recognized at all, is made to play a subordinate part, points both to inherent difficulties in the notion of selfhood and to possible weaknesses in its explaining power. These difficulties must be met. Our course will be (1) to consider briefly how the self has figured in every insight that we have reached up to this point; (2) to pass in review the more typical conceptions of selfhood in recent thought; (3) to endeavor in the light of all available material to formulate a conception of the self that will satisfy. Out of this discussion will arise certain questions that will need to be considered before our task is done.

For the sake of brevity we may gather up the issues thus far considered into three closely related problems. The first is the problem of permanence and change. While this is in a sense inclusive of all other philosophical issues, it has special reference to sense perception. The second is the problem of order as central in the field of elaborated or scientific knowledge. The third is the problem of value as objectively real.

As regards the first problem, we saw that change is un-

thinkable without a permanent entity that changes, and we recognized too that change is not easily thinkable with such an entity. The difficulty is twofold. We must provide the permanent element, and then read change into it without destroying its permanence. Now the ultimate assumption on which the possibility of sense experience rests is that the stimulations which constitute the antecedents of perception come in continuous succession, each passing out as its successor comes into being. To indicate this process we must use the term succession, but if our thought is clear we shall refrain from reading into this sequence any of that synthetic activity of the mind whereby the succession becomes a succession for us. In and for itself the only portion of the succession that could at any time exist would be the content of the individual instant, unthinkably short, that might be called a present if it lasted long enough to be named. The activity of the self in apprehending the succession as such then becomes evident. The self alone can furnish the permanent implicate; it alone can weave the distinguishable features into a temporal series. But even a succession is not yet change. In order that we should have an experience of change, the self must formulate a law of sequence and give to this law a substantial basis. As much as this is an absolute minimum of mental activity in apprehending change, and this implies a self as the agent.

One can easily criticize the procedure whereby we get our world of permanent, quasi independent things with changing states. The integrity of the thing seems to be seriously threatened by successive states, and the manifoldness of the states seems inconsistent with the unity of the thing. But to exhibit the apparent contradiction between these two aspects of change is not to set aside the evidence they furnish for the presence and activity of the self in this most elementary experience. Until we find a something other than a self that can provide for the experienced succession, without becoming itself a mere succession, and also provide for the permanent element in change without

becoming a mere changeless, inert pseudo-entity—until we can find a not-self that can perform these two unique functions, we have no recourse but either to affirm the reality of the self as the implication of all experience or to confess that we are unable to construe the most elementary fact of experience, the fact of change. Eliminate the self as the constructive reality in experience, and you cannot take the first step toward understanding the possibility of any experience whatever. The whole battle for the existence of the self can be fought out at this point. Sense perception is the arena where the self first makes its presence decisively felt. Further study may reveal other forms of its activity and help to determine its true character, but the additional evidence for its existence will simply corroborate a belief already securely established.

Order, the second problem, involves the first. The sense world begins in a welter of incipient experiences (sense data, impressions, the thought-distinguished beginnings of reaction to stimulations). These are not yet an ordered world. They are evanescent and so various one from another that no two can be considered exact duplicates. Out of this chaos, the self constructs a more or less articulated cosmos. We know in general how this is done. Everywhere we find the self fixating, selecting, modifying, arranging, as it imposes order upon its world. The result is science in all its glory. So regnant is the self in this world-building enterprise, that it does not hesitate on occasion to substitute its own construction, its tissue of concepts, for what might otherwise seem to be the unmodified objective reality. Naïve sense perception suffers many a transformation at the hands of scientists in their summary manipulation to make the sense world square with the demands of intelligence. We consent to this treatment of our spontaneous views of nature because we believe that it leads to the truth. In accordance with the laws of right thinking, this intellectual fabrication is worked over till it becomes thoroughly trustworthy—the only reality that for practical purposes the self needs to recognize. Nothing

seems real that cannot be somehow fitted into this established order. Only by obedience thereto can we make the necessary adjustments to the Power not ourselves, which is the ultimate Source of objective order. This Power must be thought as an ultimate Self if it is to function adequately as a co-worker in the construction of our cosmic world and explain that world's knowability. True, the world is set in order by us, yet it must be susceptible of ordering, else our manipulations would result in confusion.

Nowhere in nature is there any evidence of inherent disorder or faultiness of construction. When a student of nature comes face to face with what seems to him a condition of chaos, he looks upon it as simply a problem in scientific analysis and is confident that when fully understood the chaos will be resolved into perfect order and harmony. It takes a self to resolve a seeming chaos, and just as truly it implies an ultimate Self to coöperate with the finite knower in originating a world capable of being set in order. So readily and instantaneously does the ultimate Source respond to the practical demand for order, that we are not directly aware that any response is involved. Since orderliness is the deepest need of our nature as intellectual beings, orderly response to the world of stimulations is the primary expression of selfhood. The ultimate Power is the perfect Self, and we are miniature models thereof. Something of what such a conclusion means will be suggested later.

Our discussions thus far would seem to warrant us in concluding that the universe consists of nothing other than selves and their interrelated activities. This conclusion is so sweeping, so opposed to the *Zeitgeist*, and so significant that it will need to face every possible criticism before it can be considered as finally established. But we may hold it provisionally, and await the further development of our subject.

The third problem, namely, value, can hardly be stated without directly implying the evaluating self. Those who would develop a doctrine of value without explicit refer-

ence to the self have in mind a scientific treatment of the subject. Such a treatment is confessedly abstract. It consists of the analysis and classification of values with a view to their organization into a system. That this mode of treatment should yield much insight and usable knowledge is what we might expect; but that it succeeds in eliminating the self as the source of values is not in any way supported by the evidence. It means that, like all thought-content, values can be treated objectively. Yet when the question of origins is raised, the necessity of assuming the self becomes manifest. Values then originate in the self and exist only for a self. Their objective reality follows from the conclusion that they are a part of the self's response to stimulations. The self is the judge of what the values are and of their relative significance. The self's capacities and limitations determine what shall be considered true or beautiful or good. The self with its needs and capacities for development can satisfy the condition of a *summum bonum* as the adequate basis of a moral life. The possibilities of the self's development and its intrinsic worth are the sole ground for a rational belief in the permanence and augmentation of the higher social values. Finally the complete realization of selfhood is the only goal of cosmic evolution that does not leave us groping among impossible expedients. Why, then, do so many contemporary thinkers fail to appreciate the real significance of the self? There seems to be no other explanation than the persistence of the objective point of view. When the present fashion passes, the self will come into its own.

CHAPTER II

CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF THE SELF

In reviewing contemporary theories of the self, we shall find it helpful to go back for our starting point to the time when the two main schools of modern thought were in sharpest contrast and most certain of themselves. One of these schools has throughout most of its history been known as English Empiricism. It reached its culmination a century and a half ago in the writings of David Hume. The other school has, by way of contrast, but more or less inaccurately, been called German Idealism. It passed its greatest crisis and entered upon a period of fruitful development in the speculations of Immanuel Kant. While these two schools have remained fairly distinct and are still of service for purposes of classification, they have, under the stress of mutual criticism, persistently approached each other, much to the advantage of true insight. As our study is not primarily historical, a very brief reference to the theories of the earlier masters will suffice.

Hume was typically British in his devotion to the empirical point of view and his relative indifference to speculation. Starting with the assumption that the mind received its material from without in the form of what he called impressions (more accurately nowadays called sense data or *sensa*), and that these were atomic in structure, he came to the conclusion that the self was an arena or theatre where the impressions appeared, combined, and vanished. As the arena or theatre did nothing to the impressions, it served only as a verbal convenience. Essentially the self was for Hume a succession of impressions

or mental states. This is expressly declared in the oft-quoted passage from *A Treatise of Human Nature*: "When I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist."¹ A little farther on in the same section he says of individuals: "They are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. . . . The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations." This seems from one point of view rather naive. Hume is the self who examines his perceptions and does not find himself among them. When he concludes that the self is only the "theatre" where the mental states appear, he seems to simplify the problem of perception by making it a question merely of the succession of these states. No wonder that in developing his doctrine, Hume faces manifest inconsistency. He can neither renounce nor reconcile the following principles, namely, "that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences."² The difficulty, as he confesses, is too hard for his understanding. But evidently, the difficulty is of his own making. Having discarded the self as active, he was compelled to look upon the mental states ("perceptions") as isolated. They were isolated when they arrived at the "theatre," and nothing there could connect them. Yet connected they were, both as being parts of one experience and as constituting an objective world of interrelated

¹ Vol. i. pt. iv. § 6.

² *Op. cit.*, Appendix.

things. To deny connection would have been equivalent to denying the possibility of knowledge. Hume could hardly have given a more convincing exhibition of the decisive role of the self in knowledge than in his argument for eliminating the self or reducing it to a passive somewhat that could be entirely ignored. One is reminded of Emerson's words:

"They reckon ill who leave me out:
When me they fly, I am the wings."

But Hume's embarrassment was not merely that he failed to find a metaphysical entity distinct from the flow of mental states, but that when he would give an account of the empirical ego (what psychologists generally denominate "consciousness"), he found it utterly elusive. The empirical ego comes and goes, it hovers about the experiences as a vague, intangible addition, doing nothing and yet somehow present during our waking moments. It seems accentuated whenever we become strenuous for the accomplishment of a purpose; then during times of relaxation and day-dreaming it may fade almost to the vanishing point. That point is reached when sleep overtakes us or we become unconscious. When, therefore, Hume tried to answer with scientific precision the question, What is the self as experienced? he was baffled by finding that the object of his thought always turned out to be a mental state and nothing more.

No material advance upon Hume has been made since his day by his followers except to make more definite and precise the nature of the difficulties that lurk in the problem of the self. Those who have thought little about the problem know the self as a matter of course. Only the insistent thinkers discover the complexity of the problem and the apparently hopeless outlook for a solution. The Humian school of thought has made some progress by going outside the range of empiricistic principles and recognizing the distinction between the elusive self of experience—the self that the psychologist would make

the object of analysis—and the self that is presupposed in any thoroughgoing theory of knowledge and reality. The self of the psychologist is the empirical ego and remains and must always remain for empiricism a mere problem. Science can never be satisfied with an empirical self that cannot be analyzed. Philosophy, on the other hand, must have a self that transcends experience and that cannot be wholly experienced because it is the presupposition of experience—it makes experience possible. We can therefore appreciate the interplay in later empirical thought of these two conceptions—the self as empirically apprehended and the self as implied in the very possibility of knowledge. We see this intermingling in the writings of W. K. Clifford. He would give greater concreteness to the idea of the self without acknowledging its inherent power to produce results. Why, he reasons, might not the self be thought after the general analogy of material things? Just as things are compounded out of indefinitely small particles, so the self or soul might be thought as made of minute elements which could appropriately be called “mindstuff.”³

The theory bears testimony to the necessity of reckoning with the self, even while denying its essential nature. But Clifford's appeal to hypothetical bits of spirituality, of which we know nothing, to explain the self that we know, is not worthy of much consideration. A contemporary of his, Hodgson, would find a place for the self in an extra-phenomenal realm, yet deny to it any power to effect changes in actual experience. After making the usual assumption that the reality of selfhood is consciousness he speaks of consciousness as “a mere foam, aura, or melody arising from the brain but without reaction upon it.”⁴ He calls this entity an “epiphenomenon.” The conception itself is a philosophical curiosity. It has a passing interest for us, but only as illustrating again the

³ *Lectures and Essays*, p. 284 ff.; cf. E. Haeckel on cell-souls, *The Riddle of the Universe*, pp. 88-130.

⁴ *Time and Space*, p. 279.

futile effort to find the self in its world, among its own constructions. Hodgson's reasoning, reduced to its lowest terms, seems crude. To deny outright the existence of the self would not do; but what exactly could it be? He could not find it among outside objects; it must be revealed in consciousness. Consciousness, then, expresses the essential nature of the self. But consciousness is less than the least phenomenon, though every phenomenon is somehow impregnated with it. To call it an epiphenomenon would seem to do it ample justice. Our only comment is that such a self could not be even an aura; it would wholly vanish into process.

Empiricism has its defenders in America. The most illustrious, if not the most thoroughgoing, has been William James. In justice to James, we need to distinguish his earlier from his later attitude toward selfhood. His earlier interest was predominantly scientific, hence he inclined to reduce the self, after the manner of Hume, to a "stream of thoughts" or a "stream of consciousness."⁵ Manifestly the term "stream" like the term "succession" or "bundle" or "theatre" really contains the problem. Is the stream anything distinct from the individual states? James answers this question from the scientific standpoint in his essay, "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" His answer is an emphatic, No. What is called consciousness consists, for him, of certain bodily functionings. "The 'I think' which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects is the 'I breathe' which actually does accompany them."⁶ As science, this rather startling conclusion is entirely legitimate. The "I" is as much in the breathing as in the thinking. One can observe the breathing, but who ever saw or handled a thought? Thoughts as such do exist, however, even for James, and can be studied indirectly through the physical manifestations. In them-

⁵ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 401 ff; *Psychology*, *Briefer Course*, p. 467 f.

⁶ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, vol. i. pp. 477-491.

selves the thoughts are essentially disparate, yet are connected after a fashion by their "fringes." When in his later work he faced the question whether a unitary abiding self was presupposed in psychic activity, he stoutly declared that "the thoughts themselves are the thinkers."⁷ This paradox may seem absurd, but it is good science. That is, it is as far as science needs to go in dealing with the question. The limitations of the scientific viewpoint, however, are clearly recognized by James, as is evidenced by his closing words in discussing so-called "scientific psychology." He says: "'Psychology as a natural science' . . . means a psychology particularly fragile, and into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint, a psychology all of whose elementary assumptions and data must be reconsidered in wider connections and translated into other terms."⁸ James's contribution to the question of the self was only preliminary. He showed in a striking way the necessity of transcending his own position if one is to come into the light where the self can be found.

Henri Bergson, the William James of contemporary France, approaches the question of the self from a slightly different angle. His primary interest has heretofore been in reinterpreting the general doctrine of evolution as a process in which change is all-pervasive and thoroughgoing. As he understands evolution, it is not mechanical, for a mechanism works with static (*i.e.* unchanging) elements which can do nothing but submit to shiftings and permutations. Genuine evolution is creative, a process in which the absolutely new comes moment by moment into being. The driving force, supposed by Bergson to account for this continuous appearing and disappearing, he calls the vital impetus (*l'élan vital*). In his popular work, *Creative Evolution*, he describes how this *élan* operates. The reality, then, in the cosmic flow is an energy or force. Inasmuch as it continues throughout

⁷ *Briefer Course*, p. 216.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 467 f.

the process, he calls it duration (*la durée*) ; and because it is supposed to carry with it its own past and to push its way into the future, he thinks of it as a sort of consciousness. When it breaks up into individual manifestations and has to adjust itself to the assumed entity called matter, it may rise to an awareness of itself ; it may become self-conscious.⁹

To do justice to Bergson's thought would be difficult without extensive quotation and also without a discussion of his psychological prepossessions. He is primarily a psychologist with philosophical interests. In turning away from the old mechanistic type of explanation in favor of a form of vitalism, he is able to do fuller justice to mind or selfhood. A source of difficulty in understanding him arises from his ignoring the distinction on which we have insisted between the strictly scientific and the subjective or epistemic method of approach. Hence there is abundant opportunity to misread his thought. He speaks of the individual mind as an energy, of the individual consciousness as pure creativity, and of subjective time as pure inventiveness. Yet his exposition of these ideas is generally so objective that the self seems to suffer eclipse. Consciousness (which he equates both with life and with soul) becomes for him a rivulet of the stream of life, a passageway for the *élan*, a mere tendency.¹⁰ He comes nearer to a philosophical conception of the self as consciousness when he identifies it with duration. But to get his full meaning we must read a great deal into this term. Duration means the enduring, that which remains itself while ceaselessly manifesting the new and unique. One of the most important and significant capacities of the self is its power to persist through time and retain in memory its own past. Duration is a suggestive term to apply to this characteristic, but it is susceptible of different interpretations according to the point of view. For science

⁹ *Creative Evolution*, pp. 4, 261 ff., 270, 312 f.; *Matter and Memory*, chap. iv.

¹⁰ Cf. Bergson, *Mind-Energy*, trans. by H. W. Carr, i., ii.

it may mean mere observed continuity, whereas for philosophy it may mean not only that the self creates its past but is profoundly affected by it. Bergson is so pre-occupied with his task of describing the cosmic process that he does not stop to consider the implications of his chance references to the self or mind. We seem to get fairly near to his thought of the self when we look upon it as a medium or channel ("canal") through which the cosmic power reaches opposing matter. This power, one in nature but many in manifestations, is the source of all energy, all will, all freedom. But it is fairly evident that up to the present time Bergson's interests have not yet led him to give an unambiguous and satisfactory account of selfhood, though he has thrown light on most of the problems involved. The great favor with which his general view of the mental life has been received seems to come from the impression that his brilliantly figurative language half conceals and half reveals some new thing. But in order to be sure that we understand him, we must wait until he expresses himself more fully and less ambiguously.

The lower limit of empiricistic thought concerning the self appears in Woodbridge's contention that "consciousness is only a form of connection of objects, a relation between them."¹¹ In thus transferring consciousness from the subjective to the objective realm, and making it a relation among things, he has but followed the logic of the scientific or objective method. The reasoning is patent. Consciousness is not a mere nonentity; and yet what is not an object is nothing whatever. Hence consciousness, being pervasive and not identifiable with any particular thing, must be a form of relation among things. One would like to doubt that Woodbridge really means to equate the self with consciousness, but the objective method of treatment leaves him no alternative. It is strangely true that a writer may be deeply conversant

¹¹ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, vol. ii. pp. 119-125.

with every known aspect of the self's activity, and yet, when facing the question, What is the self? have little to say that is not misleading. Such a writer may plausibly argue that as consciousness is the empirically known essence of selfhood, and as the self's activity consists largely of contacts and reactions upon the external world, consciousness, and therefore selfhood, is nothing other than a feature of the physical environment. But the reply is near at hand that consciousness is simply the state of being conscious and is not in any sense an essence. As a state it implies a self that is conscious. Evidently, then, the discussion whether consciousness exists is irrelevant, when we seek to know the reality of the self. This seems to close the discussion with the empiricist; yet he may reply that the self apart from consciousness, just as the self apart from the body, is a pure abstraction. We freely grant this contention. As we shall later have occasion to maintain, the self without a body is nothing at all; the two are indissoluble, yet neither is the other. Likewise the self that never attained to consciousness could not be known as a self. Nevertheless just as the self is not its physical manifestation, so it is more than consciousness, even when we include under the term what psychologists call the subconscious. The term thus broadened might include all the activities of the self and still the self would remain distinct from its activities.

Current discussions in the various schools of psychology continue the empiricist controversies and furnish additional evidence that the self from a scientific point of view is the most elusive thing in the whole range of human thought. This is quite as we might have anticipated. The structuralist analyzes the psychic content into sensations or *sensa* (ambiguity lurks in both terms), which have a fairly constant character and constitute the ultimately real entities of the mental life. The difficulty in building up the more complex features of psychic experience, including the empirical self, out of sensations is only partly concealed by the ability of the structuralist himself

to supply *ab extra* the needful connections and transformations. As the simplest experience of the external world is a perception and not a sensation, all the manipulations of the hypothetical sensations below the perceptive plane are pure fictions. Each step of advance beyond the stage of elementary perceptions requires further modification of the supposed data, and at each stage we have new unities that, when taken apart, lose their distinctive character. Thus in the end, when the question is raised, How have all these manifold unities called thoughts, feelings, conations come to be and what do they presuppose? the answer that they are compounded of elements called sensations and that they presuppose only those elements, seems absurdly inadequate. Whatever value for science may accrue from the careful observation and analysis of the relatively stable aspects of the psychic life, that life assuredly does not consist of elements or states but of the continuously changing activities of a self.

The behaviorist, realizing some of the difficulties encountered in the structuralist's account of the mental life and the impossibility of finding a place in that life for a "transcendent self," has broken away entirely from the idea not only of selfhood but of mental states. He contends that the facts of experience are all physical reactions to stimulations. No development in psychology is more interesting to the student of selfhood than this growing and aggressive school of behaviorists. They employ psychological terms, but they deal exclusively in physical concepts. No wonder that some of their leaders are beginning to question if their science should longer be called psychology. Their *bête noire* is consciousness, for it obstinately refuses to be reduced to any form of mere physical manifestation.

The functionalist can make out a far better case than either the structuralist or the behaviorist, though function may be interpreted in a purely mechanistic way. The theory then passes over into behaviorism. But it does not need to be so interpreted, nor is it, by the leaders gen-

erally. It may mean that function not only implies organization of inherited tendencies and aptitudes, but that what responds to the stimulations is an entity with characteristic capacities and needs, and that the responses are not necessarily mechanical, but may have reference to ends, may be teleological. Even instinctive responses (if we are still permitted to use that question-begging term) point to a future more or less anticipated subconsciously. But where functionalism advances beyond its competitors, it is throughout interpretation, and as such, of the nature of philosophy. This intermingling of interpretation with description suggests that no psychology can complete itself short of a philosophy of life. The variants from these three types of psychological thought need not detain us.

Turning now from the empiricistic treatment of our problem to the rationalistic, as exemplified by Kant and his successors, we seem to enter a different world. Kant, instead of assuming that our ideas come from without, argued that nothing is given except an undefined "manifold of sense" which the mind works over into objects. He approached the problem of knowledge by asking what is involved in its possibility. This led him to appreciate and defend the "subjective" point of view. He saw clearly that a fundamental unity ("the original unity of consciousness," as he called it) must be assumed as the source of all the synthetic activity in the experience of knowing. In connection with this epochal insight he contended that the self as known ("the synthetic unity," or better, "the unity attained through synthesis") is a mental construction and as such must be phenomenal. By this he meant that through the intellect alone ("the theoretical reason") the self can be known only as an object.¹² But later in his ethical writings he develops the theory that in being ethical or self-legislative, the self is an agent, having noumenal reality. In so far as ethical

¹² *Critique of Pure Reason*, A, p. 321 ff.

it is free, and as free or "autonomous," it is of infinite worth, having an immortal destiny.¹³ Whatever one may think of Kant's reasoning whereby he arrived at these conclusions, the conclusions themselves can be brought into harmony with the ripest thought of the present day if they are reinterpreted in the light of recent developments in psychology, biology, and other sciences.

Kant's greatest successor in the study of selfhood was Hegel. He undertook to show that the universe of knowledge is so constituted that no concept concerning it is adequate to explain its nature. He argued that every concept, being abstract, has a limited application and range of meaning, so that whenever we stop in our conceptual thinking we are made to realize that a universe lies outside its compass. Thus if we try to rest in the thought of "being" as the final, all-encompassing category, we find pure being is pure emptiness. It can take on significance only as it passes over into "manifestation." But both being and manifestation point to something other than themselves. Taken separately, they are devoid of content. What is true of these representative concepts is true of all. But to appreciate the cogency of Hegel's reasoning, we should not make the mistake of reading into the concept more than its intellectual character will permit. Being as a concept does not mean an object that has being, and manifestation as a concept does not mean a thing manifested. The concept must be taken in its utter abstractness. Reality then is more and other than concept, more and other than any form of intellectual content. All concepts as such pertain either to an implied reality as the source of experience or to the phenomenal manifestation as revealing a reality. No concept can include both being and manifestation. So long as we remain in the conceptual realm, being can be only being, and manifestation, manifestation; neither can be the other.

This may at first seem to be little more than a quibble,

¹³ Kant, *Theory of Ethics*, trans. by Abbott, pp. 65 ff., 218 ff., 240 ff.

but in fact it is a difficulty of the first order when we try to make our intellectual world explain itself. This is the most fruitful insight in all Hegelian philosophy. While it was implicit in Kant and others, it was brought by Hegel into the light of logical inevitableness, so that no one after him could ignore his demonstration and be philosophically up to date. Many since Hegel, even a large element of his own followers, have chosen to ignore this insight, but in every case the result has been the recurrence of the same insurmountable difficulties in their philosophical thinking. If concepts as such are incapable of encompassing reality in its concreteness, how can we grasp reality as it is? As a matter of fact, we experience no embarrassment in combining abstract being and abstract manifestation. The difficulty is in separating them. How can we combine them if not conceptually? Not by first thinking being in the abstract and then manifestation in the abstract, and somehow uniting them. They are always experienced together. The inadequacy of the concept to express the essence of reality only means that reality is something extra-intellectual, something of the nature of an agent, a power that can act without losing itself in its activity, a self that can have experiences and modify them after a pattern of its own. When this insight is mastered, the impossibility of the world's being mere system, process, or impersonal energy, is demonstrated. Only a self can remain itself while having experiences of a world, a not-self. But Hegel did not call this power that could maintain itself in its activity a self; he used the Platonic term "Idea." This term suggests that Hegel remained to the last in the intellectual realm. But in the third part of his *Logic*, in which he treats of the concepts of the Notion leading up to the "Idea," the distinctive advance of meaning over what the concept had in the other two parts consists in the implied agency that performs the necessary synthesis of being and manifestation. Because of this implication the concepts of the Notion may be considered "concrete," but the "Idea" is

more than a concrete concept or universal; it is a self. The inference can be drawn from his argument that all concrete things of experience are such because of the fiction of selfhood that we ascribe to them. Without the ascription of selfhood, things would disappear and nothing could save them. This brief statement of Hegel's thought movement or "Dialectic" gives scarcely a hint of the impressive richness and convincing power of his argument. He laid bare the structure of the universe as knowable and therefore rational. In doing so he enthroned the self.¹⁴

The foregoing interpretation of his system is called in question by some of his ablest followers. These thinkers maintain that Hegel never actually transcended the notion of a perfect system, hence was from first to last an intellectualist. His system is, for these interpreters, a purely logical manipulation of ideas. A certain ambiguity running through his entire argument makes the rival interpretations possible. As he persisted in calling the ultimate principle of explanation the "Idea" or "Notion" ("*Begriff*" which means "concept"), he made the second interpretation easy and plausible. This second interpretation has generally prevailed among students of Hegel though it is apparently not the one he himself intended. Therefore we shall have to review certain very difficult conceptions of selfhood developed by his followers, especially those who followed him afar off. Of these we may profitably consider the two foremost English representatives, F. H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet, and the leading American representative, Josiah Royce. While these three have acknowledged general allegiance to Hegel, they endeavor to improve upon him by taking over what is valuable in empiricism and other more recent developments. They will interest us the more because, interpreting the Hegelian view as the apotheosis of system, they

¹⁴ In support of this interpretation, cf. Calkins, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, 5th edition, p. 382 ff.; Baillie, *Hegel's Logic*, pp. 123, 218 ff.

have worked out its implications. After we have considered the three briefly, we shall be ready to gather up from all available sources whatever will throw light on the essential nature of the self and its relation to the world and to the future.

Bradley sets forth his view in his systematic treatise, *Appearance and Reality*, and in a supplementary volume, *Essays on Truth and Reality*. In the treatise he is chiefly intent on exposing the inconsistencies and ambiguities that vitiate the philosophical world-views prevalent at the time of its publication. His success precipitated a crisis in English thought. But when he entered upon his constructive effort, he was much less successful. His keen dialectic could all too easily be turned against his own positive conclusion. Hence the total effect of his thinking is prevailingly negative. The more the student of Bradley insists on being rigorously logical, the more hopelessly and utterly negative the results appear to be. His discussion of selfhood is characteristic. He finds in popular thought seven more or less distinct conceptions of the self. It is (1) the present content of experience, (2) the constant average mass of experience, (3) the inner core of feeling, (4) some kind of monad or single (non-complex) being, (5) the matter in which the "I" takes a personal interest, (6) the subjective content of the self as distinguished from the not-self or the world of experience, (7) the mere self as the negative of experience, the self that is outside of the purpose at the moment of its inception.¹⁵

Bradley has no difficulty in showing that all these conceptions are faulty, that they are full of contradictions and hence can be nothing but "appearances." (By appearance, it should be explained, Bradley means a mental construction, something "ideal." He calls the appearance contradictory when he wants to emphasize the impossibility of its being reality in an assumed non-mental world,

¹⁵ *Appearance and Reality*, bk. i. chap. ix.

that is, a world of mere sentiency unmodified by thought.) There is no question about the contradictions involved in taking any one of these seven conceptions as ontologically real. They are condemned out of hand, because they are manifestly mental constructs. The action is not the actor, the affective state is not the feeling subject, the experience is not the experient. No conception is so full of contradiction as that of the self when thought as less or other than an agent. Bradley's sixth and seventh conceptions come closest to the adequate view. But they also fail and are cast aside. In the sixth, the self is represented as a kernel of being, but with no power to act on its own initiative, a mere shadow of objectivity. In the seventh, the subject is reduced to a state of feeling.

Bradley concludes that we cannot know the self, that all our representations or conceptions of it are contradictory and erroneous. He is quite sure that in some sense we are selves, but maintains that this can have a meaning for us only as we identify the self with experience. He says with more vigor than insight, "The Ego that pretends to be anything either before or beyond its concrete psychical filling, is a gross fiction and mere monster, and for no purpose admissible."¹⁶ This statement is true as against any notion that the self can exist in the future or the past as an object of experience. The nature of time ought to settle that matter without room for controversy. The statement is also true in so far as it excludes the notion that within the self is a core of being which merely exists and is not active in experience. But it is not true of the self as that which has the concrete psychical filling, the self for which the past exists as past and the future as future. The act of constructing the past and the future is no doubt an event in the present, but only for the self, with its power to arrange experiences in a temporal order. Though the self is not its psychical filling nor anything before or beyond the filling in any objective sense, yet the filling declares its presence and expresses its real nature.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

Bradley's unacknowledged reason for his stand against the only self that we can construe as real is apparently the assumption, made everywhere throughout the book, that whatever cannot be fitted into a logical scheme and made a part of a system is not real. Nor, according to Bradley, is the system itself more than "appearance" unless it is all-inclusive and perfectly wrought out. All finite conceptions of the system are therefore necessarily mere appearance, that is, limited and in need of adjustment. This conclusion is a truism. No finite mind ever normally aspires to infinite and exhaustive knowledge. But we can know intensively a great deal about the self and its world, and what we know can be tested sufficiently to satisfy our needs. That everything must look different to an infinite Intelligence we may be sure, for everything takes on a new appearance to us whenever we put on glasses or open the window or change our interest in the object. All that Bradley says about the imperfection of human knowledge can be granted; yet we have ways of satisfying ourselves that we know what we know, even though another being might know it differently. To know that our knowledge is relative is to know one thing that is not relative.

But Bradley's real difficulty with the self is that he cannot fit it into his system. He cannot reduce it to mere content, psychic filling, or aspects of the changeless whole. It refuses to be corralled. If it is to be a part of the system, it must be harmonious both internally and in its relation to the rest of the system. The law of contradiction is binding on it exactly in the same sense as on the system as a whole. Bradley's Absolute thus excludes selfhood from the universe. The contradiction between the conception of a finite self and the exigencies of system is far less glaring than the contradiction between the conception of an infinite Self as the originator of the universe and the view that the universe including all selfhood is an absolute system. A system cannot be both subject and object, even though it be infinite and all-inclusive.

The authority of the law of contradiction is decisive in the whole realm of intellectual construction. No system is immune. But it is different with the self that constructs the system. Of the self one cannot say, as of a faulty system, that it is disrupted by contradictions. Nor would one be right in saying that it is harmonious and devoid of contradictions. Such language simply does not apply; it has meaning only for that which the self constructs. Bradley therefore fails to find the real self, and as a consequence becomes involved in many difficulties as he tries to develop his doctrine of reality. He is finally compelled to take an agnostic position both with reference to the self and to the possibility of knowledge. His system as developed in *Appearance and Reality* thus destroys itself.

In his later work, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, Bradley modifies his position to some extent. Here he distinguishes selves from finite centers of experience. The selves are what we have in mind when we think the finite centers, and hence are "ideal." The finite centers alone are real.¹⁷ This distinction is valuable. The "ideal" may have a reality of its own, but the reality of the thinker for whom the ideal exists is of a different order. Yet even with this distinction before him Bradley fails of the true insight. The finite centers are for him mere manifestations of the Absolute or the "All" considered as a system. Thus considered they have no existence in and for themselves. Hence the fundamental characteristic of selfhood is overlooked. The exigencies of his metaphysical system distort what would seem to be plain matter of experience. He still holds that what cannot be incorporated in his Absolute must be set down as illusory. We see in this contention the persistent working of the objectivity prejudice. The finite center, or the self in the sense in which we use the term, thus becomes an undefined character. Give it definition, that is, think anything about it, and you make it "ideal." That Brad-

¹⁷ Cf. chap. xiv., "What is the Real Julius Cæsar?"

ley should have failed is the more significant because he not only had unusual powers of clear incisive thought, but was very much in earnest about the problem and brought to his task great intellectual resources.

Bosanquet restated the views of his master, Bradley, and advanced beyond them in certain particulars.¹⁸ A brief consideration of his treatment of the self will be of interest because he seemed to recognize the real difficulties and tried in his own way to meet them. He represented the self as more than mere content. It had for him a "formal" distinctness which consists of certain feelings arising both from bodily separateness and from the limited and purely personal character of our experiences. He still insisted that selves are essentially finite centers of experience, and that so long as the formal disparateness lasts there can be no dissolution of selfhood. But here emerges a difficulty. Selfhood is contingent on the continuance of a non-essential aspect of experience; it is a feeling, an expression of physical separateness, a manifestation of finitude. As such it is precarious, without any assured future, a passing phase in the life of the Absolute. In short, we have in this conception a grudging recognition of something other than content, but the assurance that it is unessential and evanescent.

Bosanquet stresses the importance of the content element in selfhood. Now content according to Bosanquet may be common to many or all selves. Two or more people may have the same thought about a given situation. As friends, for instance, become better acquainted and develop a sympathetic understanding, they think alike to an increasing extent. Social life makes a blend of individual experiences. In this way a sort of collective social self emerges which is super-personal. On this basis he argues that as the formal distinctness of selves is really unessential and becomes less with the increase of social life, the individual self as a distinct individual is destined

¹⁸ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*.

to pass away and be absorbed in the life of the whole. What will survive is not a personality or self but a value. Each self in its experience will contribute a unique value to the life of the Absolute.¹⁹

Such, in brief, is the line of thought developed with great acumen by Bosanquet. Concerning it, we would point out that persons do not blend in society; rather do they become more truly and abundantly self-conscious personalities as they enter into the experiences of social life. Why should Bosanquet have failed to appreciate this patent fact? Evidently because he was intent on identifying the essential self with its content, its "psychical filling," as Bradley would say. But even the contents do not blend; every thought, feeling, volition remains unique. Yet each person develops an increasing capacity to understand and sympathize with his fellow. This, as we know, is made possible by our dependence on the complex system which we objectify as nature. Owing to this dependence we are able to devise the common symbols by which we communicate one with another. The limits of personality are not transcended in the sense that one person can actually think, feel, or will for another. The mystery of personal influence is not wholly explained by our own exposition of the *modus*; but the physical analogies on which Bosanquet seems to have relied fail to illuminate the subject.

We may ask again, Does not Bosanquet know of this uniqueness of each individual experience? Certainly, but when once committed to the theory that the universe is a unitary whole, articulated to the last detail, logically coherent, and orderly in all its manifestation of change, the reasoner is not easily persuaded that selves with their intermittent consciousness, limited range of activity, and short career can have any substantive existence. In the cosmic perspective the self at its best seems but a transitory phase of the interweaving and equilibration of cosmic en-

¹⁹ *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 47 f., 54, 58.

ergies. Monism in the form of a universal system holds sway over one's thinking, and not even the evidence of one's own unique existence can shake one's faith. It may be worth while to take another look at the self through the eyes of the monistic absolutist, and feel the full force of the argument against the substantial character of self-hood. The theorizer may well start with the mind-body issue. He need not argue that every manifestation of the self is physically conditioned. The self grows, matures, and wanes with the body. So profound is the dependence of psychic upon physical functioning that only two courses lie open, either to conclude outright that so-called psychic phenomena are merely expressions of physical processes, or to acknowledge that they issue from a source that is precarious and has no existence in itself. Hence one is not permitted to think a dualism of self and body. If true to the facts and cogent in deduction, one must conclude that both are transient manifestations of some primordial energy, an energy which might be variously called substance, life, experience, according as one or another characteristic is emphasized. Whatever it may be called, it is in truth the Absolute, the All. It comprehends all change, yet in itself changes not. Nothing exists in its own right except the Absolute. Infinitely complex, it is a perfect unity. From its infinite depths all things proceed. This doctrine is the utmost reach of intellectualism—the view that reality can be exhaustively construed in intellectual terms. But the doctrine makes reality a blend of all things and gives little real insight. If we focus attention on the blend, the things of experience disappear and we have nothing to explain; but if we are "tough-minded" enough to insist that things are things and differ one from another, we endanger the unity of the whole. Bosanquet, following Bradley, would avoid this well-known *impasse* by emphasizing that the ultimate and all-comprehending reality includes an infinity of possible objects, some of which are the quasi realities known as selves.

The blanket objection to this way out of the intellectual difficulties is that if we start with experience, it must not be experience in general and in the abstract but our experience in its particularity, along with all its implications. An experience implies an experient. If we eliminate the experient, the experience with its content disappears. Bosanquet cannot have his absolute if he repudiates the finite self as a creative energy—a true monad. Another way of coming to the same conclusion is to point out that with the passing of the finite self would go every reason for attributing selfhood to the absolute. An absolute that is not a self could be only experience-content, and as such would lack every principle of order, and would be without any conceivable power of self-maintenance. It would be without form and void; it would have less substantiality than the river mist that the sun burns away. Thus Bosanquet, in so far as he denies the permanence and centrality of the self, fails to make provision for the existence of his ultimate reality.

The American representative of this school of thought, Josiah Royce, developed a view of the self which is unique and original in some respects. He describes the self as in form a self-representative system.²⁰ By this he means that it is like a perfect map contained within the object mapped, such a map showing all the details, including itself drawn to scale. It would involve a map of a map of a map, and so on. For Royce, then, the self is an infinite series: self-consciousness is consciousness of a self that is conscious of its being conscious, and so on into infinity. This mathematical mode of expression indicates a significant aspect of selfhood, suggesting that there is in its nature an element of the infinite. We shall have occasion later to consider this, though not mathematically. As regards the nature of the self's reality, Royce is clear and definite in his rejection of the substance notion. "The Self is not a Thing, but a Meaning embodied in a con-

²⁰ *The World and the Individual*, vol. i. Supplementary Essay.

scious life.”²¹ “In the narrowest sense, the Self is just your own present imperfectly expressed pulsation of meaning and purpose,—this striving, this love, this hate, this hope, this fear, this inquiry, this inner speech of the instant’s will, this thought, this deed, this desire,—in brief, this idea taken as an Internal Meaning.”²² These passages not only deny that the self is a passive thing, but reject any and every conception that can be exhaustively expressed in descriptive terms. He explains the term “meaning” by equating it with “life-plan.” “Never in the present life do we find the Self as a given and realized fact. It is for us an ideal.”²³ “By this meaning of my life-plan, by this possession of an ideal, by this Intent always to remain another than my fellows despite my divinely planned unity with them,—by this, and not by the possession of any Soul-Substance, I am defined and created a Self.”²⁴

For Royce, the ultimate Power or Absolute is a completely realized Self, differing from the human or finite self in being “a Society of Selves.” “Whoever conceives the Absolute as a Self, conceives it as in its form inclusive of an infinity of various, but interwoven and so of intercommunicating Selves, each one of which represents the totality of the Absolute in its own way, and with its own unity, so that the simplest conceivable structure of the Absolute Life would be stateable only in terms of an infinitely great variety of types of purpose and of fulfilment, intertwined in the most complex fashions.”²⁵ The only difference, as indicated in this passage, between the human self and the infinite self is that the one is a finite representative system, while the other includes all the systems in the same interrelated whole. Each finite self is thus a sort of mirror of the infinite. The conception is not sun clear.

²¹ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 269.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 272.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

Royce maintains that selves are free in the sense that their life-plan is unique and expresses their nature. "The problem then of my freedom is simply the problem of my individuality. If I am I and nobody else, and if I am I as an expression of purpose, then I am in so far free just because, as an individual, I express by my existence no will except my own. And that is precisely *how* my existence expresses, or results from, God's Will."²⁶ This passage is important as indicating how Royce relates the self to the Power on which it must ultimately depend. The dependence is mutual, according to Royce. "God cannot be One except by being Many. Nor can we various Selves be Many, unless in Him we are One."²⁷ Further light on Royce's conception of the self comes from his treatment of moral evil. The self that develops the evil will schools itself to ignore the right ideal in favor of one of its own choosing. "The rebellious Self . . . acts with a *viciously acquired naïveté*. . . . To sin is *consciously to choose to forget*."²⁸ Finally Royce speaks with great positiveness on the reality of the self. "Unless the finite is real, the Absolute itself has no Reality."²⁹

These quotations suggest how readily Royce's conception of the self gains plausibility by illuminating the deepest problems of life. Royce marks an advance upon Bradley and Bosanquet in giving the self a more positive character. For the other two thinkers the self as an individual is ephemeral. All that gives it individuality is unessential, being the effect of bodily connections and certain affective states. But Royce places a strong emphasis on the reality, uniqueness, and permanence of the finite self. So pronounced is Royce in his insistence on the essential permanence of the self that its survival of death seems a matter of course. The self is bound up in the life of the Absolute. For Royce the Absolute, instead of being an all-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 330 f.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 358 f.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 364.

comprehending system, is a community of selves, "the Beloved Community," as he later called it. All this is reassuring. His theory seems to come nearer to doing justice to the various aspects of experience than has any other that we have thus far examined.

Royce's insistence on the self's being an ideal rather than an accomplished fact, a life-plan always in process of realization, is profoundly true of the self viewed as constituted by its own activity. We come to selfhood gradually, and never attain it in full measure. All the forces that play upon the self in experience contribute to its unfolding. Nevertheless we should not lose sight of the complementary fact that the self is more than a life-plan plus self-consciousness, it is the deviser of the plan. It finds itself in its work, but it is not its work, nor the plan of the work, nor any or all aspects thereof. It is the worker, the agent, the originator of plans. This remark may seem an unessential addition to Royce's thought, but in fact it can be shown to be of prime significance. So important is it and so manifest even to a wayfarer, that we must believe Royce to have been fully cognizant of it. Why did he ignore it? Evidently he was preoccupied with the activity aspect of the self.

We have noted two ways of approaching the problem of the self. The self may be viewed as an object held in the cosmic matrix, where it can adjust itself to some extent to its environment. In this role it appears as one of the many forms of dependent activity, unique in its complexity and in its manifesting the phenomenon of consciousness, but still only a part of the cosmic whole. It may seem to be a more or less permanent finite center, it may develop unique values, but in the end it must be dissolved into other expressions of the Absolute. This is because it never rises above the system, never has any existence in its own right.

The other method of approach is to study the self at work and recognize the patent fact of its agency. Then the question arises, What assumptions must we make to

understand its activities, its evident dependence on an environment that it does not make, and its world of values which so far as we can see are the only values that exist? In seeking an answer, we recognize the humble origin of the self, how it gradually differentiates itself from its world, how it slowly and blunderingly feels its way into the consciousness of itself and its power to modify its surroundings, how it remains to the end profoundly dependent on the physical instrument called its body. Such facts have their meaning. But of themselves they cannot give us a theory of selfhood. Whatever assumptions we must make to explain the known facts of self-activity should therefore have such authority as nothing else can possibly have. They must be accepted as true or the whole problem of explanation must be given up.

Now Royce seems to have tried to hold to the first type of exposition while recognizing the more vital elements in the second. Hence we find, scattered through his later writings, statements that appear to satisfy the utmost demands of the second type; yet whenever he explains these statements they are shorn of all that cannot be harmonized with the first. The self for him is really never more than a conscious life-plan, expressing a unique form of activity on the part of the Absolute. It is the Absolute who makes the life-plan, the Absolute who is free in its realization, the Absolute who alone is responsible for deviations from the way of moral rightness, and the Absolute alone who makes amends. This hides the self away from itself in the all-containing Absolute. Because the self is thus misconceived, all else continues to be only partly explained. Or rather, because the known character of the self is not recognized and made the basis of explanation, the whole realm of experience remains in the end unexplained.

Hence while we recognize the value of Royce's conception of the self's activity, we need to maintain with all emphasis that the self is more and other than a life-plan; that freedom is not synonymous with uniqueness, that the

problem of survival is not solved by assuming that a finite life-plan as such, in its specific content, is of permanent value to the Absolute.

It is hardly worth while at this point to turn back and consider at any length the many variants from the types of theory that we have been reviewing. Yet there is one that deserves a word because of its specious appeal to a wide circle. The reference is to Wilhelm Ostwald's conception of consciousness as a force or energy which can be equated with other forms found in the physical world.³⁰ This conception suggests Woodbridge's theory of consciousness as an objective relation. The ambiguity is evident. If Ostwald means that just as thermal energy may pass over into electrical or mechanical energy, so it may take the form of consciousness without changing its nature as energy, he is simply describing observable phenomena and indicating that he can group under one concept all known forms of activity, including consciousness. This is at best a triumph of classification. The differences remain untouched. But if he means that consciousness, as manifesting energy, points to a something other than consciousness which somehow maintains itself as energy in all forms of its manifestation, the term energy must be practically synonymous with the old term "force." It would then be exposed to all the destructive criticism heaped upon that much belabored concept. As already pointed out, if a force is posited to explain a given motion, it can have the unity only of that particular motion. Any change in direction or rate requires a new force to account for it. These infinitely multiple forces can have no connection among themselves, unless the whole transaction is taken over from the non-mental into the thought world.³¹

³⁰ *Natural Philosophy*, p. 185 ff.

³¹ In the further discussion of our theme—the nature and destiny of the self—we shall feel free to utilize the best insights of those whom we have been criticizing as well as those with whom we more fully agree. Among the latter should be included—to mention here only recent English and American thinkers—James Ward, *The Realm*

of Ends; A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*; W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*; Hastings Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*; John Laird, *Problems of the Self*; H. W. Carr, *A Theory of Monads*; C. D. Broad, *Mind and its Place in Nature*; B. P. Bowne, *Metaphysics, Theism, Personalism*; W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*; M. W. Calkins, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*; E. S. Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy, Religious Values*.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF THE SELF

The more we study the nature of selfhood the more we are impressed with the importance of a right point of view. The authors whom we have been criticizing fell short of a satisfactory conception of the self because they persisted in treating the self as an object that can be inspected and described. Apparently no amount of evidence against such a method is sufficient to stay successive thinkers from trying again. But the self, we must repeat, cannot be identified with its experiences taken either severally or as a connected whole. To insist on such identification is to bar the way to insight and to land in ultimate scepticism. Whatever else we may have to say concerning the self must follow from recognizing it as an agent whose nature it is to bring new experiences into being. In the attempt to work out a conception of the self from this point of view, it is well to be economical of theories. Unless a theory actually helps to explain the facts to which it refers, it can be discarded without great loss. This rule of economy is a philosophical truism. Yet we must recognize the practical value of devices that rest the mind without informing it. We have already met several of these mental easements. As regards these, the only difference between common sense and critically chastened thought is that the former mistakes them for truth and the latter knows them for what they are—devices and nothing more. Some courage is required to hold to this rule of economy and face the consequences. Misunderstandings are likely to swarm about one. But to refuse to have a

theory where no theory that meets the requirements of explanation has been formulated is a mark of intellectual freedom.

If the self is to be the ultimate principle of explanation in philosophy, it cannot itself be explained. This seems evident. As the active principle the self can explain all else, just because everything not a self can be encased in a concept, can be grasped intellectually. But the self can never resolve itself into a mere content. Hence to the confirmed intellectualist the self seems to be nothing at all. Because it escapes from the net of its own categories, it has no place in a logical scheme of things; it cannot be ruled in or ruled out by the law of contradiction. This is what we might have antecedently expected. The movement of thought is from concept to concept. There is no end to this movement, since all concepts point to some concept other than themselves as their explanation. Let an intellectualist start on this course of explaining by connecting and with a kind of mental inertia he will insist on explaining everything conceptually. When the limits of possibility are pointed out to him he is apt to draw one of two conclusions. Either he will continue to push on into intellectual darkness by trying to explain selfhood conceptually, or he will solemnly declare that all knowledge ends in mystery and nothing is really knowable. Neither conclusion is justified. Logically there must be a terminus *ad quem* to explanation, and for philosophy the self is that terminus.

The inference that we cannot know the self because we cannot resolve it into something else is far from the truth. We know the self—or can know it—more completely than we know the objective world. Through its experiences it stands revealed in its innermost nature. Our knowledge of it is far more intimate and concrete than our knowledge of anything else. In fact, this direct apprehension of the self by the self may well be called primary knowledge, since it is the model of all other types. Whatever the self distinguishes from itself is known in

terms of itself, is known only representatively. Thus things are, strictly speaking, forms of the self's activity. The self is more than feeling, more than intellection, more than volition; these are distinguishable aspects of its living, active unity. Knowledge of the self by the self, then, includes all expressions of its nature as active in apprehending and appreciating experience. If, for instance, we should study any object as thoroughly as our scientific resources might permit, our knowledge would still be fragmentary and incomplete. It would necessarily be abstract. But the self can be known as having the experience, with all the infinitely varied shades of meaning and all the play of sentiment and interest connected with the apprehension of the object. We know ourselves in this direct immediate way, while we know all else derivatively.

This statement runs counter to the surface meaning of much psychological literature of the day. It is well recognized that the child comes to know first the outside world, and does not consciously distinguish itself therefrom until the period of reflective thought is reached. The theorizer, having started with this observation, is in a fair way to conclude that the self is a derived idea, a construct, a concept, and at best a mere "appearance." The trick is patent. The self constructs its "appearance," and in the act of constructing, disappears, while it continues to think of its construct. Its interest in itself has not yet been sufficiently developed to cause it to take account of itself as the agent by which its conceptual world comes into being. Only because the self is essential agency does it explain all else. Whatever can be looked upon as an agent is the beginning and end of explanation. The closer the approximation to the complexity of selfhood, the more there is that needs to be explained. Inanimate objects are relatively simple. Tying them together in bundles with proper labels, exhibiting them as related in certain mechanical ways, is all that can be done with them. They have the minimum of selfhood in them, and hence are seen to be mere activities of something other than

themselves. When we pass up through the organic into the psychic and social, our knowledge becomes progressively richer, because the knowing self finds ever more of itself in these objects of its experience. But the self is not subject to explanation. Nothing in its nature can be explained except its limitations, and they indicate more what it is not than what it is. In a sense, then, we must grant that the self is a mystery; it cannot be referred to something other than itself in the usual scientific method of procedure. We can afford to live with one mystery if that mystery is ourselves, concerning which we directly know so much.¹ In studying selfhood we propose to confine our attention largely to the human self, with only a casual reference to the more outstanding questions concerning the subhuman and the superhuman selves.

As agent, the self contrasts with all that is not-self, with all objects whatsoever. This insight taken in its generality may seem little more than a truism, yet it carries implications that only the more thoroughgoing accept. What, for instance, is the relation of the self to space and time and the other structural principles of experience? The self is not in space though its activities have the form of space. Does this mean that the self is indifferent to space, that it can be anywhere or nowhere? No. It means that the self cannot be thought as in space at all without denying its nature as agent. When we try to think of the self as real and yet as occupying not even a point of space, we are baffled. Our imagination rebels. We need to fortify ourselves by a review of the reasons for the conclusion that the self is non-spatial and then see what we can make of the doctrine. Why, then, must we conclude that the self, as the most fundamentally real of all existences, is non-spatial?

(1) Space is the form of the self's activity. If the activity were self-explaining, that is, if we could start with pure activity and make it the key to all insight—as some have tried to do—we might be able to make space-filling

¹ Cf. B. P. Bowne, *Theism*, p. 41 f.

the *sine qua non* of reality. But activity is not agency. It is simply a name for a form of manifestation. The term may be applied to movement of translation or to chemical reactions. It may also refer to the mental processes involved in having experiences. But in no construable sense is activity other than manifestation implying an actor. Now the self is not activity, nor is it activity plus a non-active center of pure being. As actor, the self cannot be put among its own objects as one of them. It is distinct from them all and cannot have their form. Of all the attempts to avoid identifying the self with its activities, the least successful is to assume that it is an inactive core of being. Such a conception not only fails to explain anything, but multiplies difficulties when we try to apply it to the problems it creates.

(2) The self as agent must be a monad, an indivisible unity, that is, it must act in its entirety whenever it acts. This is a logical requirement and should appear self-evident to the reflective mind. If the self could be actually broken up into parts, each acting separately, the parts themselves would be exclusive of one another and each would function as a separate self; each would be unique and unitary. If, then, the self is essential agency and therefore unitary in the absolute sense, it cannot occupy space, since space is the principle of separation and mutual externality. There can be no ultimate unity in space. This statement is the testimony of scientific research as well as of logical deduction. For instance, the atoms of science break up into electrons and protons variously arranged. These turn out to be merely the imaginary representations of complicated activities called an electrical charge. It may include an indefinite number of parts. Quite in harmony with the findings of recent science Pascal called upon his reader long ago to see in the (abridged) atom "an infinity of universes."

(3) The self as agent must have an inner life, unanalyzable into disparate elements. This inner life manifests itself as a synthesizing activity, holding in an ideal form

the past that has ceased to be and the future that can only be anticipated. This inner life contrasts at every point with what merely occupies space. Space-occupying is pure externality; agency is the principle of internality.

If, then, we conclude that the self is not spatial, we should expect that all attempts to read space into the self or the self into space would be futile. They seem to succeed because they substitute for the self as agency something essentially different. Examples in point are the theory of W. P. Montague,² that as a form of energy, consciousness (equated with mind) is space-occupying; and that of W. H. Sheldon³ that the self is essentially spatial because it operates spatially.

A specious counter argument builds upon experience to show that the unity of the self is derived and is the product of a slow development. We are not conscious of the self as a distinct and unitary entity till years after we begin to think and exercise volition—if even then we are conscious of it. What the self was before it became aware of itself as unitary, we cannot say; but experience shows that its unity was acquired. Furthermore this unity can easily be lost, as when through illness or injury a profound change occurs in our emotional life and memory becomes defective. In fact, all breaks in memory mean breaks in the continuity and hence in the unity of the self. The phenomena of multiple personality are only extreme forms of such mental disturbances. In the thought of those who argue thus, the self is an experienced unity and nothing more. But the self we are considering is necessarily unitary because it is an agent. The necessity is strictly logical. Agency cannot be multiple except in the sense of coöperation by many individual agents. The unity of the self as a condition of its own synthetic activ-

² "Consciousness as Energy," *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James*, p. 105 ff. Cf. *The Ways of Knowing*, p. 319 ff.

³ "The Soul and Matter," *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxxi. p. 133 ff.

ity should be distinguished from the consciousness of subjective unity as revealed to reflective thought. The first is certainly non-spatial; the second, being a product, has spatial relations, at least in the sense that it is where it acts. But this form of expression need not mislead us.

A similar line of thought leads to the denial that the self, strictly speaking, is in time. By this is meant that it is not, in any thinkable sense, a mere succession. But one may ask, Does it not change? Do not all its experiences have a place in the time series? Can one conceive of a non-temporal existence—one that has no past or future or present, no duration? If the self is not in time, is it not strictly a nonentity? Such questions come naturally to mind. And they are not easy to answer. The temporalist points out that the self is conditioned by its cosmic environment and must therefore be subject to the same law of temporal succession. The self, moreover, changes not merely in its apprehension of external events that come and go, but in its innermost nature. No conceivable experience can rise above the temporal flow. Hence the self, so the temporalist would conclude, is either in time and subject to temporal conditions or it is outside the universe altogether, that is, it is non-existent.

In considering this argument, we need to bear in mind that the issue is not whether our experiences have the temporal form, but whether that which apprehends objects as in time is itself subject to temporal conditions. Our problem would not arise if experience were self-explanatory. He who cannot see that the self is the essential unity presupposed in all synthetic activity, fails as a matter of course to see the reason for the conclusion that the self must transcend temporal relations in order to apprehend the succession of events as a succession. One way of meeting his difficulty has already been referred to as offered by Bergson, who identifies the self with duration. For him the self is the unity and continuity of the succession. But as it stands, this conception leaves the self stripped of its essential character as agent. Though the self endures and

all duration is for a self, the self is not duration. We have only to recall, in this connection, how time originates in the act of the mind as it creates a past, present, and future in which it arranges its experiences. This temporal distribution of the complex mental content is so spontaneous and so involved in the possibility of any experience whatever, that, in advance of criticism or in spite of it, we incline to detach the time element in experience and set it up as an independent real. What could be more real than duration, since it alone encompasses the succession and receives all new members of the temporal series as they emerge into the present? This question mistakes a function of consciousness for the self that is conscious.

Nevertheless he who would maintain that the self is not in time must face the two disturbing facts mentioned above. The one is that we not only have temporal experiences, but we are a part of the interrelated universe and subject to the conditions that are themselves in time. As thus controlled in our activities, we must belong to the cosmic process. The other disturbing fact, following from the first, is that we undergo change in the very center of our being as the result of interaction with the environment. We pass from youth to old age and thus exemplify a time process. In what, then, consists our timelessness? Have we a changeless center of being that manages to remain outside of the temporal flow merely because it does nothing? That view has already been discarded and must not at this point be brought in to increase our difficulties.

The way to positive insight is to remind ourselves again of the facts revealed by the analysis of sense knowledge. Whenever we apprehend a temporal series, we grasp it as a whole. This may and generally does mean that we have lived through it or a similar experience. But we live through the successive stages of the experience and know them as successive only because we ourselves are not successive but continuously exist through the series. To grasp the series as a whole and as temporal we must be

more and other than the series. The succession is the work of memory and anticipation, a construct of the self. As such it is in the present, though it means a past and to some extent a future. If, then, we are entirely clear in our apprehension of the self as agent, we may be able to accept two statements that seem to contradict each other. One of these is that the self is not its experiences and hence has not the temporal form of those experiences. The other is that the self is manifested in its experience. All the fundamental characteristics of the experience world, including its temporal form, are so many revelations of the nature of selfhood. The self and its experiences are strictly relative to each other, yet neither is the other. Keeping this paradox in mind we can appreciate the truth in Bergson's identification of the self with duration. The self endures; we know of nothing else that does, except as an experience of a self. Duration then expresses a fundamental characteristic of selfhood. But duration is a descriptive term that applies to a series of manifestations that have the temporal form. Manifestations can exist only in the present. Duration, then, in so far as it includes the past and the future, exists only ideally as a mental construct. We may, therefore, at this point conclude that time, either as a succession of instantaneous present moments or as duration in which the past, present, and future are arranged, has meaning only with reference to the activities of the self, not to the self as the active agent. Though for us time begins when we begin to have experiences and will end when we cease to be, yet as selves we are not the temporal flow.

But the temporalist might reply that this doctrine makes of the self nothing but the logical subject of mental states, whereas the reality is all in the flow. This criticism has all the advantage of being easily expressed in words and of holding strictly to experience. In contrast, the view that the self is timeless in relation to its world suffers from the handicap that no form of language can carry the thought unambiguously. It is further embar-

rassed by having to set over against experience something that by its very nature is excluded from experience. There surely must be some truth in the contention that the self is in time, even though there is ground for holding that it is timeless. The temporal character of the self is a conviction too persistent to be set aside. In what sense, then, is the self in time though actually timeless? It is in time for any one who objectifies it. The observer notes changes of attitude, interest, conduct in the self observed; time infects it all. But the self observed is a construct of the observer and as such is an experience having the temporal form. We are usually so engrossed in practical affairs and assume so easily the attitude of the observer and manipulator that when we would consider the self as a reality, we incline to set it in our midst and inspect it as we would any other object. Thus viewed it is of course subject to all the conditions of any other features of experience. As we have grounds for believing that the cosmic power is an Intelligence, we may hold that we are completely enfolded in the time of his world. But this again can mean only that we are in his time series as object, not that we are in the time of our own experience. Now when we view our experience as ours—not as it appears to others but as it is for ourselves—we cannot identify ourselves with our experience, whether in whole or in part. We as actor, thinker, agent, contrast with our experience as that which possesses the experience. We can confidently assert, then, that the laws of organization and construction in experience do not apply to selfhood, and that the self, therefore, is not in the time of our own experiences. To get the full force of this conclusion we need to remember that the only time we know is the time of our experience world.

But what of the changing self? If it really changes is it not actually in time? Does it not form in its very being a temporal series, including the stages of development and the linkages we call time? In reply we might ask, What in the series would you call the self? Is it the sep-

arate states, or is it the linkage, or is it the series as a whole? The first would resolve the self into elements and make knowledge impossible; the second would make the self pure duration, which is an abstraction; the third would make the self impossible till it ceased to be. That the self progressively realizes itself, then, can be construed only as meaning that at any time in its career it is all that it can then experience, and that as developing it never is complete. We must not forget that when we speak of the changing self, we are viewing it objectively, exactly as we would a physical thing. It changes for an observer. We seem to ourselves to change only because we gather past experiences together and compare them with those of the present, and then think of ourselves as different from what we were. But the difference is recognized as consonant with the identity. We are the same though different. The conviction we have of our identity is normally more pronounced than the sense of changing. In fact, we are disposed to refer the permanence and identity to ourselves as agents and the changes to our mental states. Here we face a mystery. Not much light can be thrown upon it from any source. How can a self be permanent when nothing exists except in the present and the present must continuously be renewed? A semblance of explanation is found in the idea that the self is a permanent potentiality that is continuously realizing itself. Growth would mean an increase in the process of self-realization. In view of the fact that there are no assignable limits to its potential resources, we may think of it as never exhausting itself, never becoming completely expressed. The self as thus viewed can hardly be said to exist, it is rather an ideal progressively becoming real. This manner of speech gives an illusive sense of insight. It is no more an explanation of permanence and identity in selfhood than is a topographical map an explanation of the country it represents.

Another suggestive way of making the timelessness of the self intelligible is to identify it, as does Royce in certain passages already referred to, with a life-plan. The

timelessness of a plan is evident and indisputable; it holds over while being realized and exists at one time or another indifferently. But this confuses the self with a form of its activity. The timelessness of the plan is the timeless grasp by the self of its own ideals. The self lives in its activities, all of which have the temporal form, all of which express the self, but none of which are the self. These statements about the self—that it is timeless, that it lives through the temporal series which it apprehends, that it changes internally—cannot of course be built into a system of knowledge. They seem to be mutually inconsistent because they are considered objectively. A system of knowledge is nothing if not consistent. The self that constructs the system is nothing if it is consistent. In fact, consistency loses its meaning when applied to the self. With what, for instance, might it be consistent? With another self? But the two would agree or disagree only as regards their intellectual constructs. Should the self be consistent with itself? But every experience changes the nature of the self. It is continually becoming something new. It is the only being in the universe that can change, because it alone can maintain itself in becoming something other than itself. Change is read into its world of experiences by an act of transferring into that world a semblance of its own permanent nature. If then it changes, with what shall it be consistent? We say of two opposing predicates that the one excludes the other. Both cannot be true. But in the process of detecting the inconsistency, the self harbors both alternatives, passes from one to the other, compares, contrasts, rejects, recalls, with never a thought of its own consistency. Only when interested in the question of truth or falsity in the consideration of thought-content does it bring forward and apply its rule of consistency. The self is inclusive of every possible inconsistency, but in matters of belief it cannot accept as true two propositions that are mutually exclusive.

But after all that we have said about the permanence of the self, must we not still acknowledge that the self is a part of the world process and therefore in time? The self is conditioned in all its activities. It can never rise above these conditions; they affect every part of its being. In answer we can only say that in so far as externally conditioned, the self exemplifies the time process; but in so far as it has selfhood, it is superior to the process. The finitude of the self as we know it makes this double reference possible. A complete self would be an infinite self, and hence independent of the conditions of any and every temporal succession.

After what has just been said it is hardly necessary to insist that none of the other constructive principles of the internal or external world can describe the self. It is neither substance nor attribute, neither one nor many, in the sense in which these categories refer to experience. The term substance has repeatedly been employed to characterize the self, but generally with unfortunate results. Substance as experienced is a mental construct. Yet the term, when carefully defined as meaning that which maintains itself through its experiences, expresses exactly one aspect of selfhood. In this sense the self is preëminently a substance—the only substance that exists ontologically. But neither the term substance nor the Bergsonian term duration quite expresses what we mean by the power of the self to know itself as having lived through a past, and as having a capacity to maintain itself through a succession of new experiences. But is not the self one rather than many? Yes, if we make a qualification similar to that made in the case of substance. It is not one in the sense that it is a purposive whole, for that would make it exist only as the expression of a back-lying self. As an agent it is not only unitary, but the source of all derived unities. So we might run the entire gamut of categories and show that none of them, without fundamental change of meaning, can apply to the self.

When we have done cataloguing what the self is not, have we not disposed of it entirely, bowed it out of the universe? The inclination is to turn for light to such a writer as F. H. Bradley, and with him identify the self with experience. The need is desperate to make this theory work at all hazards. We could then have experience to build on and to refer to as our final court of appeal. May not experience, after all, be the whole of reality? We may call it life if we please, all-pervasive, ever changing, indestructible, and under certain conditions attaining consciousness, even self-consciousness.⁴ Only experience can be directly studied, it alone is susceptible of proof or disproof. As experience is potentially rich beyond all computation, we have no right in advance of an exhaustive study to say that it may not include all that we have tried to set over against it as a self. What may seem to be deeper than experience is not self but life, and life is just the constant factor viewed as expressed in experience. Such attempts to escape the necessity of positing a reality that sharply contrasts with experience and yet is wholly expressed in experience is successful only so long as we remain close to the surface and refuse to be persistently critical. The self is not any or all of its experiences, though these tell what it can do. It is not a life-plan, though without a life-plan the self could not know itself as a unitary whole. It is not a feeling nor a psychic content of any kind, though Bradley is right in saying that it is nothing (objectively) beyond or besides the "psychical filling."

All these reiterations are for the purpose of making impressive the truth that the self belongs to a different order of being from the rest of the universe. This truth might be taken for granted were it not for the fact that the self is so persistently objective in its interests; it is so absorbed in the task of adjusting itself to its environment. It is at home in its world and insists on remaining contented there. It is fascinated by the game of living; its eye is

⁴ Cf. H. Wildon Carr, *A Theory of Monads*, chap. xiii.

fixed on the goods that experience reveals in such exhaustless profusion. Why should it concern itself with what cannot be objectified or experienced or even imagined? So the self reasons itself away from the deepest, most significant truth concerning its own real nature. That we as selves exist, few would gainsay; but what we are and what we may become, people generally are not much interested to know. Or rather they quite uncritically locate the self where it cannot possibly be found. Assuming that the self as a reality in the midst of realities must be an object with apprehensible qualities, they look upon the self as a space-filling, continuous substance capable of functioning in ways recognized by introspection. They can hardly fail to see the shortcomings of their theory when they try to explain how such a self as they portray confronts its characteristic task of relating, changing, appreciating its experiences. Better far to have no theory than such as this, which lands one in hopeless confusion. The only reason for affirming a self distinct from its world is to explain the possibility of experience. If the self could be explained as experience, it would presuppose another self as its creator. In passing from experience to a self, we pass out of one world into another *toto cælo* different. This difference is so fundamental that the self cannot be expressed in thought terms.

What, then, is the self? we ask again. To give our answer positive content we must tell what is included in the oft-repeated statement that the self is agent. To do this we need to turn again to experience where the self is at work. For although we do not experience the self, we do experience what it does, and what it does tells us what it is. Hence all the interests that have appealed to us as worth considering, all the difficulties encountered, all the issues met, must come up again in a general way for final review in studying the self as the originator of its world and as constituted by its world. We are at the center of insight, and as we look out over the world of experience, we see it all in a new light, with a new perspective. The

world is seen to exist in and for the self, while the self is revealed as living in and through the world.

From this central viewpoint the universe is a world of concreted values. When studying the world as value, we had to face the problem of moral choice, and found that the basal issue was whether the choice was real, whether it expressed a free act of the self. This problem of freedom must again be taken up in its broader aspects as involving the most decisive issue in the discussion of selfhood. When studying æsthetic values, we found that the heart of the æsthetic experience was the playlike spontaneity of the self in creating an ideal world. To what extent is the self creative? is another question that we shall have to consider. In sketching some of the more outstanding cognitive values, we felt keenly our intellectual limitations as human beings. Having an infinite world of possible knowledge all about us, we are, to use the Newtonian figure, like one who gathers a few pebbles by the sea-shore. With defective memories, blurred vision, a confused thought life, a will that all too easily falters, and an emotional bias that clings to prejudices, we seem to be foredoomed to small attainment in the way of knowledge. This raises the question of the relation of the mind to the body as the seat of our limitations. What significance has the body for the life of the self? This moot question cannot be dismissed without some consideration. Finally our study of religious values accentuated the problem of human destiny—the self facing its future. This question of destiny, the most difficult as well as the most vital to the thoughtful mind, involves the relation of the self to the cosmic Power. With a brief examination of this problem we shall close our study of selfhood.

As agent the self is unique. There is nothing more fundamental and nothing like it. The universe is a duality: agent, on the one hand, and activity, process, energy, experience, on the other. This duality cannot be cancelled. Neither type of existence can be reduced to the other, neither can exist without the other. To know the self as

agent is to know its character as revealed in its activities. Its world is itself manifested. If we would understand the nature of the objective world, we must ultimately turn to the self for the answer; if we would know the self, we must point to its world of experience as the expression of itself. Furthermore the self is not merely a constructor of objects out of preëxisting material; it is not a mere artificer, but is in very truth a creator.

The intellectualist is likely to take umbrage at the statement that the self is literally a creator, and that creativity is of the essence of selfhood. He can find nothing in the realm of concepts that even remotely resembles the activity of creation. For that reason he is tempted to put off the issue by referring the apparent creativity of finite selves to the ultimate Source of things. But this helps to insight not at all. It simply makes the difficulties involved less pressing for the man of the street. It were better to face the evidence and take the consequences. If we cannot intellectually construe creativity, one of two courses is open to us; we may deny creativity altogether and take refuge in the concept of potentiality, or we may insist on accepting the facts of experience just as they present themselves and draw the obvious conclusion without recognizing the right of the intellect to adjudicate the case. In favor of the first alternative is the logic of the old dictum, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. It seems self-evident and it seems to apply. The so-called creative act would mean bringing into existence what did not exist before, making something out of nothing—a palpable absurdity. When stated negatively, the principle of criticism seems self-evident: nothing can come of nothing. But when given a positive expression, that is, when its positive implications are considered, it does not make the same logical appeal. Positively it means that all things have existed from the beginning; change is illusory. Apparently the only escape from this conclusion is into the dark, mysterious realm of potentiality. But this is only a catch-word. The denial then of creativity gives us a "block universe" and

flouts experience. We know from experience that the future does not exist *in rerum natura* until it is set before us as constituting our present. To say that it lurked in the recesses of the past waiting for the moment of manifestation, is to talk gibberish. Change is a fact, however little the intellect can make of it, and change means the appearance of what did not exist before. What right have we to say that? May not change be the appearance of what existed but was for the time invisible? Realists generally hold this view. But we have seen how unmanageable it is. A phenomenal world that is independent of us and exists changelessly could not possibly be known to us as the changing world of our experience, a world that is continuously coming into being. But the word "potentiality" arrests the imagination. The potential is pictured as the exhaustless reservoir of all future events. It provides for all contingencies, even our blunders, inaccuracies, and contradictions. And so we rest from our troublesome questions, till we again become critical and want to know the facts.

The facts of experience cannot be gainsaid. Every feature of our known world comes into being by an act of the self, and every feature is something entirely new. To be sure, this creativity, so far as the outside world is concerned, is strictly under control by a Power not ourselves. At least this is true of the initial stages. Yet without question the response to stimulation is in every respect different from the stimulation itself. So great is the creative impulse in the self that only a small portion of any familiar stimulus-complex is ordinarily needed to phenomenalize a whole group of objects. Nothing is easier than the act of creating. The mind indulges not only when goaded from without, but on its own initiative. Perhaps the keenest pleasure of which we as thinking beings are capable comes in the act of imaginative creation. Our emotions become enlisted, self-stimulation reacts to increase itself, and we revel in a world that is all our own, a plaything that we can change at will. In fact, the world

we live in is an intermingling in varied proportions of direct responses to cosmic stimulations and the free play of fantasy.

No amount of such activity seems to lessen the mind's capacity to create. This is a marvel too great for some sober thinkers to accept. They would make a distinction between creating a world and having images of external objects. The one is the act of bringing into existence what did not exist before, except possibly in the thought of the ultimate Reality, the other is an act of apprehending what is given. But we have seen that this distinction will not hold as against the conclusion that the mind is essentially creative in all its work. The distinction has its place and value when we are interested in contrasting the inaccurate notions that we carelessly take to be true with the apparently independent world of objects that compel us to revise our erroneous conceptions. But when we speak of the mind's creativity, this contrast does not come into view. Both terms of the contrast—the images and the phenomenal objects—have their origin in the mind, but one is valid and the other is not. If we deny the marvel of creativity, we must abandon all hope of explaining how knowledge is possible. This is the testimony of history as well as of logic.

The intellectualist speaks again. Is there no way of satisfying the desire to understand creativity? Must the choice be between potentiality and nescience—a choice that is no choice? Apparently these are the alternatives until we pass out of the domain of changeless concepts into the midst of volitional experiences where the self is enacting the role of creator. There we may note what it does, may see how the new appears as a result of its agency. The mystery of how the non-existent can come into being remains a mystery, but it is carried back not to an impossible objective world of potential existences that have no actuality, but into the life of the self that can know itself as having been in the past, as active in the present, and as holding a power of future action. Permanence, re-

vealed in memory, belongs by inherent right to selfhood alone. In the life of the self the term potentiality has a serviceable meaning, as we have already pointed out. The self may know enough of the present situation to anticipate the future. In that sense the future is potential in the present. When the barometer falls rapidly, we have reason to expect rain or high wind. The rain or wind is potential in the atmospheric conditions that cause the barometric pressure to lessen. But we are not at liberty to use the word in this sense when we would make it hold the future as a quasi present existence. The future exists only for a self and in the act of anticipation. The mystery of mysteries, then, is the self in its power to know and to do.

The self is creative, but is it free? We can readily see how those who discount the self as merely the name for a stream of consciousness, or as identical with its world, or as mere "psychical filling," should not only deny the freedom of the self, but should be annoyed that anybody should still raise the question.⁵ But from our point of view, freedom might be taken for granted. We could recognize all the evidence pointing to the limitations of human freedom, and yet maintain that these limitations only accentuate the fact of freedom within the prescribed limits. The burden of proof would seem to rest with those who deny freedom, or with those even who would limit it. In other words, it seems to us that the self is free except as the indubitable facts of experience establish a limit beyond which the self cannot exercise its freedom. This reversal of the current attitude toward the question has thus far been based largely on moral considerations, though at every critical stage in our discussion of sense perception as well as of elaborated knowledge, we came upon evidence of the self's power to act on its own initiative. In facing the implications of the moral life, we had to conclude that to be moral the self must be free. It must be free not only in the negative sense—free to run its preëstablished course unobstructed—but free to plan

⁵ Cf. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 393n, 435n.

and execute its will in the light of its own ideals of good.

Against the doctrine of human freedom in the positive sense have been ranged (1) all the considerations drawn from the scientific study of human conduct, and (2) the metaphysical scruples arising from the utter dependence of the finite on the infinite. These difficulties are formidable. They combine apparently the weight of scientific authority with that of metaphysics. They must be met, therefore, by counter evidence both indisputable and conclusive, if the doctrine of freedom is to have any standing among thoughtful people. The first impulse is to point as we did to the exigencies of the moral life as furnishing such evidence. But ethical literature is replete with attempts to explain the facts of our moral consciousness in accordance with determinism. For instance, the consciousness of freedom, on which the libertarian stakes much, may mean merely that no effective opposition is felt to a thoroughly predetermined course of action. If such an interpretation be allowed, then the consciousness of freedom can at best mean only a possible absence of restraint, freedom in the negative sense, such as the proverbial flying arrow might have. With the same ease every requirement of a theory of morals might plausibly be met by determinism. Is it a question of responsibility? The determinist can say that the individual is responsible for his acts only in the sense that they are the result of his character—rational and emotional—interacting with his environment. The man is his character, and his character is the accumulated effect of his conduct. Do we mention the possibility of following the weaker motive? The motive we actually follow is demonstrably the strongest, else why should we follow it? But what of the sense of guilt and remorse? They can be explained psychologically without recourse to the doctrine of freedom. Moreover, whatever one's theory, it is eternally right to be just, benevolent, temperate, true. Consequences do not wait upon opinions about the self. Thus the determinist can apparently undermine all the usual arguments for freedom as popularly under-

stood. For this reason it will be better to find, if possible, a less debatable starting point for the positive argument in support of freedom. We can then turn with greater assurance to the consideration of the determinist's attempt to banish freedom from the field of morals.

The advocates of determinism make their strongest appeal by pointing out that their doctrine is grounded in the scientific law of causal connection. This law, they urge, holds not only throughout physical nature, but in the life of thought, feeling, and volition. No event without a cause; nothing isolated, nothing unconnected with what preceded it. The law is as true of self-activities as of the external world. What is the self? Is it not, so the determinist argues, a complex product of growth? Did it not start with a definite equipment of potentialities and tendencies? Were these not elicited and developed by interaction with environing conditions? Do not the results show themselves in reflexes, impulses, habits, tastes, interests, and whatever constitutes the character of the individual? Character is the expression of causal laws working with resistless certainty. Character changes under the influence of new experiences. It is subject to continuous growth. Every act, whether volitional or impulsive, leaves its impress. Thus while every so-called free act is but the outgoing of a character impulse, it reacts to make a new type of action possible.

This argument of the determinist has many elements of strength. Can it be answered in such a way as to retain the truth that it embraces and exhibit the whole situation as involving freedom? There is common ground in certain propositions which both parties to the controversy doubtless accept. First, the self has a nature; that is, all its activities are subject to law. No other conception of the self is thinkable. Secondly, the past of the self enters into its present life as a controlling factor in determining what the self may consider desirable. Thirdly, however free the self may seem to be, its every act can be viewed objectively as a member of a causal chain. Every act, that is, takes its

place in the world order and thus becomes related to what precedes and what follows. Fourthly, every so-called free act is completely motivated by the needs, interests, and capacities of the self at the time. No act of self-expression is isolated. Fifthly, freedom does not pertain to the acts but always and only to the self as intelligent agent.

With these acknowledgments of the truth embedded in determinism, we would call attention to certain conclusions already established. The scientific doctrine of causal connection is recognized as not a theory of productive efficiency, but only an emphatic assertion of orderliness in nature. It is an *a priori* assumption involved in the knowability of our experience world. No objective proof could avail to establish it if it were not presupposed in all thinking. As a law of thought it requires that every situation, however chaotic it may at first appear, must be so analyzed and adjusted as to exhibit orderliness. Every event must have its selected antecedents from which it follows according to rule. But does this mean the more law the less freedom? Is freedom excluded from a mechanistic view of the world? Not at all.

The conception of the world as mechanism simply expresses the perfection of intelligence and power. If either were lacking to any appreciable extent, unthinkable confusion and chaos would result, and life would be impossible. The causal law then is the requirement of thought in its effort to satisfy its own ideal of order. In so far as the thinker is free he will endeavor to realize this ideal. His success will measure his freedom. We must then revise the ordinary dictum and say, the more order the more freedom. But such a conclusion would apply only to conscious volition. From this point of view the entire mass of scientific achievement is the consummate expression of freedom. We may carry this line of reflection a step further.

We take orderliness to be a fundamental law of thought because the purpose of thinking is to attain certitude in beliefs. We would form workable conceptions of our

world. We would know the truth. But our efforts are beset by difficulties. Error lurks in every conclusion that is not critically thought out. How may we know this fact of error? Evidently only as we can test our conclusions in the light of criteria set up by the mind itself. In short, to know the simplest fact of nature, we must be able, first, to distinguish between truth and error, and secondly, to find grounds for establishing the one while discarding the other. Both these conditions reveal the presence of freedom in the positive sense. Without the power to apply a standard we could not know when we had the truth. Every belief would have to be taken at its face value as a matter of course, merely because it existed; or utter and all-inclusive scepticism would result. Either alternative would paralyze volitional activity and cut us off from ever attaining to real knowledge. But this act of holding up to view a conclusion or belief and asking if it be true is strictly an expression of freedom. It would be inconceivable as anything less. Then the machinery of testing, the critical review of previous thought, the marshaling of new evidence, the application of the method of "trial and error," all mean the exercise of freedom. Without freedom the self could not take one step in the acquisition of knowledge, could not even know that such a thing as truth or error existed.

When once we catch the force of such considerations, we can combine them with the moral argument and see how they support each other. As the moral argument for freedom has already been stated, we need not review it here. The deterministic interpretation of moral facts and implications is specious, and gains most of its plausibility through the focusing of attention on the relation of an act to preceding conditions—a relation which a libertarian has no interest in questioning. As a counter to the deterministic argument it would not be difficult to show that its scientific support when rightly understood falls away, or even passes over to the indirect support of libertarianism. All that the argument drawn from psychology and related

sciences proves is that the question of freedom not only can but must be ignored if we are to be scientific. Until we transcend the standpoint of science, the question of freedom does not arise. Why then does the scientific student so persistently conclude to determinism? Because he inconsequently carries the problem of freedom over into science and there demands a solution. The only solution is an artificial one, because from the scientific point of view the question is itself artificial and essentially absurd.

Science can say no more than that the self, treated objectively, is a series of states connected in an orderly way. Scientific determinism, in so far as it is a theory of real or productive causation, is a denial not only that the self is free but that there is any self. The last word of science is process. What is not process does not exist—and, we may add, what is process exists only for that which is not process. The dilemma is familiar to us. Its very essence is the denial of freedom. For unless the self is free, there is nothing in it to distinguish it from the rest of objective nature, hence it passes away into process. Unless it is free, it is not an agent in any conceivable sense. Unless it is free, it can at best be only a center of activity by a back-lying agent. We thus get a hint of how all problems in philosophy, all questions we may ask about the world or ourselves, culminate in the question of freedom. The first step in explanation cannot be taken without implying freedom, and each advance accentuates its reality.

But how are we to meet the metaphysical difficulty of our essential dependence on the ultimate Power? It cannot be met on its own plane, because its assumption is that the connection between the ultimate Power and ourselves is analogous to that between an external substance and its states, or between the law of a system of interacting units and the units themselves. We thus start with an a priori conception of what the dependence must be, and in its name deny that the dependent can exercise freedom. But the analogy does not hold. Every consideration pointing to the fundamentally different status of selfhood from that

of mere events emphasizes the ineptness of the analogy. Even at the risk of further repetition it may be worth while to bring this fact into relief.

The objective attitude is so much a matter of habit and is so important in reckoning with nature, that its influence remains potent in ordinary thinking even after a person is convinced of its inappropriateness for certain philosophical investigations. It is a persistent bent in human nature to demand that experience explain experience, that events control events, that things cause change in things, and that the whole constitute a self-explaining system. Any given event is thus assumed to be adequately accounted for by showing that its invariable antecedent is a certain group of preceding events. This assumption is abetted by the crude notion that something—substance, energy, force, or influence—actually passes from the antecedent into what follows and explains the resulting change. "Does not the antecedent," one may say, "disappear in producing the event? The continuity of nature is thus preserved. There is no evidence that matter is ever destroyed. It simply changes its form of manifestation." The plausibility of such reasoning gains decidedly in convincing power since the doctrine of the conservation of matter apparently solves the problem of sameness and difference. The sameness is provided for by the assumption that whatever appears in the resultant was already in the antecedent and only required the appropriate conditions to emerge. The difference is evidenced in the modification of the thing affected. Hence nothing has really changed; the potentialities of nature have been realized.

Such are the thoughts behind the notion that the Power to which we must refer all reality cannot create free beings. He is conceived as essentially a thing with a thing's limitations. The only way, then, that he can produce finite beings must be by diremption, partition, fission, or some form of degradation of himself. The mystery of change is disposed of by impliedly denying the fact of change. No other outcome, indeed, is possible to a purely mechanistic

explanation. It must carry back into preceding sources all the complexity of the later manifestations, or else leave something unprovided for. Thus nothing is explained. The relation of the ultimate Power to finite selves is left absolutely opaque. The ultimate Power is reduced to a mere aggregate, and change becomes a shifting of material from one part of the time series to another. Only the most reckless self-stultification can accept such an outcome. To deny change, to reduce the self to a phase of the Infinite, to look upon the Infinite as an aggregate, the quantitative all, is to abandon explanation. It may impress one as intellectual humility, but it makes the victim a martyr by mistake.

That the difficulty in the conception of independence has no ground in reason but is merely the result of a blunder may be seen by reflecting on the obvious fact that in nature all is activity, movement, change, and nothing survives of itself across the smallest interval of time. The process is continuous. Nothing is, but all is becoming. Nowhere in the process is there the slightest self-dependence; no portion can maintain itself. This means that the explanation of apparent permanence and continuity in nature can be found only in that which is distinct from nature, a Power whose characteristic is its ability to maintain itself while ceaselessly producing a world of activities. In this connection it cannot be too much emphasized that no back-lying world essentially similar to the world of experience can possibly supply the permanent element. Neither a potential world nor an actual world can meet this *sine qua non* of real existence. Only a self can satisfy the requirements. And we know it can do this only because it demonstrates its capacity in experience. The self can because it does. We reach the end of insight when we recognize this fact and build upon it. Mechanism does not help us except to set before us a scheme that satisfies the imagination, though it ignores reason. We presumably have a choice of alternatives. Either we may limit ourselves to the mechanistic type of explanation,

which not only fails to provide for creativity, but leaves all change an impenetrable mystery, or we may accept the theory of continuous productivity, for which we have the best analogy in our own mental life.

Once we admit that the ultimate Power is pure creativity, the problem of freedom involves no insuperable difficulty. We need simply refer to this Power as the adequate Source of all that experience reveals. The question of how a free intelligence can be created, just as the question of how anything can come into being, remains unanswered. We have no revelation on that point.

But the objector may interpose a demurrer. "Dependence we must grant, and if that is thoroughgoing, what becomes of freedom? Even though you assume that the ultimate Self fashions the universe according to his sovereign will, it is still his will that dominates. Nothing can defy him or swerve in the slightest degree from what he requires." We may answer that this is in essence a repetition of the difficulty just considered. It is a turning again to the *a priori* method of deciding beforehand what can be by assuming what must be, rather than going to experience to find out what is, and then trying to explain it. We carry over into the unique world of agency the limitations characteristic of the world of mere activities. Repudiating this blunder we may ask, "Can the ultimate Power create free beings?" and answer our own question with confidence, "Yes, if he does." It is well to remember that our only ground for affirming the existence of an ultimate Power is our need of explaining how we, as finite creatures, come into being and maintain ourselves in a cosmic environment. This Power must be assumed as the adequate Source of all existences, for he is our only explanation of selfhood. He is what we must think him.

The creative act by which a finite self comes into being cannot in the nature of the case be construed intellectually, because it is not an intellectual transaction; it is dynamic and volitional. As well try to bottle a sentiment or imprison an aspiration by physical means. When we try to

compass the act by concepts we encounter the same difficulty as in trying to explain change. Change is an ultimate fact, and so is creativity. Every attempt at explanation from whatever angle of approach involves us in the treadmill motions of the mechanistic conception. Hence we raise a false issue when we ask how it is possible for the ultimate Power to bring anything new into existence. That he does, we know from experience. In like manner we must rest in the plain fact of experience that this Power creates selves. If we must think about the mystery of creation, we should take our own volitional activity as the model. We create for ourselves a world in which other selves move as real. We influence one another by social appeals. We have a sense of freedom which increases with the development of social ties and tasks. Thus in the world of social forces, the more elaborate and binding the connections, the freer we become. Hence freedom means power, influence, effectiveness. If we consider the ultimate Power after the analogy of our own social creativity, the special difficulty of dependence need not trouble us. To deny his ability to create free intelligence leaves us in the dark on every question concerning ourselves or the world. The mystery of creativity remains; but creativity itself is the commonest of common experiences.

We conclude, then, that determinism has not made out its case, that it fails to explain experience, and makes the simplest item of knowledge a logical puzzle, while it reduces the moral life to a purely fatalistic illusion. It says with science that if you want the cause of an event, you must look for it in something that preceded it. This of course means the infinite regress. It practically ignores the self, or else reduces it to a member of the phenomenal series. "But has the past nothing to do with our acts?" one may ask. Certainly. The self's past and its environment contain the ground of preference in choosing. Out of these sources arise the sense of need, the consciousness of capacity, the knowledge of method, and all that can be included in the preparation for an expression of choice.

But until the self is recognized as willing the result and controlling the means to that end, the choice itself is not explained.

This conclusion seems so evident that many of the more thoughtful determinists undertake to provide for freedom under the form of self-determination. In so doing they are concerned to give full value to the influences that mold character and thereby affect choice. "What are we," they say, "but developed characters? We started with certain inherited capacities and tendencies of nature, and these were developed by interaction with the environment. In this way our characters, including interests, tastes, tendencies, impulsions, were slowly formed. To the character of the individual must be referred everything that the individual does. From the depths of his character arise every motive and every preference in the choice of goods. Moral reasoning is the organized appeal of the developed and developing self as constituted by its character." This theory is championed by some of the sanest writers on ethics. The theory seems to meet the two fundamental requirements as revealed in experience: (1) the significance of the self's original endowment, unique in every individual and varying widely in scope and vigor; and (2) the ineradicable sense of responsibility. The argument is simple and plausible. Unless freedom is seen as the expression of the slowly unfolding character, inherited propensities and native limitations mean nothing. The self, in acting without reference to them, would be not free but a slave to caprice. Responsibility could have no intelligible meaning, since the self would not really be acting.

This line of thought has great convincing power, because every contention of the self-determinists must be granted. Inherited traits do play their part in determining conduct. And so do acquired dispositions and interests. The self is its character. But danger lurks in emphasizing heredity and environment. As soon as we begin to think of character as a resultant, the moral life begins to

resemble a mere mechanism, in which freedom is annulled. We seem to be confronted again by the dilemma—either heredity and environment determine conduct, and then there is no freedom; or they do not, and then freedom is meaningless caprice. The difficulty is real. There is no way of meeting it so long as we try to think a free act.

Thought, as we have had occasion to point out, can set forth the antecedent and sequent events, but not the freedom of the act. That escapes, absolutely and always, any intellectual formulation. We face here the ultimate mystery of selfhood. As an agent the self cannot be an object of intellectual contemplation. By studying the past of the self, its habits, interests, and contacts, one may get valuable information bearing on the problem of motivation. Practical ethics is occupied almost exclusively with this problem. Yet every intelligent volition, however motivated, when viewed by the actor is seen to be the unique expression of the self as agent. It involves the weighing of evidence and the rendering of a decision in the light of what the self at the moment judges desirable. Character, then, is the self considered as having a developed nature. Because the self in free volition acts with a modicum of intelligence, the course of events as studied by an observer can be represented more or less accurately in a mechanistic scheme. But that does not mean that the self is a character mechanism.

This reference to the orderly procedure of the self in overcoming external conditions brings us to the next question. To what extent is the self a cause and therefore free? In answer we may say at once that the self is conditioned on every hand by the infinitely complex network of events called the universe. This constitutes a permanent though changing order of limitations. But the physical environment is not in absolute control; it only marks limits and prescribes methods of action. It indicates the measure of freedom that the self can exercise in the physical realm. These limitations permit a much larger scope of free activity than is immediately evident. Every time

we do anything volitionally, that is, with intelligent purpose, we actually change the nexus of environing conditions (the physical order). Both by direct bodily contact and by those manifold indirect methods invented by man's ingenuity, we can affect nature over wide areas. Whenever we change the conditions we modify the scope and character of our freedom, either to lessen it, as when we sustain an injury, or to extend it, as when we learn a new way to make nature manipulate nature in accordance with our desires.

In our relation to environing nature we continually exercise the power of selection, and thereby determine in a way what feature of the enveloping conditions shall constitute our distinctive environment. When we select intelligently we proceed in accordance with the generalized knowledge of the permanent factors. Our ignoring is based on knowledge, on that which we have learned is significant to the matter in hand. No environment can hold us bound by its individual and specific character. We can bring to bear upon it the stored wealth of experience and loosen its hold by applying general principles. We know how to circumvent, to escape from the toils of "brute fact." In so far as this is possible, knowledge is liberating, and our environment itself becomes an expression of freedom. Instead of being controlled by it we make it serve our ends.

Furthermore our sentiments enter into our environment and give it a distinctive character. If we allow the happenings of the day to depress us, we not only see the more somber side of nature, but we actually render it somber; whereas under other conditions of our inner life, we should see attractive beauty. Values in the world about us are made and remade in a twinkling, as we change our moods and interests. These values, along with all that they imply, are the very essence of our real environment. Thus we get a suggestion of how extensive the range of the self's freedom really is. The conditions that limit the self have been studied minutely by

highly trained specialists; but far less critical attention has been given to the study of the self's free activity within those limits. Hence we have a distorted conception of the self, one that exhibits it as cramped, shut in, and controlled by its surroundings. It is progressively reduced from a commanding figure in the world to one of less and less significance, till the conclusion seems near at hand that, if we knew more, we should view the self as nothing but a name for a peculiarly complex set of conditions. Perhaps it might turn out to be a mere epiphenomenon. In the popular mind, the conviction has become deep-seated that the scientist is continually reducing the range of freedom and that only the more obscure forms of mental activity remain unconquered.

This view receives a kind of support from the phenomena of habit. We are creatures of habit, so the saying goes. But what is a habit? It seems to be a mechanization of conduct. A given act by frequent repetition not only becomes easier but gives rise to a tendency to further repetition. This tendency may result in the practical elimination of conscious attention even in the performance of complex activities. Thus the action approximates the reflex type. But does this mean that freedom is thereby curtailed? Is habit-forming a species of bondage? Not necessarily. Viewed from within, a habit may mean the reduction of effort and strain in doing a given piece of work. Habit enters largely into what we call skill. Of course some habits tend to weaken our capacity for volition, limit our range of interests, and reduce our intellectual grasp. In any complete discussion of habit such facts must be carefully set forth. But at present we need only note that habit may be the ally of freedom; it may mean a lessening of tension and strain in the performance of the lower types of activity and a releasing of power for the higher expressions of the self's nature. Objectively life is becoming more mechanized, but this is a triumph of freedom, through the achievement of science in setting its world in order. Since freedom does not come within the

purview of science, a free act will always be for science simply a problem in mechanical adjustment. It may remain an unsolved problem, because of its complexity or the obscurity of the factors involved. But science will never consent to solve it by reference to freedom, for that would mean the abandonment of the distinctively scientific task. Nevertheless all conduct viewed from within, as philosophy insists on viewing it, is orderly in proportion to its expression of freedom. If no law, then no freedom; for a free act is an intelligent act and therefore the expression of order.

We may conclude then, first, that the self, so far as it is cause, is free, and it is cause in a positive sense when it exercises its power of choice and volitionally effects a change in its environment. This conclusion stands without qualification, and leads to the second, namely, that instead of taking the limitations for granted and requiring decisive proof of free activity, we should reverse the order and maintain that the self is free in all that it does, except where positive proof is furnished that it is controlled by influences outside itself. Thus in placing the burden of proof on the one who would in any given situation deny freedom, we change the whole aspect of our world-view. To show this in broad impressionistic outlines will be our next task.

What truth is there, we may ask, in the statement that the self is a real determining factor in the ongoings of the world at large? It volitionally produces changes in its immediate surroundings and through these affects remoter regions. But it would seem that the scope of such influences is quite limited. How much is it limited? We know without giving the subject more than a moment's thought that our influence on the outlying regions of the universe is infinitely slight—at least we think we know. We are fairly sure also that this is true of the larger features of the earth's activities. But to recognize that our influence in these macrocosmic realms is practically negligible is not to deny that in a genuinely positive sense we

share with the ultimate Power both the capacity and the responsibility of world ordering. If our part seems infinitely slight, we can assure ourselves that from the standpoint of self, the seeming is not all fact.

We can at least call to our aid the lightning, the steam, the power of the waterfall, the heat stored in coal beds, and so on. All these servants do our work for us; they bend to our wills. How much farther we may in the future be able to go in this process, no one can say.

This much exploited argument in support of a belief in freedom encounters a curious rejoinder, not from the determinists but from certain champions of freedom. One of the most interesting of these attempts, considering the high standing of the author in the scientific world, is contained in Sir Oliver Lodge's *Life and Matter*, a book written with the avowed purpose of combatting Ernst Haeckel's fatalistic materialism. Lodge holds that the doctrine of the conservation of energy is not to be called in question. Any view of freedom that hopes to command the interest of a scientist must square with this doctrine. "My contention then is—and in this contention I am practically speaking for my brother physicists—that whereas life or mind can neither generate energy nor directly exert force, yet it can . . . exercise guidance and control: it can so prepare any scene of activity, by arranging the position of existing material, and timing the liberation of existing energy, as to produce results concordant with an idea or scheme or intention: it can, in short, 'aim' and 'fire.' Guidance of *matter* can be effected by a passive exertion of force without doing work; as a quiescent rail can guide a train . . . It will be said *some* energy is needed to pull a hair-trigger, to open the throttle-valve of an engine, to press the button which shall shatter a rock. Granted: but the work-concomitants of that energy are all familiar, and equally present whether it be arranged so as to produce any predetermined effect or not . . . The energy is independent of the determination or arrangement. Guidance and control are not forms of

energy." On the basis of this conception of energy, Lodge concludes his defense of freedom by declaring, "We are free, in so far as our sensible surroundings and immediate environment are concerned; that is, we are free for all practical purposes, and can choose between alternatives as they present themselves. We are controlled, as being intrinsic parts of an entire cosmos suffused with law and order If we could grasp the totality of things we should realize that everything was ordered and definite, linked up with everything else in a chain of causation, and that nothing was capricious and uncertain and uncontrolled."⁶

This attempt of the noted physicist to find scientific ground for a belief in freedom is especially interesting, if for no other reason, because in the end he is forced to conclude that freedom is only a seeming, and that if we knew all we should realize that "everything was linked up with everything else in a chain of causation."

In recognizing that the law of the conservation of energy is abstract and purely descriptive of results without reference to causes, Lodge is in line to transcend the scientific conception of experience. The transcendence cannot be effected by denying or questioning the law, but by realizing that it holds only among objects and their movements in so far as they are essentially passive. Whatever is passive can be mechanically moved and mechanically stopped and mechanically adjusted. The law of conservation must hold in such a world. Philosophy, building on this view of the world, would call attention to certain other features of the problem, features already dwelt upon in the preceding discussions. (1) The distinction between energy of action and energy of guidance is artificial. The physical universe is a nexus of activities, nothing more, and the self in making adjustments to this nexus is able to react upon it and change the form of its activity. The very life of the self depends on this dual relationship—it can adjust itself to conditions and can modify them.

⁶ Pp. 164-178.

(2) The laws of nature are man's nearest approximation to the expression of perfect objective order; and perfect objective order, where the law of conservation holds, is the condition of freedom on the part of the self. (3) Freedom is not caprice in contravention of law; it is intelligent manipulation, it is the ability to change the course of events in accordance with a plan. That this should be possible nature must be the realm of inexorable law. (4) But a "reign of law" in nature cannot mean that events are literally held together in a causal chain, if by causal we mean the activity of a mysterious physical force distinct from the events themselves and binding them together. The events as such disappear. All the resources of the physical universe are not sufficient to make one of them hold over into the next instant. (5) Hence the difference between the conception of freedom advocated by Lodge, the scientist, and that which philosophy would defend grows out of the more thorough analysis by philosophy of the meaning and implications of such terms as natural law, causal connection, matter, force, energy, as applied to the world of experience. With these terms cleared of ambiguity, a belief in freedom as defined by philosophy seems to have the entire support of experience.

The more we reflect on the interrelations between the finite self and the ultimate Power, a relationship infinitely close and sensitive, the more we appreciate what human interests must mean in the cosmic whole, how much man's freedom in volition may accomplish. Do we, for instance, really influence the earth as a whole or the stars in their courses? We do not know; but we have a strong conviction born of considerations we dare not set aside, that the stars would have no courses and the universe no on-goings, were it not for the Infinite's purpose to develop spiritual beings, essentially like ourselves. Our free activity, then, is cosmic in ways that experience does not and perhaps never will reveal. Within experience our freedom is considerable and beyond experience probably ex-

tends with diminishing influence to the outermost reaches of the universe.

From the viewpoint of philosophy the case for freedom seems to us conclusive. The doctrine is shrouded in mystery for the intellect: it cannot be construed. But if we would catalogue whatever in our world cannot be intellectually construed, we should need to include every experience that involves change—and what experience does not? The self and its free activity must be appealed to if we would get the slightest understanding of change. In dealing with change the intellect must translate it into changeless elements of a temporal series. Moreover all ultimate facts are mysterious; that is, nothing beyond them can help in their explanation. The task of the reflective thinker is to find the well attested mystery that clears up all the other mysteries of experience and remains itself a mystery only because it is an ultimate fact. The self as a free agent is such a mystery: it illuminates all other mysteries and, we may add, it is the only one that does.

Before leaving the subject of freedom, we may say a word concerning the relation between freedom and creativity. The connection is obviously so close that where we find the one we are practically certain to find the other. A genuinely free act is essentially creative, since it involves making actual and existent what before was only a guiding ideal. Conversely the creative act can be referred to the self as its originator only if the self has sufficient power in itself to account for it. An act of blind impulse could hardly be thus referred. The self, when acting impulsively or instinctively, is largely controlled from without. Practically, then, if not also logically, freedom means creativity and creativity means freedom. This conclusion can be maintained while recognizing the dependence of the self on the ultimate Power. When the self acts creatively it neither refashions a preëxistent raw material nor molds pure emptiness into forms of existence. The new creation is a joint achievement—the self works in free coöperation with the ultimate Power. In view of the fact that

this coöperation is an essential feature of all experience, we can ignore it as a differentia of freedom, and emphasize the self-originated ideal or purpose and its actualization in free volition. There is always a great temptation, as we have remarked before, to force the free act into the molds of conceptual thinking. But when the psychologist tries—as did Hugo Münsterberg in his *Willenshandlung*—even to describe an act of volition, the best he can do is to trace the preparatory muscular adjustments and the subsequent muscular and neural releases together with the accompanying emotional states; he has not a word for the volition itself. Thought-content may serve as guide to the self, but cannot perform the free creative act.

It is usual to distinguish the creativity of finite selves from the creative acts of the ultimate Power, but the distinction throws no light on the problem of how anything can come into being. In creating the cosmic universe of changing conditions that make possible the life and well-being of finite selves, the ultimate Power evidently has resources that we do not possess. But this fact is only another aspect of the infinite mystery that envelops the whole of experience. All that we need to maintain, in order to account for our part in the joint transaction of world-building is that we as selves are free and creative under the limitations that experience reveals.

Of all the creative activity by the self, the apprehension of other selves and the social whole is the crowning attainment. It is here that the world of the self most nearly approximates the creativity usually ascribed to the infinite Being as his exclusive domain. We might not think it strange or beyond the powers of a finite self to construct, under the compulsion of stimulations, the physical world in so far as that world becomes known to the individual. This would seem from one point of view to be merely a case of following directions and reproducing an original that already existed in the divine mind. But when we have to account for the presence of other selves in our

experience, we hesitate to draw the obvious conclusion. If we are correct in our analysis thus far, there is nothing for us to do but to push ahead and "go where reason leads," just as Huxley thought he was doing. We know others before we know much about ourselves. They dictate our conventional life in its broader aspects, produce for us our social values, humanize us, and bring us to the richer self-realizations. They constitute our life in so far as our main interests and activities are concerned. It would be difficult to overstate our dependence on society.

How can another self come into our world and produce such changes in our innermost nature? The only answer consistent with the facts is that another self in becoming a self for us is as much a part of our creative activity as is the rest of our experience world. That the other self exists for itself apart from our knowing it is not now the issue. It is simply an interesting and highly significant fact which compels us to look upon selves as fundamentally different from all other forms of existence. But this in no way weakens the conclusion that selves, whatever they are for themselves, are for us who know them our own creation. In the act of apprehending another self we really produce a duplicate of our own self-activity in the body of the other self, while at the same time we make such changes in detail of expression as the facts of our experience require. We may describe this as a projection of ourselves into the body of another self; or we may call it *Einfühlung* or sympathetic rapport, or any other current expression, but nothing really explains it. The lack of explanation, however, need not prevent our seeing what takes place. As nearly as psychologists of selfhood can make out, the following aspects may be roughly distinguished.

On occasion of appropriate stimulations sufficiently complex and varied, the self responds, creating the other self or group of selves in the same way as it responds to

the appropriate stimulations in getting an experience of physical things. The difference lies in the manifest fact that more of the apprehending self is expressed in the one case than in the other. It is literally a matter of more or less. Whenever the self has occasion to respond to stimulations its first impulse seems to be to posit another self, and only when that is found to be out of harmony with the evidence does it modify its response by reducing the apprehended object to a lower type of existence. As the self passes down the scale of complexity in the stimulations, it learns to subtract more and more from its ideal of selfhood, till it reaches the limit of descent in the purely physical. Thus it fashions its world with itself as a model. What is essentially different from the model is taken to be less than a self. We may generalize, then, with a fair degree of accuracy, and say that all constructive activity of a self in response to stimulation is as nearly a duplication of the apprehending self as the context of experience will warrant.

We learn from experience that the tendency to attribute selfhood to objects must be held in check, and in consequence we incline to interpret indications of intelligence in the sub-human with increasing care, lest we make ourselves ridiculous. Yet our judgment concerning animal life generally depends to some extent on whether our interest is scientific or sympathetic. If it is scientific, an attitude of detachment and objectivity is appropriate, since we seek such information as can be formulated in a general statement. The influence of the scientific ideal of mechanism is also evident to some extent. Hence the tendency is to credit the animal with only the minimum of intelligence. Every evidence of essentially human characteristics is called in question and interpreted, as far as possible, on a purely reflex plane. On the other hand, when we become sympathetically attached, as in the case of a household pet, we seem to attain a more intimate

knowledge of the animal's nature. The influence of the social ideal becomes evident. We incline to attribute an undue measure of human traits to our brute companions. We may talk to them as if they understood and were conscious of what was going on in our own thought life; as if they had a sense of gratitude, shame, affection. Some carry this tendency to great lengths. In this field, however, assertion is out of place. At least we must allow a wide range of difference in judgment. As we recede from the plane of the human, we know less and less of the object, for the sufficient reason that there is less to know.

The temptation is to supplement knowledge. The tendency to read more into the evidence than a strictly critical attitude might justify is practically universal. All interpretation is upward until the human plane is reached. Social intercourse on the human plane is revelatory in both directions. Each person discovers in his fellow new complexities of nature, new depths of emotional life. At the same time, social life discloses to each individual more and more of himself. Under the stimulus of social life, each unfolds hidden potentialities of his nature. While selves are essentially alike, they differ widely in particular manifestations. The differences in taste, interest, point of view, and capacity are multiplied by differences in actual experience. Hence in so far as we can enter socially into the lives of others, we draw out our own natures. This process is never complete, and there seems to be no limit within the span of life to the growing complexity of the results.

We cannot fully know the self, for it grows throughout its career. This commonplace remark should not be interpreted as meaning that all the self's past is saved to it in the process. The self passes from one form of expression to another. Thus every experience reveals something of the inner nature. We are forbidden, therefore, to start with a preconception of the capacities and limita-

tions of the self, and in the name of this prejudice proceed to deny what experience may suggest or reveal of a vaster self. We should not be bound by the conception of selfhood given in unreflective experience. When we try to understand the self by taking into account all that it does, we find that we must think cosmically. The nature of the self as revealed at any moment in its unfolding must include not only the world as then experienced, but all that the self may at the time hope or fear or dream. This does not mean that the self is its world—a manifest error—but that it is all that is necessary to create such a world. The experienced universe, then, is the measure of the present self. If we would know all that the self is, we should have to take much else into account. The world of experience is changing moment by moment. We are learning more and more of our friends, making new acquaintances, getting new information about society and its manifold problems. All this must be reckoned as expressing the nature of the apprehending self. Besides we must consider that although the self forgets most of its doings, there is no telling when or under what circumstances the forgotten will come again before the self as a remembered experience.

Furthermore both the capacity to remember and the variety of new experiences depend on conditions that are apparently inherent not in the nature of the self, but in the bodily organism. The self, in other words, is limited in the range of its activities only externally, both as regards present experiences and those that are referred to the past and the future. There is no real evidence that in any functioning of the self there is even an approach to a limitation from within. We become weary, but that is manifestly physical; we soon reach the limits of our intellectual or volitional activity, but that too is traceable to the bodily conditions. A better brain, and we think better. The better thinking is as easy as the other kind, when the

physical conditions permit it. Give the body needed rest, and the capacity of the self is renewed. In short we never experience self-weariness or self-limitations; what seem to be such are all traceable to bodily functioning. This potential infinity of the self is not ordinarily appreciated. We are as a usual thing, and for our own good, immersed in the routine of life, and must first reckon with the commonplace, before we can advance and get the larger vistas. We find ourselves in the measure that we find a world.

CHAPTER IV.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF SELFHOOD

We enter now upon the discussion of special problems of selfhood. One of the most pressing of these problems, much discussed both by psychologists and by philosophers, is the relation of the self to the body, the "mind-body problem." It cannot be ignored by any serious student of selfhood. Even the behaviorist is forced to consider it before he can finally dispose of the self as anything other than the body in action. In fact few of his problems are so troublesome. He prospers so long as he moves on the plane of physics and psycho-physics, but whenever he has occasion to consider such psychic phenomena as perception, conation, evaluation, the mind-body problem becomes acute and he has no resources with which to meet it. The only course open to him is to substitute for the psychic activities, forms of physical functioning. This deceives no one, not even the behaviorist, unless he considers that his methodological device yields not only scientific but also philosophical truth. The mind-body problem is really not so unmanageable if we start with the facts of experience and remain true to them. There is mystery here as everywhere else; but within the broad limits of the knowable we can find a fairly satisfactory theory.

The self and the body are profoundly interrelated. Whatever the question concerning the activity of the self, the answer must recognize the part played by the body; whatever the issue concerning bodily functioning, no explanation can be final that ignores the self. The reality is

not the self nor the body, not even the self and the body, but the self body unity. If asked, What is the body? we might do worse than answer, It is the self as expressed in physical functioning. And if asked, What is the self? we might answer, It is that which is manifested in what constitutes for us the body. Heretofore we have been referring to the self as if it might conceivably function apart from the body and in accordance with its own spiritual nature. This assumption must now be either justified or discarded; we face the mind-body problem.

That the self depends on the body is manifest. The effects of bodily injury, of malnutrition, disease, growth and decay, all indicate this dependence. On the other hand, the evidence that the body is conditioned in subtle ways by the self is not quite so unmistakable, though quite as abundant. Confusion arises when the living body in continuous contact with the self is not sharply distinguished from the body after this connection has been severed—the mass of slowly disintegrating material that we call the dead body. The living body utilizes energy, replaces worn-out or deenergized tissue, carries on the complex activities involved in the maintenance of bodily structure and function, responds to emotions, passions, conations, and in a variety of ways reveals the controlling influences of the life principle. It serves as the sole medium of communication between the self and the outside world. It remains itself while continuously appropriating and discarding physical elements from the environment. In contrast the dead body is characterized by the absence of all these forms of activity. All that means organization, unity, sensitivity, responsiveness to psychic influences, ceases with the passing of life from the body. Nothing is left but the discarded material that happened to constitute the physical elements at the moment of death. This has no conceivable connection with the self. Our problem is the connection between the self and the living body. The vast literature on this subject witnesses

to its continued interest. Psychology, psychoanalysis, abnormal psychology—to mention no more—are largely devoted to it. We can attempt only general suggestions on the nature of the self as related to the body and the nature of the body as related to the self.

Certain abnormal bodily functionings, such as the so-called automatisms, raise the question, Which is primary, the self or the body? The phenomena of dreams suggest the question whether the self may not under certain conditions detach itself from the body and temporarily, if not permanently, take on a different form of physical manifestation. The rare experiences known as dissociation or dual (multiple) personality point to the possibility of the self being split up into several selves. Finally the facts of growth and decay are susceptible of more than one interpretation as to the permanence of the self. These four issues—the primacy, independence, integrity, and permanence of the self—are philosophy's chief concern with the mind-body problem.

In studying automatisms, the scientist has rarely hesitated to make the body primary, and to treat the self as a mere accompaniment or even a mere name for the complex physical activities. If the mind shows abnormalities, the physician looks for a lesion in the body, some organic or at least functional trouble. But more and more investigators of these maladies are coming to appreciate the subtle influence of mental conditions in the patient. The physician very correctly places the emphasis upon the physical maladjustments, for they can be directly studied, and the problem for him is one of effecting a cure. But when we would know what the facts under discussion signify as to the nature of the mind-body connections, we need to give special attention to the psychic elements. Can the facts be interpreted in harmony with the conclusions already reached as to the essential agency of the self and the essential passivity of the body? If so, this conclusion must continue to hold against all rival theories. We believe we can do justice to all the facts concerned by

maintaining that these physical maladies indicate an abnormal functioning of the self: the power of self-expression is impaired. The self may still, therefore, be looked upon as the active principle in the mind-body combination.

What have dreams to tell us? Is there any truth in the ancient superstition that the soul in dreams can leave the body and wander forth either bodiless or with an etheral, phantom body? To ask such a question marks one as visionary and wanting in scientific acumen. We modern folk are far removed from the crudities and credulities of primitive peoples, at least we believe we are. Nevertheless certain well-known experiences of the dream consciousness are hard to explain on any other theory than that of spiritual detachment. The self seems in the dream to break away and roam at will while the actual body remains in one place. Whatever our final conclusion as to the meaning of these experiences, they cannot be brushed aside as of no significance. They are rooted in the essential nature of selfhood. The revival of interest in the interpretation of dreams following upon the researches of Freud, Jung, Adler, and others, makes our question seem less bizarre. The psychoanalysts were at first satisfied to explain dream experiences as mechanical functioning of the bodily organism while under special tension. But the more carefully these dream experiences were studied, the more the self appeared as a determining factor. How far may we go in recognizing this dominance of the self? Can we accept the subjective evidence at its face value and, with certain religious sects, contend that the self may, under exceptional conditions, actually leave the body for a season? Evidently the theory is no more grotesque than the contrasting theory that the body itself does the dreaming while the self is a figment of bodily activity. If we dared to believe that the self has this power of independent action, certain doctrines of survival might be much more easily accepted.

But we are not justified in such a belief, and for two principal reasons. (1) The belief implies that the self is a space-filling substance, capable of locomotion through space. This is tantamount to denying that the self is strictly and wholly an agent, for as agent it is non-spatial. (2) The dream experiences can all be accounted for in closer harmony with both the findings of psychology and the conclusions of philosophical reflection. We need only to recognize that the self is an agent, creating and modifying its experience world, and that in all its activities it is under limitations which determine for it the structure of its world. As limited the self must express itself in forms of activity that have a definite structure and mode of operation. In short, the self can give effective expression to its inner life of agency only through a body. A self without a body would be ineffective, if indeed it could exist at all. On the other hand, the self thus limited need not be attached to any particular group of physical elements such as compose the body at any one time. It could not be so attached if it would; the anabolic and catabolic processes that mean the life of the body, judged from the objective side, preclude such a possibility. The body as the structure expressing the limitations of finite selfhood remains, while the physical elements are ever passing and being replaced. This manner of speech is in harmony with the ordinary common-sense view of the physical world. If we should express the thought more in accordance with the results of our previous discussions, we should say that the body is merely the flowing expression of the self in manifesting itself to others and in producing changes in its experience world. The continuity and integrity of the body is the continuity and organic character of the self's activity. The movements of the body express the limitations under which the self works. When, therefore, the self passes through a series of dream experiences that seem to indicate a power of detachment from the body, we must conclude that it is manifesting its creative energy under a different type of limitations. The

new dream type may well be called a dream body since it is effective in the dream world. But it ceases to be effective when the self passes out of the dream state. In this sense the self may have as many bodies as it has dreams, but none of these bodies could belong to the phenomenal world.

The phenomena of dissociation suggest that the unity and the integrity of the self can be disrupted or else that more than one self can occupy the same body. This raises the question of the self's essential integrity. Under certain conditions the self may apparently suffer such complete breaks in the continuity of its life that it seems to be quite another self. It can have a different set of interests, different modes of activity, different vocabulary, different memories. Everything that manifests selfhood may be different. These strikingly different groups of psychic phenomena may alternate at intervals and each represent a complete cycle of experiences. In extreme cases, neither "personality" remembers the experiences of the other. Do these phenomena point to the conclusion that the unity of the self is a function of the body? or do they mean that a single body may successively function for numerically different selves? One of the most subtle and effective attacks upon the primacy of the self in the mind-body combination is the insistence upon the unity of the body in the phenomena of dissociation. Though we do not know enough about these phenomena to dogmatize, we are free to suggest that they are susceptible of quite another interpretation. In fact, several other interpretations have been brought forward and defended. If the dissociation were complete and final, if no connections could be discovered or developed between the alternating personalities, the interpretation might possibly be that separate and distinct selves successively manifest themselves in the one body, each finding the physical system suitable to its nature. Under the conditions as stated, it would seem less reasonable that the original self had actually been broken up into two or more. But neither of these conceptions is quite satisfac-

tory. As against the theory of a divided self we may urge that the self is not a space-filling organism capable of fission. It is essential unity because it is pure agency and therefore not made up of parts that can be separated. From the physician's point of view, the observed phenomena may mean literal dissociation, because for him the physical facts are the significant ones. To the student of selfhood this view is simply impossible as a final explanation. Besides the close observer of the phenomena is almost certain to discover subtle connections between the personalities, connections that may consist in subconscious mannerisms or in actual though vague recollections of each other's experiences. It is the task of the physician to develop these connections until the two personalities blend; the patient is then pronounced cured. These facts could mean that throughout the experiences of alternating personalities the self remained itself, but because of physical conditions was compelled to manifest two sets of widely differing experiences. That the self is capable of thus simulating more than one personality is abundantly evidenced in the phenomena of dreams. It is also at least suggested by the sympathetic rapport of one self with a fellow self in society. Every self that we learn to know as another self is in a real sense ourselves manifested. The main objection to the other interpretation of the phenomena, namely, that different selves alternately inhabit the same body, is that selves do not occupy or inhabit a body, they manifest themselves in bodily form.

The mind-body entity grows, matures, passes into senility, and finally ceases to be. How may these facts be interpreted? They may mean that the self grows as does the body, that it starts at the zero point of effective living, waxes with the increase of bodily vigor, and wanes with the weakening of the body. This is the ordinary interpretation, but it is open to certain obvious criticisms. For instance, the body as the manifestation of the self depends for its effectiveness on the organization and utilization of physical elements. What, then, appears as the growth

and decay of the self is in reality the increasing or decreasing capacity of the self to dominate the physical modes of expression. It is well known that at any moment in the life of the self a sudden change may take place in its capacity to exercise these prerogatives. The excessive loss of blood, the effect of stimulants, the reception of deeply moving information or any one of many disturbing influences may profoundly modify for good or ill the physical expression of the self. This physical expression depends for its efficiency and normality upon a certain balance and harmony of parts in the organization, a certain responsiveness of function. This harmony may be so disturbed that the self misinterprets its experiences. Forms of dementia may result in which all expression seems awry. It is difficult to believe that the self as an entity fluctuates in these various ways; that on occasion it all but ceases to be, that, following a physical change, it augments its nature up to or above the normal; that with physical maladjustment it becomes itself deranged and demented, incapable of normal functioning; and that this condition may pass and the self become its true self again under the surgeon's knife. A belief in such utter dependence of the self upon the varying and unstable aspects of bodily activity is the more difficult when we take into account the qualitative complexity of the psychic life as compared with the qualitative monotony and simplicity of the distinctively physical functionings. The self overflows the physical at every point.¹

But if we draw the conclusion that the self is not subject to the same fluctuations of growth and decay as the body, we must meet manifest difficulties. Is the self full grown in infancy? Is it still in possession of all its inner psychic resources at the period of senility? Is the self superior to change? We are not prepared to answer these questions, we can only throw out tentative suggestions.

¹ Cf. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, Introduction, and *Mind-Energy*, vii.; also H. Wildon Carr, *A Theory of Monads*, chap. viii.

We are persuaded that the self is vaster, more complex, more enduring than any or all possible physical expressions of it. The physical expressions must be learned, they are in very truth only expressions. When by a clot of blood on the brain the intellectual and moral giant is reduced to imbecility in emotional and intellectual life, or when by the removal of the clot, he is restored to his original brilliant career, it is purely a matter of adequacy of expression. After certain lesions of the brain the patient on recovery must often re-learn the most ordinary physical movements, such as walking, eating, speaking. This re-learning is manifestly a problem in mastering a method of the self's expression. Whenever the self is forced out of harmony with one system of expressional conditions into another system, it must perforce learn the methods of the new set of conditions, and while doing so will seem to grow *pari passu* with the mastery of the new conditions. In other words, the self may on occasion have to learn a new set of physical reactions, new methods, new habits—the same self all the time, yet not the same, because it cannot manifest itself so adequately. Over against these reflections we must place the fact that all the experiences of the self affect its inner life. It is never the same after as before a given experience. In this sense it is a growing entity. But growth of inner nature through successive experiences is quite a different thing from such identification of the self with the bodily activities as equates every variation of the physical capacity with a variation of selfhood.

We may now sketch certain plausible conclusions from our study of the mind-body problem. (1) The self is always the agent expressing itself in bodily functioning, whether conscious and volitional, or subconscious and reflex. Whatever distinguishes the living body from the dead body is a mode of the self's expression. (2) The body is a living organism carrying on the complicated processes of anabolism and catabolism in the objectification of the self's activities. It is for the self an intricate nexus of

unique experiences, the locus of all sensations, the instrument of all thinking and conation, the condition of consciousness, the basis of all goods within the reach of the self. It is the mechanism of communication between selves. It measures the self's capacity to modify its environment. It exists for the self only as a part of the self's constructed experience; it exists for other selves only as they too construct it in response to stimulations. (3) All abnormal phenomena in the life of the self must be interpreted as deranged expressions of selfhood under the limitations of its finitude, though for obvious reasons they seem to originate in the physical organism. We can say the same of all normal experiences of the self; in so far as they reveal an orderly sequence and predictable character, they may be referred to the body as their source. But this reference of experiences to the body should be recognized as merely a matter of convenience. Otherwise we progressively distort the real nature of the situation. If we start with treating the body as the source of ordinary experiences, we tend to make the self only the mysterious background of psychic phenomena not yet explained. The self is thus in process of being eliminated from its own world.

Certain interesting questions grow out of these conclusions. If it is true that the body is a mode of manifestation on the part of the self and marks the limit of the self's power to manifest itself, then we are close to tautology when we say that with a more facile brain one might think better, or with a more vitalized blood supply and firmer muscles and steadier nerves, one could accomplish more.² But if a better brain means a better self and an injured brain a suppressed self, what of the statement in the last chapter that the self's limitations are external to it? It is true that the body merely expresses the limitations and only the self has causative or ontological reality. The conditions, then, that control the self and circum-

² Cf. *supra*, p. 351.

scribe the range of its activity are apparently not external to it; at least they do not emanate from the body. But in that case are they inherent? Do they pertain to the essence of the self? Must it be limited in order to be a self? The answer to these questions is that the self as we know it is limited, but selfhood is not. The idea of the self as agent does not involve any particular system of limitations. These are matters of fact. As characteristic modes of response by the self to controlling stimulations, the bodily changes may vary through wide limits. They are not only evanescent but non-recurring, and hence bear the marks of being strictly adventitious. The purely physical functions are far from being the only forms of self-expression. We are cognitive beings with capacity to think, evaluate, and form purposes. Thinking as an act of the mind contains no limitation within itself; that is, there is no reason in the nature of thinking why the finite self should not compass all possible knowledge. Knowing the simplest fact is the same as knowing all things. Memory might be perfect instead of intermittent and weak. All the processes that enter into discovery and appreciation might conceivably be carried to such effectiveness as to compass the physical universe and penetrate the innermost secrets of the spiritual life. We might be able to appreciate all beauty, all meaning, all value. As for volition, nothing is easier, when the conditions justify the act. When we are once convinced that the thing desired can be obtained without undue effort, the volition wills itself, as it were. The difficulties lie altogether in the objective conditions. Until certain inventions were perfected one could not actually will to ride in a motor car, but now for many people the volition to use such a conveyance is a mere routine. Willing the most insignificant change is the same essentially as willing a universe into being. All the activities of the self above the plane of physical functioning are thus potentially limitless.

We may conclude then that the bodily limitations might conceivably be other than they are without annull-

ing the identity of the self. Whatever else it is, the body is a tool, an instrument of expression, a means of reaching and influencing other selves. As such it is not to be lightly esteemed. It is indispensable to our present mode of living. But that does not mean that it is the only possible way in which the self can express its nature. As finite the self must work under limitations of some sort, hence cannot exist without a body and an external world with which it must reckon. But the body as we know it might become other than it is with greatly enhanced powers, and the self would expand in its activities correspondingly. What this might mean is suggested by the fact that even a slight increase in brain power adds enormously to the possible range and richness of the spiritual life. We do not know what we shall be, for we know not what we are.

Being finite the self is never in full possession of its potentialities. It not only must express itself in successive experiences, but is limited in the grasp and understanding of any given situation within its experience. It never can command all the resources of selfhood. Hence to the student of psychic phenomena the conception of a subconscious self has proved useful. The term covers not only the latent possibilities of the self, but also and more especially the wide range of psychic activities that do not ordinarily emerge into clear consciousness. It comprehends the unexpressed life of the self, including the vital functions of the bodily organism, all reflex and instinctive activities, the processes in sense perception and intellection, the abiding effects of past experiences as tendencies and dispositions, and in short whatever in the conduct of the self is not at the time an object of consciousness. Most of the mental and conative functioning is not a matter of direct experience. Only the results come into clear consciousness. As James pointed out, we concern ourselves with the stopping places in thought rather than with the transitional features. These termini of thought may seem fixed elements, given to the mind in their completed form,

yet we know that they are reached only by a process, sometimes very complicated, and they continue to exist only as the constructive activity of the self sustains them. We need to enlarge our conception of the self to include whatever may at any time, under any circumstances, either emerge into consciousness or indirectly influence our conscious life. The conception of the subconscious to cover the unknown and inferential is a great convenience. It invites us to investigate, it appeals as a *terra incognita* lying close at hand. Moreover it satisfies the imagination when we do not need to be especially critical. To its uncharted spiritual possibilities we can refer all our forgotten experiences, all our propensities, all the strange outcroppings of character, all impulses, aspirations, habit-tyrannies. It makes picturable the phenomena of multiple personality, it furnishes what may be needed to explain in an uncritical way telepathy, clairvoyance, and even divine revelation. How, forsooth, can the ultimate Will make its purposes known to man with infallible certainty? One might answer with James that it is by their breaking through into the subconscious, where they take their chances of crowding above the threshold of consciousness. The conception of the subconscious is ideally adapted to support any crudity or vagary that may gain currency, concerning the nature of experience. It is the natural home of *allerlei Schwärmerei*. Hence we should be on our guard against its careless or uncritical use. Especially should we not be trapped by the notion that when a bit of conscious experience, say a perception or a thought-content, drops below the threshold, it remains intact and essentially unchanged. We have no reason to believe that any experience whatever continues to exist in any sense when it ceases to be a conscious experience. As a storehouse of experiences, the subconscious is pure fiction. At best it is a place of mystery reached for the most part by inference of doubtful validity.

Other questions grow out of our discussion of the self as finite and conditioned but capable of indefinitely

extending the range of its activities: If the finite self were fully realized, would it be less than infinite? Would it be longer opposed by a resisting power? Could it be conscious? Fortunately these questions do not need to be answered, since the possibility of the conditions being realized by any of us is so utterly remote. However we are at liberty to assume in a tentative way that whatever is essential to the fullest expression of selfhood may, in the course of time, be possible to the developing human self, though not of course in this life. We cannot conceive of what it would mean even to approximate the goal, but we know that the limitations under which we now live are mere matters of experience and far from necessary to selfhood. From the standpoint of selfhood, the limitations are the real mystery. We know that we as finite beings are selves in the making, but we do not know why we are limited in the particular manner revealed in experience. It is perfectly conceivable that we as selves should be able to retain our integrity and identity while passing, through æons of time, from one set of limitations (body) to another in widening ranges of activity, forever approximating the goal of complete selfhood. On occasion of each fundamental change of environing conditions, we should probably need to learn a new method of self-expression, and thereby pass through stages roughly corresponding to the career of a human self in this present life.

One reason given for believing that the ultimate Power is not conscious is that nothing can possibly exist in opposition to his will. Nothing, therefore, can test that will and compel it to consider. But this is pure speculation in the objectionable meaning of the term. It starts with a definition of the ultimate Power and then deduces what must be the relation of such a Being to finite and conditioned selves. But the only safe method of procedure is to study selfhood as partly revealed in ourselves. From the controlled character of our experiences we can pass inferentially to the nature of a being equal to exercising such control and thereby making the experience of

a practically infinite physical universe possible to us. If we follow this "sure method of science" and avoid unnecessary hypotheses, we must recognize that the ultimate Power, though infinite, is confronted by the wills of all other selves. This of itself is enough to make and keep him conscious. He must be conscious if he is to manage the infinite nexus of environing conditions in such a manner as to realize the potentialities of finite selves.

The self comes from mystery into being, and all its unfolding capacities root in mystery. The best we can do is to follow with care the observable changes in its life history and draw tentative conclusions therefrom concerning its inner nature and possible destiny. Some light on special problems may come from a study of the sub-human realm, but always with the uncertainty attaching to an interpretation of what is confessedly not quite human by standards that are necessarily human, though these standards are hypothetically reduced to make them applicable. In this transaction sympathy helps, as it does in all interpretation, but this act of "reading in" has its drawbacks. Its lack of trustworthiness is indicated by the wide range of opinion concerning the degree and extent of animal intelligence.

Having considered the nature of the self as expressed in its physical and social environment, we have now to point out certain tentative conclusions concerning its relation to other selves and to the supreme Self. The discussion concerning the nature of the body led us to the assertion that whatever else it may be, the body serves as the means of communication between the self and other selves. All the results of our activity as affecting other selves begin with the movements of the body and are passed on to the nexus of physical conditions to be taken up and interpreted by the other selves. This is the observed course in all social life.

The body, then, is the immediate instrument and the rest of the world the mediate instrument of communication. From this point of view the universe consists of the

ultimate Power and the community of selves who act partly on their own initiative and partly—so far as they experience an objective common-to-all world—on the impulsion of this Power. Such a view seems to make of the body and the physical world generally a mere shell of conditions; but as we have seen, this is not true. If one should ask what else is included, the reply would be that the physical world—body and all—is just what it appears to be. We found that this solid earth was helpless to resist resolution into mere process except as its reality becomes value-content. This conclusion reduces it to existence for selves; it cannot be construed as anything more. Nowhere below the plane of living organisms can we find a trace of self-maintenance. Whatever exists in this realm is strictly “psychic content,” or better, the controlled activity of the self. Its very reality depends on the finiteness of the self, that is, on the compulsion exercised over the self by the independent Source. Logically antecedent to the physical universe is a realm of selves, who by means of a complicated mechanism of conditions are able to communicate with one another and form societies for mutual advantage. Society, then, is the fact for which the physical world exists. We might express the conclusion in another way by saying that the selves are the causal, the ontological reality; the physical realm is the evidence that they have found a way to communicate with one another and to maintain themselves.

In one sense the individual self is the unit; in another, society; in still another, the entire universe as it presents itself to the individual. So necessary is society to the individual that we cannot see how anything more than the most rudimentary existence would be possible without the social contact. Even in elementary sense perception the apparent independence of the object involves the application of the social test. The term objective means common-to-all. From this most elementary functioning of the self through the entire range of experiences, every stage is subject to the social test. This is illustrated by

the way a hermit, separated from his kind, makes pets of animals and endows them with essential humanity.

The persistent social reference of all self-activity gives a peculiar individuality and quasi personality to society. When human beings are studied in the aggregate and social bonds are considered in the abstract, society takes on the form and significance of a super-individual self with powers, impulsions, tastes, and destiny all its own. Not much training is needed in the art of reifying abstractions to conclude that the real is not the individual selves, but society as a whole. It is then in place to talk of this mysterious personality as the Divine Nature or as the "Beloved Community" or as essential Humanity. The temptation is great. In the first place, this theory has the support of a striking analogy. Just as the objects of our sense world lose their apparent independence as soon as we note the connections that bind them together, so the individual selves may seem entirely disparate until we give due weight to social influences. Carrying this analogy through to its logical outcome, we seem to get light on many troublesome problems of selfhood. Instead of having to stop with the idea of a multiverse of separate individuals, each an irreducible entity—an idea obnoxious to the intellect—we may now find relief in the theory that the knowable world constitutes a universe in which all individuals are but changing aspects and the whole is a harmonious system. In satisfying the intellectual demand for ultimate unity, the theory furnishes an adequate basis for the thriving science of sociology. Psychology also inclines to welcome it as being in line with the scientific need to reduce psychic life to a series of phenomena. Furthermore the religious value of the theory is considerable, especially to those who put their trust in mysticism. If society and not the individual self is the real unit, the way is open to conclude that the ultimate Power is the infinite Socius in whom all individual selves find their destiny. Theologians of a speculative bent have reveled in such a conception, and philosophers have found

it a haven of rest from their perplexities. But the value of the theory is fictitious and its support in experience is vaporous. There is really no evidence whatever that society is anything more than the aggregate of discrete selves who have the unique power of influencing one another. The analogy of physical things vanishing into dynamic connections, we have long since learned, is utterly misleading. As a speculative way out of perplexities, the theory is a complete failure. This need not be dwelt upon after our study of pantheism and its fatuous negations. The integrity of the self is at stake. We must steadfastly hold to an individualism of the most pronounced sort, if we would resist the alluring fallacy of exalting society into a reality distinct from its members. But the individual unit is the social, not the centripetal self.

Just what do we mean by the social self? A summary answer would include the following items: (1) that the self comes into consciousness in experiencing other selves; (2) that the world of values is largely social in origin and significance; (3) that society is literally an expression of the apprehending self's own nature; (4) that the realization of the social self is bound up with the realization of society; and (5) that the will to realize the ideal of society is the same ultimately as the will to realize the social self. This brings us to the much discussed conception of the Kingdom of Selves.

This Kingdom as an ideal becomes an experience to the self who lives for its realization. The literal truth of this statement is seen when we reflect that society is for each self an objectification of its own nature, concreting its social interests and purposes. In a very real sense we see in those about us what we will that they should become. This ideal of them is the controlling influence of our lives in so far as we come into contact with them. Our ideal of society is its reality for us. If, for instance, we are willing to remain passive as regards social betterment, we incline to form a conception of society on the plane of its

lower average of expression. A relaxed attitude toward its welfare tends to make the less significant and desirable aspects dominant in our thought. We excuse ourselves to ourselves for our indifference and lower the moral quality of our living. We are drawn downward in our tastes, interests, purposes, by the phases of society that we tolerate but do not try to improve. If, on the other hand, we devote ourselves to the upbuilding of society, the ideal for which we strive becomes identified with all that is best in society. Its latent possibilities—what we see that it is capable of becoming—constitute our actual social environment. Hence not what society is as seen from the standpoint of the onlooker, but what it means for us as an object of endeavor, is of paramount significance in our self-development. We can make it mean, so far as we are concerned, all that we would have it become, if we concentrate on its realization. By doing so we become members of the Kingdom for which, in its perfect realization, the whole creation waits. The self then comes to itself in creating society. Whatever it learns about people or any other part of its environing universe is self-expression. But how can a self create society? Is not this an extravagant claim based on a confusion of knowing and being? No. The question itself involves the confusion. We have no occasion to consider what society is apart from its apprehension by the several selves that constitute it. There is no such metaphysical entity; it exists only in and for its members. Society is what it is "experienced as," to use James's expression. We are considering it because it helps us to know what the self is. It reveals the self as bewilderingly complex, akin to the Infinite.

Whatever the self is, its complete dependence on the ultimate Power must be assumed. This relation of dependence cannot be construed; it cannot be intellectually grasped. From whatever angle we approach the subject, we confront mystery. If, with many, we try to formulate a theory of this dependence after the analogy of the

relation of human beings to their thought creations, we run imminent danger of reducing the finite self to a mere thought of the Infinite. Or if we try to envisage the connection as of part to whole, the selves become fragments, temporary phases, mere effluxes of Deity, to be cancelled in due time, perhaps to be absorbed or transmuted. But if with less imagination and more intellectual penetration, we think of human beings as essentially divine in nature though temporarily compressed within the bodily organ, we seem to explain both finiteness and self-consciousness. To be finite would be to live in a body subject to bodily conditions. Self-consciousness would be the turning of the self back on itself when it must face difficulties. The theory seems to provide also for such aspects of experience as the sense of freedom, the possibility of knowledge, and the temporary loss of consciousness, in swoon or sleep. Freedom could be represented as quite consistent with absolute dependence, for it would be merely self-dependence. Knowledge would be our birthright even though carelessness or physical limitations might cause us to fall into error. Sleep would be dependent on physical conditions. Consciousness, being an expression of our finite status, would be suspended whenever bodily functioning was impaired in certain ways.

But this theory is open to serious criticisms. While seeming to exalt personality, it really does the opposite. Personality is made a mark of finitude, to be abolished when the spirit leaves the body. Whatever is most characteristic of the self as we know it must be looked upon as strictly temporary. All values in so far as they depend on conscious evaluation must be denied permanence. This leaves nothing worth mentioning in our world of value. The identity of the self could not survive such a degradation. The theory seems to depend for its appeal on the conception of an infinite plenitude of resources which each self may share because it is a part of the whole. But to give up belief in the self's per-

manence and the continuity of consciousness and the conservation of all values as we know them is too great a price to pay for a merely formal explanation in which no aspect of experience is really accounted for. It sets before us the picture of the infinite Intelligence limiting itself for no conceivable reason and enduring the consequences—self-imposed consequences—that might with perfect ease have been avoided, only to have the suffering and striving and remorse and spiritual unrest cancelled by the very Being that had compelled itself to endure the misery and degradation. From the point of view of the theory all moral aspiration is as ineffective as moral wallowing. So long as the divine game of self-deception lasted, there would inevitably be a certain amount of evil to endure; but when the game was over, all this would be transmuted.

We really have no light on this subject of finite dependence, and must refuse to follow speculations in their vague wanderings. Our only recourse is to take life as it reveals itself to us and make such inferences as seem to help to insight and intellectual satisfaction. The facts of experience teach us that the finite self is free, yet limited; that it may blunder, yet find ways of correcting its false conclusions; that it can adjust itself to its environment in such a way as to make considerable progress toward a larger life; that it has sufficient value in the sight of its Creator to justify a hope that it may continue to live after it departs this life; that it may live in such close communion with its Creator as will bring to fruition its highest aspirations. But to see that experience actually does suggest these conclusions, we need to think beyond the surface of ordinary routine and formulate for ourselves a world-view that will do justice to all phases of life. To stop short of such a view is to rest in a distorted, unsatisfactory conception of both the finite self and the ultimate Source of being.

It is not easy to be thoroughgoing in our intellectual life and at the same time hold steadfastly to the plain

teachings of experience. The overweening influence of the ideal of system is the source of nearly all our difficulties. The intellect can make nothing of creativity or freedom or value, except to reduce them to something essentially different. It is because of this that we have such a plenitude of purely verbal explanations. One of the lessons of our investigation into philosophical thinking is the advisability of living without a theory on many subjects of controversy. The spiritual release from theories that do not explain is worth all it costs. Yet we should always be open to new light and eager to test every new suggestion. By holding steadfastly to the conclusions already attained, we can get suggestive hints as to our relation to the ultimate Source of our being and of our destiny in Him. The religious conception of the Fatherhood of God, when interpreted in the light of the whole of experience, gives us the most satisfactory view of God's relation to human selves. This view carries with it a fairly convincing argument for belief in a future life.

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
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
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